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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the political origins of the international rules for internal 
armed conflicts. It explores the following questions: Where do these norms and rules 
come from? Why have states negotiated and accepted them? How and why have 
international legal responsibilities been assigned to armed non-state actors waging civil 
wars? The two crucial international instruments of this type are Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols to those Conventions, from 
1977. Through them states agreed to limit their means of action via binding treaty law 
while promising to extend humanitarian care to their challengers, at the risk of favoring 
them militarily or of legitimating their cause. States also extensively debated whether and 
how their armed contenders should bear responsibility. These are historically important 
and theoretically counterintuitive developments in international law and security, and this 
is the first work of political science to investigate them on the basis of extensive multi-
archival research (amounting to over 35,000 declassified documents) and interviews 
conducted in four countries (the UK, the US, France and Switzerland.) I adopt the 
qualitative methods of process-tracing and focused case comparisons to answer the 
research questions. 
 
The argument unveils in two phases. In a first stage, I show how international shocks, or 
domestic shocks of international proportions (typically, major civil wars) progressively 
opened windows of opportunity which 1) evinced the “need to do something” about 
internal conflicts; 2) motivated prominent non-state actors to take up the issue and press 
for change; and 3) facilitated states’ acceptance to work out new international rules either 
by morally motivating some of them or by helping others relax their initial reluctance 
toward them.  
 
Yet I argue also that socializing “the need to do something” was only half the work. 
Between the collapse of the old orthodoxies and the construction of new norms, much 
politics occurred. I theorize this second stage as one in which states waged struggles in 
international conferences to hammer out consensus formulae, with different groups trying 
to influence/coerce their opponents into accepting their vision. In 1949, for instance, 
while several Western democracies (including the United States, Scandinavian and Latin 
American countries) accepted the idea of the humanitarian regulation of civil wars, many 
others still fought hard to include high restrictions on its application. The Soviet Union 
fiercely supported the idea against all predictions, while the United Kingdom and France, 
already facing turmoil in their colonies, strongly opposed them and tried to warn their 
peers of the dangers posed by rules that might encourage or protect rebels. In the midst of 
these various pressures, I show how the pro-regulation majorities in the room managed to 
socially coerce (rather than persuade) skeptics into accepting the idea of making new 
rules. In the 1970s, under the powerful banner of self-determination, a majority coalition 
of newly-independent, Third World and socialist states forced the diplomatic hand of 
otherwise more powerful Western states into accepting polemical language that legally 
legitimated “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination 
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and alien occupation and against racist regimes” as international conflicts. 
Simultaneously, this coalition fought hard to water down standards to regulate other types 
of internal conflicts, which many of them were experiencing in the aftermath of 
decolonization.   
 
In a final step, having shown the effects of social coercion in diplomatic negotiations, I 
also detail how coerced states reacted or “pushed back” covertly by crafting 
counterproposals whose language seemed acceptable to them at the same time that it 
appeared to address the concerns of pro-regulation groups. In the case of Common 
Article 3 of 1949, I detail how the UK and France jointly re-shaped the resulting text to 
read simultaneously generous and vague, knowing this might allow them to “interpret 
their way out” of the commitment later on. In the 1970s, Western states swallowed the 
bitter pill of enshrining violent struggles for self-determination in international law while 
making sure the language applied only to specific and increasingly rare conflict 
situations. Far from representing a persuasive consensus, I argue that final regulatory 
outcomes in this issue-area are difficult compromises that strike an uneasy balance 
between various’ states’ concerns for status legitimacy, morality and military expediency, 
whose conflicted political origins partly explain their limited impact in practice. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction, Theory and Research Design 
 
Historically, war has ranked perhaps highest among the interests of International 
Relations (IR) scholars. In addition to studying its causes, dynamics and consequences, 
IR as an academic subfield has long recognized war as one of the most heavily regulated 
of social phenomena, with webs of normative and legal injunctions attempting to govern 
both state recourse to armed force as well as combatant conduct during hostilities.1  
Yet surprisingly --given this long-standing interest and recognition-- the norms and 
laws of war, now popularly known as “international humanitarian law” (IHL,) remain 
deeply understudied subjects in modern IR.2 As I explain later, some important attention 
has gone into elucidating the emergence and evolution of some rules covering inter-state 
conflict or to explain why “taboos” have befallen certain weapons, among others.3 Yet 
the origins, implementation and effectiveness of the international norms regulating the 
most prevalent type of armed contest in the world today --internal conflicts such as civil 
wars-- have only very recently begun to capture the imagination of the IR academe.4 This 
                                                
1 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 69. 
2 I use international humanitarian law or IHL throughout the dissertation, but recognize that the 
label is not undisputed. Some scholars and commentators prefer to speak of the “law of armed 
conflict,” insisting that there is little that is humanitarian about armed conflict or war. There are 
also deeper historical reasons for this distinction, explained later. 
3 Martha Finnemore, “Norms and War  : The International Red Cross and the Geneva 
Conventions,” in National Interests in International Society, 1996; Richard Price, The Chemical 
Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Ward Thomas, The Ethics of 
Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2001); James 
D. Morrow, “The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties,” International 
Organization 55, no. 4 (October 01, 2001): 971–991; James D. Morrow, “When Do States Follow 
the Laws of War,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): 559–572; Nina 
Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 
1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
4 Two exceptions to this statement (with respect to the Additional Protocols) are: David P. 
Forsythe, “Legal Regulation of Internal Conflicts: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International 
Armed Conflicts,” American Journal of International Law 72, no. 2 (1978): 272–295; Keith 
Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984). A notable recent addition is Helen M. Kinsella, The Image 
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is so despite the fact states have been formally discussing internationally-sanctioned 
protections and restraints applicable during civil conflict since at least 1912, and that the 
protagonists of many such conflicts, including the parties to the Spanish Civil War of 
1936-1939, the Algerian civil war in 1956-1962, the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 70s, 
the Salvadorian conflict in the 1980s or the still-ongoing conflict in Colombia, have at 
one point or another vowed to respect some international standard, be it to refrain from 
attacking Red Cross workers or to respect captured combatants. More importantly, in 
1949 and in the 1970s states negotiated actual international, binding humanitarian 
instruments to regulate internal conflicts, variously defined. These legal norms –Article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and two Additional Protocols to those 
Conventions, from 1977,-- compel both state and non-state armed forces to, among 
others, respect and protect wounded, sick, surrendered and detained fighters and non-
combatants, and prohibit gruesome war practices against such persons including torture, 
ill-treatment, hostage-taking and unlawful execution.5 Civil society advocacy groups 
                                                                                                                                            
Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between Combatant and Civilian 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
5 The full text of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (1949) reads: “In the case of 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of 
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and 
cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further 
endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions 
of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict.” The First Protocol governs international conflicts and wars of 
national liberation, while the Second Protocol complements the contents of Common Article 3 
with respect to civil wars. Among others, it expands the protections for fighters put out of 
combat, for civilians and for objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. 
Later I elaborate on the content of these rules and instruments as needed.   
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have for decades drawn on these international rules to pressure for better combatant 
behavior during internal war, with some success.6 More recently, these international rules 
provided the essential legal bases that enabled the international criminal tribunals created 
in the 1990s --including the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC,)-- to exert 
accountability for atrocities committed both by state and armed non-state actors in 
various internal conflicts, from the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Darfur, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo or Lebanon.  
The relative academic silence vis-à-vis the origins and operation of international rules 
of acceptable behavior in internal conflict is thus notable. Theoretically, the sheer 
existence of international obligations for states countering rebellion or “national 
liberation” groups opens up fundamental puzzles for a discipline traditionally centered on 
the concept of sovereignty (and its correlate, international anarchy.) That states have 
agreed to enshrine international treaty limits on the violence they can inflict upon their 
armed challengers, even committing to showing them humane treatment, is surely a 
striking development.7 Indeed, why would they create and accept such rules? The answer 
to this simple question is not obvious, yet until now IR scholars have not even posed it.8 
Historians and especially international lawyers have done much more to address this 
vacuum, but analytical efforts that go beyond description based on published records are 
extremely rare.9 The puzzle extends further when one understands, as I just noted in 
                                                
6 David Weissbrodt, “The Role of International Organizations in the Implementation of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict,” Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 21 (1988): 313–365. 
7 As I explain later, human rights norms and laws represent a similar but distinct challenge.  
8 Kenneth Abbott came close, but did so obliquely by asking how the legal distinction between 
international and internal conflicts arose. Kenneth Abbott, “International Relations Theory, 
International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” American Journal 
of International Law 93, no. 2 (1999): 368–371. 
9 Noteworthy but short treatments of the specific topic of internal conflicts are Best, War and Law 
Since 1945, 168–179; William I. Hitchcock, “Human Rights and the Laws of War: The Geneva 
Conventions of 1949,” in The Human Rights Revolution: An International History, ed. Akira 
Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2012), 
368. Keith Suter analyzed only the process of the Additional Protocols, without reference to 
primary government sources; see Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global 
Politics of Law-Making. David Forsythe wrote an excellent early analysis of the negotiation of 
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passing, that both Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions purport to regulate the conduct of armed non-state actors, giving them not 
only protection but also, arguably, constituting them as legitimate bearers of international 
legal personality.  
In this dissertation I seize squarely upon three puzzles: How did the international 
rules for internal armed conflict emerge? Why did states agree to them? How can we 
explain regulatory outcomes and their change over time? In so doing, I seek to contribute 
in particular to historical, legal and theoretical debates about the politics of international 
norm emergence and law-making.10 I answer these questions on the basis of extensive 
primary and secondary research in the diplomatic archives of four countries (the United 
Kingdom, the United States, France and Switzerland) and various organizations 
(especially the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva,) as well as 
interviews with protagonists and experts.  
Empirically, this dissertation offers one of the most exhaustive treatments to date of 
the historical and political process of emergence of these perhaps implausible 
international rules.11 I begin in the mid-nineteenth century with the creation of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, a non-governmental 
organization that has ever since acted and been recognized as the “guardian” of 
humanitarian law. Step by step I identify crucial moments in the construction of 
                                                                                                                                            
the Second Protocol cited earlier and on which I partly build here, see Forsythe, “Legal 
Regulation of Internal Conflicts: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts.” 
10 I follow the now-standard definition of norms as collective standards of appropriate conduct 
within a given identity. Peter J Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National 
Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, 
no. 4 (1998): 887–917. This dissertation investigates the origins of international legal rules, but 
for ease of readership I refer to “norms,” “rules” and “laws” almost interchangeably. Granted, 
there are some important conceptual distinctions between these terms, and these are noted 
whenever relevant. 
11 Three comprehensive legal histories on the international rules for internal conflicts are Jean 
Siotis, Le Droit de La Guerre et Les Conflits Armés D’un Caractère Non-international (Paris: 
Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1958); Rosemary Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et 
Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de La Réglementation Internationale (Geneva: Editions 
A. Pedone, 1986); Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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international expectations about humanitarian protection and restraint in internal 
conflicts, from a time in which these were left to state discretion –and were believed to be 
plainly unsuited or undesirable for international treaty law,-- to a moment in which it 
goes without saying that internal atrocities can and should be prosecuted and punished 
through international legal means (the present.) In each of these stages I develop specific 
historically-appropriate “sub-puzzles” to frame the empirical and theoretical discussion. 
Along the way I also pay close attention to how debates about non-state armed actors 
have factored into the making of these international rules. 
Theoretically, careful analysis of extensive historical evidence enables me to draw 
from, complicate and ultimately complement prominent rationalist and constructivist 
expectations about why and how international norms of this type arise. Following recent 
trends in IR research, my argument combines elements of the interest-based logics 
highlighted by rational institutionalists and the moral motives and social-relational 
dynamics and effects that are usually the turf of constructivists. In the process, I weld 
insights from both approaches to posit a causal mechanism –social coercion—which I 
argue helps us understand why crucial parts of these controversial rules were ultimately 
accepted by the Diplomatic Conferences that debated them, despite the caveats or 
outright opposition of powerful states. Moreover, a richer understanding of the tense 
politics behind the emergence of these rules allows me to suggest plausible reasons for 
why they may at times have been ignored in practice, contributing to current debates 
about rule effectiveness and compliance. 
In this introductory chapter I expand on the above discussion. As a means to frame 
my research puzzle, I begin by presenting a general overview of the international 
relations and international law literatures as relevant to the concerns of this dissertation. I 
then develop various theoretical expectations on the basis of established IR traditions, 
specify ways to adjudicate between various expectations, present the dissertation’s 
research design, and introduce my argument and its contributions at greater length. I 
close by laying out the chapter-by-chapter plan for the dissertation.  
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I. Situating the Issue 
The study of international law and international relations has undergone profound 
rejuvenation over the past twenty years. A veritable explosion of research has emerged 
across a number of areas, including international trade, finance, human rights and the 
environment, to name a few. This transformation is noteworthy because until not too long 
ago prominent theoretical IR traditions (notably, realism) allowed little room or relevance 
for international law, despite the amount of resources and energy international political 
actors appeared to invest in it. The current outlook is quite another, with studies of 
international law capturing the pages of the most prestigious journals and presses 
publishing international relations scholarship. Many now speak –rightly-- of International 
Law/International Relations as a constituted subfield with its own acronym: IL/IR.12 
International humanitarian law is often counted among the areas of law partaking in 
this surge of research. And indeed, as mentioned earlier, renowned IR scholars have 
considered a few of the core issues falling under the umbrella of humanitarian law or the 
laws of war. Martha Finnemore’s study of the signing of the First Geneva Convention of 
1864 provided a stepping-stone analysis along constructivist lines. Richard Price’s 
genealogy of the chemical weapons “taboo,” as well as his investigation of the swift 
signing and ratification of the Landmine Ban treaty in the late 1990s furthered 
Finnemore’s efforts.13 Helen Kinsella and Tuba Inal’s explorations of the role of gender 
and civilization discourses in the history of the noncombatant immunity principle, and in 
the prohibition of rape and pillaging in war, recently entered that canon.14 In a 
rationalist/game-theoretic vein, James Morrow has offered arguments about the 
institutional design of the regime protecting prisoners of war in international conflict, and 
                                                
12 Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu 2012; Shaffer and Ginsburg 2012; Dunoff and Pollack 2013. 
13 Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo. One might add here Nina Tannenwald’s work on nuclear 
weapons. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1945. However, nuclear weapons are not formally banned under international 
law, and the “taboo” that Tannenwald investigates is not part of the humanitarian law tradition as 
such.  
14 Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between 
Combatant and Civilian; Tuba Inal, Looting and Rape in Wartime: Law and Change in 
International Relations (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
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has researched the conditions under which states will abide (or not) by some of the laws 
of war, a conversation also joined by Benjamin Valentino and his co-authors.15  
Beyond these efforts, however, IR has remained rather quiet about the history and 
implications of the plethora of agreements that constitute the modern body of 
international humanitarian law. The resurgence of international criminal law and courts 
dealing with atrocities committed in international and internal armed conflicts --no doubt 
an intimately related field-- has since the late 1990s injected some impetus into this 
agenda, but seminal questions and puzzles, especially about the older instruments, remain 
unaddressed.16 Why have states historically created various intricate humanitarian 
conventions featuring few formal enforcement mechanisms? What explains the particular 
timing, design and change over time of the regulations governing the use of 
indiscriminate warfare?17 Such questions, on which primary research materials are now 
widely available, call for fresh investigation. Even with regard to human rights, which 
have understandably elicited much attention and generated exciting research in recent 
years, theory-driven treatments of the origins and design of important treaty instruments 
and features is only now surfacing.18  
                                                
15 Morrow, “The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties”; Benjamin Valentino, 
Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco, “Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the 
Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” World Politics 58, no. 3 (2006): 339–377; Morrow, 
“When Do States Follow the Laws of War.” 
16 Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton 
University Press, 2000); Christopher Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics 
of War Crimes Tribunals,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (September 01, 2001): 655–691; 
Nicole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the 
ICC Case,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 33–65; Beth A Simmons and Allison 
Danner, “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court,” International 
Organization 64 (2010): 225–256. 
17 From their own vantage point, Valentino, Huth and Croco asked as recently as 2006: “If states 
generally do not comply with the laws of war, why do they bother to create and sign them?” 
Valentino, Huth, and Croco, “Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the 
Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” 374. 
18 On the rationalist side, see: Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer, and Christopher J. 
Fariss, “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties,” 
International Organization 65, no. 04 (October 07, 2011): 673–707; Barbara Koremenos and Mi 
Hwa Hong, “The Rational Design of Human Rights Agreements” (2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1643809. In a sociological vein, see Christopher Roberts, 
“Exploring Fractures Within Human Rights: An Empirical Study of Resistance,” Ph.D. 
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One crucial understudied area, as I have argued, concerns the international regulation 
of internal conflicts. Until now there has simply been no sustained theoretical 
examination of why states have created and accepted international rules to govern their 
response to rebellious armed violence within their borders, with the challenges that this 
may present to sovereignty. This is so despite the fact that civil wars are now widely 
acknowledged as the most prevalent form of armed conflict around the world, with 
images of civilians and combatants falling victim to violence in Syria, Libya, Iraq, 
Afghanistan or Colombia routinely populating media outlets. One legal tool mentioned 
earlier, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (CA3, hereafter,) 
entered recent public consciousness due to US misconduct with regard to captured Al 
Qaeda fighters in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and is now more widely recognized as 
perhaps the crucial international standard of appropriate conduct in internal conflicts.19 
Yet discussion and acknowledgment have not sparked theory-driven investigations of its 
history, form and content. Why does CA3, for instance, refer to the violent struggles it 
purports to regulate obliquely as “non-international” conflicts? Why does this article not 
contain prisoner of war provisions? Why are civilians not mentioned explicitly? For their 
part, although the two other crucial legal instruments that exist to deal with conflicts 
occurring within states’ borders, the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva 
Conventions (respectively regulating international conflicts including wars of national 
liberation, and civil wars) elicited some important theoretical analyses at the time of their 
making in 1974-1977, they have failed to re-ignite the imagination of IR scholars in a 
time of renewed interest on national liberation amid the so-called Arab Spring.20 Non-
state actors re-entered the canon of mainstream IR scholarship in the past decade or so, 
but only recently have IR scholars begun to ponder why and under what conditions armed 
rebel or paramilitary groups might respect or violate international standards placed upon 
                                                                                                                                            
Dissertation  (University of Michigan, 2010). Much more attention has been paid to the issue of 
compliance with human rights instruments than to their origins.  
19 See fn. 5 above. 
20 Again, important early analyses figure in Forsythe, “Legal Regulation of Internal Conflicts: 
The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts”; Suter, An International Law of 
Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making.
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them.21 Hence, as Kowert and Legro have pointed out, IR scholars, even those interested 
in the operation of humanitarian and human rights norms in international society, “tend to 
treat their own core concepts as exogenously given.”22  
We could briefly speculate about the reasons for this relative absence of research. It is 
possible that international relations stalwarts, long skeptical about the ability of 
international law to temper the conduct of embattled actors, have felt that the effects --let 
alone the origins-- of these instruments are ultimately negligible. Alternatively, they may 
have deemed that the study of the origins of these international norms could be left to 
historians and lawyers. It may also be that --as the recent turn to measuring compliance 
with international treaties suggests-- a certain policy urgency for ascertaining the 
circumstances that increase respect for the law has driven research interests, setting 
historical questions aside temporarily.23 Whatever the cause, it is certain that the field is 
ripe for new and more inquiry, and not just on treaty but also on customary law, as 
recognized by freshly published books and articles on “the state of art” in IR/IL.24 
Unsurprisingly, historians and legal scholars have been more attuned to the long 
trajectory of these international norms, and many treatises now exist that are exclusively 
dedicated to describing and interpreting the rules of internal armed conflict. The majority 
of these, however, provide only a summary description of the political dynamics shaping 
these instruments, and those that delve into their history at greater length typically stop 
short of providing theoretical explanations for the negotiating process and regulatory 
                                                
21 Hyeran Jo and Katherine Bryant, “Taming the Warlords: Commitment and Compliance by 
Armed Opposition Groups in Civil War,” in From Commitment to Compliance: The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jessica Stanton, Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, 
“Strategies of Violence and Restraint in Civil War,” (Columbia University, 2009). 
22 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Columbia University 
Press, 1996). Ward Thomas later reinforced this point with specific reference to certain norms of 
war. Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations, 18. 
23 Martti Koskenniemi also critiques the scholarly tendency to focus on compliance as a gesture 
that “silently assumes that the political question – what the objectives are – has already been 
resolved.” See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 485. 
24 Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu 2012; Shaffer and Ginsburg 2012; Dunoff and Pollack 2013. 
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outcomes.25 To be clear, I do not take this to be a flaw of this scholarship since, after all, 
historians and legal scholars do not usually see themselves in the business of providing 
political analysis driven by abstract social science theory. Yet the fact remains that there 
is much room to complement the descriptive historical and legal-interpretive work on 
these crucial humanitarian laws, most of which –it must be said—has been written almost 
entirely on the basis of the published proceedings of the international conferences that 
produced the rules, not on previously classified archival materials, especially 
governmental.  
As the empirical chapters that follow will illustrate, the emergence of the 
international rules for internal conflicts has been an uphill battle. States have been 
notoriously sensitive to the idea of granting humanitarian concessions to rebel groups for 
both reasons of legitimacy, material protection and political empowerment. They have 
also been fearful of inviting outside concern or actual intervention impinging on their 
sovereign right to respond to “criminals” and “terrorists.” “On no earthly account can I 
admit any thought or act hostile to the Old Government,” pithily quipped a Russian 
General in 1912 while discussing a proposal for an international treaty legalizing 
humanitarian aid in internal conflicts, since “any offer of services, direct or indirect, of 
Red Cross Societies to insurgents or revolutionaries could not be conceived as more than 
a violation of friendly relations, as an “unfriendly act,” likely to encourage and foster 
sedition or rebellion in another country.”26 These arguments recurred in the 1940s and 
1970s, yet they did not hamper the creation of certain important limits to state action 
                                                
25 This is truer for Common Article 3 than for the Additional Protocols, but I believe holds as an 
overall claim for both. A non-exhaustive list is: Frédéric Siordet, “Les Conventions de Génève et 
La Guerre Civile,” Revue Internationale de La Croix-Rouge 1, no. Feb-Mar (1950); Siotis, Le 
Droit de La Guerre et Les Conflits Armés D’un Caractère Non-international; James Edward 
Bond, The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War (University Press, 1974); Michel 
Veuthey, Guerrilla et Droit Humanitaire (Geneva: Institut Henry Dunant, 1976); Abi-Saab, Droit 
Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de La Réglementation Internationale; 
Laura Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Rules Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006); Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict; Anthony Cullen, 
The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
26 Neuvième Conférence Internationale de la Croix-Rouge tenue à Washington du 7 au 17 Mai 
1912, Compte rendu, Washington D.C., The American Red Cross, 45. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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during internal armed conflicts, often against the preferences of powerful governments in 
the room. Fast-forwarding to the more recent past, at the 1998 Diplomatic Conference 
that established the International Criminal Court the possibility of not introducing 
criminal punishment for atrocities committed in internal conflicts was considered simply 
unacceptable by the great majority of the participating delegations. Thus, despite 
persistent anxieties and some stiff state opposition, international norms such as those 
legitimating humanitarian attention or prohibiting the mistreatment of captured fighters 
and civilians in internal conflicts and wars of national liberation, among others, have 
slowly surfaced to become both moral expectations of the “international community” and 
binding legal rules with “teeth.” The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and 
theorize this phenomenon, one that to my mind can only be characterized as a change in 
the normative fabric of international politics. 
Before moving on to the next section, a clarification is in order. While I frame the 
puzzle of norm emergence for internal armed conflicts around sovereignty (especially 
sovereignty “concessions,”) I realize that this should not be overstated. As IR scholars 
have noted, the institution of sovereignty has always been relative in practice, such that 
the (Weberian) concept on which it is traditionally based should be seen not as an 
empirical claim but as an ideal-type.27 Particularly in the twentieth century, certain 
political ideas have arisen as projects to forcefully challenge and modify how sovereignty 
is understood and practiced, notably self-determination and human rights. While, as this 
dissertation will show, these two projects and the construction of legal norms for internal 
armed conflicts have historically intertwined in interesting ways, I contend that they 
cannot be collapsed into one. Each has a distinct (though not mutually exclusive,) 
political genealogy with specific background conditions, protagonists and moral/social 
                                                
27 Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin 
America,” International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 411–441; John Gerard Ruggie, 
“Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International 
Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–174; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social 
Construction of State Sovereignty,” in State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, ed. Thomas 
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); 
Christian Reus-Smit, “Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International 
System,” International Organization 65 (2011): 207–242. 
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dynamics that may or may not overlap. Beyond their history, the challenges these three 
political constructions pose to sovereignty differ conceptually. Human rights norms and 
law, for instance, regulate the relationship between states and their presumably peaceful 
citizens. Even in the case of protesters or alleged criminals, the nature of the challenge 
they pose to state sovereignty, and the legitimate means through which the state is 
expected to respond to them, vary significantly vis-à-vis organized armed rebellion. 
Similarly, self-determination need not have violent manifestations. In contrast, by 
definition internal armed conflict presupposes an overt and potentially large-scale violent 
confrontation against the established government, making it an especially hard arena for 
the introduction of humanitarian duties and concessions. This aspect constitutes the 
uniqueness of the issue studied here.  
 
II. Theoretical Possibilities 
In this dissertation I raise three specific puzzles related to the international regulation 
of internal armed conflicts, which have so far gone unanswered: How did these rules 
emerge? Why did states agree to them? How can we explain regulatory outcomes and 
their change over time? A dearth of received and “competing” explanations on a specific 
research topic makes life both easier and more difficult. It makes it easier because the 
field is wide open for experimentation and there are few established accounts to 
“overturn.” It makes it harder for precisely the same reasons: room for experimentation 
makes an intervention potentially riskier, or incomplete hence less engaging.  
Luckily, IR thrives with general arguments amenable for “adjustment” to the specific 
empirical puzzles explored here. Although I aim to engage all the principal traditions of 
IR theory (realism, institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism,) I find it useful to 
regroup them in two (rationalism and constructivism) according the logics of action, 
concerns and actors that drive them.28 Below I present what I take to be the field’s crucial 
expectations and operative mechanisms possibly operative in the emergence of 
                                                
28 In so doing I follow Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, 
“International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 
4 (1998): 645–685. 
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international rules for internal conflicts, setting the stage for my own intervention in the 
debate. I try to specify as much as possible the kinds of observable implications one 
might expect to find in practice as a way to both buttress my argument and to 
prime/prepare readers for the empirical chapters that follow. 
a. Rationalism 
Rationalists approach world politics as an arena of interaction between interest-driven 
(usually self-interested) and utility-maximizing actors. Upon this shared ground, diverse 
variants of rationalism co-exist, sometimes complementarily, sometimes competing 
against one another. In this section I introduce conjectures based on the versions of 
rationalism in IR that appear most relevant to this dissertation’s substantive focus.   
Most straightforwardly, some rationalist theories built upon an assumption of 
(sovereign) risk aversion would expect states to have actively resist the making of 
international rules that impinge on their ability to quell internal rebellion. For scholars 
subscribing to what can be termed risk-averse rationalism, the fact that self-protecting 
states would be willing to concede protections to armed rebels is quite confounding.29 Yet 
at certain moments (1949 and 1977, notably) certain rules for internal conflicts have been 
accepted in Diplomatic Conferences, with many seeing government delegations seeing 
them as both desirable and necessary. Hence, arguments hinging on simple risk aversion 
are, on their face, unable to capture the entire empirical story as it unfolded. However, 
since until 1949 states had largely refused to entertain discussion of binding rules for 
internal conflicts, risk aversion may have historically acted as a barrier to law-making in 
this area, and therefore remains a theoretical possibility worthy of attention.30 Risk-
aversion is easily identified through evidence of state efforts to thwart the idea of 
regulating internal conflicts by sidelining it or pushing for its deletion. 
                                                
29 Note, however, that risk aversion is not a mechanism but an assumption underlying a variety of 
rationalist arguments. One well-known example of this type of scholarship is James Fearon, 
“Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52, no. 2 
(1998): 269–305. 
30 Prompting the following question: How and why was risk aversion “overcome” in this issue-
area? I embed this aspect in my own theoretical argument, developed later. 
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But rationalist arguments exist that endorse, not reject, logics for creating 
international laws of war. The most prominent account of this type has been offered by 
James Morrow. Morrow’s approach, representative of a school known as “rational 
institutionalism,” views this branch of international law as the functional creation of 
states seeking to solve a “problem.” A recent war, for instance, can spell either the need 
for a brand new rule (prisoner of war treatment after World War I) or of improvement 
upon a prior agreement or “equilibrium” later shown “inefficient” (most parts of the law 
after World War II.) In this approach, humanitarian treaties are the voluntary product of 
the strategic choice of states trying to better their lot in light of past failures or gaps, with 
a view to making future wars less brutal. Treaties do this essentially by providing clear 
“common conjectures” about how actors waging war should (or should not) behave in it, 
and what the consequences of failure to comply would be.31 Morrow takes these laws to 
embody a mix of self-interest and shared (rational) purpose among states: “International 
law is the codification of the common conjecture underlying certain institutionalized 
behaviors in world politics,” where “common conjecture” is a shared understanding “that 
one another will play according to the equilibrium,” that is, follow a given agreed-upon 
rule.32 
James Morrow’s work does not focus on the international laws governing internal 
wars. So how would rational institutionalists à la Morrow theorize this phenomenon? 
Emulating the logic above, they could plausibly suggest that states might have --after 
much experience with internal wars-- realized that to regulate them was in their benefit, 
especially as a way of incentivizing reciprocity from rebel groups through the creation of 
shared (rational) understandings producing “common conjectures.” This is a plausible 
candidate motivation and process-level mechanism for norm emergence in this area, to 
which, for ease of reference, I will refer to as reciprocity-inducement. In order to know 
                                                
31 James D. Morrow, “The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in 
International Politics,” The Journal of Legal Studies (2002). 
32 James D. Morrow, “The Laws of War as an International Institution,” 2009, 5. Typescript. 
Morrow sometimes claims that moral principles play a role sustaining respect for the laws of war, 
but his explanation of how they do so resort to a notion of rational, not humanitarian, 
“appropriateness.” For this reason I disagree with his attempts to frame his theory as one attentive 
to constructivist concerns. For evidence to this, see Ibid., 27, 29. 
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whether this logic is operative empirically one ought to find persistent allusion to 
reciprocity by states, both as a reason to create rules for internal conflicts and later as a 
fundamental concern during the drafting or negotiation process.  
Taking a similar tack, a cluster of rationalist scholarship known with the label of 
“rational design school” has emerged to study the design of international institutions, 
including aspects of legal agreements such as their precision or flexibility. This work, 
however, tends to remain agnostic about the question –crucial to this dissertation—of 
why and how international “designers” (usually states) come to care about an issue to 
conceptualize it as a cooperation problem to be addressed “rationally.” In the words of 
Barbara Koremenos: “States (understood as the government actors negotiating the 
agreement) are assumed to have an interest in cooperation; why this is so is outside of the 
scope of rational design… Instead of asking why states cooperate, the relevant 
question… is why states cooperate the way they do.”33 This is a revealing admission that 
underscores the type of contribution the present study (and other historically-sensitive 
approaches that do not take state interests or international social problems as given) can 
make to the study of IL/IR, especially since, as I explain later, understanding the origins 
of international social concerns has important consequences how international legal rules 
are designed.  
Yet despite their admitted disinterest in the question of why states would wish to 
regulate internal conflicts, the conjectures posited by the rational design school are worth 
taking into account. Scholars working from this perspective could potentially suggest 
that, given an interest in eliciting reciprocity from rebels, states may have wished to make 
rules for internal conflicts precise and low in flexibility (thus making reciprocal good 
conduct more likely.)34 To know whether these motivations are at play one should be able 
to locate sufficient evidence of states’ desire for precision and low flexibility in the 
                                                
33 Barbara Koremenos, “Institutionalism and International Law,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey Dunoff and 
Mark A. Pollack (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 69. 
34 In this sense, I do not conceptualize precision and low-flexibility as separate explanatory 
mechanisms, but rather aspects related to rational reciprocity-seeking that may be empirically 
observed during the negotiating process. 
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drafting history of the rules, for instance in negotiators’ insistence on stipulating the 
rules’ terms explicitly, leaving little room for interpretive ambiguity or “wiggle room.”  
A third distinct type of rationalist expectation, following traditional realist zero-sum 
logic, could claim that states may have attempted to create prohibitions that would benefit 
their way of waging war to the detriment, for example, of guerrilla warfare. More 
cynically perhaps, states may have regarded adopting rules for internal conflict as a way 
to intervene in countries where they harbored some veiled economic or political interest. I 
will refer to this set of motivations simply as offensive design. Persuasive evidence of this 
motivation might be found less in public proceedings than in private position papers: to 
ascertain its operation one should locate statements reflecting states’ desire to leave 
rebels worse off (perhaps by outlawing certain types of weapons or tactics explicitly 
recognized to be useful to rebels.) With regard to “interventionist” possibility, evidence 
suggestive of adopting rules that enable or legitimate external (non-humanitarian) 
incursions by third states would appear convincing.35 In addition, since a common realist 
claim is that (materially) powerful states should tend to drive negotiation processes and 
manage to impose their will on others either through (threats of) material coercion or 
side-payments, considering the possibility of what might be termed hegemonic design is 
important for this project.36 
Liberal theories share the key rationalist assumption of utility maximization on the 
global arena but bring to bear aspects from the domestic politics of the interacting states 
to explain the formation of state preferences. Most distinctively, liberal IR scholars point 
to the causal role of the varying institutional structures and mechanisms related to states’ 
regime types (democratic, newly-democratic, authoritarian) and to the politics among 
domestic interest groups. Borrowing from Moravcsik’s logic with regard to the origins of 
the European human rights regime, one might hypothesize that variation in regime type 
                                                
35 I exclude from the range of threatening interventions those of the ICRC or other National Red 
Crosses.  
36 For two examples (among many) of scholarship asserting that major powers should be expected 
to drive international regulation, see Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise 
of Supranational Institutions (Princeton University Press, 2000); Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics 
Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, 2007). For a 
related, more complex realist position, see Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. 
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could have played a role for defining states’ preferences toward the regulation of civil 
conflicts. Concretely, new democracies, wishing to “lock-in” liberal humanitarian norms 
to ensure good behavior and to protect democratic institutions in the face of future 
domestic turmoil, may have wished to lead the way in rule-promotion. Established 
democracies and autocracies, for their part, might have tended to oppose such a 
commitment.37 I refer to this type of expectation as the liberal “lock-in” mechanism. 
Alternatively, others have recently suggested (drawing on the case of international human 
rights treaties) that long-time democracies may be more benevolent to these types of 
liberal commitments, a possibility worth bearing in mind.38 Evidence for these 
mechanisms might be found by analyzing the breakdown of states’ attitudes to the rules 
for internal conflicts during negotiations in Diplomatic Conferences. Private diplomatic 
papers indicating state preferences to have originated in domestic pressures to safeguard 
democratic institutions would constitute important evidence for this theory as well. 
The above provides a brief sketch of how some of the most important rationalist IR 
traditions (institutionalism, realism and liberalism) might conceptualize rule emergence --
and design, partially-- in the area of internal armed conflict. The fact that I have 
presented them one by one as though they were “alternatives” does not mean that I see 
them necessarily as mutually exclusive. Institutionalist and regime-type mechanisms, for 
example, might be easily amalgamated to construct plausible causal stories of norm-
emergence. Hegemonic and offensive design, as eminently self-interested impulses, may 
unproblematically go together (and many realists would expect them to.) This overview 
is thus merely analytical, and as I show later on, I find it useful to combine elements of 
different IR theoretical traditions to build my own explanation. Some of these are 
rationalist, others are constructivist. I turn to the latter next. 
 
Table 1 summarizes this section: 
                                                
37 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 217–252. 
38 Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Simmons theorizes ratification, not drafting, but the 
same logic can be expected to apply. 
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Mechanism/Assumption Distinctive Type of Evidence for Rule-Acceptance 
Risk aversion Rejection of rule on the basis of sovereignty-inspired argument 
Reciprocity-inducement Express desire to include reciprocity so as to elicit good conduct by rebels, etc. 
Offensive Design 
Statements suggestive of adopting rules to 
enable or legitimate external (non-
humanitarian) incursions by third states 
Hegemonic Design Same as offensive design but major powers drive process 
Liberal “Lock-in”; Domestic Interest-
Group Politics 
Language indicating domestic-level 
interests to use international law to 
safeguard democratic institutions 
Table 1.1. Rationalist Mechanisms and Types of Evidence 
 
b. Constructivism 
Constructivist scholars, as is widely recognized, take a very different vantage point to 
their study of world politics. In the most basic sense, they ask questions that precede and 
problematize the rationalist research agenda as laid out above: they investigate the 
historical sociopolitical sources of state identities and interests, take pains to show how 
these endure or transform over time, and demonstrate how states and other actors living 
in collectivity develop intersubjective (“social”) facts, establish specific patterns of 
relating to one another (i.e. as friends, rivals or foes,) and even build broader forms of 
sociality (security or regional economic communities, for instance.) They also theorize 
the important causal role of factors usually overlooked in rationalist worldviews, 
particularly ideational, non-material, and sometimes even non-strategic, altruistic reasons 
for acting. 
As with rationalism, various strands of constructivist theorizing exist, each taking 
their approach into the study of international society. Of particular relevance here are 
what has been termed “norm-centered constructivism” or, more recently, “agentic 
constructivism,” which zoom in particularly on the political processes that certain actors 
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engage in with the purpose of creating new standards of appropriate behavior (that is, 
new norms) within and among states.39  
Below I describe a wide variety of possible mechanisms within this branch of 
constructivism that may be relevant to this dissertation. At this point, however, there is an 
important clarification to make: beyond the question of why and through what means 
certain actors create new social standards of appropriateness, constructivists have been 
less concerned with the “design” aspects of the rule-making process, at least relative to 
their rationalist colleagues.40 This is not anomalous: Although constructivists might agree 
that international trend-setters should want rules that are clear, monitoreable and 
enforceable, for them the crux of the matter usually lies in understanding how 
international norms and law are made legitimate and become accepted by their target 
actors, not necessarily in asking whether new rules come with stiff control levers.41 In 
other words, the traditional task of the constructivist-oriented researcher has been to 
understand the political struggles permeating norm- and law-making processes that 
routinely feature actors with different identities and preferences, who command unequal 
material and social resources, and who may follow different ethical programs.42 In 
addition, constructivists have studied the conditions and mechanisms through which new 
norms suffuse the international system over time, potentially leading states and other 
actors to internalize standards of appropriate conduct. As such, they see rule-compliance 
                                                
39 Three classic statements in this vein are Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” 
International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 363–389; Finnemore, “Norms and War  : The 
International Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” Kathryn Sikkink has proposed the notion of “agentic 
constructivism” in her recent book. See Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human 
Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2011). 
40 This point was well made by Reus-Smit 2003. Constructivist interest in regime design seems to 
have increased in recent years. See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law,” Duke Law Journal 54, no. 3 (2004): 612–
703; Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, and ‎Andrew K. Woods, eds., Understanding Social Action, 
Promoting Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
41 Note, though, that human rights scholars have usefully incorporated insights from rational and 
sociological institutionalism to explain variation in compliance patterns. 
42 Christian Reus-Smit, “Politics and International Legal Obligation,” European Journal of 
International Relations 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 591–625. 
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less as a result of institutional design aspects than of social processes of arguing, 
persuasion and habituation.  
The implication of this is obviously not to fault constructivists for not “doing” 
institutional design as their rationalist colleagues do, but to remain attentive to the aspects 
and questions constructivists highlight, especially concerns over social processes, 
legitimacy and ethics which, as this project illustrates, can and often do relate to rational 
instrumental or strategic drives.  
This clarification aside, we can now ask: What types of arguments have 
constructivists made to explain how international norms emerge? How do they relate 
more precisely to the question at hand? 
One of constructivism’s foremost figures, Martha Finnemore, conducted a seminal 
study precisely about the making of the 1864 Geneva Convention, the first-ever 
international humanitarian treaty in history, thus providing us with an archetypal 
constructivist account of humanitarian norm emergence. To summarize, the story goes 
like this: Swiss businessman Henry Dunant, having stumbled upon a battlefield in 
Solferino awash with sick, dying and dismembered soldiers in 1859, wrote a deeply 
moving book that shocked the conscience of elites across Europe and beyond.43 Dunant’s 
“Memory of Solferino” earned him the attention of a small group of prominent Swiss 
men with whom he created an institutional platform to further their cause (later known as 
the ICRC,) drafted a template treaty and lobbied several state leaders to gather and 
discuss it. In 1864, at a second international conference and with the help of a few very 
important governments, this group of principled entrepreneurs managed to persuade the 
majority of states of the cause’s moral purpose, culminating with the signing of First 
Geneva Convention for the protection of wounded and sick soldiers on land.44   
Extrapolating from the above, one might claim that constructivists expect 
international humanitarian rules to originate with principled actors (often acting in 
tandem with other individuals, organizations or state officials) who come to care deeply 
                                                
43 Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Geneva, 1986); Finnemore, National Interests in 
International Society, chap. 3. 
44 Reluctant states like the United Kingdom did exist, but “came around” a year later. 
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about an issue that they find problematic, perhaps due to recent traumatic events. Such 
norm entrepreneurs, as they are commonly known, operate as strategic agitators who 
seek allies, lobby decision-makers to convene meetings where they argue forcefully 
against detractors, and –importantly-- eventually persuade majorities to create new 
international rules.45  
This bears repeating: “The characteristic mechanism” of norm emergence “is 
persuasion by norm entrepreneurs.”46 Most distinctively, the type of persuasion Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink outline has a moral quality, by virtue of whose power 
some actors convince others that a specific norm is right and that certain behaviors are 
wrong.  
Translated to the research topic of interest to us, one might expect that international 
humanitarian rules for internal conflicts have emerged as the product of moral, 
persuasive entrepreneurship. Facing the moral agitation of principled entrepreneurs, 
previously skeptical states might have been convinced that internal conflicts should be 
regulated because it is the right, humanitarian thing to do. The observable implications of 
this expectation are clear. One should be able to identify the existence and operation of a 
moral entrepreneur attempting to convince states that it is necessary to institute a new 
international norm, thus addressing wrongful conduct. Further, private evidence of moral 
conviction produced by the actors targeted by moral campaigns is ultimately decisive to 
adjudicate the operation of this mechanism since states might be inclined to cite moral 
arguments insincerely in public as a reason for a change in policy.47  
Although moral persuasion figures in most accounts of norm emergence in IR, other 
scholars of a constructivist stripe have developed arguments and mechanisms about why 
                                                
45 Among the documented cases of principled entrepreneurship explaining norm emergence are 
 the landmine ban or the construction of the ICC. See Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: 
Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 
613–644; Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in 
the ICC Case.” Price 1998 combines persuasion with social emulation but is unclear about 
whether the latter leads to preference change. 
46 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895. 
47 Ian Johnston uses this as a litmus test for real persuasion. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social 
States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008). 
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states may accept international agreements or change their conduct and preferences with 
regard to various issues. These are worth considering because they may be fruitfully 
applied to the case under study. These are: deliberative persuasion, epistemic 
communities, social influence and rhetorical coercion. Let me address each one briefly. 
 
Deliberative persuasion. Often presented in contradistinction to the self-interested 
interactions that we saw underpin rationalist accounts, this mechanism highlights the 
ability of actors using reasoned arguments to sway interlocutors and produce unexpected 
outcomes through public and usually institutionalized deliberation, rather than through 
coercive bargaining. Risse and Kleine explain that: “Arguing as a mode of action and 
interaction implies that actors challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or 
normative statement and seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a 
situation, as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. As a 
logic of action, arguing means that the participants in a discourse are open to be 
persuaded by the better argument.”48 The goal is thus to seek a reasoned consensus, not to 
pursue (and stubbornly stick) to one’s fixed preferences: “Actors’ interests, preferences 
and the perceptions of the situation are not fixed but subject to discursive challenges.”49 
Note that the means (discourse,) effect (persuasion) and observable outcome 
(changed attitude or behavior toward an idea or agreement) that this mechanism proposes 
are very similar to those captured by moral persuasion. The difference lies in the nature 
of the arguments proffered: deliberation emphasizes reasoned argumentation that 
convinces interlocutors through the power of their logic, often emphasizing procedural 
aspects (inclusiveness, publicity, equality, fairness) but without necessary reference to 
moral notions of “right” or “wrong.”50 In terms of the present project, one could suggest 
that certain actors, whether state or non-state, may have successfully convinced skeptics 
about the soundness of crafting type of norms because it makes sense that just as there are 
                                                
48 Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine, “Deliberation in Negotiations,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 17, no. 5 (August 2010): 4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC 
Case,” 44. 
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rules for interstate war there should be some limits to violence in internal conflicts. 
Moderation in such contexts, so the story could go, is a sensible goal in and of itself in an 
increasingly legalized world, helping to equalize treatment of soldiers, prisoners and 
civilians across all forms of conflict. Statements (especially private documents) 
indicating changes in previous policy positions through exposure to such procedural or 
legal-rational logics would support the plausibility of the deliberative persuasion 
mechanism in the processes studied here. 
 
Epistemic Communities. Adopting a different line but still following the constructivist 
emphasis on ideational influence, this mechanism captures the effects that groups with 
specialized technical knowledge can that play in creating and spreading ideas to guide 
policy. Because they possess independent professional credentials that certify their 
expertise and knowledge, these groups may attract the attention of governments or other 
powerful actors seeking solutions to problems they are uncertain about and, by advising 
them, might influence international policy-making.51 In terms of this dissertation’s topic, 
one could expect that a group of scholars –of humanitarian or human rights law, for 
instance—may have played a role in instigating attitudinal change in governments toward 
the regulation of internal conflicts through international legal means. If this is so, 
diplomatic governmental documents, especially during the preparatory and negotiation 
stages of the humanitarian agreements, should reveal an important influence of 
professional expert knowledge, for instance, through the hiring of international law 
experts to form part of states’ diplomatic teams.  
 
Social influence. Drawing from the insights of social psychology, an additional group 
of IR scholars have suggested that states may be amenable to pressures emanating from 
social-group dynamics.52 The wager here is that, in addition to wealth and relative power, 
                                                
51 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 
International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35. 
52 My discussion is inspired in Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-
2000. For two authoritative statements from the social psychological literature see: Herbert C. 
Kelman, “Interests, Relationships, Identities: Three Central Issues for Individuals and Groups in 
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states also care about their status, especially with reference to certain groups with which 
they identify or feel they belong to, vis-à-vis others that lack such pull.53 Emotional, 
cognitive and identity-related factors such as self-esteem, honor, empathy, a desire for 
social conformity or to increase one’s positive status in a society all figure as possible 
reasons for state behavior. Crucial to this perspective is that actors worry about the 
effects of their actions on their reputation, not out of an instrumental concern for future 
gains or losses, but for reasons related to their image, standing or role within a particular 
group.  
These varied motivations (cognitive, identity-related or emotional) suggest that 
“social influence” is better characterized as a family of mechanisms. As Iain Johnston 
explains, “Social influence refers to a class of microprocesses that elicit pro-normative 
behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments.”54 Importantly, 
social influence can be distinguished from persuasion (whether moral or deliberative) 
because its targets can be shown to have changed their public position without modifying 
their private preferences. “Public conformity without private acceptance” is a phrased 
often used to help differentiate this type of influence from otherwise similarly social 
mechanisms.55  
For clarity purposes, given the multiplicity of factors that can fall under the label of 
social influence, it is useful to distill a few better-specified theoretical expectations with 
relation to the topic of interest here.  
                                                                                                                                            
Negotiating Their Social Environment.,” Annual Review of Psychology 57 (January 2006): 1–26; 
Robert B. Cialdini and Noah J. Goldstein, “Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity,” 
Annual Review of Psychology 55, no. 1974 (January 2004): 591–621. 
53 This mechanism dovetails nicely with constructivist arguments about the importance of state 
identity to explain international outcomes, such as those of Alexander Wendt. However, I do not 
tease out separate expectations for the diverse arguments made by all scholars working in this 
direction, but select one (the social-psychological one) that I find easier to assess empirically. 
54 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, 79. 
55 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, 80.This definition of 
social influence coincides with the concept/mechanism of acculturation as defined by legal 
scholars Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks. See: Goodman and Jinks, “How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law.” I use Johnston’s work here only because it is 
more familiar to IR scholars. 
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One possibility is that states have decided to accept international rules for internal 
conflicts because some important group they look up to or identify with (because they 
share similar substantive values) has chosen to embrace them. This could be, for instance, 
a “club” of democratic or liberal states, some of which may have decided to adopt this 
type of rule. Initially skeptical liberal or democratic states, worrying about the prospect of 
being shamed and isolated by those with whom they identify, ultimately acquiesce to the 
in-group view. The operative engine here is a desire to avoid “internal costs such as 
anxiety or loss of self-esteem due to social opprobrium.”56 There are two possibilities 
here: one is that states foresee the possibility of group pressure and change their tune to 
prevent it (self-inflicted conformity,) another that they are peer-pressured into 
conforming.57 Evidence of these social-psychological dynamics should be observable in 
states’ private documents, either via statements denoting state insecurity and choice to 
conform to in-group's probable position, or actual pressure to accept their in-group's 
views.  
Another potentially relevant mechanism in this vein is emulation, whereby actors that 
lack strong views for or against an idea or a policy simply follow their peers’ cues.58 In 
contrast to conformity-related factors, anxiety to weigh social costs and benefits is 
lacking here, such that decision-making may be less reflexive or contrived that in 
situations of actual or perceived pressure to follow others’ example. A simple slogan 
(“Everybody else is doing it, so we will too”) might best capture the logic at work under 
emulation, and private evidence resembling it would indicate its operation. 
                                                
56 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, 84. 
57 Social pressure might also hypothetically come in the form of naming and shaming, a 
mechanism usually used to explain diffusion and compliance with international agreements, not 
norm emergence. I do not list it here since, conceptually, naming and shaming is a resource 
utilized not by a state’s own peers but by detractors. I find this dynamic useful, however, and will 
return to it when presenting my own argument about social coercion. 
58 World polity scholars refer to a similar dynamic of imitation with the terms isomorphism and 
standardization. John W. Meyer and Ronald Jepperson, “The ‘Actors’ of Modern Society: The 
Cultural Construction of Social Agency,” Sociological Theory 18, no. 1 (2000). 
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The literature on social influence is incredibly rich and many more of its insights 
could be harnessed to draw up causal stories.59 However, in my view, the mechanisms or 
“micro-processes” discussed above (self-inflicted conformity, peer pressure or emulation) 
present themselves as the most plausible candidate expectations with clear applicability 
to the case of the emergence of international humanitarian rules for internal conflicts. 
 
Rhetorical coercion. Let me turn to a final relevant mechanism. Ronald Krebs and 
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson have proposed that rather than persuasive or “convincing” 
effects, the use of political rhetoric in public international forums may be seen to have 
coercive consequences. In their view, strategic, skillful language “can underpin a 
successful political campaign – not by persuading one’s opponents of the rectitude of 
one’s stance, but by denying them the rhetorical materials out of which to craft a socially 
sustainable rebuttal.”60 The backdrop of this rhetorical contest is a context-bound battery 
of legitimate and illegitimate discourses, tropes or commonplaces, from which a deft 
political negotiator might draw to “twist the tongue” or corner her adversary. Important to 
this story is the existence of a third party (a public) which sets limits to the policy stances 
contestants might take and to which a negotiator gestures in attempts to secure the 
legitimacy high-ground, hence denying her competitor of that luxury. As Krebs and 
Jackson note, “In sum, one argument ‘wins’ not because its grounds are ‘valid’ in the 
sense of satisfying the demands of universal reason or because it accords with the 
audience’s prior normative commitments or material interests, but because its grounds are 
socially sustainable – because the audience deems certain rhetorical deployments 
acceptable and others impermissible.”61 Relative to the moral, deliberative and social-
psychological mechanisms described earlier, rhetorical coercion seems to have a more 
                                                
59 There are, for instance, variants that emphasize actors’ desire to “maximize” social liking by 
engaging in multiple acts that will heighten others’ positive perceptions of them. I find this less 
plausible as a candidate explanation in this case, but bear it in mind when evaluating the 
empirical evidence.  
60 Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 42. 
61 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” 
47. 
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contentious flavor, such that its nature and effects are produced less by virtue of moral 
appropriateness, reasoned logic, or feared/actual embarrassment, and more through public 
exchanges of heated wordplay. 
Once more translating the above it into a causal story applicable to the emergence of 
humanitarian rules for internal armed conflict, one might suggest that certain states 
adopted them because, after engaging in public debate with others espousing different 
arguments, they lost the discursive “high-ground.” Perhaps in the face of mounting 
humanitarian pressures to “do something” about civil war violence at a certain point in 
time, recalcitrant state concerns over sovereignty may have fallen out of favor as 
plausible arguments to repel the introduction of new rules. Particularly convincing 
evidence for the operation of this mechanism may come in private correspondence, for 
example via actors’ recognition that certain logics will no longer carry weight in public 
given the dynamics of the debate.  
Table 2 summarizes these constructivist mechanisms and the types of evidence one 
might find as supportive of their claims: 
Table 1.2. Constructivist Mechanisms and Types of Evidence 
Theoretical Mechanism Distinctive Type of Evidence for Acceptance 
Moral persuasion Private acceptance of moral argument 
Deliberative Persuasion Reasoned argument cited as convincing 
Epistemic Communities Expert knowledge cited as convincing 
Self-Inflicted or Peer Pressure Conformity 
Mention of perceived or actual cognitive and 
social costs of isolation from esteemed 
reference group 
Emulation Unreflective “following” 
Rhetorical Coercion Loss of discursive struggle. Recognition that certain arguments are unavailable 
 
c. Summary of the Theoretical Possibilities 
 This completes an overview of the major rationalist and constructivist 
expectations regarding the emergence of international rules for internal conflicts. Table 3 
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presents them all schematically for ease of reference. To reiterate: Although for analytic 
clarity I have presented them as distinct (alternative) possibilities, these mechanisms can 
and do intertwine in interesting ways empirically. Precisely the purpose of this 
dissertation (and, as will be seen, of my argument) is to show how they do in the case of 
the emergence of international rules for internal conflicts. Table 3 summarizes the entire 
range of posited mechanisms: 
 
Table 1.3. Taxonomy of Social Mechanisms and Expectations (by approach) 
A Tool-Box Taxonomy of Social Mechanisms and Expectations (by Theory) 
  Basic Approach Specific Theory Mechanisms Concrete Expectation 
1 Risk-Averse Rationalism Risk-Aversion 
States are in complete 
opposition or move for 
deletion of rules 
2 Institutional Rationalism 
Reciprocity-
inducement 
States want to create rules 
to elicit reciprocity through 
precise and strict rules 
3 Realist Rationalism Offensive Design 
States want rules to leave 
rebels worse off AND/OR 
to legitimate and enable 
external intervention  
4 Realist Rationalism Hegemonic Design Major powers drive process 
5 
Rationalism 
Liberalism Liberal Lock-in 
States want to ensure good 
behavior in civil war in 
order to protect democratic 
institutions in the face of 
future domestic turmoil 




states of the moral 
goodness of the rule 
7 Deliberative Constructivism 
Deliberative 
Persuasion 
States believe it makes 









States may be swayed to 
adopt these international 
rules due to the influential 
advise of independent 
expert groups 
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9 Social Influence #1 Self-Inflicted Conformity 
Insecure states expect their 
peers to promote/accept 
rules and choose to support 
for fear of status loss 
10 Social Influence #2 Peer-Pressure 
States pressure their peers 
to promote/accept rules 
citing identity/group 
likeness factors 
11 Social Influence #3 Emulation 
States do not have clear 
views on this type of 
regulation so they simply 







States attempt to corner one 
another through skillful use 
of political rhetoric before 
an audience. A winner 




III. Research Design: Stages, Method and Sources 
This project comprises almost 150 years of political and legal history. As Chapter 2 
shows, the earliest debates in the modern era regarding the possibility of introducing 
positive international rules for internal armed conflicts date from 1863, the year in which 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was formed by Henry Dunant and 
four like-minded individuals. The process continues today, with the ICRC facilitating 
international discussions among states and National Red Cross Societies on whether and 
how to revise or extend existing law.  
Given such a historical span, I find it useful to break the longue durée of norm 
emergence in a series of “stages” that represent what I take to be the critical junctures of 
international rule-making for internal conflicts.62 I identify these stages attending to an 
observed variation in normative outcomes: that is, each stage captures a time-bound 
process in which international debates about creating rules either “produce” a rule or not. 
At each stage I pose the three motivating research questions: How did rules emerge? 
Why did states agree to them? How can we explain regulatory outcomes and their change 
                                                
62 For one explanation of the concept of critical junctures, see Paul Pierson, “Not Just What, but 
When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 
14, no. Spring (2000): 72–92. 
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over time? The first two relate to the concrete processes and actors involved each episode 
of rule-making or negotiation. The third is attentive to global historical change and the 
dynamics of legalization, which operate often by setting initial precedents and building 
upon them at later moments. Put another way: Over 150 years, international social 
structures, and with them the nature of political and normative debates relevant to the 
topic of study, have changed considerably. Studying the way in political circumstances 
(say, the political nature of internal armed conflict) change both internationally and 
domestically, and the way in which such changes affect the nature of the regulation that 
obtains, is crucial to this dissertation. As a result I sometimes find it necessary to 
“recalibrate” the three broad questions above so as to make them appropriate to each 
historical period. I do this by introducing more specific “sub-puzzles” that get at what is 
going on at the time under study. This helps me avoid anachronism and allows me to 
present a more interesting and –I hope—persuasive story.  
One example may suffice to clarify what I mean: whether or not to legitimize wars of 
national liberation and freedom fighters was central to the negotiation of the Additional 
Protocols in the 1970s, giving rise to a sharp division between wars for self-determination 
and “other” internal conflict between the two Protocols. Thirty years or sixty years 
earlier, however, “freedom fighters” were by comparison either the incipient concern of a 
few or a non-issue, and their imprint on the resolutions that emerged in 1921 or on 
Common Article 3 of 1949 was either non-existent or not determinant. I thus find it more 
interesting and relevant to frame the chapter on the Additional Protocols around the 
question of why and how it was possible for wars of national liberation to be “upgraded” 
to the status of international conflicts, while internal conflicts were given a far less 
preferential treatment, rather than by asking more generically: “Who did what and how 
did this affect the legal outcomes?” The choice for this is partly stylistic and partly 
substantive, but it does not lead to an obscuring of the central puzzles that drive the 
dissertation. 
With regard to the changing dynamics of legalization, the point is made more simply: 
Rules created at a given moment often have an impact on rules created later, and vice-
versa: rules created later may complement, supersede or restrict earlier norms.  
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Table 4 presents a summary of the different stages studied in this project, some 
relevant contextual factors, whether or not they saw the emergence of a rule for internal 
conflicts, and the types of questions asked. 
 
Table 1.4. Stage Classification and Questions Considered 






After mid-19th Century 
with creation of ICRC, 
initial ideas arise 
leading to practical 
concern but are not 
made into international 
law 
Some normative concern 
exists but actors do not push 
for international treaty 
regulation 
How did humanitarian 
concern for internal 
conflicts surface? 
What explains the 






Resolutions are drafted 
and concerns are 
formally introduced 
into International Red 
Cross Conferences. 
Proposals are initially 
dismissed but later pass in the 
context of Red Cross 
Conferences  
Where did the impetus 
for discussing these 
resolutions come 
from? Why were they 






Yes - Common Article 
3 to the Geneva 
Conventions 
Norm Emergence I 
Where did the push to 
extend the Geneva 
Conventions to internal 
conflicts come from? 
What were states' 
views on this move? 
How was the rule 
made and what 
explains its design? 
1954-1965 
No. ICRC attempts to 
extend substantive 
protections of the 
Geneva Conventions 
but the Draft Norms are 
never adopted. 
Failed Attempt 
Where did the impetus 
for the Draft Rules 
come from? How did 
states view them? Why 
did the initiative fail? 
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1965-1970 
Yes. Impetus for 
revision of the laws of 
war, including on 
internal conflicts, 
resurfaces and is 
enshrined in UN 
resolutions 
(Pre) Norm Emergence II. 
Where did the UN 
interest come from? 
What were states' 
positions with regard 
to internal conflicts? 
1971-1977 
Yes. Protocol I 
regulates international 
wars and struggles for 
self-determination; 
Protocol II regulates 
internal conflicts 
Norm Emergence II 
How were the rules 
negotiated? What were 
states' positions? Why 
were national 
liberation wars 
"separated" from other 
internal conflicts? 
What explains the final 




Yes; customary law 
and criminal law are 
recognized and later 
formally extended to 
internal conflicts. 
Human rights 
increasingly seen as 
complementary to IHL. 
Norm Emergence/Extension 
III, mostly drawing  from non-
traditional sources and areas. 
Internal conflicts are 
enshrined in the statute of 
adhoc tribunals and later in 
the ICC. 
What explains turn to 
other bodies of law? 
What were the politics 
of the emergence or 
extension of these 
rules?  
 
Note that some “stages” explored involve non-outcomes, that is, processes that 
“failed” to produce the regulation envisioned by their proponents. I pay close attention to 
the actors, circumstances and arguments that drove the initial impetus but eventually led 
to their “fizzling.” Studying positive and negative outcomes partially allows me to posit 
that some factors and mechanisms may be necessary conditions for successful norm 
emergence, and thus may be susceptible of being transposed from one specific historical 
moment to another. For instance, I can identify with confidence certain non-trivial 
necessary variables for norm emergence such as involvement by the ICRC in the rule-
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making process as well as the support or at least the non-opposition of a core group of 
states (especially major powers) to the idea of revising or improving existing law. The 
strategy also allows me to evaluate the operation of causal mechanisms already posited in 
the IR/IL literature in each of the episodes, as well as to introduce a new mechanism 
(social coercion) that others can extrapolate and “apply” in other historical moments and 
issue-areas. In other words, this project both probes existing theory and generates new 
arguments. 
Related to the above, it is important to recognize that each of the “stages” analyzed is 
not “independent” from one another, and in that sense I cannot sensibly “generalize” 
whole causal stories or combinations of variables across a “population” of cases of 
international norm emergence. Making “out of sample” predictions is also not among the 
goals of this project. Instead of a straightforward comparative cross-case strategy, this 
dissertation embraces a logic of inquiry that attempts to explain how various specific and 
largely interdependent outcomes within the same issue-area are produced over time by 
(sometimes similar, sometimes varying) specific configurations of factors. These are 
contingent combinations or “configurations” of actors and mechanisms operating in 
broader social contexts which constitute pathways of norm emergence in the case of the 
international rules for internal armed conflicts, but that have the potential of being 
extrapolated by other scholars to their issues of interest. This is akin to what Andrew 
Bennett has recently termed “typological theorizing,” a theory that beyond specifying 
causal factors and effects produced provides “contingent generalizations on how and 
under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations” to 
produce effects.63  
The type of explanation pursued in this project is thus mechanistic. As Robert 
Keohane pithily noted, “Any coherent social science explanations requires a causal 
                                                
63 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 235; Andrew Bennett, “Causal Mechanisms and 
Typological Theories in the Study of Civil Conflict,” in Transnational Dynamics of Civil War, 
ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 216. 
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mechanism.”64 By social mechanism I mean “the pathway or process by which an effect 
is produced or a purpose is accomplished.”65 Mechanism-based explanations have also 
become increasingly valued in the study of IL/IR, constituting part of the subfield’s 
theoretical frontier, as Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal assert.66  
What is the relation between this study and existing theory? In a previous section I 
framed the regulation of internal conflicts through international law not only as 
underanalyzed but as puzzling in view of prevalent IR arguments. I proceeded to offer an 
extensive list of mechanisms that belong to rationalist and constructivist traditions as 
possibly useful explanatory devices. My purpose here, however, is neither to “falsify” 
rationalism or constructivism, as this patently cannot be done. Rather, the goal is to 
complement studies of norm emergence by zooming deeply in on an unlikely case that, I 
argue, fits uneasily across these broad approaches and hence forces us to think harder 
(and ideally, to innovate) with regards to what the extant literature posits as the dominant 
mechanisms.  
To accomplish this I pursue a methodological strategy called “abduction,” 
increasingly endorsed by IR scholars.67 This approach, inspired in the thought of 
                                                
64 Robert O. Keohane, “Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations,” 
The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (2002): 311. 
65 John Gerring, “The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box,” British Journal of 
Political Science 38, no. 01 (December 07, 2007): 178. This is an increasingly accepted definition 
of the concept.  
66 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the 
Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and 
International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 51. I strongly disagree, however, with Abbott and Snidal’s 
claim that young scholars would be wrong to focus on “specific treaties, regimes, or issue areas.” 
This presumes, dubiously in my view, that there is sufficient accumulated knowledge about 
specific areas among interested social scientists. It also places emphasis on analyzing features that 
are “comparable” across legal regimes (adjudication or flexibility, to name two common ones,) 
occluding tremendously important specificities such as: Who counts as a subject of X 
international regime? Whose actions are regulated by it? Who is given license to do what? See 
Ibid, 50. 
67 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: 
Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jörg Friedrichs 
and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance 
International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63 (2009): 701–
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pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce, is situated somewhere in the middle between 
deduction and induction, and “rests on the cultivation of anomalous and surprising 
empirical findings against a background of multiple existing… theories and through 
systematic methodological analysis.”68 With sufficient knowledge of existing theory, the 
analyst examines in depth the empirical material, organizes it as coherently as possible 
and, upon the location of evidence that confounds received theory, is prompted not to 
“falsify” or annul it but to formulate new theory, in this case, novel mechanisms and mid-
range explanations. Adhering to Martha Finnemore’s words: “I present deductively 
derived hypotheses that shape the initial design of the inquiry but quickly prove 
insufficient to explain events. Consequently, I supplement the deductive arguments with 
inductively derived insights, moving back and forth between the two to produce and 
account that will be ‘verisimilar and believable to others looking over the same 
events’.”69  
In qualitative political scientific research, the method best suited to carry out this type 
of study is process tracing. According to George and Bennett, process tracing “attempts 
to identify the intervening causal process –the causal chain and causal mechanisms- 
between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of a dependent 
variable.”70 Though this phrasing privileges causal theorizing (and exhibits a positivist 





                                                                                                                                            
731. Similarly, Andrew Bennett claims that typologizing “involves both deductive and inductive 
reasoning… The analyst can then iterate between what was theorized apriori, what is known 
empirically, and what is learned from additional empirical study…” Bennett, “Causal 
Mechanisms and Typological Theories in the Study of Civil Conflict,” 221. 
68 Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory, “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From 
Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis,” Sociological Theory 30, no. 3 (September 10, 2012): 
169. 
69 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, 13. 
70 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 206. 
71 Ibid. 
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Sources 
The investigation of political origins I pursue in this dissertation requires an intensive 
empirical strategy. I have strived to be as thorough as possible in tracing the events and 
actors that have taken part in the construction of the international rules for internal armed 
conflicts. One organization –the ICRC— has historically centralized the great majority of 
initiatives dealing with the international humanitarian law, including debates on internal 
conflicts and civil war. In fact, from 1863 until the mid-1960s almost all debates of 
relevance to that body of law took place within ICRC-led forums, most of which I have 
been able to document exhaustively at the organization’s archives in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The ICRC archives are only open to the public until 1965, however; after 
that year I have had to rely on published information, either by the ICRC itself, the Swiss 
government, or by scholars who participated in the rule-making processes of the 1970s 
and onward. I have interviewed some of the latter experts as well. 
The other essential data source for this project has been the archives of select states. 
Prior to embarking on the fieldwork process I identified some of the crucial states that 
participated in the negotiation of the rules studied here: the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France. I found these states to be key not only due to their actual role 
during the negotiations, but also because they are theoretically interesting from the 
perspective of various IR approaches and global history more generally. In particular, 
various rationalist strands would expect them to be either risk-averse vis-à-vis binding 
their management of internal conflicts through international law, or to see “low rewards” 
from conceding their sovereignty in this way (especially in the case of the colonial 
powers, England and France.)  
Fieldwork yielded the following types of material: 
• Confidential correspondence between the ICRC and each of these states on the 
scope of the meetings and the contents of the agreements, as well as about 
scheduling/attendance by other states and actors; 
• Confidential correspondence between the various relevant agencies within each 
state involved in the preparations for the negotiations; 
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• Confidential correspondence between these states and other states/actors to 
compare or coordinate positions and strategies prior to and during the 
negotiations; 
• Confidential working drafts and final secret instructions/position papers for state 
delegations, not only for the main Diplomatic Conferences but also for several of 
the preparatory meetings (known as the travaux préparatoires); 
• Most of the confidential telegraphic correspondence (cables) exchanged “in 
action” between the delegations in Geneva and their home governments during 
the negotiations and other relevant international conferences. These also include 
some “update memos” periodically sent back home by some delegations; 
• The confidential final reports after each conference/negotiating session, with 
recommendations and discussions about whether/how to approach signing and 
ratification; 
• Confidential memos and correspondence related to domestic inter-agency as well 
as inter-state debates about reservations, signing and ratification; 
• Evidence about states’ intent to apply (or their actual application of) these 
norms/laws in current or future internal conflicts; 
• Considerable documentation (of all the types described above) about the ICRC’s 
(failed) efforts during the 1950s to complement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
and about parallel debates in the UN in the late 1960s-1970s on “human rights in 
armed conflict,” freedom fighters/decolonization, and international terrorism. 
 
At the archives of the ICRC I collected material concerning: 
• Internal ICRC policy debates in its early period, particularly between the creation 
of the organization and the death of its first President Gustave Moynier (1863-
1910;) 
• The private correspondence between the ICRC and certain important interlocutors 
with regard to internal conflicts and civil wars between 1863 and 1923; 
• The confidential minutes of various ICRC bodies, including its Council of the 
Presidency (the second highest-level body of the ICRC) and its Juridical 
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Commission, focusing on any important discussion of internal conflicts/civil wars 
in 1937-1966, particularly in relation to the behavior of combatants from both 
sides, and the use and application (or lack thereof) of Common Article 3. 
 
In total, this project is based on 7 months of archival research, approximately 40,000 
original primary documents and interviews with the high-level ICRC staff and Swiss 
diplomats who participated directly in the negotiations of the 1970s, as well as experts on 
international humanitarian law and human rights.  
 
IV. A Theory of Norm Emergence and Norm Construction 
This dissertation advances a theory of international norm emergence and construction 
to explain the origins of the international humanitarian rules that govern internal 
conflicts. In its broadest formulation, I argue that these rules are the result of a slow 
historical process generated by three factors: exogenous shocks, moral entrepreneurship 
and international political contests waged at Diplomatic Conferences between various 
groups of states with different interests and identities, which themselves changed over 
time. The growing institutionalization and legitimacy of international humanitarian law 
as a normative framework, as well as the robust reputation of its relentless guardian, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, have operated as crucial two enabling pre- 
conditions for the creation and development of this regulation.  
That norm emergence and development in this issue-area have been slow is 
unsurprising. After all, these rules impinge upon the most sensitive area of all for states: 
their internal prerogative to react to organized violent challenges which, in the most 
dramatic cases, threaten their territorial integrity and their very survival. And yet, as this 
dissertation shows, in the last 150 years international society has gone from a moment in 
which most considered the idea of authorizing the provision of international humanitarian 
relief to civil war victims and combatants to be treasonous, to a time when legally 
punishing atrocities in internal wars is desirable and possible. This stark distinction 
enables me to characterize this as an important case of change in the normative fabric of 
international relations, even if, as the cruel cases of civil war in places like Syria or Libya 
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show, practice has not always kept apace. The expansion of these rules has naturally been 
embedded in broader transformations of social structures as the international level (the 
diffusion of international law, the spread of liberal democracy and the delegitimation of 
totalitarianism and formal empire, to name an important few) but, as I attempt to 
demonstrate, the causal chains of protagonists, actions and circumstances can be drawn 
much more precisely. 
The theory of norm emergence I propose combines insights from constructivist and 
rationalist approaches outlined earlier, partially confirming but also qualifying some of 
their assumptions and expectations. Most importantly, it presents and illustrates the 
operation of a mechanism that I term social coercion, merging some of the mechanisms 
presented earlier, especially social influence and rhetorical coercion.  
Let me present these findings at some length. 
My theory proceeds in two steps. The first concerns the question of where normative 
impetus comes from to regulate internal conflicts and the combination of factors that 
operate to initiate an episode of rule-creation. The second focuses on the political 
dynamics that permeate each norm-making episode once it has been set in motion, and 
which shape its process and outcome. Both phases are marked by the specific historical 
contexts in which they unveil. Below I illustrate how the theory operates by focusing on 
the emergence of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions in 1949, the first binding 
international rule for internal conflicts ever created. 
 
a. STAGE 1: Triggering the Impetus for Normative Innovation 
The first phase proceeds in a manner similar to established constructivist arguments. 
First, a shock, typically a major civil war, generates some level of moral concern that 
transcends states’ borders. The first such conflict to cause important moral outrage (after 
the advent of treaty-based international law in the mid-nineteenth century) were the 
Balkan uprisings against the Ottomans in the 1870s. Although at the time no state appears 
to have surmised that there should be an international legal response to an eminently 
“internal” situation, the ICRC --still a young organization but already a respected legal 
and practical pioneer in humanitarianism,-- mused about what should be done. In 1875 
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Gustave Moynier, the organization’s restless founding president suggested that states 
should apply the First Geneva Convention (designed to protect wounded and sick soldiers 
in inter-state conflict) to civil wars by analogy. The humanitarian “spirit” of the 
Conventions commanded such a course, Moynier claimed. Soon debates within the 
Conferences of the expanding Red Cross movement witnessed the suggestions of 
principles for the provision of humanitarian relief in civil wars— non-binding principles 
that, by depending on the consent of the embattled state, did not greatly disturb 
sovereignty norms. 
The Red Cross principles were, however, never formally debated or adopted, and the 
issue remained unsettled for the time being. Curiously, during this period no actor (the 
ICRC included) proposed that there should be a binding legal covenant applicable to civil 
wars resembling what existed for inter-state conflict.72 In Chapter 2 I suggest an 
explanation for this less-than-enthusiastic response by humanitarian law’s key norm 
entrepreneur by locating the organizational reasoning of the ICRC within the 
sociopolitical context of the late nineteenth century. As we will see, more practical 
experience with civil war cruelty, a new leadership and accumulated outside pressure 
were needed for this morally committed actor to take up an issue that lay well within its 
mandate. 
International discussion on the matter reopened in 1912. The political entrepreneur 
this time was not the Red Cross but a government. At the Ninth Conference of Red Cross 
Societies held that year in Washington D.C., the United States delegation, in tandem with 
its close partner the American Red Cross, introduced a draft treaty text that in essence 
proposed to enshrine the existing Red Cross principles into hard law. The US proposal 
was the idea of State Department lawyer, Joshua Reuben Clark Jr. who, while stationed 
                                                
72 When the idea was put to them, the eminent international lawyers that since 1876 had 
constituted the first ever scholarly international law association (the Belgian-based Institut de 
Droit International) dared only discuss the norms of neutrality to be followed by third states in 
times of internal conflict. In their meetings of 1898 and 1900, the majority of the experts present 
seemed to believe that the issue of humanitarian civil war provisions was “too politicized.” Not 
surprisingly, many of these experts were or had recently been in government service.  
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in Mexico, had seen his Mormon co-religionists suffer the violence of the revolution of 
1911 without the legal power to solicit humanitarian aid from outside.  
The above roughly corresponds to the constructivist mechanism of moral 
entrepreneurship. But was entrepreneurship persuasive or effective in this case? Chapter 
2 describes how, despite the moderate terms of the US initiative, in 1912 many 
representatives of important countries debating at the Red Cross Conference reacted quite 
harshly. “In no case or manner could the Imperial government become a contracting party 
to or even a discussant of any agreement or vow on this topic,” virulently quipped 
General Yermolov of the Russian Empire. Rationalist expectations of risk aversion begin 
thus to reveal their importance in the story.  
Such a response was unsurprising: Imperial powers, whose voice weighed especially 
heavily in these traditionally European forums, had good reason to fear this as an 
intrusion in their security affairs. Yet as I show in Chapter 2, the reasons for states’ 
anxieties were more interesting than allowed by the rationalist worldview. Most states 
expressed fears not just about materially benefitting rebels via humanitarian relief, but 
especially about the possibility of legitimating them through their inclusion in 
international legal instruments. As noted earlier, one long-standing constructivist point 
about the nature of international norms is their ability not only regulate but also to 
constitute its subjects.73 State reactions in 1912 (and consistently ever since,) give this 
theoretical insight strong empirical support. Throughout this dissertation I make efforts to 
trace just how persistent and powerful this constitutive concern was, alongside but not 
reducible to strategic and material state worries.  
In 1912 we had a case of failed moral entrepreneurship due to overt state aversion 
toward the very idea of having legally binding rules for internal conflicts. But, 
importantly, a precedent was left (such that the Red Cross could say that the issue had 
already once been dismissed, making it harder to dismiss again later) and the story did 
not end there. In fact, the same combination of triggering factors (civil war-induced 
                                                
73 Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law 
and Politics,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 743–758; Reus-Smit, “Politics and 
International Legal Obligation.” 
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shocks and proliferating bottom-up pressures to “do something,” coming especially from 
advocates on the ground and from National Red Cross Societies,) recurred in 1917-1920 
with the Russian and Hungarian Revolutions, finally convincing the previously hesitant 
ICRC to pursue the issue forcefully, and leading to initial non-binding resolutions 
adopted at 1921 International Red Cross Conference.  
Yet it was the horrors of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939,) considered by many to 
have been a continent-wide conflict situated within the even larger trauma of World War 
II that finally drove home the point for the ICRC that soft principles had been exhausted 
as a response for the seriousness of the issue. Repeated major civil-war trauma and the 
existence of previously ineffective precedents thus seemed necessary to create a 
consensus on the form that an international response should take: binding treaty rules. 
Renewed atrocity also seemed to have a discernable impact on states’ views on the 
subject, for when it was first put to them during the first preparatory meetings for the 
revision of the Geneva Conventions in 1947 and 1948 only a few expressed overt 
opposition to the idea. It seemed like the time for introducing international legal 
regulation in this area had finally arrived, and that it might have smooth passage. 
 
b. STAGE 2: Negotiating International Humanitarian Rules: Social Coercion 
This soon changed. In the second step, my theory posits that once the actual 
negotiation of these rule begin, international moral politics collide with the diversity of 
states’ domestic interests in theoretically complex and unexpected ways. In sum, in this 
stage I show that diplomatic negotiations of humanitarian rules pit (mostly) external 
moral pressures against domestic interests and identities, and if anti-regulation states find 
themselves in a minority, they may be susceptible to social coercion out of fear of public 
embarrassment by others taking them to task for blocking humanitarian protections. In a 
final move, although international pressures may publicly force the hand of powerful 
recalcitrants and inhibit overt refusal to accept the norms that majorities desire, it may 
also trigger surreptitious or “covert pushback” on their part, through private attempts to 
make the terms of these humanitarian rules indeterminate or to shape them in ways that 
lowered the likelihood of their application in the future. 
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By 1949 many if not most states saw introducing humanitarian regulations for 
internal conflicts as important. But the devil --which we know is in the details-- remained 
at large. What counted as an “internal conflict”? What criteria would define the 
application of the law? Would obligations be conditioned by reciprocity? Did legal 
humanitarian imply political recognition? These questions did not come with preordained 
answers and proved excruciating to resolve due to states’ varied interests. The breakdown 
of positions went something like this: Some states expressed an ardent belief in the 
humanitarian value of having generous rules: Scandinavian countries and Switzerland 
were key examples of this view, alongside Latin American states like Mexico or 
Uruguay. Others were more cautious and asked for important sovereignty safeguards (the 
United States, Canada, Greece or China, the last two facing civil wars of their own at the 
time). Only one state (England, a colonial power,) publicly dared go against the grain by 
suggesting that an alarming idea that struck so directly “at the root of national 
sovereignty” should be set aside altogether (France was more cautious in public but 
harbored similar thoughts privately.) In doing so, Britain expected empathy from its 
peers, by rehearsing an argument that it believed would easily resonate.  
As this suggests, rationalist and constructivist expectations both have partial support 
in these findings, albeit in qualified form. Contra a strict rationalism, most importantly, 
across-the-board risk aversion was in the postwar world a thing of the past. States 
interests were now more varied, with some putting humanitarianism first, others agreeing 
with the humanitarian sentiment but showing a bit more caution, and finally a small 
minority pushing back. This suggests that the international moral shock of the recent 
wars, channeled especially by entrepreneurship of the Red Cross movement, had indeed 
exerted a effect, helping to shape how states defined their interests and perhaps their 
identities (the latter most clearly for the case of the Scandinavians and Switzerland.) That 
state interests change, and that state identities shape interests, as we saw, is a core 
constructivist insight.74 Also heeding constructivist insights, the politics of recognition 
and legitimacy surfaced again in 1949 as they had in 1912, prompting the insertion of the 
                                                
74 Peter J Katzenstein, “The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics” 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
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only clause all states could agree with: “The application of the preceding provisions shall 
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”  
But it was also the case that (as institutional rationalists would expect,) a sizable 
group of states had come to Geneva wearing their strategic lenses to press actively for 
precise safeguards that, in essence, ensured that the rules would only apply to high-level 
civil wars. Others similarly pressed hard for the eventual rule on internal conflicts to 
include an explicit condition of reciprocity, such that if rebels did not respect the 
provisions, states would be left off the hook.  
As hinted above, the encounter of these actors’ self-interested concerns and others’ 
humanitarian views produced results not comfortably grasped by rationalists. To cite one 
crucial example: Despite the persistence of the important state representatives pushing for 
reciprocity, the opponents of the idea made it abundantly clear that they were not going to 
compromise on their view. The argument that conditional reciprocity might make the 
entire rule dead letter more or less automatically (since it would give states an easy way 
by claiming that rebel misconduct justified non-observance) seems to have been effective 
and skeptics in the room seemingly found it hard to counter because from then on none of 
the alternative formulas that came up for debate mentioned reciprocity as a condition-- a 
momentous outcome nicely captured by the logic of rhetorical coercion.  
Since self-interest was clearly not out the window, were British wishes for complete 
deletion successful? Did other strategic-oriented states echo this desire, as one might 
expect they could have?  
The answer, as I detail in Chapter 3, is a resounding no. Britain’s proposal to set the 
idea aside entirely carried no force, even in a room featuring a number of important 
sovereignty-mindful peers. Flabbergasted by this response, and instead of choosing to 
leave the room, UK diplomats privately expressed profound anxiety of isolation, 
perceiving their image and reputation to be at such peril that they literally implored their 
colleagues in London for a change in instructions. Importantly from a social identity 
perspective, British delegates noted in their cables how their closest Commonwealth 
allies and “even the Soviets” were siding with the humanitarians. They also remarked 
how Swiss papers were deriding their legalistic attitude as that of a decaying, desperate 
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empire. Their situation had simply and quickly become embarrassing. London quickly 
acquiesced to the plea and gave a green light to a more flexible attitude. 
Social pressures of a particularly coercive flavor appeared to play an important role in 
forcing the hand of a powerful stalwart. This is perhaps the moment to introduce this 
dissertation’s central theoretical innovation: a mechanism I label social coercion. 
 
c. What is Social Coercion? 
By social coercion I refer to the mechanism that captures why and when states 
(individually or collectively) are cornered by an opposing group of actors and are forced 
to accommodate to a clearly unpalatable outcome for fear that publicly refusing to do so 
might carry important moral or social costs.75 “Costs” here does not refer primarily to 
material losses, but rather to anxiety about perceived potential blows to aspects of one’s 
social status or identity.76 In this sense it can certainly be located within the family of 
“social influence” microprocesses outlined earlier. However, it differs from them in that 
the source of the pressure is not limited to an actor’s “peers” or fellow in-group members 
but rather is expanded to encompass pressure from its opponents. To this extent social 
coercion resembles the “naming and shaming” dynamic identified in constructivist 
studies of compliance with human rights norms, whereby antagonistic pressure groups 
                                                
75 It is worth clarifying that social coercion is not necessarily a conscious or coordinated strategy 
by the “coercing” majority. Its effects may also be produced inadvertently, by coalitions that align 
only circumstantially in situ. What is important is the effect, that is, that the minority feels itself 
cornered and obligate to acquiesce, which will likely occur when the four conditions above are 
met. 
76 Identity may be defined as “the set of values, attributes, and practices that members believe 
characterize [their collectivity] and set it off from others. Identity is the (shared) answer to central 
if vague questions: Who are we? What are we like? Who are we similar to and different from?” 
See Robert Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, II, 
Crisis and Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 2010. Material asymmetries, 
though broadly important in international politics, are not always crucial determinants of 
outcomes in international organizations or events organized on the principle of universality 
without weighted voting. Two examples are the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) or 
the International Conferences of the Red Cross. Another is the Plenipotentiary Diplomatic 
Conferences organized by the Swiss government in which international humanitarian laws have 
usually been negotiated. In this contexts the potential for social coercion increases since groups of 
smaller and weaker states can and often do band against otherwise more powerful states. I expand 
on this point later. 
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point to a target actors’ weak spots by criticizing the recalcitrance, backwardness, or 
hypocrisy of its actions and positions.77 Naming and shaming and social coercion differ, 
however, in that the former may be said to operate once a state has already accepted an 
international rule against which it is measured, whereas social coercion occurs in the 
absence of such a pre-existing commitment. 
Expressions of social and moral costs include finding oneself isolated in public, 
perhaps out of step with a consensus (being in a minority of one,) associated to actors 
considered to be international pariahs (being seen voting with a “racist” state,) acting in 
disassociation from one’s reference group (not being “in respectable company”,) or being 
seen as overtly championing policies and actions that contradict a states’ values or 
reminiscent of a shameful past (for example, disliking the glorification of national 
liberation wars but being unable to express it given a colonial history.)  
Social coercion finds its distinctive theoretical edge by pointing to social identity 
costs, but in practice does not exclude the possibility that they may mix with instrumental 
goals. To give an example: states might wish to avoid exposing themselves publicly as 
responsible for an unfortunate outcome (“we cannot take responsibility for wrecking a 
humanitarian conference”) or for allowing a valued institution be disgraced (“we must 
not let international humanitarian law be irresponsibly thrown by the board”.)  States may 
simply “value” an institution not only for moral or social reasons but also for 
instrumental ones: The former surely does not rule out the latter but cannot be reduced to 
it either. Fresh studies of compliance with human rights norms have come to a similar 
conclusion: In many cases it makes little sense to obsessively try to separate rational and 
social mechanisms or motivations for action.78 Yet I believe one must be cautious not to 
let this “pluralist” insight slip into the obliteration of the analytical value of theorizing 
social dynamics and mechanisms. 
How can we distinguish the operation of social coercion from other mechanisms such 
as persuasion, deliberation or rhetorical coercion? To name two crucial ones: There must 
                                                
77 See for example Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
78 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: 
From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 13. 
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be clear indication of the perceived social costs, and these should be moral, status- or 
identity-related. Second, the evidence must clearly suggest that the actors in the 
acquiescing minority are not privately swayed by the arguments of the majority, that is, 
that they have not been “convinced to change their minds” by either rational deliberative 
reason or the moral power of the idea. Instead it must be demonstrated that they are being 
pressured to change their positions to go along with the circumstances, against their 
express wishes. Yet unlike in cases of rhetorical coercion, the source of a changed 
position is not the discursive unavailability of an argument, but the awareness that using a 
line of reasoning or maintaining a conservative position will bring social or affective 
discomfort to an actor. 
The specification of a theoretical mechanism should ideally come accompanied by 
mention of the conditions under which it becomes operative. In this dissertation I point to 
at least four factors that are necessary for the operation of social coercion. First, the state 
or states that are its target must believe themselves unable to effectively change the 
majority’s opinion and/or block their vote. They must know they are isolated in a 
minority facing an obtuse majority unlikely to change its position through further debate 
or material inducement. Second, as stated earlier, target states must believe that there are 
serious moral or social opprobrium costs attached to their public refusal to acquiesce with 
the majority. Such costs may be more or less plausible in reality, but what matters is that 
the target state believes they exist and that they may be exacted by an international or a 
domestic audience. Inherent to this is target states’ belief that the majority’s public 
position carries such legitimacy that maintaining their recalcitrant minority stance will 
bring them shame and derision. Third, target states must believe that outright 
disengagement may lead to even worse outcomes, and so that it might make sense to 
remain at the table to contain further damage. Fourth, for social coercion to operate states 
must be interacting in a relatively institutionalized setting whose processes and outcomes 
are deemed important by participating states and are believed to carry some degree of 
scrutiny by a cherished audience or reference group. 
 
d. Coerced States Strike Back: Covert Pushback 
  48 
As I have shown, in this dissertation I argue that under certain conditions some states 
may be socially coerced to acquiesce to unpalatable outcomes. In the narration I had 
begun above this referred to colonial states, especially the United Kingdom (but also 
France, if more quietly.)  
But does the story there? Does social coercion have foreseeable consequences? Did 
the British and French react submissively?  
Again, the answer is no. Through public debate and private conversations the French 
and British Heads of Delegation had become aware of the similarity of their revised 
instructions: to accept a text that guaranteed the application of humanitarian principles in 
internal conflicts without explicitly calling for conditional reciprocity or delegating 
decisions to an external body but with the implicit understanding that lower-intensity 
rebellions were excluded, and that without saying as much, would leave the final decision 
of application to the concerned state. Their goal from then on would be to accomplish this 
through a formula acceptable to them but which could gain others’ support while keeping 
more “extremist” versions at bay. In Chapter 3 I detail how, with some important 
additions, the France-UK “joint” text emerged as the adopted rule in the end. And in 
Chapter 5 I demonstrate how a similar effect was produced during the negotiations of the 
Additional Protocols with regard to the inclusion of wars of national liberation (and 
partially) prisoner of war protections for freedom fighters.   
This is a type of strategic reaction I label covert pushback, which I argue has a direct 
impact on the implementation of the resulting rules. Following its negotiation, Common 
Article 3 from 1949 was disregarded in many occasions by states taking advantage of the 
vagueness of its scope. The First Additional Protocol not once became applicable in wars 
of national liberation because none of the liberation groups could rise to the high 
standards that the treaty, standards set high in deceptive ways. Yet the value or life of the 
produced rules with regard to internal conflicts was not always obliterated by covert 
pushback; in the case of Common Article 3, indeterminacy allowed for narrow as well as 
generous interpretation, and with the passage of time the vague scope CA3 became seen 
as useful by the actors pushing for better conduct in low-intensity conflicts. 
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The following figure illustrates the operation of social coercion and covert pushback 
from the perspective of the “coerced” state: 
 
Figure 1. Social Coercion and Covert Pushback 
Although the bulk of the dissertation is devoted to describing and explaining the 
process of formal rule-making in the area of internal conflicts in the context of 
international humanitarian conferences and diplomatic negotiations until the 1970s, the 
story of these norms has not ended there. Quite the contrary, over the past 35 years 
initiatives have proliferated that have extended the breadth and the means for 
accountability of the standards set earlier. This has occurred chiefly through the 
intersection or “cross-pollination” of humanitarian law with two bodies of law that had 
until then developed separately: international human rights and criminal law. The 
international architecture of these sets of standards has transformed radically over the last 
few decades, particularly with the creation of various regional and international 
commissions and courts, among which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is 
foremost.79 Given the importance of these trends in historical terms and for their 
relevance to current debate I devote an entire final chapter to tracing them and explaining 
them. As I show, the pathway to norm-making adopted since the 1970s has taken 
“alternate” routes that department from conventional interstate negotiations of treaty law, 
forcing me in some ways to “break out” of the theoretical discussions that frame the norm 
emergence and development story until then. This chapter should thus be taken as 
preliminary but also as suggestive of the future of standard-setting in this area. 
                                                
79 Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford University Press, 2011); David Scheffer, All the 
Missing Souls: Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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V. Plan of the Dissertation  
 The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with the absence of 
codified international humanitarian rules, a process inaugurated by the Red Cross. 
Specifically, it explores why the ICRC, after initially vowing to focus on the 
humanization of inter-state war in 1863, soon decided to pursue relief action in civil 
conflicts but shied away from pushing for formal regulation. This chapter also analyzes 
the early debates about the international legalization of humanitarian relief in civil wars 
from the early twentieth century until 1921, the year that saw the emergence of the very 
first non-binding international humanitarian principles for internal armed conflicts. 
Chapter 3 resumes the trajectory and explains the circumstances leading to the idea of 
extending the Geneva Conventions to “non-international conflicts.” This chapter zooms 
deeply into the disputed negotiation of Common Article 3. Chapters 4 and 5 continue the 
historical investigation by tracing the ICRC’s and other organizations’ efforts to develop 
the scope of Common Article 3 during the 1950s and 60s set against the backdrop of a 
new wave of armed conflict violence and atrocity, culminating with the inauguration of a 
new stage of norm creation. At the time Western states and the ICRC faced legitimate 
pressures to humanize wars of national liberation and to protect freedom fighters, a major 
moral crusade led by coalition of otherwise “weaker” states that ultimately prevailed. 
Given traditional power differentials, how was such success possible? To answer this 
question I descend again into the careful study of the preparation and negotiations of the 
two Additional Protocols over an intense period of almost seven years, and probe the 
operation of social coercion in this changed world-political context. Finally, Chapter 6 
connects the process and outcomes of the 1970s to the (many) developments seen in the 
following three decades, highlighting in particular the rise of decentralized standard-
setting through resort to international customary and human rights law by prominent 
international legal scholars and, crucially, by a new set of institutions and criminal 
tribunals. The concluding chapter reflects on the empirical and theoretical findings, and 
offers ideas for policy and future research. 
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Chapter 2 - The Early History of International Humanitarian Norms in Internal 




Internal armed conflicts were first formally regulated via international treaty law in 
1949 through Article 3, common to all of the Geneva Conventions, and later through the 
Additional Protocols to those conventions, negotiated in the 1970s. The origins of those 
instruments concern chapters 3 and 5 of this dissertation. Less well known is the much 
longer history of thought and practice on the treatment of civil conflict that preceded 
them. The first goal of this chapter is to describe the general contours of such precursor 
debates, focusing particularly on the discussions on humanitarian principles and practice 
in internal wars since the mid-nineteenth century, a period that witnessed a flurry of 
initiatives geared toward the “humanization” of war through international declarations 
and treaties. Despite a received lineage of ideas and doctrinal debates on the specific 
issue of internal armed conflicts, no international codes emerged at this time to bring 
humanity to bear on armed violence within states’ borders. Instead, the prevailing legal 
frames remained tightly beholden to states’ ad hoc decision to grant rebels recognition 
and/or good treatment, which happened only rarely. Moreover, although various actors 
gained an interest in regulating armed hostilities and protecting certain types of victims 
through international law, those standards were designed to apply strictly to conflicts 
between states, not within them. 
This is perhaps not very surprising from the perspective of sovereign-minded states 
that wished to retain their security prerogatives internally. Some rationalist worldviews 
presented in the previous chapter have this expectation as their baseline. What is 
noteworthy, however, is the fact that the non-governmental organization that emerged in 
the early 1860s as the principled beacon for making war more humane --the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)— for decades did not press especially hard for the 
formulation of binding legal rules for internal conflicts, despite the fact that soon after its 
creation it became deeply concerned and practically involved in alleviating their horrors. 
Why was this so? The second part of this chapter focuses on describing and explaining 
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the incremental, atrocity-punctuated process of change in the ICRC’s thinking and 
practice with regard to conflicts within state’s borders, what Gustave Moynier, ICRC 
President from 1864 until his death in 1910, colorfully termed “intestine” wars.  
With regard to this question, I argue, in brief, that the ICRC was a creature both of 
and ahead of its time. A model trendsetter though it was, the Committee operated both on 
and through the prevailing norms of sovereignty at the time. And throughout the 
nineteenth century, but especially toward its end, sovereignty as a social institution was 
characterized by reinvigorated imperial colonialism and growing military nationalism. 
These elements of the broader structural context, I suggest, militated against projects 
seeking to place burdens on states vis-à-vis their internal prerogatives, particularly those 
that potentially emboldened domestic violent challengers. Thus, despite the ICRC’s 
increasing involvement in the practical alleviation of the victims of internal wars, the 
organization ultimately seemed unwilling and/or unable to contradict the received 
international doctrine on such conflicts, which essentially left it up to states to decide 
whether to recognize rebels as belligerents worthy of humane treatment.  
Beyond macro contextual factors, various organizational-level constraints emerged 
soon after the founding of the ICRC that may have inhibited it from challenging 
prevailing international norms and sovereign imperatives too radically. These 
institutional challenges ranged from petty organizational jealousy, to the discredit that 
arose when the rules enshrined in the 1864 Convention were egregiously violated in the 
major inter-state wars that followed its creation, notably in the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870. In addition to lessening the organization’s social resources to act a humanitarian 
broker, I contend that these setbacks may have “locked-in” a certain conservatism within 
its small group of leading figures, particularly in its restless President Gustave Moynier. 
This conservative stance likely further reduced incentives within the ICRC to support 
adventurous proposals for new binding rules or institutions. 
Here I focus especially on the ICRC and the Red Cross movement because, until 
1912, no government had suggested that there should be biding international 
humanitarian rules for internal armed conflicts. However, the third and final part of this 
chapter takes readers all the way through 1920-1, describing states’ early proposals and 
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debates at international conferences on this issue. Importantly, I document and theorize 
the sources and processes through which the ICRC began to actively endorse the idea of 
formulating clear --if non-binding-- principles for humanitarian (mostly relief) action in 
internal conflicts, as well as the process through which states’ risk aversion toward those 
international norms started to recede.  
In sum, this chapter shows why, how and who placed the thorny issue of humanizing 
civil wars on the international agenda. Specific conditions and pressures generated 
incremental changes both in state and non-state concerns, spurring their combined moral 
entrepreneurship. And while during this time certain structural constraints blocked the 
emergence of “hard” humanitarian law in this issue-area, the seed idea became firmly 
planted and continued to grow over time due to similar, recurring auspicious conditions. 
 
II. Strands of legal thought before the nineteenth century 
Legal historians trace the origins of the debates among political theorists about the 
nature and participants of internal conflicts to Plato’s Republic, written around 380 BC, 
and to Cicero’s writings four and a half centuries later. According to Stephen Neff, 
political thought since this early period has consistently tried to differentiate between 
“true wars” against “worthy enemies” and conflicts with “bandits” or “brigands.”80 
“Real” enemies were those with clear internal lines of authority, with some claim to 
territory, wealth, and popular legitimacy. With them, war was to be waged according to 
certain rules of good conduct, such as respect for prisoners of war. The latter and “lesser” 
type of conflicts, in contrast, could be dealt swiftly and violently, according to the local 
criminal laws that were in place. Notable legal publicists and political commentators of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including figures such as Francisco de Vitoria 
and Hugo Grotius, agreed with this view, usually locating civil strife in the second, 
“criminal” category.81  
                                                
80 In this section I rely heavily on the work of Stephen Neff and Lindsay Moir, both international 
legal experts. Stephen C Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict.  
81 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 251–276. 
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In essence, this position did not seem to change until the mid-to-late eighteenth 
century when emerging liberal contractualist ideas began to ferment in Western Europe, 
slowly legitimating claims for representative government.82 The notion that a revolt 
against a sovereign could potentially be justified if he did not perform his duty to protect 
his subjects seems to have provided a crucial conceptual change that enabled a more 
“sober” assessment of internal strife.83  
This move is reflected in the thought of the deeply influential Swiss legal scholar 
Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767,) who in his treatise on the Law of Nations (1758) 
introduced a triad of distinction between types of internal strife: rebellion, insurrection, 
and civil war. This taxonomy would prove influential. According to Vattel, rebels were 
those (usually few in number and acting in a disorganized manner,) who waged an 
“unlawful” revolt against sovereign authority. They were to be treated as criminals. 
Insurrectionists, for their part, had some type of “just cause” that motivated them, 
including combating repression by their sovereign, but did not aim to overthrow the ruler 
altogether. Only when those in arms sought to bring down the central government could 
one speak of a civil war proper which, in Vattel’s view, pitted two parties against one 
another as if they constituted distinct societies.84 Importantly, it was also only this 
“higher” state of internal strife that according to Vattel activated the application of 
humanitarian principles: “It is very evident that the common laws of war, those maxims 
of humanity, moderation and probity… are in civil wars to be observed by both sides.”85 
Historically then, entitlement to good treatment between combatants has been entwined 
with questions of status recognition and claim to legitimate authority, two issues that, as 
                                                
82 Some cite instances in which Islamic law during the Middle Ages sought to depart from this 
strict division and to create a space for “doctrine-based” struggles as different from sheer 
criminality. This seems to have been an isolated position, however. Neff, War and the Law of 
Nations: A General History, 251. 
83 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History. Note that my discussion here has a 
narrow focus on the prevailing ideas and norms about civil war or internal conflicts, not on 
interstate war. For this reason I do not mention other crucial sources of the laws of war writ large, 
such as the Chivalric codes. 
84 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 255. 
85 Cited in Moir 2007, 3.  The emphasis is mine. 
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we will see, have persistently riddled debates on the regulation of internal armed conflicts 
through the present. 
 
III. Legal thought in the nineteenth century 
Vattel’s proclamation about the application of humane rules in the context of civil 
war, however, was far from constituting a broader normative belief or an international 
rule shared by statesmen at the time. Instead it seems that his opinion was quite novel. 
International legal scholar Lindsay Moir notes, for example, that “toward the end of the 
eighteenth century there had been a distinct move toward the application of the laws of 
warfare to internal conflict, but this was based almost exclusively on the character of the 
conflicts and the fact that both [interstate and internal war] were often of a similar 
magnitude, rather than any overriding humanitarian concern to treat the victims 
equally.”86  
To this one may add that the decision of whether to apply the customary laws of war 
was essentially at states’ own discretion and, generally speaking, states seemed happy to 
continue treating internal uprisings as expressions of criminality.87 Moreover, as I will 
note, it tended to be third states that seriously confronted the question of whether to 
afford recognition, not the states directly facing armed opposition, which usually 
preferred to avoid the issue altogether.  
Nevertheless, Vattel’s attention to the varied nature and intensity of armed challenge 
appeared to resonate among the legal publicists of the time, leading to the gradual carving 
out within traditional customary international law of three corresponding conflict 
categories: rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. The importance of his opinions comes 
to light when we are reminded that, at the time, international law did not yet come in 
codified or “positive” written form, and that its key sources were state practice (custom) 
and the opinions of leading legal experts, of which Vattel was a shining example. 
                                                
86 Ibid. The emphasis is mine. 
87 A systematic assessment of this claim has not been conducted, perhaps due to reasons of data 
availability. For a longer discussion, however, see Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947); Moir, The Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, chap. 1. 
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These three categories replicate almost verbatim the distinctions explained earlier. 
Rebellion was thought to cover small uprisings that could be dealt with through regular 
local measures— international rules had simply no import to quell it. Insurgency, for its 
part, involved a higher --and still undefined-- level of hostilities and organization, and its 
recognition triggered a few rights and responsibilities by parties to the conflict vis-à-vis 
each other, as well as to foreign countries. (The inability to set a clear “hostility 
threshold” would also plague rule-making in this area until the present.) International 
responsibilities to foreign third parties were chiefly related to economic matters at sea, 
such as the insurgents’ duty not to blockade ports, or their right to search suspicious 
vessels in order to prevent supplies coming from abroad from reaching their opponents.88 
According to Stephen Neff, recognition of insurgency meant that captured opposition 
fighters could be given prisoner of war status by the government they opposed, instead of 
simply being treated as criminals. This, however, was not a formal or obligatory legal 
provision but a humanitarian one, granted by states on an ad-hoc basis.  
State recognition of this second category –insurgency-- rarely came in explicit form. 
Despite this it appears that for the commentators at the time insurgency status could be 
triggered automatically (that is, without a declaration) once a few objective criteria were 
met: that the armed challengers occupied some concrete portion of territory over which 
they exercised sovereignty; and that they conducted hostilities under an organized corps 
with clear leadership, and in accordance with the customs of war. Neff clarifies that 
although “even to present day, there is no definite judicial authority on the point… there 
is little doubt that the automatic recognition of insurgency is the rule.”89 The extent to 
which this automatic activation of insurgency status was observed by governments has 
yet to be subjected to systematic scrutiny, however, and as such Neff’s claims about the 
“automaticy” of recognition remain tentative.  
The third and “highest” level violent non-state groups could “graduate to” was 
belligerency, which, when recognized, was taken to mean that a full-scale civil war was 
taking place, and hence that both parties should be treated in the same way as inter-state 
                                                
88 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 7–8. 
89 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 273. 
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war in the eyes of international law. The benefits attached to belligerency went further 
than those of insurgency status because the former activated a fuller body of neutrality 
norms that had to be respected by the foreign state granting the recognition.90 Simply, it 
constituted the most sophisticated legal mechanism that states could use, among others, to 
show humanitarian restraint toward their internal armed challengers. It legitimated the 
opposing party as “state-like,” a status that afforded both wartime rights and duties to the 
belligerent party.  
Some prominent occasions of belligerence recognition (by third states) exist. Britain 
exercised it in the case of the Greek independence struggle against the Ottomans in the 
1820s, and vis-à-vis conflicts in Portugal in 1828, in Trieste in 1848, and perhaps more 
importantly, in the American Civil War in 1861.91 Other major powers followed Britain’s 
example, such as France and Russia toward the Greeks in the 1820s, and the Netherlands, 
Spain and France in the 1860s. The United States also employed it in regards to the South 
American states that sought independence from Spain in the 1810s, or in the case of the 
Texan independence struggle from Mexico in 1836.92 
Notwithstanding these important cases, recognition of belligerence appears not to 
have been a predominant practice.93 Although in theory certain “objective” criteria 
existed that triggered it, embattled states were not under any obligation to recognize 
belligerency, and rarely did so. When it was used, as suggested above, it was usually by 
third states that stood to enjoy some commercial or legal benefit, particularly if trade took 
place with insurgent-dominated ports. Thirds states also afforded recognition if they 
explicitly wanted to materially support and give political legitimacy to an internal 
struggle occurring in another state, sometimes citing a humanitarian motive.94  
                                                
90 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 260. 
91 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 262. 
92 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 267; Moir, The Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict, 6; Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law. 
93 Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, 268. 
94 See generally Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of 
Force, chap. 3; Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008). 
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Importantly, as Lindsay Moir asserts, “the laws of war were not automatically 
applicable to internal armed conflicts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”95 
Only in few cases during the nineteenth century did the states directly concerned sign ad 
hoc accords with rebels to guarantee mutual respect for certain restraints in civil wars. 
Reciprocity was a key motivation in these bilateral agreements. Two prominent examples 
are the Swiss Civil War in the 1840s, and at least twice in Colombia (in 1820 during the 
War of Independence with Spain, and in 1860-1 during one of the many civil wars that 
country experienced at the time.)96  
Yet without a doubt the most crucial precedent in the history of the written laws of 
war arose during the American Civil War, through an instrument now commonly known 
as “the Lieber Code.” This domestic code took on such seminal importance that it bears 
some extended mention. 
 
IV. Seminal Efforts at Codification 
a. The Lieber Code 
The Lieber Code is widely regarded as a significant landmark in the history of the 
laws of war because, quite simply, it constituted the first-ever formal written codification 
of such rules endorsed by a government in modern times.97 Ironically, however, although 
originally conceived as a manual setting out standards for conduct in internal armed 
conflict, outside of the American Civil War the Lieber code became instead a model for 
the regulation of inter-state war. 
Francis Lieber (1800-1872) was a Prussian-born academic who migrated to the 
United States, eventually becoming Professor of History, Political Science and 
International Law in South Carolina and later at Columbia College (now Columbia 
                                                
95 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 17. 
96 Alejandro Valencia Villa, La Humanización de La Guerra: Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario y Conflicto Armado En Colombia (Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991); Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
97 This is by now such a well-acknowledged fact that only one citation bears mention; Geoffrey 
Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 170. For a recent, 
extensive and celebrated account of the laws of war in the history of the United States, focusing 
on Lieber’s influence, see John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American 
History (Free Press, 2012). 
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University.) Lieber, who had also had direct experience on the battlefield during his 
youth, became known for his teachings on the customs of war. In 1860, on the brink of 
the American Civil War (1861-1865,) Lieber wrote a document entitled “Guerrilla Parties 
considered with reference to the Law and Usages of the War” at the request of Mayor-
General Henry W. Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Army of the United States, who led 
the Union’s armed forces during the war.98 General Halleck solicited Lieber’s opinion on 
the grounds that:  
“the rebel authorities claim their right to send men, in the garb of peaceful 
citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses, and to destroy 
property and persons within our lines. They demand that such persons be treated as 
ordinary belligerents, and that when captured they have extended to them the same rights 
as other prisoners of war; they also threaten that if such persons be punished as 
marauders or spies, they will retaliate by executing our prisoners of war in their 
possession.”99 
 
Lieber’s twenty-two-page response paper occupied itself mostly with parsing out the 
constitutive differences between guerrillas and several other types of rebellious agents 
including: freebooters, marauders, brigands, partisans, free-corps, spies, rebels, 
conspirators, and robbers. Curiously, however, he conducted this survey in reference to 
the context of external invasion or occupation, but, explicitly, not of civil war. In the 
closing paragraphs, in fact, he declared that, 
“I do not enter upon a consideration to their application to the civil war in which 
we are engaged, nor of the remarkable claims recently set up by our enemies, demanding 
us to act according to certain rules which they have signally and officially disregarded 
toward us… The application of the laws and usages of war to wars of insurrection or 
rebellion, is always undefined, and depends upon relaxations of the municipal law, 
suggested by humanity or necessitated by the numbers engaged in the insurrection… 
Neither of these topics can occupy us here, nor does the letter prefixed to this tract 
contain the request that I should do so.”100 
 
President Lincoln and General Halleck were preoccupied with lack of knowledge of 
the laws of war by the thousands of new young volunteers that had swelled the army 
                                                
98 Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with References to the Laws and Usages of War 
(New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862). 
99 Letter of Major-General H. W. Halleck to Francis Lieber, Washington, August 6, 1862, in Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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ranks in preparation for the Civil War.101 Hence, a year after the publication of his 
original pamphlet Lieber requested to be appointed to write a broader code regulating the 
conduct of government forces during war. Halleck welcomed this request and Lieber was 
assigned, alongside three other military experts, to draft such a code.102 The resulting 
157-article work was soon thereafter adopted by President Abraham Lincoln as the 
official instruction manual for the Union’s troops, and dubbed “General Orders 100 - 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.”103  
The Lieber Code crossed borders to become a model quickly emulated by several 
other states, including Great Britain, France, Prussia, Spain, Russia, Serbia, Argentina 
and the Netherlands, all of which issued military regulations of their own over the next 
four decades.104 Legal historians have noted the irony contained in the fact that a 
domestic set of norms should become a template for international regulation, though this 
type of diffusion dynamic is consistent with much IR research on normative spread.105 
Lieber himself expressly hoped that his code would become the basis for similar 
documents in other countries.106 Given how well connected he was to the budding society 
of European international law experts and practitioners, with whom he corresponded 
often on various topics, it is unsurprising that his ideas floated swiftly across the ocean.107  
                                                
101 Burrus Carnahan claims that in the pre-war period the US Army consisted of 13,000 
professional fighters. These figures appeared to have risen to a million for the civil war, 
prompting Lincoln’s concern. Burrus M Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The 
Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity,” American Journal of International 
Law no. 92 (1998): 213–231. 
102 Lieber was the major author, with the rest of the Committee Members reportedly only briefly 
editing his draft. Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in 
War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
103 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863). 
104 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 155–156; Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: 
Origines et Évolution de La Réglementation Internationale, 23; Solis, The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, 41. 
105 Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm 
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107 Romain Yakemtchouk, Les Origines de L’institut de Droit International (A. Pedone, 1973); 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-
1960. Another plausible reason for the positive international reception of Lieber’s work was that 
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The success of the Lieber Code was not only international. It appears that, despite its 
initial rejection of these norms, the Confederate side eventually adopted it for the training 
of its troops.108 This was surely a welcome outcome since it seems that part of the 
reasoning behind the drafting of a code about the regulated exercise of warfare by 
Lincoln was to elicit reciprocity from the opposite side.109  
Importantly for our purposes, the Lieber Code also contained a full section (section 
X) on “insurgency, civil war, rebellion,” which, as indicated, was missing in the paper he 
had written a year earlier. The Code’s treatment of these matters was relatively modest 
(eleven articles out of a total of 157.) It provided definitions that mirrored the differences 
between insurgency and belligerency offered by Vattel.110 Similar to the prevailing legal 
doctrine, Lieber proclaimed the possibility (but not the obligation) that humanitarian 
provisions such as prisoner of war status could be extended toward rebels, but beyond 
this no other concessions were specified. Lieber also seemed seriously preoccupied with 
clarifying that a government’s gesture to give humanitarian concessions to rebels “neither 
proves nor establishes an acknowledgement of the rebellious people, or of the 
government which they may have erected, as a public of sovereign power.”111 This is 
worth noting, since it further confirms that state anxiety to avoid the legitimation of 
rebels through legal recognition has a long and sustained trajectory.  
Without a doubt, the Lieber Code constituted a watershed in the codification of the 
laws of war. Its prominence at home and across the Atlantic notwithstanding, it did not 
constitute an international treaty. Moreover, as hinted earlier, the Lieber Code would 
                                                                                                                                            
its language and provisions were not circumscribed to its direct geographical/political context 
(that is, the American Civil War,) but rather they were formulated in comprehensive terms, 
covered broad areas of warfare (including occupation,) defined crucial concepts in such as 
“military necessity” and, in general, crystallized in official form a rich tradition of legal reflection 
and custom on the waging of war. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict; Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International 
Humanitarian Law in War. 
110 Notably, it did not concern itself much with differentiating between these two, and brigands 
and other types of criminals—presumably the definitions he offered were clear enough to exclude 
them by fiat. 
111 Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. 
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have a distinct influence on future efforts to humanize war among states but not within 
them.  
 
b. The Birth of the International Law of War: the First Geneva Convention and the Law 
of The Hague 
Discussions about humanizing war through international agreements were brewing in 
Europe at the same time that Lieber wrote his manual for Lincoln and Halleck. Various 
developments served as background conditions for this movement, among them a 
growing enthusiasm for international law in Europe, the introduction of compulsory 
military service by increasingly nationalistic states, and the rising visibility of war 
atrocities through public reporting on the subject.112  
Actual international regulations of warfare among states began to crystallize in the 
1860s through the efforts of non-state and state actors. The year 1863 saw the creation of 
the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC, originally under a different name) 
in Geneva.113 Red Cross-inspired rules have since concerned principally the alleviation of 
harm to war victims, a category initially reserved for wounded and sick combatants.114   
A few years later, certain European states, especially the Russian Empire, began 
spearheading multilateral meetings to, among others, craft international instruments to 
                                                
112 Outside of the war regulations briefly reviewed here, the 1860s and 1870s saw the creation of 
the International Telegraph Union (1865) at the behest of France, and the International Postal 
Union in 1874 through the stewardship of the United States and Prussia. Alongside the ICRC, 
these are among the oldest, still-existing international organizations. On the enthusiasm for 
international law among liberal “internationalists” in Europe and the US around this time, see 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-
1960, chap. 1. On war reporting and its historical impact, see generally Paul L. Moorcraft, 
Shooting the Messenger: The Political Impact of War Reporting (Potomac Books, Inc., 2008). 
And on the eventual symbiosis between the Red Cross movement and growing war-prone 
nationalism in Europe, see John F Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the 
Red Cross (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
113 The denomination of the International Committee varied during its early meetings. First it was 
named Société Genevoise d’Utilité Publique (Geneva Society for Public Welfare,) later Comité 
International de Secours aux Blessés (International Committee of Relief to the Wounded,) among 
other slight variations. Eventually, in 1875 the current name (with Red Cross in its title) was 
adopted.  
114 The respect and protection of wounded and sick combatants stemmed from the fact that they 
could no longer fight and therefore threaten the enemy. 
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regulate the use of weaponry and legitimate behavior between combatants, of which the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences became the critical examples.  
This “division of concern” between victim protection and warfare regulation over 
time gave rise to two relatively separate bodies of regulation: the “humanitarian” Geneva 
lineage shepherded by the ICRC, and the state-driven “military” Hague tradition mostly 
concerned with the conduct of hostilities and the legitimate methods of war. Although to 
the contemporary eye this may seem like an artificial and puzzling distinction, it was 
deeply felt and maintained by states for almost a century, only to be overcome after 
intense public pressure and fierce governmental resistance in the 1960s and 1970s. 
(Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation will explain at more length how this came to be.)  
The credit of bringing about the first-ever international agreement for humanizing 
inter-state war (the First Geneva Convention of 1864) goes to the ICRC.115 This 
organization was created by five notable Swiss men of Christian faith as a platform to 
champion a set of humanitarian ideals, whose essence may be simply captured by the 
statement: “War is a fact of human life, and while it is unlikely to disappear, its horrors 
can be mitigated.”116 Although its “ideator,” the Genevan businessman Henry Dunant 
was not the first person to spouse this belief,117 he became its most effective and 
dedicated “agitator” when, upon witnessing the horrors of the Battle of Solferino in 1859, 
                                                
115 Although a Declaration on war at sea had been signed in 1856 in Paris at the end of the 
Crimean War (which for almost three years pitted Russia against Great Britain, France, the 
Ottoman Empire and Sardinia,) its contents did not bear humanitarian traits but were limited to 
protecting neutral maritime trade. Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed 
Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 4th Editio (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 1055. 
116 The story of the ICRC and the Red Cross Movement has been aptly documented elsewhere 
and thus needs only be briefly summarized here. The most balanced accounts are those of David 
Forsythe, especially David P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (Cambridge University Press, 2005). For an extensive account of this early period of 
the movement, see Pierre Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 
1985). More critical accounts are included provided by Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War 
and the Rise of the Red Cross; Caroline Moorhead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the 
History of the Red Cross (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1998). Finally, for a condensed 
version processed for IR scholars, see Finnemore, “Norms and War  : The International Red Cross 
and the Geneva Conventions.” 
117 The other towering figure was Florence Nightingale in the UK. Best, Humanity in Warfare, 
148–149; Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 19. 
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he wrote a moving manifesto (A Memory of Solferino,) and paid out of his own pocket to 
publish and circulate it among many of the key political and intellectual luminaries of the 
European world at the time, who received it with considerable interest.118 His opus 
depicted war horrors (especially those related to the helpless fate of wounded soldiers) 
with impressive skill, and its prose made it a sensational success, turning him into a sort 
of instant celebrity. The book drew praise from most quarters throughout the continent, 
from notable French figures such as Victor Hugo and Ernest Renan, to Swiss military 
hero General Henri-Dufour, whose career included being Commander-in-Chief of the 
Swiss Army during the Sonderbund Civil War of 1847 and who had also trained a young 
Napoleon III (who became Emperor of France in 1852,) with whom he remained close 
friends.119 Dufour went on to be part of the original “Committee of Five” that composed 
the original ICRC. 
Another recipient of the book was Gustave Moynier, a respected and well-connected 
Genevan philanthropist and lawyer, who was similarly moved with Dunant’s narrative 
and became enthusiastic about making it a reality. Moynier, like Dufour, had the moral 
and social standing to see the project through. At the time he presided the Geneva Society 
for Public Welfare, an organization founded in the 1820s that “brought together high-
minded Genevan pietists, men of affairs who sought to improve both the moral and the 
material lives of the common people.”120 Other Genevan notables were invited by 
Moynier to form part of the Committee, possessing medical skills to further back team 
credibility: along came Dr. Théodore Maunoir, a “distinguished surgeon who had been 
twice president of the Geneva Medical Society, [and who] possessed both a lengthy 
experience in medical philanthropy and an awareness of developments in the English-
speaking world that others lacked.”121 Maunoir enlisted Louis Appia, his “protégé” and 
                                                
118 Dunant, A Memory of Solferino. The Battle of Solferino was part of the wars of Italian 
reunification.  
119 Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima, 49–53. 
120 Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 21. 
121 Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 22. 
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then-President of the Geneva Medical Society, who also held a respected record of 
publications on wartime medical care.122  
Given their collective social resources, Dunant, Moynier, Dufour, Maunoir and Appia 
were quite well-placed to act as brokers of the nascent humanitarian spirit by tapping 
onto their links to high-level political figures.123 It also helped that Dunant’s oeuvre came 
equipped with concrete proposals, making the enterprise more amenable to realization. 
Dunant’s specific ideas were: 1) To organize relief societies of principled volunteers who 
would succor the military wounded and sick during interstate war; 2) that these societies 
would be formally recognized by governments and armies as legitimate providers of aid 
on the field; 3) that their members would be identified and protected by a universally-
accepted emblem;124 4) that this commitment could ideally be sanctioned as an 
international principle in the form of a Convention.125  
Together, these ideas constituted the initial agenda of the ICRC. Dunant and his 
colleagues were able to organize two Conferences in 1863 and 1864, and from the latter 
emerged the already-mentioned First Geneva Convention protecting sick and wounded 
                                                
122 Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 23. 
123 According to Stacie Goddard, in social network theory brokers are political entrepreneurs 
“who bridge structural holes in fragmented networks; they maintain ties with actors who would 
otherwise remain unconnected.” And “by bridging structural holes, brokers occupy central 
positions in a network structure, acting as nodes through which the multiple transactions 
coalesce.” Stacie E. Goddard, “Brokering Change: Networks and Entrepreneurs in International 
Politics,” International Theory 1, no. 02 (2009): 257. To this basic definition I would add that 
brokers not only attack existing “structural holes” but can and often do make them evident by 
pursuing a number of different tactics. See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16–25; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” These tactics are 
ultimately geared, among others, toward providing a common interpretive terrain and a focal 
point for action. Thus, the theoretical approach I adopt here pays substantive attention to brokers 
as agents of change, but maintains that the conditions under which entrepreneurs as agents 
succeed ultimately depend on the structural position they occupy. On transnational social 
mobilization more generally, see Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
124 The primary use of the Red Cross emblem was initially reserved for military medics, 
something that helps explain why initial governmental and army resistance to these new 
humanitarian standards soon subsided and transformed into a forceful embrace. 
125 A fourth one was added soon after: That the relief workers should be considered neutral by 
combatants and thus could not be targeted.  
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soldiers during inter-state war on land.126 As will be seen later, this would become the 
standard procedure of humanitarian rule-making for the ICRC; First, calling for 
“unofficial” meetings of government experts (and Red Cross societies) that served to 
socialize ideas, gather feedback and produce working drafts that did not constitute formal 
commitments, and second, liaising with the Swiss government to summon Diplomatic 
Conferences where state delegations held treaty-making powers.  
It is important to understand that, beyond humanitarian rules, the creation of the 
ICRC in 1863 propelled the emergence of the broader Red Cross movement that survives 
until today, which operates as a complex network of actors at the domestic and 
international levels. The ICRC sits in Geneva as an independent Swiss-registered non-
governmental organization with the ability to regulate itself and to guide international 
legal humanitarian debate, in addition to many other activities of protection, and to the 
soft “enforcement” of the law through quiet diplomacy with warring parties during 
conflict. National Societies of the Red Cross, for their part, are locally-run organizations 
that gather volunteers and rely on state approval and some amount of state funding, and 
thus --to varying degrees-- remain beholden to governmental authority.127 Since the early 
                                                
126 For the text of the First Geneva Convention see Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864 at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/120?opendocument or in Schindler and Toman, The 
Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 365. 
The political negotiation of the First Geneva Convention in 1863 and 1864 were arduous, 
however. Some governmental participants at the first (1863) conference, for example, initially 
balked at the idea of letting untrained amateurs “get in the way” of the battle, and it took spirited 
interventions by Moynier and others to tilt the adverse balance of opinion, eventually achieving 
most of what had been foreseen by the ICRC. Furthermore, only few state representatives seemed 
to have been morally committed (the Dutch medical expert Bastings, for example) to these ideas 
from the outset. Rather, most appear to have been convinced by ICRC and their peers’ influence 
in the context of the Diplomatic Conferences. Although it is not a goal of this chapter to provide 
evidence for or against persuasion or peer-pressure dynamics among states in these meetings, 
there is historical material that suggests that this was the case with at least some of the 
representatives in attendance. For an argument supportive of the convincing-through-persuasion 
hypothesis, see Finnemore, “Norms and War  : The International Red Cross and the Geneva 
Conventions.” Also, John Hutchinson’s more skeptical description of the 1863 and 1864 
meetings, from which I draw heavily, is helpful to discern between the positions of different state 
officials. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 33–56. 
127 This is but a bare-bones description of the Red Cross movement in its early period. I do not 
bring in more detail yet so as not to confuse readers, especially as the movement’s structure (and 
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years of the Red Cross movement the ICRC has balanced decentralized authority vis-à-
vis National Societies, among others, by retaining and upholding the right to recognize 
new Societies, and by fostering continued dialogue among the various Red Cross entities 
through events known as the “International Conferences” of the Red Cross.128 As we will 
shortly, these periodic gatherings have also constituted an essential forum for the 
development of IHL.  
For over three decades, the 1864 Geneva Convention remained the only international 
binding war-related convention. Yet, as mentioned earlier, while the ICRC was the non-
governmental precursor, there were other actors in its midst with similar goals. For 
reasons still subject to debate (historians cite a combination of military interest and 
perceived reputational benefits,) the Imperial Government of Russia became an active 
convener of inter-state meetings to discuss agreements about peace, disarmament and 
legal moderation in war in the second half of “the long nineteenth century.”129 At the 
                                                                                                                                            
that of its component organizations) is utterly complex and has transformed historically. It is 
important to note, however, that National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have been since 
1919 grouped by another organization, the League (now International Federation) of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, which arose out of organizational rivalries (and ambitions) instigated 
by the American Red Cross vis-à-vis the ICRC in the immediate post-World War I period. 
Historically, the League had a fairly difficult relationship with the ICRC regarding agenda-setting 
and claims to authority, but problems appear to have been ironed out in recent decades. In general 
it can be said that the League/Federation deals with natural disaster work and the ICRC is 
concerned with armed conflict.  For more on the organizational history (among others) of the Red 
Cross, see especially Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 316; François Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection 
of War Victims (Macmillan Education, 2003). For a recent argument about how the decentralized 
network structure of the ICRC has been beneficial to its operations, see Wendy Wong, Internal 
Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2012). 
128 The First International Conference took place in Paris in 1867. The latest (XXXI) edition was 
held in 2011 in Geneva. Until 1892, the name of the event was officially “International 
Conference of Red Cross Societies.” The switch to “International Conference of the Red Cross” 
provided greater accuracy in that the participants to these meetings included not just National 
Societies but also the ICRC, the states parties to the Geneva Convention, and after 1928, the 
League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (now International Federation.) For an 
exhaustive history of these gatherings, the actors behind their organization, the resolutions they 
produce and their legal status, see Richard Perruchoud, Les Resolutions Des Conferences 
Internationales de La Croix-Rouge (Institut Henry-Dunant, 1979).  
129 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 163. See also Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 3. 
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behest of the Russians, a conference met in St. Petersburg in 1868, which issued a 
Declaration to ban explosive and/or incendiary bullets, the first example of a formal 
international weapons ban and a source of future, more expansive commitments.130 Later, 
in 1874, a Conference was organized in Brussels by Russian Czar Alexander II to 
examine a draft protocol on the laws and customs of war inspired in the Lieber Code and 
expanding the regulations of the means and methods of war initiated earlier in St. 
Petersburg. Although the participating states (all European plus Turkey) at the Brussels 
Conference were only willing to sign (but not ratify) the document, its standards soon 
made their way into a military manual issued in Oxford in 1880 at a meeting of the 
Institute of International Law (IIL,) an organization created in 1873 by a group of 
prestigious European and American international lawyers interested in the progressive 
development of international law.131  
That code, however, was conceived as a model for voluntary domestic incorporation, 
not as a multilateral treaty.132 It was not until 1899, in the context of an International 
Peace Conference organized in The Hague once more on the initiative of the Russian 
Imperial Government, that the non-binding precedents laid earlier, especially on the 
conduct of hostilities and the methods of war (i.e. weapons,) were extended and made 
                                                
130 Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, 
Resolutions, and Other Documents, 91. 
131 See the text of the Brussels Declaration in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed 
Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 21. For excellent 
accounts of the origins of the Institute of International Law, see Yakemtchouk, Les Origines de 
L’institut de Droit International; Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and 
Fall of International Law, 1870-1960. It is worth noting that it was Francis Lieber who had 
sparked the idea behind the creation of an organization of prominent European and American 
experts to debate the development of international law more generally. Lieber died in 1872, 
months before the inaugural meeting of the IIL took place. That organization is still active, see its 
website at http://www.idi-iil.org/ (Consulted on August 13, 2013.) 
132 As noted earlier, in the 1870s and 1880s various states adopted domestic law-of-war codes 
inspired on the Geneva Convention, the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration or the Oxford 
Manual.  See Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de La 
Réglementation Internationale, 23. Notably, ICRC President Gustave Moynier was entrusted by 
his fellow experts with authoring what became known as the “Oxford” Manual on the Laws of 
War on Land, in reference to the city where the IIL adopted it. See Schindler and Toman, The 
Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 29. 
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into international treaty law.133 A Second Hague Conference, held in 1907 with American 
and Russian backing, revised and complemented the agreements from 1899. Although 
The Hague meetings failed to produce the intended disarmament accords, they are 
considered crucial in the history of war regulation and international institutions more 
generally for producing (among others) the seminal treaties referred to above, as well as 
for creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration to interpret and adjudicate international 
disputes.134  
 
What About Civil Wars? 
Internal armed conflicts were not considered at any of the diplomatic or Red Cross 
events described above, and as a result none of international instruments they produced 
dealt with the subject.135 As said earlier, from a statist perspective this is not really 
puzzling, given that prevalent custom did not obligate sovereigns to grant combatant 
status or good treatment to rebels. State risk-aversion, per rationalist expectations, 
worked against disturbing the status-quo. From this one could plausibly conclude that, 
despite the Lieber Code, the humanization of civil war had seemingly not generated any 
concern among the actors involved in international rule-making. But was this so? In 
particular, looking beyond states, how did the ICRC (as the recognized principled non-
                                                
133 The agreements obtained at The Hague Conferences are too extensive to detail here but can all 
be found in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, 
Resolutions, and Other Documents. The website of the ICRC also features them at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl. Note that at the Hague meetings states left the 1864 Geneva Convention 
untouched except for 1) adapting it to maritime warfare; 2) ensuring that The Hague Conventions 
included its standards. As I mention below, the ICRC fiercely reserved its position as the 
guardian of this “humanitarian” branch of the law, making sure that the original 1864 text was not 
revised without its direct stewardship. A Diplomatic Conference to that end was convened by 
Switzerland in 1906.  
134 This court was twice re-named, after the First and Second World Wars. It is now known as the 
International Court of Justice. For more on The Hague Conferences, see James Brown Scott, The 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Volume 1 (Nabu Press, 2010); James Brown Scott, 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Volume 2 (Ulan Press, 2012). For three IR 
analyses highlighting the various important outcomes of these events, see Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International 
Relations, chap. 6; Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society, chap. 3. 
135 Although later I will cite two expert meetings of the International Law Institute in 1898 and 
1900 that considered the subject but failed to produce humanitarian codes on it.  
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governmental organization devoted to the development of protections of war victims) see 
its own mission vis-à-vis that type of conflict?  
Existing accounts suggest that from the very first founding meeting of the ICRC in 
1863, questions were raised about the application of humanitarian provisions in civil 
conflicts.136 Dunant’s Memoires and the minutes of these seminal gatherings reveal that 
“after lengthy discussion, the Committee [thought] that it might be better and wiser to 
limit itself solely to thinking about the question of voluntary care in the context of the 
struggles between Great Powers, and only to European Wars.”137 Gustave Moynier is 
himself quoted as clarifying in 1864 that: “In case it needs to be said, we are not referring 
here to civil wars; international law is not applicable to them.”138 The reason for 
excluding civil wars was seemingly one of organizational (start-up) strategy: the 
Committee should have a clear and limited focus on which consensus by European rulers 
might be more or less easily attained. The extension to other types of war was not 
precluded on principle: rather, the ICRC founders felt that once the Red Cross idea had 
taken root and experience had accrued, it could grow in other directions.139  
Thirteen years later, these relatively shy positions on civil war had seemingly 
undergone radical transformation. Moynier’s own words are evidence of this. In 1876 he 
wrote: “That the wounded are insurgents…. Is that reason not to take them into account? 
Evidently not, since the motivations of the Red Cross are exclusively humanitarian, and 
detached from politics.”140 He added:   
                                                
136 Henry Dunant, Mémoires (Geneva: Institut Henry Dunant - Editions L’Âge d'Homme, 1971), 
71; Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de La 
Réglementation Internationale, 30–31; Jean-François Pitteloud, ed., Procès-verbaux Des Séances 
Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge: 17 Février 1863-28 Août 1914 (Société Henry 
Dunant, 1999), 20. 
137 Dunant, Mémoires, 71; Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et 
Évolution de La Réglementation Internationale, 30–31; Pitteloud, Procès-verbaux Des Séances 
Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge: 17 Février 1863-28 Août 1914, 20. The translation 
is my own, as are the italics. 
138 Moynier, cited in Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de 
La Réglementation Internationale, 31.The translation is mine. 
139 Pitteloud, Procès-verbaux Des Séances Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge: 17 
Février 1863-28 Août 1914, 20. 
140 Abi-Saab, Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Internes: Origines et Évolution de La Réglementation 
Internationale, 31. 
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“The affirmative would not be in any doubt if the Convention was involved only 
with reciprocal agreements between the governments adhering to it, as would be the case 
of a commercial treaty or a postal convention. But the Geneva Convention is more than 
that. There is nothing to be found in its text that limits its effects to the contracting 
parties; on the contrary, all its articles are worded in general terms as if they were the 
expression of rules to be observed not only in relations between the signatories 
themselves, but in all circumstances. It is a kind of humanitarian profession of faith, a 
moral code which cannot be compulsory in certain cases and optional in others.”141 
 
What was the reason for this change of heart? Simply put, internal conflicts ravaged 
in the immediate years after the ICRC’s creation. Table 5 presents a list of the internal 
wars in which the ICRC or National Red Cross Societies were involved during the first 
three decades of existence.  
 
Table 2.1. Partial List of Internal Conflicts with Red Cross/ICRC Involvement, 
1868-1949142 
 
Country Year Civil war, internal 
troubles, or visits to 
political prisoners in 
internal tensions? 
Turkey (Candie Revolt) 1868 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Austria (Dalmatia) 1869-1870 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Borneo 1870 Troubles (Insurrection) 
France (Paris Commune) 1871 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Spain (Carlist 
Insurrection) 
1871 Civil war 
Spain (Carlist 
Insurrection) 
1874 Civil war 
Turkey (Herzegovina) 1875 Civil war 
Argentina 1880 ? 
Transvaal 1880 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Turkey (Bosnia) 1881-2 Troubles (Insurrection) 
                                                
141 Moynier, cited in Ibid. 
142 Sources: Jacques Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des 
Détenus Politiques (Geneva: Institut Henry-Dunant-Editions L’Age d'Homme, 1973); Gustave 
Moynier, La Croix Rouge: Son Passé et Son Avenir (Paris: Sandoz et Thuillier, 1882); ICRC, 
Manuel Chronologique Pour L’histoire Générale de La Croix-Rouge, 1863-1899 (Geneva: 
Imprimerie I. Soullier, 1900); André Durand, From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1984); Catherine 
Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta a Dien Bien Phu: Histoire Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge, 
1945-1955 (Geneve: Georg Editeur, 2007); Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima. 
  72 
Egypt (Arabi-Pacha) 1882 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Peru 1885 ? 
Argentina 1890 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Argentina 1893 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Brazil 1894 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Peru 1895 Civil war 
Argentina 1895 ? 
Spain (Cuba) 1895 Civil war 
England (Rhodesia) 1896 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Cuba 1897 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Uruguay 1897 ? 
Boer 1899 Civil war 
Philippines 1901 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Macedonia 1903 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Uruguay 1903-1905 Civil war 
Armenia 1909 ? 
Spain 1909 ? 
China 1911 Civil war 
Cuba 1912 ? 
Russia (Soviet 
Revolution) 
1918 Civil war 
Hungary 1919 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Upper Silesia 1921-1923 ? 
Soviet Russia 1921- Troubles (Insurrection) 
Ireland (Free State) 1922-1923 Troubles (Insurrection) 
Poland 1924 Political Prisoners 
Montenegro 1924 Political Prisoners 
Italy 1931 Political Prisoners 
Austria 1934 Political Prisoners 
Germany 1933-1938 Political Prisoners 
Spain 1936 Civil war 
Lithuania 1937 Political Prisoners 
Greece 1946 Civil war 
China 1948 Civil war 
Burma 1949 Troubles (Insurrection) 
 
Thus, the ICRC was confronted with the cruelty of quickly erupting civil conflicts, 
which prompted certain policy changes to its relatively narrow initial mission. Note that 
this list of conflicts includes some minor uprisings and revolts short of insurrection and 
civil war. This confirms that since its early years ICRC practice did not conform to the 
distinctions between different levels of conflict set out by the customary international 
norms surveyed earlier in this chapter and thus, perhaps unwittingly, broke new 
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ground.143 (The discussion on internal troubles and disturbances would surface again 
many decades later, as Chapters 3-5 will show.) 
In its early years the International Committee refrained from directly attempting to 
operate on the ground unless it had been invited to do so by a legitimate local actor (the 
recognized National Society, or the conflict-ridden government.) Instead, respectful of 
sovereign non-intervention norms, it preferred to encourage the local Red Cross Society, 
if one existed, to take charge of relief provision.144   
The first real instance of ICRC “indirect” influence occurred during the Third Carlist 
War in Spain (1872-1876.)145 During that conflict and upon the request of the Spanish 
Red Cross Society, the ICRC extended its good offices, encouraged combatants to 
observe the Geneva Convention of 1864, and offered moral and intellectual support, 
particularly to the idea that relief workers should be granted neutrality from all sides and 
that they should not be treated as insurgents by the government merely for providing 
critical aid to the wounded and sick.146 Eventually the Carlist insurgents decided to set up 
their own relief society, La Caridad, and jointly with the official Spanish National Red 
Cross, set up a liaison office in Paris.147 Gustave Moynier himself managed most of these 
contacts directly from Geneva, as so many other International Red Cross affairs at the 
time.148 Importantly, in this case the ICRC also sent appeals to the other National Red 
Cross societies for the channeling of aid to Spain, and agreed to publish constant updates 
                                                
143 On the long history of the ICRC’s work on political prisoners in internal troubles, see 
Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus Politiques. 
144 Some National Societies acted out of their own volition. The earliest example of this was 
during the uprising on the Island of Candie (now Crete) in 1868, during the Italian reunification 
wars. Another example was the work of the French Society for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers 
during the uprising known as the Paris Commune in 1871. François Bugnion, “The International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Challenges, Key Issues and Achievements,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 91, no. 876 (May 07, 2010): 246.  




148 Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima, 297.  
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on all these developments in the organization’s bi-monthly journal, the Bulletin 
International des Sociétés de Secours aux Militaires Blessés.149  
The experience of the Carlist War is generally representative of ICRC operation in 
these initial cases, during which it acted largely by combining moral pressure, publicity 
and the mobilization of practical help. The outcome of this collaboration seems to have 
been a happy one, as eventually both parties to that conflict issued orders against 
executing prisoners and the wounded, and permitted the flow of aid from other Red Cross 
Societies.150  
Yet “success” in Spain was soon dampened by dire news arriving in 1875 about the 
violence in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria during their uprising against the Ottoman 
Empire. Indeed, the Balkan uprisings seem to have provided the crucial “moral shock” 
that led the ICRC to publicly change the position it held a decade earlier. According to 
Pierre Boissier, “in Bulgaria, particularly, the rising was put down by Turkish irregulars, 
known as Bashi-Bazouks, with appalling cruelty. A terrible tale of torture and massacre, 
claiming over 30,000 victims, soon reached a horrified and indignant Europe.”151 Such 
figures and messages seem to have helped the ICRC realize that the duty of the 
movement was “crystal clear: take action, regardless of the nature of the conflict.”152  
The “action” of the ICRC was careful and controlled, however. First, as in Spain, it 
saw itself as unable to enter internal conflicts without express invitation. In the case of 
the Balkan wars the Committee could not easily appeal to the Ottoman National Society, 
which, due to the recent passing of its founder, was moribund.153 Second, the ICRC 
keenly understood the external politics of the conflict: it suspected that the uprisings had 
been fostered by Austria and Russia, and thus had to exercise caution since it risked 
upsetting two crucial Red Cross partners. (This danger also precluded asking the Red 
Cross Societies of the neighboring countries to intervene.) Eventually, the ICRC chose a 
                                                
149 Later renamed Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix Rouge. 
150 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques, 26. 
151 Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima, 298. 
152 Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima, 298. 
153 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques, 28. 
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partial, safer solution: upon receiving a plea for help from Montenegro (a neutral country 
during that war) to cope with the refugees that had reached its territory, the Committee 
was pleased to organize its very first delegation and to act in partnership with the newly-
formed Montenegrin Society.154 As Moreillon notes, this set a double precedent for the 
ICRC: it had for the first time decided to help the (civilian) victims of internal conflicts, 
which was not in its initial mandate of tending to wounded and sick combatants. The 
circumstances had evidently forced the Committee to devise creative, if limited, ways of 
dealing with an internationalized civil war without upsetting its key protagonists.155  
Beyond political barriers to action, the performance of the Red Cross movement in 
the midst of internal armed conflict was marred by a long list of practical hurdles:156 from 
poor means of transportation and communication, meager financial and medical 
resources held by local Red Crosses, to ignorance or denial of its existence by insurgents 
and sheer antagonism by governments that reneged on their prior commitment to the 
Geneva Convention. Civil wars and internal conflicts of lower intensity clearly presented 
the movement with extraordinary challenges. In all, however, it can be said that 
Committee definitely went beyond the initial expectations it had set for itself in 1863-
4.157 
Beyond practical help and moral influence, how did the Committee view the 
prospects of formulating rules for civil war? Writing in 1882, Moynier reflected: “In the 
absence of written precepts [for civil wars], which we agree are delicate and difficult to 
formulate a priori, the Red Cross did not always show felicitous inspiration, given the 
diversity of cases that it encountered. In our opinion, it sinned by abstaining too often, 
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and that was either because it did not feel protected enough by the laws of war, or 
because political considerations exert more influence over it than they should.”158 
In the passage above Moynier curiously found himself both underlining the importance 
of formulating legal rules and foreclosing the chance of attaining them. In the same book 
he almost solemnly declared that: “it is time to regularize the way in which the Red Cross 
conducts itself vis-à-vis intestine wars, just as we have done with international wars. One 
does not see why it would not extend its obligations in the former case as in the latter.”159 
Did the ICRC heed Moynier’s own advice and move in this direction?  
Certainly, as I have shown, the organization did not either ignore the issue or remain 
aloof in practice. In the book just cited from 1882, Moynier formulated the practical  
(“National Red Cross first”) approach it had followed until then as a potentially 
generalizable procedure for relief action in internal conflicts.160 Yet these principles fell 
far short of the rules the organization had proposed years earlier for inter-state war. 
There was also opportunity to debate the topic in the context of the periodic 
International Conferences of Red Cross Societies, which as mentioned earlier constituted 
an ideal forum for the socialization of new humanitarian principles. For reasons that are 
still unclear, sometime in the 1870s the Belgian Red Cross submitted to the ICRC the 
following question for consideration at the next meeting of National Societies: “In the 
case of insurrections, is there occasion to send relief to insurgents before they have been 
recognized as belligerents?”161 At the time the customary procedure was for the ICRC to 
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divide the various questions it had collected among the different member Red Cross 
Societies, which upon acceptance would prepare a brief report for presentation.162 
The ICRC initially tasked the French Society with responding to the question on relief 
to insurgents. Such a request probably stirred controversy among the French since they 
had only a decade earlier dealt with the uprising of the Paris Commune of 1870, during 
which the rebels had not only denied recognition to the Red Cross but also attacked it. 
Unsurprisingly, the French Count of Beaufort, head of that country’s Red Cross, 
responded politely but negatively to Moynier, declaring in a private letter that “given the 
diversity of circumstances in which this [voluntary assistance to insurgents] can become 
manifest, it does not seem to us to be amenable to a search for general rules or 
conclusions of principle which guide the practice of the Red Cross in the future.”163  
Given this reaction, Moynier appointed the Dutch Red Cross Society as a new 
rapporteur on it.164 That Society came back with a set of proposed principles that in 
essence attempted to codify the practical experience the Red Cross had garnered up to 
that point, largely coinciding with Moynier’s own thoughts on the matter. The Dutch 
report, however, was only submitted to the Third Conference to be held in Geneva in 
1884 and (seemingly for reasons of time) did not actually come up for discussion.165 The 
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proposal carried over to the Fourth International Conference of the Red Cross in 1887, 
where it, however, died a strange death after being mysteriously “withdrawn” by its own 
authors before discussion, without further explanation offered on record or in private.166  
Given these failed attempts by National Red Cross Societies, the question rears its head 
again: Why did the ICRC, despite singling out the lack of clear humanitarian rules as the 
most important blocking factor for the pursuit of its work in civil wars, stop short of 
mobilizing states around that cause? Why did it embrace practical action but not legal 
change?  
The answer to this question is likely over-determined. That is, multiple factors 
probably worked to inhibit ICRC movement in that direction. Yet analytically and 
historically it may be interesting to ponder just what these factors were. I volunteer, first, 
that while the conditions under which the ICRC succeeded in eliciting regulations for 
inter-state war were salutary, during the same period there were powerful social and 
political circumstances that were utterly inhospitable to the idea of introducing 
international rules for internal armed conflict, notably the prevailing sovereignty norms 
and practices among European powers, characterized both by rising military nationalisms 
and the expansion of imperial colonialism.  
Second, at a more agentic level, soon after the signing of the First Geneva Convention 
of 1864, the International Committee’s initial social standing was tempered by a set of 
important setbacks that threatened its role and existence, likely removing incentives to 
put new issues on its regulative agenda. This attitude, I would argue, probably became 
“locked-in” into the practice of organization and the mindset of the individuals that led it, 
only to recede when a new generation of ICRC leaders came along. Let me briefly 
elaborate on each set of factors. 
 
Inhibiting macro contextual factors and their influence on the Red Cross and the ICRC 
As said in the introduction, the ICRC was a creature both of and ahead of its time. It 
acted (and continues to act) through and on the prevailing norms of sovereignty.167 
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Throughout the nineteenth century, but especially toward its end, sovereignty as a social 
institution was shaped by the impressive expansion of Western imperial colonialist 
practices in non-Western territories, particularly in Asia and Africa—at noticeably higher 
levels than in the past. As David Strang notes: “In the hundred years between 1780 and 
1880, new colonies were formed at the rate of five a decade. Between 1880 and 1910, 
new colonies were formed at four times this rate, or twenty per decade. The pace of 
colonial formation slowed after 1910, as the number of candidates for colonial 
imperialism declined.”168  
Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber have called our attention to “the constitutive 
relationship between state and sovereignty; the ways the meaning of sovereignty is 
negotiated out of interactions within intersubjective identifiable communities; and the 
variety of ways in which practices construct, reproduce, reconstruct, and deconstruct both 
state and sovereignty.”169 The colonial practices of Western states mentioned above, I 
wager, reflected and reinforced (“constituted”) a world that was simply not a universal 
society of formally equal and sovereign states.170 During this time, according to Strang, 
“Europeans resuscitated pre-Wesphalian forms of divided sovereignty like the 
protectorate, and compromised the internal authority of nominally sovereign states like 
China. Western powers received tribute as suzerain states in Asia and Africa, and paid it 
as well. Settler colonies like the British Dominions developed complete mixtures of 
formal dependence, internal self-government, and international personality.”171 Imperial 
control, thus, was “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, 
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the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy –
effective sovereignty- of the other, the subordinate periphery.”172 
This larger context, I argue, was patently less than conducive to the type of legal 
regulation of the internal (and often but not only colonial) affairs of the Western 
European states that were the ICRC’s main audience. Drafting, signing and ratifying a 
formal, binding treaty that would impinge upon the expansive interests of these powerful 
states in such a critical way, with language that could potentially empower these (mostly) 
non-Western subjects, simply does not seem like a viable route for the International 
Committee to have taken, or at least not one with any reasonable hope for success. 
Highlighting the Western/non-Western divide is crucial here because, as noted, it was 
precisely the countries in Asia and Africa that were the crucial target of Western 
imperialism during this period, and whose changes in sovereign control were at stake. 
Moreover, as Gerrit Gong has suggested, international law, including the laws of war 
drawn up in Geneva and The Hague, reflected the “standard of civilization” of the time, 
founded upon the imagined cleavages between civilized states from uncivilized 
peoples.173 
How does this relate to the ICRC more directly? It has been widely documented that, 
visionary as Henry Dunant, Gustave Moynier and company were in the domain of 
humanitarianism, they bore shared traits with what one could call the social “episteme” of 
the time.174 Prior to becoming a remarkable humanitarian, Henry Dunant was since his 
youth a convinced Bonapartist who believed that France, led by Napoleon III (whom he 
is quoted as having called “the successor to Romulus;” “the new Cyrus”) had been tasked 
with “reconstituting” the Holy Roman Empire.175 A few years before A Memory of 
Solferino appeared, Dunant’s opera prima had been “an impressive in-quarto of 46 
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pages… decorated with the Imperial arms” titled The Restoration of the Empire of 
Charlemagne and dedicated to “His Majesty Emperor Napoleon III.”176 In fact, it was 
while he was literally chasing on the heels of Napoleon in order to deliver this book to 
him personally that Dunant found himself in Solferino and witnessed the impressive 
horrors of the battlefield.  
For his part, Gustave Moynier, who has elsewhere been referred to as a “dedicated 
colonialist,”177 was a supporter of the view that the Red Cross “should extend itself only 
to those parts of the world that were becoming westernized.” Boissier further concedes 
that “while he did not relegate all colored men to the ranks of “the savages or 
barbarians”” Moynier remained convinced (in 1873) that ““the races which have a 
civilization, but a civilization different from ours” [did] not have the moral standards or 
philosophy that are compatible with the Red Cross.”178  
The mid-to-late nineteenth century was also the time in which military nationalism 
gained strong roots within Western European countries, something to which the Red 
Cross movement was not impervious.179 John Hutchinson puts it quite bluntly when he 
claims that “between 1880 and 1906, the Red Cross was transformed from an institution 
that owed its first allegiance to the idea of civilization to one that, by its actions as well as 
its words, wholeheartedly supported the aggressive nationalism and militarism of the 
period.”180  
“The basic direction of this evolution was set at the Geneva Conference in 1884, 
when, at the behest of the Italian central committee, two fundamental propositions were 
discussed and approved: that ‘the Red Cross owes the military sympathy and deference in 
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peacetime, and absolute obedience in wartime; while the state owes the Red Cross 
protection, in the form of laws that will assure its special position as an institution 




“It is fair to say that greater rapport between national Red Cross Societies and the 
military was an almost universal phenomenon in the period from the 1880s to 1914 and 
that the dominant feature of this closer relationship was the planned integration of the 
Red Cross into the wartime military-sanitary arrangements of each country.”182 
 
A respect for non-intervention at a time of both growing colonialist and nationalist 
practices thus likely exerted inhibiting effects on the decisions of the ICRC.183 Even 
historian (and current ICRC member) François Bugnion has characterized the action of 
the Committee in internal armed conflicts during the late nineteenth century as having 
“narrow limits” and toeing a cautious line which the organization “considered necessary 
to ensure that any action it took was not seen either as unacceptable interference in the 




In addition to sociopolitical factors, one may discern another set of reasons why the 
ICRC refrained from pushing the envelope too far.  
In the early decades of its existences, the Red Cross idea and the ICRC itself suffered 
various challenges. On the one hand there were those who were unconvinced of the 
appropriateness of the Red Cross idea since, instead of supporting an all-out ban on war, 
its initiatives risked making it more palatable to states. Others believed that the notion of 
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voluntary relief substituted what should really be a state’s responsibility, lowering their 
war costs by picking up their slack.185  
By the late 1860s, states started publicly raising the issue of regulating the structure of 
the ICRC, about the role of the National Societies during peacetime, and about the 
relationship between these and the International Committee. The Prussian government, 
for example, was enthusiastic about broadening the domain of action of the Red Cross by 
suggesting that National Societies could train nurses to care for the sick poor while “on 
break” from war. This vision was not shared by other states, as most feared it would 
amount to financial, technical and moral overstretch. The ICRC also appeared ambivalent 
to the idea of taking up peacetime responsibilities and remained allergic to external 
designs impinging on its own affairs.186  
Important dissent also came from within the movement, as when the French National 
Committee suggested in 1867 that the headquarters of the Red Cross should move from 
Geneva to Paris. Although the “forced resettlement” of the ICRC did not gain traction, 
the French continued to be a thorn in the ICRC’s side. It put a damper on a project to 
extend the 1864 Convention to war at sea, for example, threatening to withdraw its 
support. In response, Moynier became anxious that an attempt to embellish the original 
treaty would bring the whole edifice down. “Such a result, [he wrote,] would be 
disastrous, because it is of paramount importance to preserve the unity of this European 
understanding, so quickly and so auspiciously formed, even if it means sacrificing part of 
the hoped-for reforms.”187 And even though eventually four additional articles on sea 
warfare were drafted and circulated among states, they did not receive enough 
ratifications by states to enter into force.  
Yet perhaps the biggest blow faced by the ICRC during its first decade went straight to 
the heart of its earlier success: the mediocre compliance (or the repeated violations) of 
governments with the provisions of the Geneva Convention during the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870. While the Prussian army seemed to have been much better equipped to 
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respect the rules they had signed, the French were reportedly in “disarray” in terms of 
medical preparedness, and unable to keep an eye out on abuses of the Red Cross emblem 
by alleged volunteers who were actually just using it deflect war levies and violence.188  
The balance sheet after the Franco-Prussian war was at best unflattering. Moynier’s 
earlier assumption --that no government would violate its commitments willingly for fear 
of looking bad-- proved naïve. Shortly thereafter he became convinced that “enlightened 
self-interest” to avoid being judged by the “court of public opinion” was not a strong 
mechanism to prevent abuses, and that legal punishment was needed.189 Yet with the war 
being so recent, Moynier decided to take a public discussion of wartime violations off the 
agenda for the upcoming Third International Conference (originally scheduled for 1872 
but delayed until 1884,) afraid of creating strains within the movement and between two 
crucial members, France and Prussia, which upset other European countries that wanted 
to see it discussed. Word of “plotting” against the Geneva Convention also surfaced 
around this time; France and Austria expressed their discontent with it and willingness to 
replace it with other measures, such as clauses within domestic military codes. Even a 
modest proposal Moynier drafted to loosely organize the Red Cross movement as a 
federation drew virulent reactions from states. In sum, as David Forsythe wryly notes: 
“the Red Cross idea almost perished during the Franco-Prussian war.”190  
Taken together, I suggest that this backlash likely caused great enough an impression 
on Moynier and company to force them to think about their own survival and to elicit a 
defensive attitude, hence discouraging them from taking the risk of formally expanding 
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their humanitarian mission. Indeed, as Hutchinson notes, by 1884, the ICRC had surely 
learned that “there were clear limits to what could be achieved and had decided not to 
risk further the displeasure of the powers, lest the gains of 1864 be lost in the process.”191  
Conservativeness and pragmatism were not entirely new factors that simply “came 
later” for the ICRC, however. Instead they are better understood as a birth defect that 
simply grew stronger over time. As Pierre Boissier’s anthology suggests, since its very 
founding, the ICRC was well aware that if it hoped to pursue its agenda with some degree 
of success, it had to be strategic and “play with the players,” that is, with states, and 
convince them to change the rules of the game.192 The ICRC was thus a curious mix of 
principled creativity and shrewd pragmatism-- likely a product of the combustion of 
personalities at its head, particularly of Dunant and Moynier.  
Admittedly, absent direct evidence on why the ICRC actually refrained from pursuing 
legal regulations for internal conflicts, the above analysis remains speculative.  
 
Efforts toward regulation beyond the ICRC 
Let me cite a final piece of evidence to reinforce the points I have just made with 
regard to the socio-legal environment of the late nineteenth century. Beyond ICRC 
thought and practice, it appears that the broader (though then still small) community of 
international legal scholars held a similarly conservative view regarding proposing 
international humanitarian rules for civil conflicts.  
The Institute of International Law, mentioned earlier (and of which Moynier was a 
distinguished member,) took up the issue of internal armed conflict in their meetings in 
The Hague and in Neuchatel, in 1898 and 1900 respectively. Although there appears to 
have been debate on the issue, IIL members could not agree on more than formalizing the 
doctrine of belligerence from classic international law, discussed earlier, especially with 
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regard to the role and conduct of third states in internal wars occurring outside their 
territories in relation to military and economic neutrality. Humanitarian considerations 
during combat proved controversial. One IIL member is quoted as saying that:  
“The IIL is a scientific association which must rigorously stay outside of the 
realms in which the political passions of the day are aired… This proposal, to me, seems 
to have a character of political actuality that is too pronounced… I suggest that the 
project be momentarily set aside as inopportune…”193 
 
This conservative view elicited opposing replies. A few members felt that, as a 
scholarly organization, the Institute should aspire to shed light precisely on this type of 
controversial legal issues.194 Others insisted that distinctions should be made between 
“constitutional or dynastic insurrections, which we must condemn, and insurrections 
against a tyrannical or oppressive governments, which are legitimate.”195 Another group 
sought to exclude “non-civilized” countries from the purview of application of the 
eventual norms, echoing some of the arguments I outlined earlier. 
In the end, the Rapporteur of the meeting opposed these contentious opinions, for fear 
that narrowing down the field of application and denying (certain types of) insurgents 
their rights “would discharge them from their attendant obligations. Instead of limiting 
the field of application, we should instead extend it.”196 The controversies were 
ultimately resolved by extricating to the extent possible the subjective political 
considerations from the official language, opting instead for technical/factual criteria. As 
such, the two ensuing non-binding declarations firmly strengthened the norms of non-
intervention and said very little about humanitarian considerations.197 Notably, like the 
customary law of the time and Lieber Code written a half-century earlier, they carefully 
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stressed that to show humane treatment to rebels did not amount to recognition of 
belligerent status. Such was the status of international legal regulation of internal armed 
conflicts at the turn of the century; seemingly very little had changed, even in the minds 
of --theoretically independent—scholarly associations.  
How these debates related to the ICRC’s own thinking is not entirely clear. Although 
Moynier was Honorary President of the IIL, at the International Committee he retained 
his independence. One instance, however, may serve to illustrate how Moynier, despite 
leading an organization that championed legal (not only practical) change, remained 
extremely sensitive toward questions that could might disturb state sovereignty and 
compromise the neutrality of the Red Cross in internal armed conflicts, emulating the 
IIL’s own “prudence” on the matter.   
In October 1895, years before the Cuban revolutionary uprising against colonial 
Spain transformed into the international conflict now remembered as the Spanish-
American War (1898,) American Red Cross (ARC) President Clara Barton privately 
wrote to Moynier consulting him about an application she had received from a recent 
acquaintance, a medical doctor by the name of A. J. Díaz, who was reportedly very active 
in providing relief to victims of the uprising in Cuba as a member of the Spanish Red 
Cross. Díaz believed that acting as a member of the ARC (in addition to the Spanish 
Society) would enable him to carry out relief operations more effectively, prompting him 
to approach Barton for official admission.198 Unable to decide on an issue that in her view 
touched indirectly on international law, Barton deferred to Moynier, hoping he would see 
no issue with this request and acquiesce to Díaz’s idea. This was not the case, however. 
Instead, Moynier opined that Díaz should seek to work with his Spanish compatriots 
only. “If this does not suffice for him, and he wishes to accede to your [Red Cross] 
Society, this cannot be, it seems to me, but for a hidden political motive and in hopes that 
this new status will enable him to [treat] insurgents. From the humanitarian viewpoint 
this would certainly be a happy outcome, but I think it would be regrettable to set such a 
precedent, ie. to associate one person to two different Red Cross Societies… in a civil 
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war during which susceptibilities are overexcited.” For this reason, Moynier advised 
Barton to turn Díaz’s request down, adding that: “… Mr. Díaz’s zeal could be usefully 
employed to produce an entente between the Spanish government and the Cuban 
insurgents toward the reciprocal observation of the laws of war and especially of the 
Geneva Convention. This would be… the surest way of achieving his goals.”199  
This vignette illustrates the points made here about the ICRC’s modus operandi. 
Moynier’s simultaneously cautious and principled response to Barton served to guard his 
organization’s interest and to show respect toward prevailing norms, while still 
displaying a commitment to the diffusion and application of humanitarian precepts in 
war. With regard to internal armed conflicts, specifically, Moynier appears to have seen 
the organization’s role as that of an intermediary working within strict (sovereign, 
neutral) bounds, with a duty mostly limited to exerting moral influence that left the 
thorny politics to others.200  
 
V. Into the Twentieth Century 
Almost since its inception the ICRC opted to participate in internal armed conflict 
relief but refrained from forcefully advocating formal legal rules to be sanctioned by 
states. Broader structural dynamics in Europe at the time (the dramatic rise of 
imperialism, and budding nationalisms at home, particularly) as well as its diminished 
standing as a humanitarian broker roughly between 1870s and the mid-1890s, with the 
attendant conservative pragmatism it may have elicited among its core members, all 
probably prevented it from taking a decisive legal approach to a such politically charged 
issue. The similarly conservative opinion on this topic of other international legal experts 
(outside of, but in contact with the ICRC,) certainly did not help to move this agenda 
forward, instead working to reify the normative status-quo.  
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By the 1890s a tense international context, however, quickly propelled state and 
pacifist groups’ interest in the prevention or moderation of interstate war.201 Arms racing 
by European powers threatened the balance of power. Tensions were also brewing at 
home for many European countries, as the traditional political institutions coped with the 
social consequences of rapid industrial growth. Against this background and in a matter 
of years, Russian Tsar Nicholas II would champion the already-mentioned First 
International Hague Peace Conference in 1899, a gesture soon followed by the United 
States which, on the heels of two recent conflicts of its own (in Cuba against Spain, and 
while invading the Philippines,) proposed a second edition, eventually convened by the 
Russian Tsar in 1907. Although the governments that would gather at The Hague were 
largely concerned with codifying rules for the conduct of hostilities and the methods of 
combat (i.e. weapons, in addition to other matters of war-limitation and arbitration,) some 
among them had for some time also wished to revise the original Geneva Convention and 
to adapt it to maritime warfare (a task left pending decades prior when an ICRC proposal 
failed to garner enough backing.)  These external pressures forced the ICRC to shake off 
its conservatism toward the idea of revisions to the existing law, and the organization had 
little choice but to adapt. Its plans were preempted, however, when on the verge of 
announcing a new Diplomatic Conference to revise and extend the original convention 
(under the sponsorship of the Swiss government,) Russia’s Nicholas II circulated his 
proposal to meet at The Hague. 202 
Given the public prominence the upcoming Hague Peace gathering had attained, 
Swiss/ICRC plans were put on hold. There was uncertainty and nervousness as to how 
the 1899 Conference would approach the original Geneva Convention, perhaps lowering 
the standards attained before. Yet it seems that with the influence of the Swiss delegate, 
governments agreed that its revision should occur not at The Hague but at a separate 
“special” event be held to that purpose, under the aegis of Switzerland. The 1899 Hague 
went ahead with adaptation of the Geneva rules to maritime warfare, but the most 
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important issue –safeguarding the integrity of the original accord—was left in the hands 
of its zealous “guardian,” the ICRC, which steered a revisions process that culminated in 
1906.  
In all these discussions, however, the issue of internal armed conflict remained 
conspicuously absent. Other less controversial and comparatively neglected issues had 
started to take precedence, notably increasing the legal protections for prisoners of war. 
The Hague Conferences had taken important steps toward regulation in this area, but 
there remained glaring gaps related to implementation that the ICRC, with some 
hesitation, declared it could endeavor to fill.203  
The new century thus found the ICRC (if grudgingly) accepting new normative and 
operational tasks in less controversial subjects, reducing the odds that internal conflicts 
might take on greater relevance. Moreover, the ICRC’s conservative organizational 
culture --depicted earlier-- remained largely unchanged. As official Red Cross historian 
André Durand noted: “At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ICRC was obviously 
in no hurry to change its composition, since no new members were appointed for sixteen 
years, from 1898 to March 1914.”204 The original generation led by the aging Moynier 
continued at the helm of the organization, and the passing of the torch to a younger 
generation would not be completed until the 1920s and 1930s with the retirement (or 
death) of Moynier successor Gustave Ador, Moynier’s son Adolphe, and of Paul des 
Gouttes. Generational persistence (or lack of generational change) thus plausibly 
operated as a reproductive mechanism that furthered the received reluctance of the ICRC 
to tread on the waters of formally regulating humanitarianism in civil conflict.  
 
Putting Civil Wars on the agenda: The US 1912 Proposal 
Given the above, it is little wonder that the idea of formally regulating civil wars did 
not come from the ICRC. Yet it should surprise that it was a state (in conjunction with its 
National Red Cross) that eventually attempted to fill this void. In 1912 the United States, 
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acting as host to the Ninth International Conference of the Red Cross in Washington 
D.C., came armed with a report and a proposal for creating the first-ever international 
agreement on the provision of humanitarian relief during civil war and internal 
disturbances.205 Although it would fail to crystallize, this initiative triggered the first 
public discussion of the topic among statesmen, and as will be shown, constituted a 
crucial springboard for future efforts at regulation.  
The US proposed to formally allow the extension of humanitarian relief to the sick 
and wounded victims from all sides (state forces, insurgents, and non-combatants,) 
expressly permitting a foreign Red Cross to offer its services to another country’s 
government or local Red Cross when faced with internal conflict. Relief offers would be 
directed at the War Department of the recipient state, had to be approved by it, and would 
have to be tendered following the humanitarian precepts governing the Geneva 
Convention for interstate war.206  
The origins of this curious initiative are not well known.207 One may first ask, why 
would a rising power care about this controversial topic to begin with? At face value this 
idea is consistent with the expansionist (and to many sheer imperialist) impulse of US in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the “Progressive Era” of the 
country’s foreign policy. Indeed, historians and political scientists recognize this period, 
especially with the administrations of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William 
Taft and Woodrow Wilson, as the (first) heyday of US expansionism, including 
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international legalism.208 Yet there was plainly nothing in the measured language of the 
draft agreement that lent itself overtly to interventionism. Rather it seemed to be carefully 
crafted to legalize the collaboration of relief provision by National Red Crosses which 
had to be approved and could be carefully monitored by the receiving state. As François 
Bugnion asserts: “The American Red Cross report was remarkable in that it managed to 
reconcile the interests of the victims, Red Cross freedom of action and the rights of the 
parties to the conflict. The sovereignty of the government was amply protected…”209 
Securing reciprocity at home as a possible motive also seems unpersuasive, since at the 
time there was no perceived risk of rebellion in the US.  
What was the motivation of the American delegation then? Whose idea was it 
anyway? A look at the original invitation sent by the American Red Cross to member 
states, National Societies and the ICRC did not include civil war as a topic for discussion. 
No state had suggested adding it to the agenda, either. Rather, its inclusion on the 
Conference agenda seems to have come in April 1912, a short month before the 
conference started. The International Relief Board, a sub-agency of the American Red 
Cross, was requested to prepare a study on the conduct of National Red Crosses in 
foreign civil wars. This report was researched and later presented at the International Red 
Cross meeting by a solicitor within the US State Department, Joshua Reuben Clark, Jr. In 
time for the upcoming Conference, and seemingly in the spur of the moment, the 
American Red Cross thought it opportune to present the results of this research to other 
states, accompanied by concrete treaty language to materialize it. 
It may be instructive to examine the personal story of Clark Jr. to gain insight into his 
project’s intent. Clark Jr. had graduated from Columbia Law School and was appointed 
Assistant Solicitor of the US State Department in 1906.210 According to his biographers, 
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when the Mexican Revolution erupted in 1911, Clark Jr. had acted as close counselor to 
the Secretary of State and to President William H. Taft. One of the areas promoted by 
Clark Jr. was humanitarian relief to victims of the revolution. A fervent Mormon, he 
appears to have been especially concerned with the seemingly important numbers of 
Mormon victims in Mexico. Beyond this, historians have noted that the problems caused 
by the “embittered rivalries of competing factions” over Red Cross aid after the 
overthrow of the Díaz regime in 1911 led the US State Department to make efforts to 
clarify the delicate issue.211  
Clark Jr. does not appear to have been an avid interventionist. Rather, the American 
proposal can be more plausibly understood as produced by a humanitarian motive 
coupled by a newly-acquired interest in providing aid relief in civil conflicts taking place 
elsewhere. The US, and with it the American Red Cross, had been an active participant in 
a few civil wars and minor uprisings since the end of the nineteenth century, among 
them, as mentioned earlier, in Cuba and in the Philippines. In terms of relief provision, 
besides the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the American Red Cross had sent missions 
during uprisings the Dominican Republic (1903 and 1906,), Venezuela (1903,) Nicaragua 
(1909), Honduras (1911,) and China (1912.)212 Thus, beyond altruism, the United States 
and the American Red Cross seemed to have developed an interest in securing clear legal 
rules in this field.  
In any event, whatever its origins, this proposal came to naught. The representative 
from Imperial Russia, General Yermolov fired the opening shot by declaring that “in no 
case or manner could the Imperial government become a contracting party to or even a 
discussant of any agreement or vow on this topic,” and “given its political gravity,” in his 
opinion “it should not be opened to discussion in a Conference of exclusive humanitarian 
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and pacifist nature.”213 In a shrewd rhetorical move, Yermolov cited the words of General 
Sherman during the American Civil War: “On no earthly account can I admit any thought 
or act hostile to the old Government.” The Russian General went further, sentencing that 
“Any offer of services, direct or indirect, of Red Cross Societies to insurgents or 
revolutionaries could not be conceived as more than a violation of friendly relations, as 
an “unfriendly act,” likely to encourage and foster sedition or rebellion in another 
country.”214 Italy and France agreed, with the latter sentencing that this was patently a 
“governmental question, and a government cannot see revolutionaries as belligerents.” To 
this, and given that at the time Latin America showed a great concentration of internal 
conflicts, the Italian representative General Ferrero added that the topic was “too local” 
and “special,” and as such unworthy of general discussion at an international conference.  
Clark Jr. reacted with a humble but nevertheless passionate defense of his proposal, 
highlighting its eminently humanitarian character and the many safeguards it included, 
especially the fact that it allowed states to accept or decline offers for foreign relief. 
Importantly, he clarified that in no circumstance would relief provision indicate a 
recognition of belligerence upon insurgents. Indeed, most states sitting in Geneva seemed 
to be concerned with legally legitimizing potential revolutionaries—a recurrent worry.  
Moreover, Clark Jr. scolded General Yermolov for his conservatism, reminding him 
that the Conference was primarily a meeting of Red Cross Societies, not of governments, 
and as such airing ideas and projects to advance the humanitarian mission was 
completely appropriate. (Clark’s plea confirms the inevitably political character of these 
meetings and the prominent role states play in them, regardless of the claims by the ICRC 
or National Red Cross to the contrary. This politicization may vary over time but is never 
absent.) Clark Jr. also cited the American Red Cross’ prior experience in relief provision 
to both sides of internal conflict. And in response to Yermolov’s audacious reference to 
the American Civil War, Clark Jr. reminded the audience of the humanitarian work of the 
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US Sanitary Commission, which provided care to wounded and sick members of both the 
Union and the Confederate forces.215  
It must be noted that not all states were as fiercely opposed to the idea as the Russians 
or the Italians. The British Representative warned against it apparently not on principle 
but due to the security difficulties it entailed, such as ensuring respect to the Red Cross 
corps by insurgents, which had been lacking, as noted earlier, during the Paris Commune 
uprising of 1871. Citing its own recent experience, China suggested that relief to 
insurgents could be domestic but not foreign, fearing an implicit recognition of 
belligerence. Greece supported the idea of principles for allowing relief once an internal 
conflict had reached civil war proportions, and once rebels had been implicitly or 
explicitly recognized as belligerents. Only three Latin American countries (Uruguay, 
Argentina and Cuba) and Switzerland agreed with the US proposal; Cuba had in fact 
come to Washington with its own proposal for legitimating domestic relief only to see it 
rhetorically lumped –and eventually dismissed-- with the American-born project. 
Despite a measure of moderation, it is clear from the debates that most states in the 
room were either dubious or overtly against the idea of legitimizing humanitarian relief 
provision in civil conflicts. The motives behind rejection are not hard to ascertain: a mix 
between risk aversion among the imperiled European powers, and states’ broadly shared 
fear of legitimizing rebels through international principles.  
The ICRC played a notoriously demure role in the 1912 discussion. Gustave Moynier 
had died in 1910, so it was his successor, Gustave Ador, who now presided over the 
organization and over the Conference. Interestingly, in his interventions on this subject 
Ador appeared to actually side with the skeptics, for instance when he acquiesced to the 
idea that these were “personal matters relating to the particular situation of certain 
countries, but which could not give rise to a voted resolution by the Conference.”216 This 
seems like a disappointingly unenthusiastic attitude. Yet in the end, Ador recognized that 
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the topic remained on the agenda and that “it is very likely that in a few years this 
question will have been advanced and may be resolved in a different manner than it was 
today.”217 
Ador was right. “More than time” what was needed was “precedent.”218 One might 
add: more, and more spectacular precedents. Over the next few years, several Red Cross 
societies and the ICRC itself would garner additional fresh experience in war relief 
efforts. These experiences would prove to lead to advances at the following International 
Conference of the Red Cross Societies. 
 
New Shocks: Russia and Hungary 
First came the Soviet Revolution in 1917. The crumbling of the Russian Empire, and 
with it the Russian Red Cross Society, one of the most distinguished and able of those 
existing at the time, raised new challenges for the humanitarian mission of the ICRC. In 
January 1918, the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars confiscated the property of the 
National Red Cross and announced a plan to reorganize it.219 Alarmed, the ICRC 
appointed a Swiss delegate in Petrograd to deal with the rapidly changing situation, 
tasked with ensuring the continued presence of the Red Cross in such dire times. Much to 
the ICRC’s surprise, however, the Soviet response was welcoming. A declaration signed 
by Lenin himself stated that Soviet Russia remained committed the Geneva Convention 
as well as to “all other Conventions and international agreements relating to the Red 
Cross,” and that the Russian Red Cross would continue to be active in assisting and 
helping prisoners of war.220 Action followed words, and a special committee for prisoners 
of war and refugees was set up in Moscow. A parallel committee had been formed by the 
ICRC representative there, Edouard Frick, and formed by Red Cross Societies from 
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neutral countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The Red Crosses from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria also attended on 
an advisory capacity. These combined efforts reportedly provided considerable political, 
material, moral and medical help to political detainees, interned children, refugees and 
prisoners of war in need of repatriation.221  
The situation in Hungary was equally perplexing. In March 1919, communist 
revolutionary Béla Kun unseated the government of President Mihály Károlyi, and 
though the coup d’état had been bloodless, the new government threatened to punish by 
death any contravention to it—a clear red flag against humanitarian values. In addition, 
Hungary represented a crucial point of passage for the repatriation of prisoners of war 
scattered through the region after World War I, and so securing its presence there was 
key for the ICRC.222  Luckily, in Hungary the ICRC and the National Red Cross were 
again given all assurances by the communist government of their neutral status, and of 
respect for their humanitarian work. This allowed the ICRC representative in Budapest to 
conduct visits to many political detainees for some time, the first such visits for the 
ICRC.  
Béla Kun, however, retracted his lofty promises when the head of the Italian Military 
Mission in Budapest offered protection to captured rebels. Italy, according to Kun, could 
not consider as combatants “armed gangs who, in the interests of the counter-revolution, 
massacre women and children and want to exterminate the Jews.”223 Kun’s hardened 
position had little airtime, however, and his revolution ended with Romania’s invasion in 
late July 1919. Concerned now with ensuring good treatment of the former Communist 
revolutionaries and other prisoners of war, along with offering some relief for the awful 
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conditions experienced by the broader population, the ICRC eventually stayed in the 
country until 1922. 
According to the International Committee’s report of activities between 1912-1920, 
the Russian and Hungarian efforts finally proved the value of the “indispensable role of 
the Red Cross in a civil war.”224 Indeed, as we will see in a moment, new non-binding 
norms were proposed and created in 1921 on the heels of these recent experiences.  
Archival evidence suggests, however, that this change of mind was neither automatic 
nor necessarily a product of the ICRC’s own reflection. In a letter from as late as January 
1919, for example, the International Committee expressly refused to support the idea of 
organizing international relief for civil war victims not just in Europe but worldwide-- a 
project submitted to it by representatives of the Danish, Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and 
Italian Red Crosses. Instead of enthusiasm, the ICRC channeled the skeptics from the 
1912 Conference by declaring that “one cannot conceive of organized action that applies 
to those types of wars, provoked by reasons in which a foreigner should not intervene.” 
Moreover, in the ICRC’s view “civil war is very different to ordinary war; it is not 
subject to the laws and customs of war. It comes in many forms in different localities and 
countries, following the character of the nation in which it reigns. One can hardly see 
how one could subject it to such an organization.”225 Following decades-old practice the 
ICRC reiterated that only the National Red Cross of the concerned country could provide 
relief to the combating sides.  The letter ended by suggesting that the International 
Committee nevertheless found the idea “interesting” and that it would consider how to 
execute it. Hence, despite the practical efforts led by its representatives on the ground the 
ICRC back in Geneva remained seemingly cool toward the idea of regulating civil wars, 
even after the bloody Russian revolution had wound down.  “Learning” from recent 
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traumas had thus not been as automatic as official histories seem to imply. What 
happened then?  
Archival research points, in particular, to the dedicated correspondence directed to the 
International Committee by a former member of the (old) Russian Red Cross, Georges 
Lodygensky, who after the fall of the Tsarist Empire had taken refuge in Geneva but 
continued to be in communication with different Red Cross organizations on the ground 
in Revolutionary Russia. Clearly anxious to facilitate concrete aid provision to victims, 
Lodygensky authored two reports detailing the profound need for coordinated Red Cross 
in civil wars, given the deep humanitarian challenges present all over his country. The 
ICRC, seemingly impressed by his work, accepted to publish these reports in its quarterly 
journal.226 Importantly for us, Lodygensky was convinced that the ICRC had to take the 
issue of internal conflicts more seriously, by creating its own permanent special unit 
devoted to civil war relief and coordination, and by promoting legal studies to achieve the 
formalization of international Red Cross collaboration in such conflicts. He submitted 
these ideas directly to Gustave Ador, ICRC President, and to others in his staff in 
personal meetings in May 1920. 
This time, and faced with extensive and dedicated research, the International 
Committee finally acquiesced. Ador himself replied to Lodygensky, recognized his brave 
perseverance, and among others, promised to “hasten the juridical and diplomatic 
examination of the questions raised by the intervention of the International Red Cross in 
civil wars.”227 Ecstatic, Lodygensky replied within three days, and over the next two 
months he sent to the ICRC his thorough vision of both the theoretical and practical 
aspects of project, built upon the multiple recent experiences of various National Red 
Crosses, in conflicts in Russia, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal, Estonia and Turkey.228 
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Lodygensky’s writings became key for the debate on the topic in the upcoming 
Conference, and he was directly invited to participate as representative of the “old” 
Russian Red Cross.  
These vignettes are worth reconstructing because they extend the empirical and 
theoretical argument made earlier regarding the persistent reluctance of the fundamental 
moral entrepreneur in the area of humanitarianism to promote formal international 
mechanisms of civil war relief. In particular, they illustrate the point that atrocity trauma 
requires activate and persistent (in this case bottom-up) mobilization to lead to prompt a 
rethinking of old attitudes and policies. 
 
A Concrete First Step: Legitimating International Red Cross Access to Civil Wars 
Recent civil wars experience, embedded within the broader collective horrors due to 
the abuses committed in World War I, did make an impression on several National Red 
Crosses. In preparation for the next International Conference of the Red Cross, and likely 
in response to Lodygensky’s missives, the ICRC asked National Societies to submit 
reports with their views on the topic. Eight of them responded positively: Germany, 
Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Ukraine and, through the person of Lodygensky, 
the “old” Russian Red Cross. As Kimberly Lowe notes, “The dissolution of the Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires catapulted numerous societies from a state of 
wartime mobilization into the throes of civil war and revolutionary troubles. These first-
hand experiences of civil violence infused the 1921 debate with a new urgency.”229 
These reports were unequivocal in affirming the need of applying the Geneva 
Convention to internal conflicts, and the crucial role the ICRC should play in them.230  
Although priority of action continued to be given to domestic Red Crosses, these reports 
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recognized that whenever these were unable to operate, the ICRC or foreign Red Cross 
Societies should have a right to help. Exact proposals varied, with the Turkish Red 
Crescent suggesting that foreign Societies and the ICRC should enjoy a type of 
“extraterritoriality” and neutral status in the context of civil wars. Others emphasized that 
the neutrality and independence of a National Red Cross operating in a country 
experiencing regime change should be guaranteed. Finally, these reports all suggested 
that states should observe the laws of war toward rebels, even if these were not formally 
recognized as belligerents. This included giving humane treatment to captured 
combatants, similar to that of prisoners of war.  
Fifty Red Crosses, some of them accompanied by government delegates, attended the 
Tenth International Conference of the Red Cross, taking place in Geneva in 1921. 
Underlying its urgency, the topic of civil war was given its own (III) Commission of ten 
members. In 1921, however, the speakers reporting directly on this subject were National 
Red Cross representatives (not government delegates,) a factor that very likely colored 
the debates and help explain why they stood in such stark contrast to those of 1912.231 
This time most Red Cross Societies agreed that there should be some sort of agreement to 
authorize Red Cross relief in civil wars. “As conceived by the conference, the right to 
humanitarian assistance ascribed to all men by virtue of their suffering and was granted 
by a moral authority superior to the state. The last three years had made it clear that 
‘today, after the fall of the three empires the most strict in their defense of autocracy, 
there is no longer any government that could refuse the Red Cross the right to help the 
rebels as well’.”232 Beyond insurgents, participants insisted that all victims of internal 
conflicts should be entitled to humanitarian aid.  
Consistent with these pleas, a resolution was eventually approved making Red Cross 
operations in internal conflicts legitimate. Codifying past practice, the National Red 
Crosses of countries facing internal conflicts were assigned a primary role, and were 
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encouraged to remain neutral and independent. More importantly, the resolution also 
authorized the National Societies to request outside Red Cross assistance, to be channeled 
via the ICRC. The ICRC, however, had to make sure the receiving government agreed 
with such help and, in case of state refusal, it was entitled to make this reluctant attitude 
public. The ICRC was also called to take over the task of humanitarian assistance if a 
government or a Red Cross was dissolved during a civil war.233  
An additional step was taken in 1921.234 Through the insistence of Georges 
Lodygensky the Conference added a statement in the resolution condemning the practice 
of hostage-taking, and suggesting that political detainees captured during civil war should 
be treated humanely.235 Yet, with regard to this addition, the German Red Cross 
representative succeeded in amending textual references to rebels as “belligerents” and 
“prisoners of war,” arguing that such language might prematurely legitimate an uprising 
in its early stages and deprive a government of its legal ability to quell it. ICRC President 
Ador empathized with this concern, noting that “if a revolution breaks out… for example 
if communist parties declare themselves against the government and seek to overthrow it, 
it is difficult to consider these revolutionaries, these rebels, as prisoners of war and to 
treat them with all the benefits of The Hague Convention offers to prisoners.”236 This 
exchange reveals two crucial points. First, it reinforces the theme developed throughout 
this chapter (and this entire dissertation) about the felt anxieties, not only by states but 
also even by the Red Cross, regarding the risks of legitimizing insurgent parties through 
the use of legal categories that enhance both their status and their prerogatives. Second, 
with regard to the specific political context of the time, it brings to light a (mostly latent) 
concern among many of the participating National Red Cross Societies in 1921 vis-à-vis 
the risk of potential communist revolutions. The idea of humanizing internal conflicts 
through the provision of aid to all victims may well have been uncontroversial by then, 
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yet since many of the possible beneficiaries in future uprisings might be of communist 
stripe, those debating in Geneva wished to exert caution so as not to legitimate them by 
inadvertently granting them the legal character of belligerents.237  
As a result, one can conclude that even though in 1921 recent civil war atrocities may 
have done away with the until-then persistent risk-aversion toward the provision of 
humanitarian during internal armed conflict, evincing a critical measure of morally-
driven change in attitudes, political fears brought on by the uncertain application of the 
principles (to the benefit of “undesirable” rebels) remained and worked to limit the range 
of humanitarian privileges that participants were willing to offer, as seen here in the area 
of the treatment of captured fighters. That the German Red Cross representative felt at 
liberty to express this concern publicly, with the acquiescence of the ICRC and the 
approval of other National Societies debating in the Third Commission, suggests that this 
was a concern shared more broadly, perhaps by the majority of them.238 This dynamic of 
modifying the language of the sanctioned rules to avoid their application in undesirable 
circumstances would repeat itself in subsequent debates about rules for internal conflicts 
in 1949 and the 1970s. However, in contrast to 1921, in those moments risk-aversion was 
most strongly felt by powerful minorities who found themselves unable to express them 
openly in public for fear of embarrassment and isolation, enabling the operation of social 
coercion and prompting “covert pushback” on the part of the coerced. 
The 1921 resolution was doubtlessly important. In practice it served to legitimize the 
work that the ICRC as well as a few National Red Cross Societies would perform in a 
variety of civil conflicts between 1921-1949, as detailed later. Moreover, as we will see, 
it laid a crucial precedent, opening the door to eventual legal developments. That said, the 
resolution’s relevance was also limited. It constituted a non-binding statement obtained 
not at a “plenipotentiary” Diplomatic Conference of state delegations with treaty-making 
                                                
237 Jacques Moreillon hints at this underlying concern and the political dilemma it created in 
Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus Politiques, 
59. 
238 The ten Red Cross Societies participating in the Third Commission hailed from Germany, 
USA, Finland, British Indies, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Russia (old Red Cross) and the 
Ukraine.  
 
  104 
power, but at a meeting of the International Red Cross movement. It may well have been 
seen as “quasi-law” by the ICRC and National Societies but it did not constitute binding 
law upon states. Second, while it legitimated humanitarian relief in internal conflicts, it 
also stopped short of expressly banning the resort to inhumane acts (except for the 
Lodygensky proposal, which condemned them.) In other words, even if its spirit pointed 
toward legitimating the idea that extant rules for interstate war should also apply in 
internal conflicts, it did not effectively regulate combatant behavior during internal war, 
which would take decades to occur. As such, it appears that even if the Red Cross was 
now convinced of its right to humanitarian action internal armed conflict, it still wavered 
on the idea that international law should regulate internal conflicts.239 
As a result, the most important effect of the 1921 resolution was to empower and 
legitimate the Red Cross movement, especially the ICRC, to play a humanitarian role in 
the midst of civil war and other forms of violence within states’ borders, rather than to set 
formal, binding limits to civil war violence. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an (admittedly dizzying) portrait of legal doctrine and history. 
Yet telling this early story is important because it allows us to trace the slow process of 
emergence both of the issue of humanizing internal conflicts through international 
principles and the conditions under which that concern could be placed on the 
international agenda.  
As shown, over several decades various facilitating as well as inhibiting conditions 
surfaced. In particular, civil war-related shocks were fundamental for eliciting moral 
concern on this issue. Only through accumulated “shocks” did (a few) states and National 
Red Crosses begin to show a marked concern and adopt a more forceful, pro-active 
attitude toward clear standard-setting. Despite this, in the early decades twentieth century 
most governments remained notoriously risk-averse citing the twin concerns of 
sovereignty and legitimacy vis-à-vis internal armed challengers. Even National Red 
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Crosses, after showing themselves morally motivated to legitimate a bolder right to 
humanitarian action in civil wars, proved fearful of “going too far” by granting rebels the 
status of belligerent and prisoners of war, suspecting that communists might 
asymmetrically reap those benefits. In the end, non-binding (if still seminal) statements 
were adopted in the context of the International Conferences of the Red Cross, laying a 
bedrock of principles that would prove crucial in the future. 
Multiple shocks were also necessary to move a morally committed entrepreneur like 
the ICRC into the terrain of internal conflicts, first in practice and eventually in principle. 
Even a non-governmental humanitarian entrepreneur required a changed social 
environment, new dramatic episodes and pressure coming “from below,” (as illustrated 
here through the figure of Georges Lodygensky and the pleas of several other Red Cross 
actors operating from the ground,) to forcefully assume the leadership of a cause it had 
considered important for decades.  
These findings point to powerful general theoretical points. First, risk-averse actors, 
including states, are not impermeable to a changing atrocity-ridden environment. For 
their part, moral (non-state) entrepreneurs may be principled and moved to practical 
action in the aftermath of horrific violence, but changes in their interests and practices are 
incremental, not automatic or radical. Moreover, moral entrepreneurs, as organizations 
operating in a difficult political and material context, weigh their actions and decisions 
rationally and cautiously. In the end, formal policy change within them can take more 
time and be more circumspect than expected, and only occur when specific conditions 
combine and cumulate. 
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Chapter 3 – The Road to and Making of Common Article 3 to the Geneva  
Conventions of 1949 (1921-1949) 
 
“It is a veritable squaring of the circle.” 
Jean Pictet of the ICRC (referring to one of the many formulas considered for the 
regulation of internal conflicts through the Geneva Conventions,) 1948240 
 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter reconstructed the long and winding process through which the 
ICRC (and the Red Cross Movement more broadly) embraced the task of pushing for 
international principles to humanize internal armed conflicts in 1920. A year later, the 
International Conference of the Red Cross, thanks in no small part to various crucial 
reports submitted by the National Societies of states recently affected by internal 
atrocities, issued a path-breaking non-binding resolution that from then on provided a key 
basis for Red Cross action in domestic contexts. 
This chapter resumes the story from that moment until the emergence of what to this 
day remains perhaps the most important legal humanitarian rule governing internal armed 
conflict, an Article (3) included in the four Geneva Conventions negotiated in 1949 to 
protect sick and wounded soldiers on land and at sea, prisoners of war, and certain types 
of civilians. The fact that it was “common” to all four Conventions gives this article its 
usual name, Common Article 3 (CA3 hereafter.) Among others, CA3 compels both state 
and non-state armed forces to respect and protect fighters who have fallen wounded or 
sick, those who have surrendered or who have been detained, as well as the non-
combatant population. It also prohibits gruesome practices against such persons including 
torture, ill-treatment, hostage-taking and unlawful execution, provides for judicial 
guarantees to captured persons and enshrines the ability of the ICRC to offer its services 
to the parties to conflict.241  
The innovations CA3 introduced at the time were profound in form and substance. 
This article constituted, simply, the first binding rule of international treaty law to protect 
the victims of armed conflicts occurring within states’ borders. The magnitude of this 
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achievement comes to the fore when taking into account that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR,) another seminal document dealing with states’ treatment of their 
citizens adopted just months prior (December 1948) by the United Nations General 
Assembly was a non-binding document, or “soft law.” It was not until the entry into force 
of the two Human Rights Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) in 1976 that binding human rights law could be said to 
exist.242 Content-wise, CA3 featured a list of principles that tackled the most frequent 
abuses inflicted upon captured persons in internal armed conflicts, including death, 
torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment. This was a startling early 
development since an international convention prohibiting torture and similar 
mistreatment applicable within states’ borders would still take decades to emerge, in 
1984.243 Moreover, CA3 added crucial fair trial safeguards that offset the traditional 
(criminal) treatment given to rebels under domestic treason laws. And although a more 
comprehensive set of protections for civilians in contexts of internal hostilities would not 
be introduced until later, CA3 laid a bedrock of humanitarian guarantees for them. 
Finally, CA3 encouraged the parties to conflict to come to special agreements and expand 
their mutual commitments as they saw fit, implicitly recognizing that states and rebels 
could negotiate accords on equal legal footing. The expansiveness of Common Article 3 
quickly led to its popular characterization as a “convention in miniature,” an expression 
initially used by a Soviet delegate in 1949 to (derisively) compare it to the broader 
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protections states had built for inter-state conflicts, but later re-signified positively by the 
Red Cross to highlight the broad coverage it actually permitted in practice.244 
CA3 was as puzzling for what it said as for what it did not say. The article’s opening 
line declared its contents would bind participants in a “conflict not of an international 
character,” yet a clear definition of what this meant was not explicitly provided in the 
text. Moreover, considering that in 1949 the customary norms of belligerence with their 
stringent requirements for application (state recognition, control of territory, etc.) 
represented the normative status-quo for internal conflicts, CA3 surprisingly said nothing 
about conditions, whether about states’ discretion to recognize the rebels as belligerents 
or about the characteristics insurgents had to display in order to trigger the application of 
international law. Even more puzzlingly, as this chapter will show, tense debate about the 
inclusion of these and other requirements did occur during the negotiations in 1949, 
reportedly making the deliberations on CA3 the longest and bitterest of those held in the 
four-month long Diplomatic Conference. Yet despite certain states’ fierce struggle for 
their inclusion, the various proposed conditions were ultimately dropped from the 
approved text. The final product in fact seems to constitute the exact opposite of what its 
strongest government detractors originally wanted; yet they saw it through to its 
adoption. How could this be? How can we explain these positions, changes and 
outcomes?  
This chapter argues that the adoption of CA3 was the product of a two-step process, 
characterized by the mechanisms of moral entrepreneurship and social coercion. First, I 
illustrate how despite the normative inroads made in 1921, ICRC action in practice was 
often hindered by government refusal to admit its services or to show humanitarian 
restraint in civil strife. These setbacks had an important effect since, in demonstrating the 
inadequacy of extant non-binding instruments, they allowed the International Committee 
to press harder for binding rules, thus delegitimizing the resort to further “soft law” 
resolutions. Second, confirming the combination of factors seen previous episodes of 
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norm emergence, this chapter shows how a “new wave” of civil war atrocity was key for 
slowly generating a shared interest among a majority of states to include humanitarian 
protections for internal conflicts in the Geneva Conventions. The most crucial of these 
shocks came with the bloodshed of the Spanish Civil War, itself embedded in the broader 
trauma of World War II, which together prompted the ICRC and various National Red 
Cross Societies to push for revising the existing Geneva Conventions. By the time the 
initial conversations about a revamp began in 1946-7, most of the participating actors 
seemed to agree that conflicts occurring within states’ borders had to be “humanized” 
through international legal means. Red Cross-driven moral entrepreneurship against a 
background of recent atrocity captures this stage of the process well.  
Yet to say that most states were willing to entertain the idea does not mean that 
actually producing a legal rule for internal armed conflicts was a foregone conclusion or 
that its scope and contents were preordained. There remained barriers to overcome, the 
most important of which was the attitude of some powerful states that had a particularly 
grave stake in the outcome, especially colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and 
France who feared the application of the rule in their dependent territories. The final and 
more extensive part of this chapter makes the case that social coercion helps explain the 
contours of the normative construction process, particularly how these powerful 
recalcitrants were forced to accommodate to the majority view.  
The analysis offered here demonstrates how intense public and private pressures 
grounded on concerns about social status and moral standing served to block calls for the 
dismissal of the idea of humanizing internal conflicts, and to “tame” others pushing for 
high conditions to the application of international law. With regard to the former, in 
particular, the political context proved crucial: by 1949 colonial powers were beginning 
to lose their legitimacy and authority in Africa and Asia as an international moral crusade 
in support of the principle of self-determination quickly gained ground. The early Cold 
War dispute between competing liberal and socialist ideologies accentuated these global 
political struggles over legitimacy, and anti-colonialism in particular gave the Soviet 
Union a powerful public argument --if for propaganda reasons-- against liberal-
democratic but imperialist Western countries. As seen later, the Soviets put humanitarian 
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arguments against colonialism to good use during the negotiation of the Geneva 
Conventions, as in other international forums at the time. In addition, the openness of 
most other participant delegations (some of them hailing from conflict-ridden states) to 
accept the idea of humanizing civil wars combined with Soviet rhetoric and pushed 
colonial and other less radical Western skeptics against the political wall. In the end, 
although privately unpersuaded about the virtues of the idea, the UK and France realized 
that continuing to oppose a project embraced by the majority would bring them continued 
public derision and isolation. Citing direct diplomatic evidence of these felt social 
pressures, I argue that these states were “coerced” to modify their position and 
accommodate.  
Yet social coercion did not exert unilateral effects. Instead, in a move that I label 
covert pushback, the UK and France decided to take the reins of the drafting process so 
as to craft a version that simultaneously pleased them and “the humanitarians” in the 
room while also neutralizing more “extremist” alternatives, especially an overtly-
generous Soviet proposal introduced late in the process. To do so the colonial powers 
shaped a key portion of the text to read vaguely –the very “definition” of the internal 
conflicts to which the rule would apply,-- hoping that such vagueness would allow later 
them to avoid its implementation in practice. These initially recalcitrant actors took pains 
to see their version of text adopted, even letting a “golden opportunity” to delete the 
provision go by the wayside. This counterintuitive attitude can only be explained through 
attention to the social aspects of the negotiations. Indeed, in 1949 the UK and France 
understood that the balance of opinion was tipped against the absence of a humanitarian 
rule for internal conflicts, and preempting the adoption of a different (unpalatable) text, 
they stood by their draft.  Ultimately, despite some very important insertions of protective 
content, theirs was the version that emerged as Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions.  
Theoretically, the analysis reveals how the historical process leading to the adoption 
of CA3 was characterized both by state interest as well as by their attention to social and 
moral pressures. Contra assumptions of invariable state risk-aversion or selfishness, 
however, “interest” is shown here to be a rather plastic category: Among the participating 
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delegations some appeared to be morally-committed humanitarians, others espoused 
public humanitarianism but did so likely for strategic reasons, others accepted the idea of 
having a humanitarian rule for internal conflicts but combined this position with 
traditional sovereignty concerns for safeguards, and finally others in the “sovereigntist” 
extreme vouched for the utter dismissal of the idea. (That the extreme sovereigntists were 
in the absolute minority, moreover, is noteworthy.) I argue that to explain such variation 
one needs not only look at domestic-level factors or calculations of material risk and 
benefit, but needs to factor in moral beliefs (in turn explained and sustained by the recent 
war-induced shocks.) Moreover, as hinted above, the most interesting findings of this 
chapter emerge once one investigates the interaction of different state delegations during 
negotiations. Social pressures (situated in a specific historical milieu) proved determinant 
for shaping the rule-making process and its outcome. This reinforces enduring 
constructivist arguments about the importance of sociality and intersubjectivity for 
understanding international politics.  
These findings militate strongly against approaches that insist on applying a single set 
of explanatory tools to understand international outcomes, often ignoring social and 
historical processes along the way. Indeed, there is a current in recent IL/IR that insists 
on framing many central questions of institutional or legal design as the product of 
rational state choice, such as the use of precise or imprecise language in international 
law.245 The assumption in this work is that states “realize” that they will face cooperation 
problems during negotiations, and as such they come to the table ready to rationally 
“solve” such issues by adopting imprecise language that they can accept and “sell to their 
publics.” The close study of the origins of CA3 reveals these assumptions to be 
misleading. Many states’ first option was undoubtedly to craft a precise text containing 
several clear conditions to safeguard their sovereignty. Given the social pressure in the 
room against precise sovereign safeguards, imprecision became a rational tactic for the 
“coerced” states. On balance, opting for imprecision here can only be said to have been 
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“rational under strong social pressure,” not the product of conscious state choice prior to 
interaction with others. This pattern will resurface in Chapter 5 during the making of the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1974-1977.  
 
ICRC and Red Cross Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 1921-1938 
As seen in the preceding chapter, the Tenth International Conference of the Red Cross 
of 1921 produced an important resolution that for the first time legitimized the operation 
of the Red Cross and the ICRC in internal conflicts.  
That document was, however, not an internationally binding rule.246 Nevertheless, it 
allowed ICRC to lend its services in a number of internal conflicts and other cases of 
domestic instability, including in Upper Silesia (1921-1923,) Poland (1924,) Montenegro 
(1924,) Italy (in 1931, through the National Red Cross,) Austria (1934,) and Spain (1936-
1939.)247  
On the whole, however, the resolution performed less well than its drafters and the 
ICRC had hoped. A few countries declined Red Cross intervention, arguing that an 
internal conflict was either not occurring or had ended, and that those being held were 
being treated in accordance with domestic laws. This was the case in the Soviet Union in 
1921-22 (and in 1926-27;) the Irish Free State in 1922-23; Lithuania in 1937, and Nazi 
Germany (1933-1945.) A failed ICRC attempt to offer help during the Rif War (1920-
1926,) in which a group of Riffian rebels (from Northern Morocco) rose up against 
Spanish and Moroccan authorities and set up a short-lived Republic, also suggested that 
colonial powers thought their protectorates were outside of the scope of application of the 
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1921 Resolution.248 In all cases, historical evidence confirms that the ICRC seems have 
been greatly frustrated by these failures of access. It was particularly well aware of the 
dire situation in which political detainees found themselves in many of these countries. 249  
None of these internal conflicts, however, seems to have had more impact on the 
ICRC and the Red Cross movement than the Spanish Civil War, which for three years 
confronted the incumbent Republican side against the Nationalist insurrectionaries led by 
General Francisco Franco. Although, as detailed below, ICRC involvement in Spain was 
heavy and saw some important successes, the atrocity balance sheet was in the end 
seriously distressing.250  
At the outset of the war, the Republican government forcibly reorganized the Spanish 
Red Cross.251 The Nationalist rebels, for their part, created their own Red Cross 
Committee based in Burgos, and thus it was unclear what this “duality” would mean for 
their relations with the International Committee. The ICRC decided to communicate with 
both Red Crosses on the basis of the 1921 Resolution. Luckily, both of them recognized 
the ICRC’s moral authority, and replied positively to a request to allow its channeling of 
foreign Red Cross assistance. Further, they committed to supporting ICRC delegates on 
the ground in the creation of information agencies for civilian prisoners and POWs. 
Finally, each accepted the fact that the ICRC would be working with the other. 
These commitments allowed the ICRC to extend its operations in Spain widely. By 
the end of 1936, it had reportedly sent nine delegations to various regions of the country, 
coordinated by Dr. Marcel Junod. According to Durand, “in the Spanish War the 
International Committee did its utmost to extend its operations as much as it would have 
done in an international war, since the conflict increasingly took on an international 
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character.”252 ICRC operations comprised a variety of important areas: basic relief 
(medical supplies and food,) aid to the National Societies, protection of the Red Cross 
sign, prison visits, assistance to prisoners, establishment of lists, news provision, 
exchange and evacuation of persons, and aid to civilians. Humanitarian need was 
staggering. By the end of the war, the News and Tracing Service set up by the ICRC had 
reportedly sent 5,025,843 family messages, including incoming and outgoing notes.253 
The ICRC also endeavored to remind both combating sides of existing international 
humanitarian law, and strived to have them sign limited humanitarian agreements on the 
basis of reciprocity, chiefly for prisoner exchange, as well as for the evacuation of elderly 
and sick population, women, and children.  
Extensive and crucial though this Red Cross help was, the situation during the war 
remained utterly precarious. Both sides engaged in gruesome practices (reprisals and 
aerial bombardment of civilian areas, most infamously,) and many prisoners, civilians or 
combatants, were either executed or held captive.254 A state of belligerence was never 
recognized between the parties and hence the laws and customs of (inter-state) war did 
not become applicable. Republicans and Nationalists also failed to reach ad-hoc 
agreements for restraints on specific acts of violence, such that, “generally speaking, the 
conflict was characterized by a callous disregard for the laws and customs of war and 
humanitarian principles.”255  
Given the extent of the ICRC’s involvement and the cruelty of the war practices, the 
Spanish conflict constituted a watershed for the eventual development of the rules for 
internal conflicts. As ICRC historian François Bugnion notes, “The [Spanish Civil War] 
highlighted the serious problems resulting from the absence of legal rules applicable to 
civil wars and showed how difficult it was, during actual hostilities, to reach agreements 
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between belligerents to limit the violence and protect the victims… In the final analysis, 
the Spanish Civil War underscored the need to draw up, in peacetime, legal rules 
applicable to civil wars.”256  
By the mid-to-late 1930s the International Committee realized that commitments 
bearing force of international law had to be put in place for internal conflicts. It knew, 
however, that this could only be done by summoning a Diplomatic Conference of states, 
which seemed like a distant thought given the brittle political context of the time. 
Political tension included not only the war in Spain but also the winds of international 
conflict in Europe. In the meantime, as a way of framing its own aspirations, the ICRC 
decided to prepare a study on the topic in preparation for the upcoming International Red 
Cross Conference, scheduled to take place in 1938 in London.  
The Yung Report and the Sixteenth International Conference of the Red Cross, 1938 
Dr. Walter Yung, a member of the International Committee and of its recently created 
Legal Commission, was in charge of the study. Explicitly on the basis of recent Red 
Cross experience, the report sought to elaborate upon and clarify the Resolutions 
approved in 1921, particularly in areas that had previously gone unidentified, such as 
prohibiting reprisals against civilians or facilitating their evacuation from war zones. 
Interestingly, the Yung report distinguished between three different types of internal 
conflict (minor troubles, grave troubles, and civil war) and proposed diverse types of 
protection for each.257 Although this categorization is reminiscent of the different “levels” 
of internal conflict considered under existing customary law (discussed in the previous 
chapter,) Yung’s report made no meaningful reference to received doctrines of 
belligerence. Rather, his typology responded to the humanitarian difficulties the ICRC 
had faced in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly to states’ refusal of foreign Red Cross aid 
because a civil war allegedly did not exist. A prior tendency to “lump” together different 
forms of internal violence under the composite notion of “civil war” in hope that states 
would not discriminate among situations (and thus allow equal protections across varying 
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levels of violence) had proved unhelpful and required a fresh look. Indeed, from then on, 
those differences would become essential in debates about creating and applying of 
humanitarian rules in internal conflicts. 
Predictably, Yung’s report argued that Red Cross action was legitimate in all three 
situations. As before, initial relief would be the responsibility of the National Red Cross, 
including during “minor” troubles, while foreign assistance by the ICRC or another 
National Red Cross would be justified amid major troubles or a civil war. The only real 
difference for Yung was that outside intervention favoring captured rebels during minor 
troubles seemed unrealistic, hence the domestic criminal code should be expected to 
apply. Yung also drafted specific guidelines for Red Cross and ICRC action, restating 
and expanding their ability to provide aid to victims. 
In addition, the Yung report explicitly recognized the fact that until then the basis for 
ICRC intervention in internal conflict was not rooted in formal international law, but 
rather stemmed from resolutions adopted by the International Conference of the Red 
Cross. This confirms, as argued earlier, that the ICRC was by then well aware of this 
“hard law” gap, which proved crucial moving forward. To begin addressing it, the Yung 
report enclosed a detailed draft resolution with detailed humanitarian safeguards for 
wounded and sick fighters, prisoners of war and political prisoners, and non-combatants. 
The 1921 resolution had included some language to this effect, but Yung now went much 
further by including several provisions drawn from the legal instruments that until then 
only applied to inter-state wars. Finally, the draft resolution clarified that none of the 
humanitarian provisions it contained should be taken as explicit recognition of a state of 
war or belligerence. Disclaimers of this type designed to neutralize the legitimization of 
rebels continued to be essential for securing governmental acceptance of any 
humanitarian rules for internal conflicts both in the context of the International 
Conferences of the Red Cross or at Diplomatic “plenipotentiary” Conferences, and they 
represented the only intersection between older doctrines of recognition and newer “non-
political” humanitarian norms. 
The ICRC sent the report and the draft resolution in advance to all National Societies 
of the Red Cross. As François Bugnion explains, “This prompted the Spanish Red Cross 
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to produce a document on the same subject. In it, the Spanish Red Cross unreservedly 
endorsed the Committee’s conclusions, and emphasized the need for close co-operation 
between the ICRC and the National Society of a country engaged in civil war.”258 Yung’s 
work and the Spanish Red Cross response were finally debated in the Sixteenth 
International Conference of the Red Cross, which took place in London in 1938. Held 
within a smaller Legal Commission, the discussion quickly collapsed an American 
delegate asked to clarify whether the ICRC resolution was to apply only to the Spanish 
case or to all future civil conflicts.259 A Portuguese representative responded that it may 
not be appropriate to discuss generalized standards at exalted times (read: during 
wartime,) and that the ICRC should continue to “study” the topic for later consideration.  
Delegates from France, Germany and Italy agreed with this sentiment, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the domestic politics in their countries prior to the outbreak of the 
world war. Now fully at the forefront of the cause, the ICRC defended its proposal by 
reiterating that it needed a solid basis upon which to operate in this type of conflicts. A 
Greek delegate agreed, but clarified that any norms set at this point could only be of 
moral, not legal, character. For their part, Belgian and Chinese representatives decried 
this attitude and highlighted the eminently humanitarian nature of the initiative, as did 
their Egyptian colleague. In the end, the French delegate admitted that it was not really 
against debating the issue and that the ICRC should indeed have a moral basis for its 
action (something that by then seemed unquestionable,) but noted that given the 
possibility of different interpretations, the topic should be left to expert international 
jurists.260  
Given these pressures to delay, the ICRC had little choice but to acquiesce. 
Ultimately, a short resolution emerged from the Sixteenth Conference recalling the terms 
of the 1921 resolution, commending the ICRC and other Red Cross societies for their 
“spontaneous” actions during recent civil wars, and requesting the ICRC and the National 
Societies “to endeavor to obtain” respect for the humane treatment of the wounded and 
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the sick, prisoners of war, medical personnel and stores, political prisoners, non-
combatants and children, among others. The resolution also encouraged the ICRC to 
continue studying the issue of Red Cross protection during civil war, and to report its 
work at the next International Conference of the Red Cross.261  
This outcome, though modest given the ICRC’s original aspirations, was useful for 
once more highlighting the urgency of the issue. Moreover, even if the delegates present 
at this International Conference had wished to lay down more robust humanitarian rules 
for internal conflicts, it was difficult for them in any event to reach conclusions “before 
the matter had been studied in detail by the governments.”262 As seen below, this 
necessary step would take until the end of World War II to occur. 
 
II. The Long Road to Making Common Article 3 
Between 1939 and 1945, the world witnessed one of its darkest periods. The 
astonishing cruelties committed during World War II, particularly those directed against 
the civilian population (of which the Holocaust was the gravest example) and prisoners of 
war, made evident the need to strengthen the existing legal norms regulating international 
armed conflict. The Spanish Civil War, as seen, had a similar demonstration effect with 
regard to internal conflicts. 
The first one to notice the legal gaps was the ICRC, which had its hands full during 
both wars. The organization’s performance during WWII would later become subject to 
much controversy, particularly its actions (and omissions) against the Nazi Holocaust and 
its aftermath.263 At this time, however, the Committee enjoyed broad international 
admiration, even earning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1944-45 for its wartime work. Back in 
Geneva, the Committee’s Juridical Commission and its Director-Delegate Jean Pictet 
were concerned with quickly mobilizing states around the revision of the existing Geneva 
Conventions.  
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Four different treaties eventually emerged from the Diplomatic Conference in 1949. 
The first three were “updated” versions of older conventions protecting respectively, 1) 
wounded and sick soldiers on land; 2) wounded, sick and shipwrecked marines at sea; 3) 
prisoners of war; the fourth was a brand-new agreement with safeguards for civilians 
living in occupied territory or as “enemy” civilians in belligerent countries, particularly 
internees.264 This last treaty was a major innovation; in contemporary debates about 
humanitarian law it is often forgotten than until 1949 no specific covenant existed that 
offered detailed safeguards to protect the non-combatant population. And although as 
seen later the text of that convention ignored some crucial areas (such as restrictions on 
the use of force,) the step taken in 1949 laid an important foundation. For clarity purposes 
I refer to the first two conventions collectively as the Wounded and Sick Conventions, 
and to the third and fourth as the Prisoners of War (or POW) and Civilians Conventions, 
respectively. 
In February 1945, even prior to the end of WWII, the ICRC issued a first 
memorandum to the ¨Big Five” (France, the US, the UK, China and the Soviet Union,) 
laying out an agenda to revamp the Conventions.265 At this time the Swiss organization 
wished especially to ascertain whether the major powers shared an interest in revising the 
law, postponing a broader consultation momentarily. This was a general communication; 
civil war was not explicitly mentioned.  
In the meantime, the ICRC organized a new gathering of the Red Cross Movement, 
the first since the pre-war 1938 London Conference. Sparking conversation among 
National Societies before engaging governments was a common practice of the ICRC, 
one seen as useful for both receiving feedback from humanitarian actors operating on the 
ground as well as for socializing the Committee’s own ideas regarding how to develop 
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humanitarian norms. Although the outcomes of these preliminary debates were not to be 
taken as binding on any of its participants, they helped to shape expectations about what 
could and should be considered in the revised Conventions, and what could or should not. 
The Red Cross Movement, it bears noting, had been expanding since the early 
decades of the twentieth century to look less Western/European. In 1900 there were 37 
recognized National Societies, mostly from the Old Continent.266 By 1926, with the 
breakup of the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires and the associated entry 
of various new states into the system, the number of Societies had risen to 52, thus 
beginning to change the face of the movement.267 In addition, between 1900 and 1945 
various former colonies had attained full or partial independence, as in the cases of 
Ireland, Iraq, Egypt, India, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. For their part, Latin 
American National Societies had multiplied over time and become more active 
participants at the International Conferences of the Red Cross. Hence by the end of 
World War II the movement counted 64 member Societies.268 The attendance of National 
Societies to the International Conferences of the Red Cross had also popularized: at the 
1912 International Conference 35 National Societies were present, 51 came in 1921 and 
59 in 1938. (See Appendix 1 for a comparison of attendance at key meetings between 
1912 and 1949.) 
Progressive growth meant that new opinions beyond Europe and the US were being 
expressed within the movement. On balance, however, changing Red Cross membership 
during this period (1900-1946) did not prove as radical as during the 1950-1970s with the 
decolonization of the almost the entire continents of Africa and Asia, which brought 
much more numerical strength to their transformative ideas of self-determination. As 
illustration of this: In 1945, out of 64 National Societies of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent nearly half (31) remained Western European, trailed by those located in the 
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Americas (22,) Asia and Oceania (8,) the Middle East (2.) and Africa (1.)269 In contrast, 
by 1963 the total number would rise to 103 and to 122 in 1975, of which the great 
majority hailed from the “non-Western” world.270 
That said, and as seen in some of the Conferences discussed above, already by the 
1940s a plurality of smaller European, Latin American and “other” (Asian, Middle 
Eastern and African) states offered important counterpoints to major Western powers in 
humanitarian discussions. In the context of actually revising the Conventions in the 
second half of the 1940s, however, the most powerful of contrarian would be the Soviet 
Union, which remained officially disengaged from the revisions process until the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949. 
Forty-nine National Societies were represented at a July 26-August 3, 1946 
Conference in Geneva specially convened to discuss possible updates to the Conventions, 
among other Red Cross matters.271 The ICRC’s Jean Pictet272 put the issue of civil war on 
the table from the outset during debates about the Wounded and Sick Convention.273 In 
addition, two National Red Cross Societies (from Norway and Yugoslavia) had 
mentioned it as a necessary reform in their reports to the Conference.  
Interestingly, the initial ICRC proposal was cautious. It suggested that only the 
general humanitarian principles (as opposed to every single treaty provision) of the 
Convention should apply in civil wars, and under the condition that the “adverse” (i.e. 
rebel) party respected them in return—what one might term “conditional reciprocity.” 
This type of reciprocity, whereby one party can declare itself unbound by a commitment 
if the other party is shown to not comply, is fairly uncommon in international law 
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nowadays and had at least since the first POW Convention (from 1929) been limited in 
the framework of humanitarian law, yet in 1946 the ICRC felt its inclusion might make 
the idea of civil war protections more palatable to states.  
Although conditional reciprocity for internal conflicts would later become a hot-
button issue, records show that in 1946 the National Societies felt more adventurous than 
the ICRC. Representatives of the Belgian Red Cross and Iranian Red Crescent in fact 
suggested inverting the conditional reciprocity clause, so that parties to conflict would 
automatically be expected to apply the principles of the Convention unless they explicitly 
announced otherwise. (See Appendix 2 for the main textual formulas considered between 
1946-1949.) The rationale here was that most “civilized” states (and insurgents aspiring 
to “civilized” statehood) would feel compelled to respect the law and find themselves 
unable to publicly oppose noble humanitarian norms. Also importantly, participants at 
this Conference of National Societies did not see the benefit of defining with precision 
the types of internal conflicts to which eventual rules would apply. The Iranian and 
Egyptian Red Crescent Societies were of the opinion that simply referring to “armed 
conflict” would suffice since it allowed for broad coverage across violent situations, 
whether internal or between states. Other Societies in attendance were in tacit or explicit 
agreement. Finally, participants suggested that the entire text of the Wounded and Sick 
Convention, not just its underlying principles, should apply to internal armed conflicts.274 
Another commission debating revisions to the POW Convention came to similar 
conclusions.275 276 
These initial debates were decidedly encouraging for the project of humanizing 
internal armed conflicts. The ICRC had achieved more than it had bargained for both in 
terms of the scope and substance of the provisions, and none of the participating National 
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Red Crosses rejected the measure; quite the opposite. (States were not present at this 
meeting, helping to explain this “generosity.”) And as noted, National Societies were 
entertaining the full extension of the Wounded and Sick and POW Conventions to 
internal armed conflicts, not a specific “tailor-made” article (like the eventual CA3) to be 
devoted to them. That idea would emerge later. 
 
States’ Reactions to the Revisions Process in General 
By the fall of 1946 the UK, the US and France had all begun debating internally how 
to react to the ICRC proposals and whether to participate in preparatory meetings. 
Whereas France and the US soon welcomed the idea of revisions, the UK hesitated. The 
US military had tried to follow the Conventions during the World War and while it had 
generally found them useful, it had faced a number of challenges that it wished to 
catalogue and resolve, particularly in relation to POW treatment.277  France, for its part, 
having borne the heavy brunt of Nazi occupation, enthusiastically embraced the idea of a 
revamp, especially the project of a new convention to protect civilians. The UK, as said, 
was less excited initially: some British officials were unsure about the timing, while 
others felt that drafting a new Civilians Convention might involve undesirable 
commitments and distract from what should be the central task: updating the Wounded 
and Sick, and the Prisoner of War Conventions. The UK eventually accepted the ICRC’s 
invitation, as did the Chinese. For their part, as noted earlier, the Soviets remained silent 
and kept everyone guessing until almost a week before the Diplomatic Conference started 
in 1949, when they finally announced their participation. 
The US, UK and France all formed interdepartmental committees (IC) to tackle the 
revisions. The US had laid important groundwork through a War Department study of 
“gaps” in the POW Convention.278 On the heels of this work and at the ICRC prompt, the 
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US State Department called in January 1946 for the appointment of a formal US 
Interdepartmental Committee (US IC) devoted specifically to this subject, to be formed 
by representatives of the Justice, Navy, Interior, State and War Departments, alongside 
the American Red Cross and the Postal Office. The French created a similar 
Interdepartmental Committee (French IC) in May 1946 with a similar mix of military, 
civilian and technical Ministries. In addition, organizations like the French Red Cross, the 
National Federation of Mutual Aid for Political Internees and Deportees, the POW 
Federation, National Federation of Deported Workers, the Camps Secretariat, National 
Council for the Resistance participated.279 The fact that many former members of the 
resistance were now sitting in the government surely marked French vision and priorities, 
and explains their interest in the protection of civilians and of “internal combatants,” i.e. 
armed partisan groups that, like the French Resistance, had valiantly opposed German 
occupation. 
The UK prepared for the revisions since early 1946, chiefly through the work of its 
War Office (WO) and the Foreign Office (FO), in occasional consultation with the Home, 
Colonial and Dominions Offices.280 Two UK Interdepartmental Committees were 
eventually formed in July 1947, with the War Office and Foreign Office (WO/FO IC) 
devoting their efforts to studying revisions to the Wounded and Sick, and POW 
Conventions, and the Home Office (HO IC) to the new Civilians Convention.281 This 
division responded to responsibility held over subject matter: while the WO and FO had 
direct experience dealing with local and foreign wounded, sick, shipwrecked, or captured 
soldiers, the treatment of civilians was considered a province of the Home Office (for 
civilians living in the colonies the HO also consulted the Colonial and Dominions 
Offices.) Overall, however, the WO, FO and HO maintained contact with one another 
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through point persons, so decision-making on the revisions to the Conventions was 
known to all involved. 
 
Reactions to the idea of regulating internal conflicts 
To be clear, including protections for internal conflicts in the Conventions was not in 
the original plans of France, the UK or the US. Most states were probably first exposed to 
the idea through the official ICRC preparatory documentation, sent to them just before an 
ICRC-organized April 1947 Conference of Government Experts, discussed below.282 
Until that point, states had been working on their own draft revisions to the Conventions.  
Beyond the major powers (and in consultation with them,) the ICRC extended 
invitations not to all states in the world but to those that had suffered most during the 
recent world war and whose input for this reason was thought to be most valuable. This 
was usual practice for the ICRC: to liaise initially with those it deemed more 
important/relevant to the revisions of the law, ascertain their support for the project, and 
slowly expand the circle as it came up with draft agreements. This implied a marked 
Western bias, yet it was something the International Committee could freely do due to its 
private (not inter-governmental) nature. (The International Conferences of the Red Cross 
were handled differently, and since all states parties to the Geneva Conventions and all 
National Societies were invited.)    
Fifteen government experts came to the preparatory meeting that took place in April 
14-26, 1947 in Geneva.283 Unsurprisingly, government delegates were less generous than 
National Red Crosses and the formula on internal conflicts obtained a year before proved 
frail.  The Dutch representative, for example, suggested this time that only the 
humanitarian principles of the Conventions should apply, not their every provision. His 
explicit reasoning was that in contexts of internal strife it was often hard to know who 
was responsible for what, making an article-by-article application of the full treaties 
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difficult. From then on the two options for “humanizing” internal armed conflicts were: 
1) either extending the entire text of the Conventions to internal violence without 
“translation,” or 2) to find a formula that included only (some, yet to be defined) 
principles underlying them. In the end, the latter would win out, in the form of one 
especially-designed article common to all the Conventions. 
Other interesting changes to the working formula emerged in 1947. France, for its 
part, fought to insert the disclaimer that any civil war regulations should not impact the 
legal status of the combatants and or involve the recognition of the rebels’ belligerence, 
highlighting once more the persistence of this concern.284 Government experts also opted 
for a more precise definition of the conflicts to cover, changing the previously vague text 
from 1946 (“armed conflict within the borders of a state”) to read “civil wars on any part 
of the metropolitan or colonial territory of the contracting parties.”285 They, however, 
failed to define “civil war” or to set a clear threshold of violence, thus undercutting the 
precision advocated earlier. Further, they reversed the changes that the National Societies 
had made in 1946, going back to the formula of conditional reciprocity that allowed 
states to only apply the rules if the opposite party did so in practice.286  
The resulting text was disquieting in the eyes of the ICRC. It now believed that the 
clause of conditional reciprocity threatened to annul the application of the rule, since 
governments could easily use it as a way to avoid the law.  Yet the International 
Committee knew that the 1947 meeting was preliminary and the language provisional. 
Government delegates were also cognizant of this; in fact, when accepting the ICRC’s 
invitation the participating states had taken great pains to clarify that these prior 
encounters were only “exchanges of views” from which no binding commitments could 
emerge.  
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Once the 1947 Conference of Government Experts closed, the French, American and 
British delegations reported back to their superiors and raised red flags about the idea of 
including civil war in the Conventions. Delegate Albert Lamarle of France noted that “the 
prevalent trend is to extend the scope of application as far as possible. This poses, 
however, a delicate issue for its juridical aspects and the foreseeable discussions on the 
legality or illegality of this or that authority.”287 Various members of UK delegation listed 
treatment of civil war in the Conventions among the “bigger points of policy to be 
settled” by the British team.288 And the US meeting reports, like those of the French, 
noted the “unanimity of opinion” regarding the proposed extension to internal 
conflicts.289  
States continued to work out their views in preparation for the next meeting dealing 
with revisions. Concerns over the inclusion of internal conflicts, however, did not seem to 
be central to the preparatory work of the US and France. This was puzzling in the case of 
France given its reported distaste for the clause, but it may be partly explained by the fact 
that, as said earlier, the French had other very controversial issues they cared deeply 
about, including securing protections for partisans, one of its flagship proposals and one 
that stirred the most controversy during the 1947 Conference.290  
The inclusion of internal conflicts also did not occupy the US IC in any great length. 
Importantly, the US IC never rejected the idea on principle. It opted rather for tightening 
the terms of its application: rather than accepting the Red Cross-proposed expression 
(“armed conflict not of an international character,”) it suggested going back to “civil war” 
(presumably implying a high level of violence) and to insert conditional reciprocity in the 
POW and Civilians convention, though not in the Wounded and Sick Conventions. The 
reasoning behind this difference was that since the latter dealt with the wounded and sick 
combatants on land and at sea, humanitarian concerns should prevail over military 
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ones.291 These modifications were included in the draft Conventions that the US team 
would later bring to the following gathering of governments and Red Cross Societies in 
1948, to take place in Stockholm.  
Civil war, however, figured centrally on the (long) list of UK concerns. Given the 
importance the British assumed later on, I now zoom into their internal revisions process 
more deeply. 
 
Initial UK Attitudes 
As noted earlier, the British had appointed two interdepartmental committees (ICs) 
devoted to the revision of the Conventions: One combining War Office and the Foreign 
Office staff (studying the Wounded and Sick, and POW Conventions) and another led by 
the Home Office debating the Civilians Convention.  
The initial reaction of the WO/FO team after the 1947 meeting was to accept the civil 
war extension for the Wounded and Sick, and POW Conventions under the condition that 
“the adverse party accept (sic) the obligations.”292 In 1947 William Gardner, a military 
officer and Chair of the UK WO/FO team reasoned that the ICRC’s desire to cover civil 
war “probably… springs … from the experiences of the IRCC (sic) in the Spanish Civil 
War reinforced by the treatment of the Resistance Forces in the European countries 
occupied by the Germans.”293 This reinforces the argument made earlier about the 
importance of the Spanish Civil War on states’ reception of the ICRC proposal. Despite 
this, Gardner worried about the application of protections to “such situations as the 
present difficulties in Palestine or the “resistance” movement in Germany.”294 Others, 
including the legal adviser of the FO, Joyce Gutteridge, shared this concern about the 
lack of a precise definition of civil war to avoid protections amid such “undesirable” 
situations. In addition, Gutteridge disliked the expression “adverse party” because of its 
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possible legitimating effect, and worried about who would be responsible for establishing 
whether the insurgents actually respected to the Conventions.295 So thorny was the idea of 
internal conflicts for this UK team that it was one of the last issues to be worked out in 
preparation for the upcoming Stockholm meeting.296  
By 1948 the working position of the WO/FO team was that some of the humanitarian 
principles of the Wounded and Sick, and POW Conventions could apply to civil war (per 
the text adopted in 1947) with one crucial condition: that it should be up to the sovereign 
power to decide when the law should become operative. 297 That decision, moreover, 
could only be granted after states’ discretionarily accepted that the rebels had met other 
objective conditions: they controlled territory; they had issued a formal declaration of 
independence and a renunciation of allegiance to the government; they had formed an 
organized rebel army and were engaged in ongoing hostilities against their “former 
sovereign.”298  
Although the WO/FO IC felt that with all these safeguards the application of 
humanitarian principles would not prove a great burden, it decided to include conditional 
reciprocity as an additional guarantee that British soldiers fallen in rebel hands would 
receive good treatment. These tall requirements simultaneously worked to reduce the 
likelihood that international humanitarian law would apply, but made it more probable 
that if it did, rebels would have a clear incentive to show good conduct.  The WO/FO IC 
recommended that any tightening of this language was undesirable.299 Finally, for this 
UK team it was important to avoid the recognition the formal belligerency of rebels even 
if a state decided to apply the Conventions. The reason for this was twofold: As explained 
in the previous chapter, according to the prevalent legal doctrine, granting belligerence 
would mean recognizing (and thus constituting) the opposing party as a “state,” 
attributing an internal conflict the character and status of an international war. Second, 
belligerency recognition allowed the insurgent party to trade and forge alliances with 
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third states, something that obviously threatened to escalate the war and strengthen the 
insurgents.  
The Home Office team’s position on including civil war in the Civilians Convention 
was slowly shaping and would not be finalized until later.  
 
The Seventeenth International Conference of the Red Cross in Stockholm, 1948 
The “working” text that had emerged from the 1947 Conference of Government 
Experts, which included conditional reciprocity, limited humanitarian protection to 
“principles” (i.e. not the full Conventions,) and the use of the term “civil war” to imply a 
high level of violence, displeased the ICRC. The organization thus used its position (and 
power) as drafter to selectively reconcile and incorporate states’ suggestions, and decided 
to eliminate conditional reciprocity from the version it presented the following year at the 
Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm.300 (States were well 
aware of and very annoyed by this practice of the ICRC.)  
The ICRC’s “tinkered” draft also expanded the scope of application to internal 
conflicts by making “civil war” one among other types of violent situations (to read: 
“armed conflicts not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial 
conflicts, or wars of religion,”) Finally, the ICRC embraced states’ suggestion to clarify 
that acceding to this rule would not have legal consequences in regard to the status of 
insurgents (without which it probably knew it had no chance of moving forward.)301  
Delegations from fifty-six countries (National Societies and government 
representatives, see Appendix 1 for details) came to what would be the final preparatory 
meeting. The political context (in terms of active or latent internal conflicts) at the time 
was particularly tense as the Cold War started to take shape, the Israel-Palestine conflict 
intensified, civil war raged in China and Greece, and colonial tensions in French 
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Indochina and British Malaya (later Malaysia) intensified. Emotions ran high, but the 
ICRC, with the help of the highly-esteemed Swedish hosts, was able to successfully steer 
the Conference.  
The 1948 debates on internal conflicts varied slightly across three subcommissions 
discussing the draft Conventions, but general patterns emerged. This time many 
delegations, including those from France, Greece and the US acquiesced to the idea of an 
imprecise definition of conflict so as to avoid the inevitable definitional quarrels, thus 
accepting a return to the language of “armed conflict not of an international character.”302 
The reference to specific types of internal conflicts (civil war, or religious and colonial 
conflicts) however, was dropped after the ICRC, with American and French support, 
argued that adding this level of precision might weaken or narrow the scope of 
application.303 The majority of delegations also agreed that all the provisions of the 
Conventions should apply, instead of only their humanitarian principles.304  
Conditional reciprocity, however, remained a key bone of contention. The American 
delegates tried to persuade others that unless this requirement was explicitly inserted, 
states would only be binding themselves, not their opponents. Rebels, after all, could not 
sign on to international conventions and become “contracting parties;” this was a 
privilege of states. Hence, if a mechanism for securing rebel commitment (such as 
conditional reciprocity) did not figure into the rule, only governments would be 
responsible for complying with the law, a situation that rebels might exploit in their 
benefit.  
By 1948 the ICRC worriedly warned against conditional reciprocity, arguing that 
instead of giving rebels a free pass it was more likely to give cynical governments an 
easy escape clause. Despite US insistence, most of the participants were not convinced 
that the lack of conditional reciprocity was too risky, at least with respect to the Wounded 
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and Sick Conventions, which were by then the oldest and most uncontroversial of the 
humanitarian agreements. For this reason, conditional reciprocity was dropped for the 
Wounded and Sick Conventions.305 
Faced with this loss, the US rejected the idea that this formula should be included in 
all four treaties. Their concrete concern arose specifically with regard to the POW 
Convention, which would grant both parties to conflict the right to a foreign “Protecting 
Power” that would care for them. This idea, tantamount to legitimating outside 
intervention by a state in another’s internal conflict, seemed plainly unacceptable to the 
American and Greek delegates.306 Although some states worried about approving 
different terms for each convention, US warnings about opening the door to the 
intervention of foreign states resonated with other participants and the majority accepted 
conditional reciprocity for the POW and Civilians Conventions.307 
What emerged from the 1948 was not entirely discouraging to the ICRC. Eliminating 
conditional reciprocity from the oldest and “most humanitarian” agreements (those 
dealing with the Wounded and Sick) but including it in the more controversial or recent 
ones (POW and Civilians Conventions) seemed to strike some balance between 
humanitarianism and sovereignty concerns. In addition, as clarified earlier, these drafts 
did not formally commit anyone. The resulting texts were but temporary compromises 
waiting to pass their final test: the Diplomatic Convention with full treaty-making 
capacity. 
The Final Stretch: States Prepare for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
In 1948 France and the US had scored some victories with regards to the rule on 
internal armed conflicts (i.e. the inclusion of conditional reciprocity in the POW and 
Civilians Conventions,) so their representatives were not greatly disturbed by the ensuing 
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formula upon their return home. However, probably at the behest of the UK, the US 
decided it would push for supplementing the definition of “armed conflict not of an 
international character” with additional requirements for application similar to those 
entertained by the British, described in more detail below.308 
 
Back to London 
The UK’s Gardner had attended the 1948 Stockholm Conference mostly with the 
intention of “observing” other states’ attitudes rather than revealing his country’s cards. 
Once the meeting ended he returned to London and wrote up a confidential report with 
his impressions. His opinion, revealed in private soon after Stockholm to the US Head of 
Delegation, was that “the draft Conventions as they now stand were not such as any 
government could sign if it was concerned with their workability.” Despite this Gardner 
thought that “with the exception of two or three major issues, the Prisoners of War, 
Wounded and Sick… Conventions would probably not present serious obstacles to our 
acceptance; but there may be very hard battles to get those two or three major issues 
settled in a form which we could accept.”309 One of these “hard battles” was the 
application of the Conventions to internal conflicts.  
The months prior to the Diplomatic Conference were intense for the UK teams as 
they worked to produce three documents: a brief for the UK delegation to the 
Conference; an internal paper for approval by the Cabinet with a detailed description of 
their preparations, with suggested instructions for the delegation; and a public 
memorandum for circulation to participants in the Diplomatic Conference. The WO/FO 
team devoted to the Wounded and Sick, and POW Conventions was particularly anxious 
to get a green light on its views from the highest level possible, realizing the seriousness 
of the issues. The WO/FO eventually submitted a long report to the Cabinet on its work, 
while the Home Office, responsible for the Civilians Convention, wrote smaller 
documents on issues where the teams differed, especially on internal conflicts. 
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“A Step in the Dark”: The UK and the Treatment of Internal Conflicts 
Broadly speaking, there was no major difference of principle with the treatment of 
internal conflicts between the teams studying the different Conventions: both teams 
disliked it and found it generally dangerous.310 The WO/FO IC’s option was to propose a 
formula including precise conditions for application. And as said before, the WO/FO IC 
saw some potential (if marginal) humanitarian advantage from securing reciprocal 
humane conduct in a full-scale civil war.  
To this end, the WO/FO team proposed that the application of the Wounded and Sick, 
and POW Conventions to internal conflicts could only become possible if a violent 
situation occurring within states’ boundaries resembled a war between states (with both 
sides controlling territory, acting with organized armies,) if rebels respected the laws of 
war, and if they were willing and able to respect the Geneva Conventions.311 The last 
requirement was this British team’s way of including conditional reciprocity without 
stating it explicitly; a gesture that they knew was opposed by the majority.312  
The HO IC team, on the other hand, fiercely rejected any possibility of applying the 
protections of the Civilians Convention to internal conflicts. The issue was one “bristling 
with difficulties,” the risks it posed so high and its implications so “fantastic” that it 
should not “become obscured by theorizing.”313 In particular, they worried that the 
Conventions might protect and even give special treatment to the civilian population 
supportive of a rebel group, which had all sorts of dangerous military and political 
implications and hampered state’s ability to apply domestic law of treason. In short, for 
the HO the civil war idea was “at best a step in the dark… and at worst an 
encouragement to rebellion.”314 They stressed the risk of legitimating rebels and 
considered the formal clause inserted to avoid this as mere “lip service” which in practice 
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would do nothing to safeguard the position of a UK government.315  For these reasons, 
and despite their expectation to find great pressure against their view in Geneva, the HO 
team essentially recommended the UK should risk pushing for the rejection of the clause 
by convincing other states of the perils involved through the debates.316 
Cabinet approval for these positions remained uncertain until less than a month before 
the 1949 Conference opened. On March 28, a high-level meeting took place to make final 
decisions; in attendance were: the Prime Minister C. R. Attlee, the Lord Chancellor 
Viscount Jowitt, the Secretary of State for the Home Department J. Chuter Ede, the 
Secretary of State for War, E. Shinwell, the Attorney General Sir Hartley Shawcross, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, C. P. Mayhew, alongside the 
UK Head of Delegation Sir Robert Craigie, and the War Office’s William Gardner. In a 
nutshell: Attendees sided with the HO team and scolded the WO/FO team for being 
dangerously flexible. The summary of the confidential discussion is worth quoting at 
length: “It would be a matter of great practical difficulty to say at what point a riot or 
rebellion reached the stage at which it should be regarded as a civil war for the purposes 
of the Convention. In law, it was by no means clear that, as the proposal stood, the 
decision would lie within the discretion of the Sovereign Power… This country could not 
rule out the possibility of insurrection by anti-partition elements in Northern Ireland and 
there was always the danger of Communist uprisings in various European countries… 
The only practicable course was to apply civil war at the instigation of the Sovereign 
Power… the British Government should decline to sign the Convention, or sign it subject 
to reservation, if it views were not met on this matter.”317 
If the UK Delegation (through the WO) had internally shown a small modicum of 
ambivalence, these instructions made no bones about how to proceed: kill the provision, 
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and failing that, in the words of Attorney General Hartley Shawcross, “resist it to the ‘the 
bitter end’ for the Civilians Convention.”318 
 
III. The Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
Officially convened by the Swiss government, the Diplomatic Conference that 
revised the Geneva Conventions opened on April 21, 1949 and lasted four months. Sixty-
four states participated in total (59 with voting power, 5 as observers; see Appendices 1 
and 3.) The ICRC was also invited officially as an observer, as was the League of Red 
Cross Societies (LRCS) and a few other non-governmental organizations.  
The issue that most marked the political dynamics prior to the Conference was the 
question of Soviet attendance, which was announced --to everyone’s surprise-- a week 
and a half before proceedings began. The news that the Soviets were coming in the 
company of seven “satellites” sent Western channels abuzz with uncertainty. Very 
quickly they revealed to behave in exactly the opposite way most expected them to: 
Instead of sabotaging the Conference, they appeared thoughtful, well prepared and more 
“humanitarian” (if rhetorically) than any Western liberal state present. This would prove 
to have important effects on the process and outcomes, as demonstrated below. 
The second aspect that marked the Conference soon after its start was the extremely 
conservative attitude of the British, who came with the explicit mission of tearing apart 
the 1948 Stockholm texts, which they saw as an expression of the most extreme 
humanitarianism.319 Although other states disagreed with portions of that draft texts the 
ICRC put before them, the Brits’ reported long list of amendments quickly made them 
come off as obtrusive and obnoxious to most other participants.320 
The first debate on the application of the Conventions to internal conflicts happened 
over two meetings held late April in a Joint Committee. The ICRC introduced the text 
approved in Stockholm, reminding that states had decided in 1948 to delete conditional 
reciprocity in two of the Conventions (POW and Civilians) and to include it in the other 
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two (Wounded and Sick on Land and on Sea.) “The two texts should be brought into 
conformity,”321 noted the ICRC’s Claude Pilloud, wisely framing the debate to be about 
the how and not the whether. At this stage the idea was still to extend the full Conventions 
to internal conflicts, not to create a tailored article.  
France and the UK reacted swiftly. Setting the tone right from the start French 
Delegate Albert Lamarle stated that “it was impossible to carry the protection of 
individuals to the point of sacrificing the rights of States. In order to protect the rights of 
the State the French delegation would propose an amendment making it impossible for 
forms of disorder, anarchy or brigandage to claim the protection of the Convention under 
a mask of politics or on any other pretext.”322 Lamarle suggested that only well-organized 
military forces with a responsible authority capable of enforcing and respecting the 
Convention in a given territory should become eligible to any protections.  
The UK Head Delegate, Sir Robert Craigie, plainly declared that the Conventions 
could only apply to wars as defined in international law, that is, wars between sovereign 
states. Covering other forms of conflict, he said, was a source of “great difficulties” 
because it “would appear to give the status of belligerents to insurgents, whose right to 
wage war could not be recognized.” This, as Craigie put it “would strike at the root of 
national sovereignty and endanger national security.”323 This was a lightly veiled public 
admission of the private British desire to kill the extension.  
Greece, Spain, the US, Canada, China and Australia, each with slight different 
emphases, sided with the French sentiment and vouched for having clearer, stricter terms 
to avoid over-inclusion. The conditions cited in 1949 were basically the same as those 
raised in previous meetings: the level of violence; clearly establishing who would decide 
if a civil war was taking place; excluding Protective Powers from internal conflicts; 
requiring that rebels have an organizational structure, control of territory and population, 
and that they are willing and able to respect the Conventions; and decoupling the 
application of the Conventions from the legal recognition of belligerence.  
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Not all other states agreed, however. Mexico, Norway, Monaco, Hungary, Denmark, 
and Romania voiced their discontent with such heavy doses of control. Mexico alerted 
that “in civil wars there might also be movements for emancipation of a morally 
creditable character,” praising the “courage” states had shown in Stockholm to subject 
the rights of states to humanitarian considerations. Even if certain precautions were valid 
“the Conference should not be deaf to the voice of those who are suffering.”324 Hungary 
and Rumania reminded others that the point of Conference should be to extend 
humanitarian protections as widely as possible, without undercutting them through 
conditional reciprocity.325  
However, the most forceful rebuttal of the position shown by Western states came 
from the Soviets. This was remarkable and created a major impression upon other states, 
which found themselves both puzzling over the Soviet intentions and flummoxed to be 
shown recalcitrant by the premier Communist country in the early Cold War contest for 
“hearts and minds.” General Slavin took the British, the French, the Greeks and the 
Americans to task, noting that their proposals all tended to undermine the 
humanitarianism of the Conventions.326 His arguments are worth quoting at some length:  
“The United Kingdom Delegation had alluded to the fact that colonial and civil wars 
were not regulated by international law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would 
be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This theory was not convincing, since 
although the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point, some were of the 
view that civil war was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the 
Organization of the United Nations, this question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter 
provided that Member States must ensure peace and world security. They could therefore 
not be indifferent to the cessation of hostilities, no matter the character or localization of 
the conflict. Colonial and civil wars therefore came within the purview of international 
law.”327 
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This clever view seemed to reflect what soon became one of the most crucial political 
battles waged within the United Nations and without: the collective legitimation of self-
determination and the associated delegitimation of colonialism. (The next two chapters 
will delve more deeply into these important dynamics.) 
The Soviet delegate also chastised the French for pushing the idea of conditional 
reciprocity, arguing that that “if [it] were followed, there would be a danger of one party 
declaring, without proof, that the other party was not in a position to ensure order, and 
thus of justifying any violation of the basic humanitarian principles of the 
Conventions.”328 This reasoning was exactly identical to that of the ICRC.  
About a Greek proposal to subject the application of humanitarian principles to 
formal recognition of belligerence in civil war, Slavin said that it was “unacceptable… 
This amendment restricted the scope of the text of the Draft which was approved at 
Stockholm and sapped its humanitarian bases.” Similarly, “the proposal of the United 
States Delegation, by subordinating the application of the Convention to the decision of 
one Party, was no longer in harmony with the humanitarian principles governing these 
Conventions.” In conclusion, Slavin: 
“…pointed out that civil and colonial wars were often accompanied by violations of 
international law and were characterized by cruelty of all kinds. The suffering of the 
population in the instance of civil and colonial wars was as distressing as that which led 
Henry Dunant to realize the need for regulating the laws of warfare.” 
 
This spirited Soviet defense surprised all others. Although there are reasons to explain 
genuine Soviet sympathy for the prevention of civil war atrocities --having itself emerged 
from a bloody revolution,-- it is hard to be gullible and accept that the Soviets were 
simply acting out of sheer humanitarianism.329 Rather, their position in 1949, as it soon 
became clear in various other international forums and rule-making processes occurring 
at the time, was strategically crafted in large degree to shame Western countries, 
highlighting the inconsistency of their concrete legal proposals with their professed 
liberal-democratic worldview. Moreover, it is imaginable that by pushing for broad 
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protections in internal conflicts, the Soviet Union wished not only to “facilitate” 
communist uprisings in various parts of the world but also to influence the political 
direction of the postcolonial world. These suspicions with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions require careful weighing on the basis of research in Russian archives, yet 
historians and political scientists studying other processes and organizations have noted 
just how important the “scramble” for political allegiance was for both sides of the Cold 
War, especially in its early decades. Robert McMahon claims that for both the US-led 
West and the Soviets the stakes at play in the so-called “Third World” were unusually 
high. The newly decolonized world was not only instrumental to keep the overall 
military, political and economic balance around the globe, but also a “litmus test of their 
core ideas about the nature and direction of historical change.”330  As Robert Jervis has 
suggested, “What was at stake [at the time] was nothing less than each side’s view of the 
rightness of its cause, the universalism of its values, and the answer to the question of 
whose side history was on.”331 In terms of concrete Soviet conduct at international 
podiums, Ilya Gaiduk explains how “in various UN organs, the Soviet delegates put 
forward the most extreme proposals, which had a demonstrably inflationary effect on the 
actions of the anticolonial forces.”332 The Soviets’ initial words on the issue of internal 
conflicts in 1949 were suggestive of this behavior, but their actions a few weeks later 
would definitely confirm it.  
Soviet intentions aside, in light of all these stark discrepancies, the Swiss 
representative suggested forming a subcommittee to work out a compromise formula. 
The British acquiesced, and asked for a few days’ postponement “to enable delegations to 
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consider this problem in informal talks before the Committee suggested by the Swiss 
representative was set up.”333 
 
London, Paris: We Have a Problem! 
The confidential correspondence exchanged between the French and British delegates 
sitting in Geneva and their governments back home shows that alarms went off after 
these initial debates. French Delegate Lamarle, wrote various memoranda to Paris in late 
April and early May describing the diversity of arguments, particularly the polarization 
between the Soviets and the Brits. His reports confirmed that while France supported 
some kind of formula extending some of the protections of the Conventions to civil war, 
yet to be defined, they also found the 1948 Stockholm text dangerous. In response, 
Lamarle introduced an initial French draft that more closely resembled his country’s 
preferences, specially looking to avoid granting protections to “any violent movement or 
even mere banditry.”334  
British correspondence, however, revealed extreme anxiety. A day after these 
discussions took place (April 28,) three members of the UK delegation wrote to London 
depicting the tensions and requesting more flexible instructions. Their letters are worth 
quoting at length. One wrote:  
“As… anticipated the Delegation has run into very heavy weather already on the 
subject of civil war… The whole of the fire of this subject is being concentrated on our 
attitude to civilians and the Soviet Union is allying itself very strongly with the 
humanitarian school in pressing for the widest possible application of the Conventions to 
civil and colonial wars. Those who have ventured to suggest that the application to civil 
war should be restricted are being labeled legalistic … The whole delegation is, I think, 
now convinced that if we maintain our attitude we shall probably find ourselves in a 
minority of one.”335 
 
This British delegate referenced elements of the social environment which added to 
the pressure evinced in the debates, including bad press at home and abroad, the fact that 
the Swiss had “picked out this as one of the necessary extensions to the Convention 
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which recent hostile events had demonstrated as essential,” and more crucially, the fact 
that “nearly every nation of any importance, (including those who are in, or have recently 
experienced civil war,) have gone to the rostrum to adhere to this principle, the United 
Kingdom being the solitary voice raised in favour of not applying the Conventions to 
civil war.”336 He even feared a spill-over might occur across issues: “I anticipate a similar 
situation may emerge presently when we come to talk about war crimes and sanctions for 
them but sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. I thought I ought to let you know that 
this situation which may call for consideration by Ministers at an early date, was 
developing.”337 
Another UK delegate wrote home essentially repeating his colleague’s concerns, 
adding interesting social elements. “There have been some very critical articles in the 
Swiss papers. One of them even goes as far as to suggest, in effect, that the disintegration 
of the British Empire is proceeding at so fast a pace that we are determined to keep every 
possible power we can in order to preserve some of the empire. We here are quite 
satisfied that we shall never get what our instructions require.” Not even the support of 
friendly New Zealand was assured: “The international background here is against us. Our 
authority and influence as reasonable people will be seriously undermined if we acquire a 
reputation for intransigence on an issue in which the overwhelming body of opinion is 
against us.”338 
Clearly, the UK delegation felt anxious and socially isolated. Other states had 
suggested limiting the inclusion of internal conflicts in the Civilians Convention, but 
none wanted it nixed. This evidence, I argue, thus strongly supports the operation of 
social coercion between delegations in Geneva.  
Yet these and subsequent communications also revealed that the British were not 
prepared to support just any text that emerged. Rightly noting the divergences of opinion 
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and concerns about how “broad” the Stockholm proposal was, they reasoned: “If we 
adopt an intransigent attitude we will lose everything. If we are accommodating and 
prepared to compromise, we may well be able to get not all what we want but very much 
that we want (sic.)”339 This was the logic according to which they would act from then 
on, one that can be characterized as “rational” but under heavy social constraints. 
 
Devising an “Acceptable Compromise” 
The situation in Geneva did not improve for the detractors of the idea of humanizing 
internal conflicts. By May 9, after three weeks of debate, the Joint Committee voted on 
the general question of whether the topic should be included in the Conventions, with an 
overwhelming positive vote of 10 to 1 (and 1 abstention.)340 The verdict on the whether 
had at last come; the struggle would now be over the how.  
And indeed the how continued to stir much controversy. A few options were already 
on the table, already described: the 1948 Stockholm text; an initial French proposal that 
allowed for the application of the Conventions given formal conditions had been met; and 
a proposal by the American Delegation including conditional reciprocity as well as a mix 
of subjective and objective requirements for application.  
Disagreement prevailed between the partisans of inserting conditions and those 
against. In search for a solution, the Chairman of the Special Commission suggested 
forming a smaller Working Party to hash out a compromise text between the different 
proposals. The resulting text, however, retained several of the requirements aired 
previously (state recognition, rebel control of territory, high level of internal organization, 
conditional reciprocity,) again drawing strong critiques from Italy, Switzerland, the 
USSR and the ICRC.341 This last one was emphatic: “the text drawn up by the Working 
could never have been applied in any recent case of civil war. It therefore did not 
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represent a progress with regard to the present situation.”342 Given these harsh reactions, 
the First Working Party went back to the drawing board.  
Although frustrating for the participating delegates, these debates were useful for 
states to collectively shape the parameters of acceptability of the eventual rule, that is, 
they progressively clarified which elements might be too controversial to make it on to 
the final text, namely the requirements of conditional reciprocity, state discretion and the 
conditions of territorial control and organization by rebels. This attests undoubtedly to the 
rhetorical power of the ICRC, Switzerland, Latin American countries like Mexico and 
Uruguay, and most crucially (though for different reasons,) of the Soviet bloc. Without 
their sustained pressure and persistent refrain that inserting formal conditions would work 
to invalidate the application of humanitarian law in internal conflicts by providing 
unscrupulous states with excuses not to apply it, any legal outcome of these negotiations 
would have probably included at least some of them. In the end, further confirming the 
persistent and widely-shared concern among states of avoiding the legitimization of 
rebels, the only explicit condition that remained in the adopted text of CA3 was one all 
participants could agree on: The legal application of the Conventions to rebels would not 
change the legal status of rebels. 
 
Covert Pushback: The “Not Dotting the i’s” Strategy 
The British delegates in Geneva had cried for help. But were they heard? The 
response from London showed sympathy with their compatriots’ anxiety. One official 
wryly noted: “Our Delegations worst forebodings… have come true… Other countries 
will oppose us for the sake of opposition or of showing us up in a bad light in the eyes of 
all the humanitarians; the Commonwealth delegates have been told to take a less 
restrictive stance than ours and the Americans, I gather, are sitting on the fence. I think it 
is important to consider the use the Communist and ‘fellow-traveler’ press will make of 
our legalistic attitude.”343 He later concluded: “If we stick to our guns, we shall not 
change the views held by the majority of other delegations and we shall earn more 
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unpopularity than if we had refused the invitation of the Swiss to attend the 
Conference.”344 Note the very clear references to social identity concerns in these 
communications.  
Another London-based official shared this sentiment: “Now, surely there is 
something very surprising if you find the UK taking up a negative attitude to this 
proposal when it is supported by lots of other countries which have recently experienced 
civil wars and are likely to do so frequently… is not there probably some modicum of 
truth in what Sir R. Craigie describes as the ‘reaction of the conference to our attitude’ 
that the UK is influenced by conservative legalism and is indifferent to, and indeed 
opposing, the efforts of others to effect amendments and extensions to international 
law…?”345 He sentenced: “It is quite clear, I think, that the Attorney General and Lord 
Chancellor will have to agree in the change of instructions.”346  
Showing recalcitrance when so many others, friends, neutrals and rivals alike, were 
showing openness, was for the British quite embarrassing. But did such embarrassment 
translate into a change of heart? What follows suggests that it did not. Instead of being 
rationally convinced or morally persuaded, the British seem to have been coerced into 
recalibrating their tactics with a view to the humanitarian pressures in the room.  
Alongside his plea for flexibility, UK Head Delegate Craigie drafted the terms of a 
possible accommodation and shared them with London. He reasoned that the original 
Cabinet concerns “can be overcome. We all feel that it will be necessary to abandon any 
formula specifically leaving the decision in this matter to the Sovereign Power, and to 
seek rather some formula which, while not dotting the I’s, would in fact leave the last 
word to the Sovereign Power.”347 This entailed decoupling the application of 
humanitarian law in civil war from the recognition of belligerency or the legal status of 
the rebels, and restricting the idea of extending the full Conventions to internal armed 
conflicts to a more limited and “tailored” formula featuring selected humanitarian 
provisions. Craigie mused: “If we make the relevant provisions relatively innocuous, 
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would there really be an objection to this? On the contrary, might it not have the effect of 
side-tracking outside pressure for recognition of belligerency if it could be shown that 
these humanitarian provisions were being applied in a satisfactory way?” Craigie also 
intimated that the French were “tracking along the same lines as we are, though we had 
not disclosed this particular point with them and we had arrived at our conclusions 
independently.” Indeed, it was only a matter of time before the Brits and the French 
joined forces. 
In closing his note, Craigie commented on the social cost the UK might pay if 
instructions were not loosened: “I should be glad to know whether, if the United 
Kingdom, alone [among the] nations represented here, were to make a reservation on 
civil war, this would be likely to have unfortunate repercussions on our foreign relations. 
Must we not expect, in such a case, to be strongly criticized in the United States, where 
the humanitarian tide seems to be running strong? And can we… afford to lose any 
friends there just at present?... I am afraid the question is rather urgent because our 
position here is becoming increasingly embarrassing. A member of the very friendly New 
Zealand Delegation privately expressed the hope that some change in our attitude on civil 
war would soon be possible because we were tending to lose much of our influence by 
ploughing this lonely furrow. I know this view is shared by other Commonwealth 
Delegations.”348 
As this shows, the Delegations’ cries were indeed heard. A group of representatives 
from the HO, the WO, the FO, the CO, the Treasury Solicitor’s Office, the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office met on May 20th to discuss the 
civil war issue and decided that the UK should no longer press for its deletion.349 In a 
subsequent high-level meeting, the Cabinet of Ministers essentially approved this 
recommendation.350 
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Coerced Empires Strike Back 
On May 9 the French Delegate received orders from Paris to continue pressing for a 
restrictive text with formal requirements for application and conditional reciprocity. 
Lamarle knew this flew in the face of what most states in Geneva wanted. In effect, days 
later he wrote back confirming that despite his efforts, a great number of delegations 
were feeling more charitable. His strategy –he clarified—had been to continue 
participating in the debates so as to ensure that the terms of the civil war inclusion were 
“as attenuated as possible.” Adopting a wholly negative attitude, Lamarle warned, would 
risk tipping the balance in favor of the most humanitarian versions of the text and very far 
from their own preferences.351 This was essentially equivalent to the British position and 
strategy. 
By mid-May the French and British Heads of Delegation started working closely. 
Through public debate and private conversations they had become aware of their 
instructions’ similarity: to accept a text that guaranteed the application of some (selected) 
humanitarian principles that were not overtly threatening to an undefined class of internal 
conflicts (“armed conflicts not of an international character”) without explicitly calling 
for conditional reciprocity but with the implicit understanding that lower-intensity 
rebellions were excluded.352 Their goal from then on would be to craft a formula 
acceptable to them but with the potential of gaining others’ support while keeping the 
more extremist humanitarian versions at bay. It is this type of deceptive, reactive attitude 
of the British and French that I label covert pushback. 
Hammering out the desired magic formula would no doubt be difficult, given the 
range of critiques. France’s Lamarle went back to Paris seeking new instructions to see 
how far he could really go. In the meantime, the Working Party established in Geneva to 
prepare a compromise formula for internal conflicts had circulated a revised draft. The 
UK’s Craigie expressed his satisfaction with it, since it resembled his initial idea to craft 
different language for the Wounded and Sick, POW and Civilians Conventions, without 
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conditional reciprocity but with several other requirements. Yet Craigie also recognized 
the importance of supporting France, “not only because their position is closest to ours, 
but because the problem of civil war is, at the moment, a more serious one for France 
than for any other of our Allies.”353 
The French delegation returned with fresh instructions in early June. Paris was now in 
support of an article that would figure in all four Conventions but that only included the 
“general humanitarian principles” originally listed in an (eventually deleted) draft 
preamble to the Civilians Convention, and which contained neither explicit requirements 
for application nor conditional reciprocity. French instructions, surprisingly, claimed that 
the debates in Geneva had “convinced” the French government “that, on a matter such as 
civil war, which by its nature gives rise to such deeply divergent opinions, one thing is 
important: to apply as broadly as possible the humanitarian principles which lay at the 
basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention 
recently approved by the United Nations. These principles are precisely the same as those 
that appear on the Preamble of the Convention on Civilians and which, it is desired, 
should be extended to the other Conventions.” Surprisingly, the French no longer worried 
about formal conditions of application.354  
It is hard to know exactly whether the “convincing” that had taken place in Paris was 
the result of moral persuasion. The instructions to Lamarle justified this change in part by 
saying that “in taking this position, the French government is consciously staying faithful 
to the ideal of humanity that has constantly inspired its policy.” The rest of Lamarle’s 
letter, however, revealed that the changed French attitude was not self-less through and 
through: “At the same time, this position presents the advantage for states which like 
France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc. have overseas possessions and which, in 
these dominions, can face conflicts bearing traits of a civil war, to avoid having to apply 
the precise text of the Conventions.”355 The letter also confirmed that the French were 
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ready to make a formal reservation if its views as depicted were not met. It can be said 
with certainty then that the French had accommodated through the social pressures 
evinced in debates, and that the “convincing” in this case combined both moral and 
rational elements.  
The next step was to see how the Special Committee debating the issue of internal 
conflicts reacted to the new options, including a redraft of the (still very restrictive) 
Working Party text and the new French proposal, just described. This debate took place 
on June 15. With the support of the UK, Burma, Monaco, Uruguay and the ICRC, the 
French text gained some momentum. Still, the US, Australia and Norway continued to 
say they preferred the Working Party text, which offered greater humanitarian protection 
but stipulated stringent conditions for application. In response, the Soviet, Greek and 
Norwegian Delegates (who were allegedly sitting on the fence) encouraged forming a 
second Working Party to redraft the French text. 
The French delegation seized the opportunity and took the drafting lead within this 
new Working Party. In the meantime the British sought and received clearance from 
London about the French formula.356 Having finally found a palatable text, the UK 
Delegation set out to lobby other diplomats for support, particularly the Commonwealth 
states and the US, even using the implausible argument that supporting proposals from 
Western allies was militarily beneficial, without clarifying exactly what these might 
be.357 (Indeed, the military argument, however, was neither clear nor convincing because 
when Craigie pitched it privately to US Delegate Leland Harrison, the latter admitted he 
did not see where the benefit lay. Still, Harrison accepted not to oppose the French 
text.)358 
The reworked French proposal (which with some modifications, became the final 
CA3) was debated in the Special Committee on June 24th. As Lamarle said whilst 
introducing it “The text… contained no clause of a political character which could 
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possibly lead to contestation.”359 During discussions the US admitted that while they 
preferred the binding application of a wider set of protections (but with more conditions,) 
they would accept the French text with improvements, including language allowing the 
ICRC to offer its services and a clarification on judicial guarantees.360 Norway also 
proposed the constructive addition of considering humanitarian safeguards for captured 
combatants. At this stage, the only two states that did not support the French text were 
Australia, which supported a stricter alternative and the USSR (which had remained 
silent and reportedly awaited instructions from Moscow.) 
After this debate, the French-tailored text from the second Working Party clearly 
stood out as the likeliest one to constitute an acceptable compromise. It would still have 
to face some hurdles, however. On July 8th the Soviets finally received the orders they 
had been expecting from Moscow and presented for their first time their own text on 
internal conflicts to the Committee. As the French and British had anticipated, an 
“extremely humanitarian” Soviet proposal had emerged which essentially supported the 
application of the Conventions in toto to conflicts not of an international character. 
French and British joint action to work out an acceptable text and lobby for support had 
been “proved right” and stood to ward off the Soviet formula. But not all was yet said and 
done.  
 
A Golden Opportunity, Missed 
On July 8 and July 11, after over a dozen meetings on the subject and plenty of 
bickering, the Special Committee put to a vote the options on the table. Shockingly, all 
the formulas were rejected, even the French-tailored second Working Party version 
which failed narrowly (5-5.)361 Two contingencies led to this outcome: First, the Burmese 
delegate General Oung received instructions from his government to completely oppose 
inclusion of internal conflicts in the Conventions, probably responding to an aggravating 
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insurrection at home.362 Oung would, from then on and until the final vote, be the only 
public proponent of deleting the clause. Second, the Uruguayan representative, who was 
acting as Chair of the Second Working Party and who reportedly supported the French 
text did not vote because he was unsure that as Chair he could still cast a ballot. 
Regardless of these serendipitous events, the Swiss Chairman logically concluded that 
perhaps the idea of internal conflicts clause should be deleted altogether. 
After the long struggle to negotiate a formula, these results left most diplomats 
apparently deflated. Only Burma’s Oung celebrated the outcome openly, noting that the 
“Eastern countries he represented” could not at all agree on the coverage of civil war 
through the Conventions. 
This surprising turn of events provides us with an exceptional chance to gauge 
whether the starting preferences of the opposing states, particularly the UK, had in fact 
been radically altered through social pressure. The UK Delegation had at the start been 
instructed to press for deletion: Would they now capitalize and seize this ideal 
happenstance to do so?  
They did not. Instead, the UK, Australia and the USSR quickly rebutted the 
Chairman’s dire conclusion, urging him to submit the various options to the upper (Joint) 
Committee for the final settlement of the issue.363 
Why did this occur? The UK could have predictably recalibrated back to their default 
interest of excluding internal conflicts from the Conventions, period. This was the perfect 
moment for it, yet they did not seize it. 
Were British diplomats in the end genuinely convinced of the appropriateness of 
humanizing civil wars? Did they suddenly see some other sort of benefit prompting them 
to fight for it? The evidence below demonstrates that the latter is correct: the British 
strategically reasoned that they stood to gain more from supporting the French text, 
palatable to the majority of the participants, than from supporting alternatives they knew 
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were unpopular and thus unlikely to win out: total deletion, a very restrictive text, or an 
extremely humanitarian (Soviet) one. 
After the rejection of the French text the UK Delegation in Geneva reconvened to 
strategize, and explicitly decided against throwing their weight behind the other 
proposals. UK Delegate John Alexander suggested they should accept the momentary 
failure “with good grace,” and that the best tactic would be to try to reopen debate in the 
Joint Committee “when it might be possible to gather Latin American support for the 
French proposal.”364  
The UK‘s Craigie, for his part, reported back to London admitting that they had 
“reached a strange position on our negotiations and votes.” Craigie recalled “that our 
original hope had been to exclude the application of the Conventions to any form of civil 
war,” and described the process by which they had come to support the French text. Yet 
given recent developments, Craigie wrote: “We are therefore now faced with the 
possibility of being landed with one of the three texts or of having no reference to Civil 
War in the Conventions at all, i.e.: (i) No text at all; (ii) Stockholm text; (iii) First 
Working Party Text; (iv) Second Working Party text.”365  
He then spelled out a strategy which, though intricate, boiled down to lending their 
support to the alternative most likely to win acceptance, i.e. the French-tailored text. 
Although the UK delegation continued to prefer the complete rejection of internal 
conflicts in the Conventions, it recognized that this outcome was, under the 
circumstances, improbable. The best option was to try to block the “undesirable” (overtly 
humanitarian) texts or “unlikely” (overtly conditional) drafts by throwing their weight 
being their own text, which had after all emerged as a sort of compromise.366 
In addition to strategy, Craigie expressed regard for the work his and the French 
delegations had put into designing a workable solution. In a private conversation Lamarle 
had told Alexander “that after all their efforts on the subject, the French Delegation could 
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not accept any proposal to omit entirely any reference to Civil War in the Conventions. 
The French were anxious that the second Working Party’s text should be adopted.” The 
UK Delegates thus also felt that they should support the French out of loyalty, a social 
motive.367 Further proof of this is that when the Burmese delegate approached Craigie to 
rally support for total deletion, Craigie responded “that this was far more acceptable to 
the United Kingdom but that we could not break with the French, who had said that they 
would not now go back on the decision to have a reference to Civil War in the 
Convention.” The Burmese then prodded the UK diplomats, saying that the French did 
not want a reference to internal conflicts either. Ultimately, Craigie clarified that “if he 
could support the Burmese amendment without breaking faith with the French, that 
would be the best line to take.”368 Yet there again he knew that the current state of the 
debate might make that impossible. 
The behind the scenes alliance between the French and the UK seems to have 
worked, because once presented again to the Joint Committee, all the versions of the text 
were rejected except for the French-UK draft, (which was approved by 21 votes against 
6, with 14 abstentions.)369  
 
The Moment of Decision 
Yet the decisive moment would come at the final Plenary voting, when the approved 
draft would face-off against the Soviet proposal (USSR delegates had also resisted defeat 
and insisted in submitting their version to the upper body) and the Burmese motion to 
delete.  
Spirited interventions preceded the final vote before the Plenary. The words of the 
Soviet delegate are worth citing as a testament of the road that had been traveled: “No 
other issue has given rise to such a long discussion and to such a detailed and exhaustive 
study as the question of the extension of the Convention to war victims of conflicts not of 
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an international character.”370 Surely to the annoyance of the British, the Soviet diplomat 
further noted that from the long, tough debates it had clearly ensued that “the provision 
for the application of the four Convention to colonial and civil wars is supported by the 
overwhelming majority of the delegations at this Conference.”371 The Soviet speech 
aggressively continued to vouch for their proposal; singling out a variety of provisions 
which would be left out if the French draft were approved, including the prohibition of 
reprisals against the civilian population, and specific protections for women and 
children.372 
Following the Soviets was the Burmese delegate Oung, who had at this stage become 
the only public recalcitrant. His speech, equally remarkable, systematically recounted the 
many options that had been considered throughout the preceding months, and shrewdly 
highlighted the many different dangers they presented for national sovereignty. Taking 
other states to task for supporting amply humanitarian language, he said pointedly: 
“Some of you, especially the delegations of Colonial Powers, have really been 
remarkably broadminded to support the Article, though it is going to encourage Colonial 
wars... So the only help that the Article will give, if you adopt it, will be to those who 
desire to loot, pillage, political power by undemocratic means, or those foreign ideologies 
seeking their own advancement by inciting the population of another country.” The 
Burmese diplomat made a stellar case for the deletion of the idea of including internal 
conflicts in the Conventions, pushing as many “sovereignty” buttons as he could.373 But 
his arguments fell on deaf ears. 
The reactions from other states varied in tone and content. Eastern European 
countries such as Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia unsurprisingly preferred the 
Soviet draft, while others asked for clarifications on the meaning of the approved version 
or voiced support for the received Stockholm draft. Yet in the words of Swiss Delegate 
Mr. Plinio Bolla, a stark defender of the French formula: “Half a loaf is better than no 
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bread.”374 In the end no other delegation except for Burma risked saying they wanted the 
language on internal conflicts deleted. So isolated was Burma’s Oung that he declared 
himself an outcast on record and requested that the vote be made secret so he would not 
be placing his “friends” in an embarrassing situation.375 
The final Plenary vote confirmed that the majority of those present were simply not 
willing to do away with the idea of protections for internal conflicts. The Soviet proposal 
was beaten 20 to 11 (with 7 abstentions,) the recommendation of the Joint Committee 
was accepted for vote of 34 for, 0 against (1 abstention), and finally approved as 




The international regulation of internal armed conflicts through a legal humanitarian 
innovation like Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions was not a preordained 
outcome. Indeed, if anything this chapter illustrates what a complex configuration of 
political circumstance, actors, forces and contingency had to concur to produce it. 
Despite such complexity, this chapter has once more identified the importance of a 
specific combination of historical conditions and agency. With regard to question of 
where the impetus for regulation originated, the first section depicted how the shock 
brought on by additional conflict situations, compounded by the “underperformance” of 
the initial Red Cross resolutions from 1921, soon prompted the strong belief inside the 
ICRC that international binding regulation was necessary. The International Committee’s 
difficult experience during the Spanish Civil war operated as a crucial driver. The 
traumas that conflict brought on, embedded within the broader revulsion toward the 
atrocities of World War II, motivated a majority of states to welcome the revision of the 
existing body of humanitarian law, including the introduction of regulations for internal 
conflicts.  
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Going beyond impetus, this chapter spends considerable time explaining the process 
through which Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was actually made. In 
particular, it seeks to demonstrate the construction of this legal rule as the product of 
social coercion between diplomatic delegations forcefully debating in Geneva. As said, 
by the mid-1940s the majority of states admitted that an international humanitarian rule 
for internal conflicts was desirable. Yet not all of them shared an enthusiasm for the idea, 
and attitudes toward its contents certainly varied. As I showed, while moral 
(humanitarian) concerns colored the position of most states, national security interests 
retained their pull. Many states wanted to insert high requirements for the application of 
the law to internal conflicts, while colonial empires, especially the British, acted as the 
most skeptical in the room. Yet remarkably, as I illustrated, various very persistent voices 
effectively blocked off the formal insertion of conditional reciprocity and other 
requirements into the text. The pro-regulation majority also effectively cajoled the British 
into acquiescing to accepting that a rule would emerge, setting off various types of social 
anxieties for status and reputation. Notably, the Soviets’ fierce public prodding, whether 
sincere or not, seems to have pushed the political identity “buttons” inside a British 
delegation that was especially sensitive to come off as backward, decaying and legalistic, 
particularly vis-à-vis the premier Communist state in the world. The emerging Cold War 
ideological competition evidently served as a crucial contextual factor that heightened the 
urgency and political poignancy of Soviet-induced pressures. In addition to the Soviets, 
the unwillingness of fellow Commonwealth allies (or the US) to toe the British line had a 
discernible social-psychological effect on the UK delegation. Swiss newspapers’ derision 
of their retrograde stance rounded the circle of social pressure. 
Yet, as described, the process did not end there. Embarrassment did not persuade UK 
diplomats to change their position. Rather, the Brits bounced back by strategically 
planning to insert language that “without dotting the I’s,” might safeguard their 
sovereignty woes. Along the way they realized they were not trekking a lonely path and 
liaised with the French to craft a joint text that pleased them as well as the humanitarian 
voices in the room. The fact that the Soviets came forward with an “ultra-humanitarian” 
version of the article only reinforced the British and French beliefs that pushing for their 
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“moderate” text was the best bet given the circumstances, a reaction I referred to as 
covert pushback. Even when given the opportunity to support the demise of the idea (as 
was their original intention,) both preferred to see their chosen version through the end, 
fully aware that the conference would not accept the absence of a rule. Sustained British 
and French efforts translated into the eventual acceptance of a vague scope of application 
(“armed conflicts not of an international character”) for Common Article 3. 
On balance, the analysis suggests that the process and outcomes seen in the making of 
Common Article 3 seen here cannot be explained by simple assumptions of rationality vs. 
sociality and morality working independently. The conduct shown by the British and 
French during negotiations studied here can only be conceptualized as “rational action 
under strong social pressure.”  
Beyond this, the origins story offered here helps explain why, as seen in the next 
chapter, CA3 as adopted in 1949 soon also “underperformed” in practice: while 
humanitarian law promoters celebrated the rule’s “openness” and argued for its 
application in X or Y case, states facing internal conflicts often interpreted the same 
openness as vagueness and refused to argue or accept that it should apply in their specific 
situation. The British case would continue to be a crucial: once the 1949 negotiations 
were over and delegates wrote up their reports, one of them indicated that “it would 
certainly embarrass us if the situation now existent in Malaya were to be regarded by 
anyone as covered by Article 3 (and it is certainly ‘an armed conflict’.)”376 The French 
refused the rule’s application for years in Algeria, and so did a few other conflict-ridden 
in the decades that followed. Hence the analysis provided in this chapter can contribute 
not only to debates about where international norms come from and how they are 
produced, but to whether and why they are implemented/complied with on the ground. 
Importantly for this dissertation, a critical aspect also left ambivalent in the making of 
CA3 was whether and how its application by violent non-state actors could be secured: 
The legal argument made in 1949 (by the delegates of Monaco and Greece) that rebels 
would be bound by virtue of being citizens of a signatory state’s may have allayed fears 
among negotiating diplomats and satisfied the ICRC but would prove to have little 
                                                
376 TNA: PRO FO 369/4163, K10223. 
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traction with actual insurgents waging war, whose very reason for being is precisely to 
oppose their “home” state and its legal regimes. A provision in CA3 allowing for special 
direct ad hoc agreements between combatants --of which there are various examples in 
practice—helped to party make up for this weakness but did not fully resolve it. Those 
debates would continue to arise in the later history of the humanitarian rules for internal 
conflicts, as the following chapters will show.  
Finally, it should be said that the fact that a text –any text—emerged at the end of 
such a deeply contested negotiation process was a clear testament to the power of the Red 
Cross Movement, particularly the ICRC, and of the pro-extension states involved. (The 
International Committee’s records in fact suggest that even its own representatives at the 
1949 Conference privately doubted the extension to civil wars could survive the political 
turmoil.)377 Unfortunately for the ICRC and for the victims of internal conflicts, however, 
getting states to apply CA3 would, perhaps predictably, prove very difficult. This 
frustration partly set the wheels of further debates about norm development in motion, a 
discussion to which I now turn. 
  
                                                
377 The confidential minutes of the ICRC Presidency, as well as private government documents, 
confirm this. ICRC Archives A PV Conseil de la Présidence 1949-1950, 05/19/1949. Geneva. 
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Chapter 4 – The Road to the Additional Protocols (1950-1968) 
I. Introduction 
The signing of the revised Geneva Conventions in 1949, Common Article 3 included, 
was collectively hailed as a landmark achievement by the ICRC and participating states. 
The path to ratification began swiftly in December of that year, and while the major 
governmental players who contributed to its design found certain articles disagreeable, 
Common Article 3 was not among them. None entered a formal reservation or 
interpretation of the final negotiated article.378  
Yet some within the ICRC suspected that CA3’s strengths, particularly its generous 
but vague threshold of application, might prove a weakness in practice. Claude Pilloud, 
ICRC Subdirector of General Affairs at the time, recognized in an internal report (dated 
March 10, 1952) that “Article 3 will almost always give rise to discussions between the 
interested parties and an organization that, like the ICRC, will come and demand its 
application in an armed conflict.”379 Indeed, ICRC experience prior to 1949 provided 
enough evidence of states’ readiness to argue that the violence they faced within their 
borders did not constitute an armed conflict but mere “troubles,” “tensions,” or simple 
common crime and terrorism.  This suspicion with regards to CA3 would soon become a 
reality, as internal armed violence of diverse degrees was either ongoing or would soon 
erupt in Southeast Asia, North and East Africa, and Latin America. The rising tide of 
decolonization at the turn of the decade arguably posed the greatest challenge for the 
Swiss organization, occurring in areas that, like Africa, had long remained largely 
unknown to it. 
To make matters graver, conflicts for self-determination were compounded by 
repression within the Eastern Bloc and a perceived threat of communist revolutions 
elsewhere. Since most of these internal and decolonization struggles in the 1950s did not, 
at least in the beginning, reach an indisputably “high” level of violence, the ICRC faced 
tremendous obstacles in effectively persuading states to abide by international 
                                                
378 France ratified the Conventions in 1951, the US in 1955 and the UK in 1957. 
379 Procès-Verbaux de la Commission Juridique et documentation y relative, Nos 36 à 60, Vol. II, 
minutes of the 03/20/1952 session, ICRC Archives A PV (ICRC-A A PV CJ hereonafter,) 
Geneva. 
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humanitarian standards they had just signed.380 Its hopes were dashed, at least initially, in 
places like Kenya, Cyprus, Tunisia, Morocco or Algeria, where the British and French 
colonial authorities fought off the operation of the ICRC or the application of CA3 during 
much or all the hostilities.  
This chapter traces the events that followed the adoption of Common Article 3 in 
1949 until 1968 when formal debates resurfaced –this time within the United Nations—
about revising and developing the international legal rules for armed conflicts, both 
between and within states, eventually leading to the negotiation of two protocols 
complementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At first glance, this eighteen-year gap 
might suggest the ICRC sat in its laurels with regard to extending the protections of CA3 
where they seemed lacking in practice, especially in situations of internal violence that 
could not be convincingly characterized as “non-international armed conflict.” A detailed 
look at ICRC activities between 1950 and the mid-1960s reveals otherwise, evincing 
persistent efforts, doctrinal and practical, to make up for the operation of CA3 in the 
“grey” zones euphemistically referred to as “troubles” or “tensions.” In this period, as 
before, ICRC reflection is shown to have been punctuated by episodes of frustration and 
abuse on the ground, notably involving concerns about detained persons in internal 
violent contexts of varying intensity.  





Indonesia (Moluques du Sud) 1950 
French Indochina 1945-1954 
India (Cachemire) 1947 
India (Hyderabad) 1948 
                                                
380 Unlike in social science, where scholars have agreed on some numerical thresholds to 
characterize a situation as armed conflict –25 battle-related deaths, for example,-- in international 
law there is no such clear, accepted equivalent. As explained throughout this dissertation, the 
determination of “conflict status” has important legal and political implications that make it a 
tortured affair for states, particularly in the context of international rule-making. For one well-
accepted definition in social science, see the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at: 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/#What_is_a_conflict__ (Consulted July 12, 2013.) 
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Israel-Palestine 1948 

















Ireland and Northern Ireland 1959-1964 
East Germany 1957-1958 
Rhodesia (and Nyasaland) 1960-1965 
Congo 1960-1966 







Indonesia 1957-1961; 1965-1981 
Ireland 1962-1970 
South Africa 1963-1986 
Yemen 1965 
Dominican Republic 1965 
Guinea (Portugal) 1965 
Mozambique 1966, 1968 
Angola 1966, 1970 
Cape Verde 1969 




Northern Ireland 1971-1983 
















To fully understand the seeming “norm emergence gap” elapsed between 1950 and 
1968, and the subsidiary role the ICRC seemed to play initially once discussions were re-
ignited among states within the United Nations, attention must be given to a second 
(unsuccessful) legal initiative led by the Swiss organization during this time. The 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949 had given birth to a brand-new Civilians Convention, but 
it was one that said little about the precautions and limits belligerents had to observe 
toward non-combatants while planning and deploying armed attacks or using certain 
weapons with “uncontrollable effects.” In the 1950s these normative problems remained 
valid for both international and internal war, and the ICRC attempted to address them in 
                                                
381 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques; Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta a Dien Bien Phu: Histoire Du Comité International de La 
Croix-Rouge, 1945-1955; Françoise Perret and François Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: 
Histoire Du Comité International de La Crox-Rouge 1956-1965 (Geneva: Georg Editeur, 
Editions m+h, CICR, 2009); Forsythe, “Legal Regulation of Internal Conflicts: The 1977 
Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts”; Haug et al., Humanity for All: The International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts Geneva, 24 May - 12 June 1971, Vol. V - Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Conflicts (Geneva: ICRC, 1971). 
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both contexts through a set of draft humanitarian rules that it hoped states would 
embrace, first as soft guidance and later as treaty law. Yet the tense politics of the early 
Cold War, especially a growing belief that recourse to nuclear weapons helped to keep 
global peace, compounded by the fact that many powerful Western states perceived the 
Red Cross to be the wrong forum for addressing weaponry issues, led this particular 
humanitarian project to founder. Since the so-called “Draft Rules for the Limitation of 
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War” (Draft Rules, hereonafter) 
sought to cover both armed conflict between and within states at once, using their failure 
as a “negative” case to draw firm conclusions on norm emergence specific to internal 
conflicts becomes difficult.382 Yet its consideration in this chapter is crucial for 
understanding the historical process of norm entrepreneurship by the ICRC leading up to 
the next “stage” of legal construction in the 1970s. Concretely, the Draft Rules episode 
will be shown to have caused a momentary “recoiling” within the organization vis-à-vis 
pushing for formal legal revisions in general. Although the Swiss organization did not 
stay put in terms of conducting private policy discussions and consultations with experts, 
having been “burnt” publicly its approach to pressing states to change the rules became 
more cautious and circumspect. In addition, analyzing the case of the Draft Rules may 
also have some potential theoretical payoff, notably that of highlighting a third important 
condition (beyond the by-now well-established combination of atrocity-related shock and 
the existence of moral entrepreneurship) for initiating new phases of international 
humanitarian norm emergence: breaking past the recalcitrance of powerful state 
gatekeepers. This is a condition that, on its face, seems applicable equally to 
humanitarian treaty-making initiatives dealing with either international or internal 
conflict, at least during this time-period. 
By 1971, however, states were again engaged in formal debate about revisions to the 
Geneva Conventions. If not the ICRC, what and who sparked the process of updating the 
law? What actors and circumstances operated to mobilize the idea that new and better law 
                                                
382 I will describe the contents of the Draft Rules later in this chapter. For the complete text, see 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War. 
ICRC, 1956 at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/420?OpenDocument (Consulted on 
July 12, 2013.) 
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was necessary? The second section of this chapter describes and theorizes the role of new 
moral entrepreneurs and the changing (actor-specific, as well as world-structural) 
historical conditions that by the mid-to-late 1960s had begun to facilitate a new stage of 
humanitarian norm development, particularly toward conflicts occurring within states’ 
borders, including wars for self-determination and civil war. (Whether the former could 
and should be considered internal conflicts or not was a global battle in crescendo at the 
time, as discussed later.) Specifically, the persistence of atrocity episodes motivated 
another actor, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ,) to advocate for the 
expansion of humanitarian protections across all types of conflicts. Thanks to the 
networking skills and political clout of its Executive Director, Sean MácBride, ICJ 
advocacy reinvigorated the path laid by the Red Cross. More importantly, it inserted the 
process (momentarily) within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA,) at a time 
when that organization’s shifting membership had changed the internal balance of 
influence against the West, thus potentially multiplying the number of supporters of 
normative revision and expansion. Indeed, the global politics of the epoch, marked by an 
emboldened process of decolonization and the growing legitimacy of “freedom fighters” 
elicited an interest among the proliferating new states from Africa and Asia to alter the 
received body of humanitarian laws to protect (hence facilitate) conflicts of self-
determination. Coinciding with these developments but acting upon a distinct set of 
concerns, a previously skeptical actor –the United States— quickly developed a strong 
interest in extending protections for its own prisoners of war suffering abuse in Vietnam, 
with a crucial impact for the revisions process moving forward.  
In the end, I demonstrate how this combination of factors in the 1960s (a mirror 
image of the conditions seen in the 1950s) successfully triggered a new episode of rule 
emergence that culminated in the negotiation of two Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions in 1977. The same developments also set the stage for political collision 
between very different humanitarian concerns and interests during that negotiation, which 
constitutes the topic of the next chapter.  
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II. Problems of Law and Practice in Situations of Internal Violence 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions declared to protect “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities” during “armed conflicts not of an international character.” 
Most, however, found it difficult to figure exactly what this meant. The ICRC read it as 
saying that in addition to bona fide civil wars (fought in the image of the Spanish Civil 
War, for example, with clear territorial dividing lines and battle-fronts) lower-scale 
conflicts --excluding riots, protests and short-lived insurrections-- were also susceptible 
of coverage. Jean Pictet, Director-Delegate of the ICRC at the time and now amply 
recognized as the “principal architect” of the revised Conventions, claimed in 1952 that 
despite the various conditions or requirements states had insisted upon at the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference during the making of CA3, “no Government can object to 
respecting, in its dealings with internal enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict 
between it and them, a few essential rules which it in fact respects daily, under its own 
laws, even when dealing with common criminals.”383 In Pictet’s mind CA3 represented a 
condensed version of those “essential rules.”  
Yet, unfortunately, states facing internal violence often rebuffed that optimistic 
reading by claiming such instability was nothing more than isolated “troubles” or 
terrorism. Notably, the United Kingdom and France, the two colonial powers that, as I 
claimed in the last chapter, were socially coerced to accept the humanization of internal 
conflicts in 1949 and who had fashioned the scope of CA3 in a way that might allow 
them to escape its application, lived up to their duplicitous intent. The British faced the 
armed rebellion of the Mau-Mau tribes in Kenya since 1952, yet for years turned down 
                                                
383 Pictet 1952, 50. However, note that in the Commentary to the Civilians Convention, published 
six years later, in 1958, Pictet added: “Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the conflicts 
referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in 
hostilities-conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take 
place within the confines of a single country. In many cases, each of the Parties is in possession 
of a portion of the national territory, and there is often some sort of front.” Despite a seeming if 
slight change in tone, Pictet still viewed territorial control and the existence of front-lines as 
optional, not obligatory elements. Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary on the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in War, August 12, 1949 (Geneva, 
1958), 36. 
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ICRC requests to visit detained persons.384 When the organization was finally granted 
access in 1957, the British government still declared that CA3 was not legally applicable 
to the situation, despite the fact that the violence and means of repression against rebels 
very likely rose to the level of non-international armed conflict.385 Similar instances of 
British “conflict status” denial were seen in the cases of violence in Cyprus (1955-1958,) 
Aden (or South Yemen, in 1966-1967) and Northern Ireland.386 France, for its part, 
admitted ICRC visits to prisons in Algeria on the basis of CA3 only in 1956, after three 
years of escalating violence and much ICRC insistence for humanitarian access.387  
But colonial powers were not the only ones at fault for fending off the full application 
of CA3: during the Korean war (1950-1954) the United States Department of Defense 
and the United Nations Command operating there allowed the ICRC to visit only 
combatant detention camps on the basis of CA3 and the Prisoners of War Convention, 
refusing similar access to refugees and other affected civilians, despite being cognizant of 
the deep humanitarian crisis and of forceful protestations from both the Swiss 
organization and the US’ own State Department.388 During the Hungarian insurrection of 
                                                
384 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques, 130–135; Perret and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité 
International de La Crox-Rouge 1956-1965, 259–268. 
385 Perret and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité International de La Crox-
Rouge 1956-1965, 264; Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground  : The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the Violent End of Empire,” Humanity (2011): 107–126. Perret 
and Bugnion usefully cite the words of British international lawyer Gerald “G.I.A.D.” Draper, a 
respected voice close to the UK Foreign Office, who asserted that Britain’s decision against 
recognizing that violence in Kenya or in other British territories like Malaya or Cyprus fell under 
the scope of CA3 was political, not one “determined by an objective assessment of the facts.” 
Draper’s words are important because he was not particularly progressive with regard to 
advancing IHL for internal conflicts, as we will see later during his official actions as expert 
delegate for the UK. 
386 Haug et al., Humanity for All: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; 
Perret and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité International de La Crox-Rouge 
1956-1965. 
387 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques, 126–130; Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta a Dien Bien Phu: Histoire Du Comité International 
de La Croix-Rouge, 1945-1955, 687–698. Some ICRC prison visits were possible in Morocco but 
were facilitated through personal contacts, not on the basis of legal instruments.  
388 Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans Noncombatant Immunity and Atrocity 
After World War II (Routledge, 2006), 168–170. 
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1956, the Soviet Union and the Hungarian government also refused ICRC requests for 
visits to detained persons as offered in CA3.389  
A systematic assessment of patterns and causes of CA3’s implementation and 
“effectiveness” across areas or recipients of protection (for captured persons, wounded 
and sick fighters, or civilians, example) has not been carried out.390 To retain the focus of 
the dissertation on norm emergence, I cannot take fully take on this important issue here. 
Yet it seems fair to say, provisionally, that despite some interesting examples of 
acceptance, (whether complete, partial, explicit or implicit,) in practice CA3 disappointed 
the humanitarian expectations of the ICRC and other enthusiastic audiences.391 
Doubtless, the biggest blocking factor was state refusal to admit its application for fear 
that it might increase the legal and political standing of the rebels.  
As hinted above, beyond the situations of internal violence that could plausibly have 
led to the application of CA3, in contexts euphemistically referred to as “troubles” or 
“tensions” states proved even less willing to grant the ICRC legal authorization to access 
prisons and camps, at best saying that any visits were only allowed on moral-
humanitarian grounds, at worst completely refusing or ignoring the organization’s 
requests. For example, in French North African territories such as Tunisia and Morocco 
experiencing lower but still considerable violence during the early 1950s, colonial 
authorities largely refused ICRC action, arguing essentially that the situation was not the 
business of international actors. Importantly, during this time even the ICRC itself 
hesitated to request access on some occasions, unsure of the appropriateness of acting in 
contexts of political tension and low-intensity violence.392 The problematic threshold and 
                                                
389 Perret and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité International de La Crox-
Rouge 1956-1965, 51–83. 
390 Writing in 1978 David Forsythe took an important first step in this direction, yet systematic 
research on this important topic still does not exist. See Forsythe, “Legal Regulation of Internal 
Conflicts: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts.”  
391 Bond, The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War, 60; Moir, The Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, 67–88. 
392 ICRC historians and members have recognized the organization’s ambivalence and hesitation 
vis-à-vis internal troubles and tensions before and after WWII. See Moreillon, Le Comité 
International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus Politiques; Bugnion, The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims; Rey-Schyrr, De 
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applicability of CA3 was thus compounded by the question of whether the organization 
could and should rely on it to justify its requests to governments for access in times of 
internal troubles or tensions. Although by the 1950s the ICRC had amassed practical (if 
mixed) experience in these murky contexts, as explained later, this issue would continue 
to elicit much doctrinal reflection in the 1950s and 1960s.  
An additional major worry hovered on the agenda of the Swiss organization, namely 
whether the Geneva Conventions sufficiently protected the civilian population, in both 
international and internal conflicts.393 The new Civilians Convention, designed largely 
with the experience of the Second World War in mind, set out safeguards for civilians 
who had fallen in the hands of the enemy, and although it professed their general 
immunity as non-combatants and the procurement of their safety (for example through 
the establishment of neutralized zones or humane treatment while interned,) it did not 
touch on matters related to the precautions warring parties should follow while attacking 
one another so as to spare civilians. In particular, the Civilians Convention lacked precise 
guidelines for the “appropriate” use of weaponry and deployment of attacks during 
conflict, international and internal.  
There are at least two reasons why the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 had failed to 
touch upon this subject. First, historically (as explained in Chapter 2,) rules placing limits 
on the conduct of hostilities had belonged to the “Hague” branch of the laws-of-war, not 
to the “Geneva” lineage of conventions focusing on the humane treatment of war victims, 
especially wounded and sick, shipwrecked combatants, and prisoners of war. In an annex, 
one of the Hague Conventions (IV) of 1907 contained general principles regarding 
civilians but these were not phrased to induce restraint in the use of “imprecise” or 
                                                                                                                                            
Yalta a Dien Bien Phu: Histoire Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge, 1945-1955; Perret 
and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité International de La Crox-Rouge 1956-
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393 This concern was not new for the ICRC. Among others, its interest about the effects of warfare 
on civilians had previously been recorded in the form of a Resolution (V) issued during the XIV 
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followed. ICRC, Final Record Concerning the Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers 
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“indiscriminate” weapons and methods of war (as the ICRC referred to them) such as 
bombing from the air or launching nuclear warheads. Although the dividing line between 
the “Geneva” and “Hague” law would eventually be blurred in the 1970s and now seems 
like a curious historical artifact to contemporary readers, in the 1950 it was still firmly 
ingrained in the minds of military lawyers the world over. States respected the role of the 
ICRC as the guardian of the Geneva Conventions, yet the Hague Conventions lacked 
such a patron. (The Dutch government nominally bore this responsibility but in practice 
exerted little if any leadership on the matter.) For this reason, since the early twentieth 
century, the law of The Hague had seen few additions to its canon, or updates.394  
A second, more powerful reason existed to explain why governmental circles might 
later show allergy to the idea of new restrictions on their war practices: the principal 
forms of “indiscriminate warfare” cited above, aerial bombing and nuclear weapons, 
were two tools of war put to effective if grossly inhumane use by the victors of the recent 
world war. More importantly, NATO states, with the US at the helm, believed that 
nuclear weapons were essential for keeping world peace by deterring the Soviet Union 
and containing communism. This belief was compounded, much to the chagrin of the 
humanitarians, by the fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites had adopted calls for an 
all-out ban on such weapons as a fighting cry of their own since the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference, which nuclear Western states like the US and UK perceived as nothing more 
than hypocritical propaganda. Thus, an issue of legitimate humanitarian concern 
(widespread harm done to civilians through bombing and weapons of mass destruction 
with indiscriminate effects) had already in the early to mid-1950s become entangled with 
power politics and the East-West ideological struggle.  
The ICRC was aware of these complications but they did not deter it from at least 
trying to address such a serious regulative gap. While proposing a complete prohibition 
                                                
394 The only treaty signed since 1907 dealing with weapons was a protocol prohibiting gas and 
bacteriological warfare, negotiated in 1925 and recently revised, in 1993. See Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925  
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=921B4414B13E58B8C12563CD00
2D693B&action=openDocument (Consulted on July 12, 2013.)  
  170 
on nuclear warfare was out of its purview, the organization understood it as part of its 
mission to facilitate the setting of limits on the use of pernicious war methods that in its 
view produced unnecessary and avoidable harm to combatants and non-combatants of all 
stripes across all forms of conflict.  
As explained below, the ICRC could not foresee how elusive and contentious it 
would be to address these two issues, the protection of victims in internal troubles or 
tensions and from indiscriminate warfare. 
 
a. Political detainees in situations of internal violence  
As noted earlier, the lackluster application of CA3 to internal conflicts was certainly 
worrisome for the ICRC. Yet at a minimum that article constituted a hard-law instrument 
enabling it to “knock on the door” of states ridden by higher levels of internal violence. 
In addition to procuring aid for civilians, the organization usually drew on CA3 in order 
to request visits to captured persons, whose treatment and fate were often at profound 
peril in the hands of governmental authorities. Red Cross (1921 and 1938) resolutions 
aside, however, no such authoritative tool existed for internal violent situations of lower 
intensity, leaving detainees in such contexts at a special risk of abuse or disappearance. 
For this reason in the years immediately following the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
the ICRC became particularly concerned with situations of internal troubles and tensions, 
feeling it necessary to study and discuss, privately at the beginning, whether it might have 
competence to take action in them.395 
Internal reflection began in July 1951, when the organization’s commission charged 
with reviewing the organization’s statuses debated whether the ICRC should intervene in 
cases of flagrant violation of human rights. This proposal was considered too risky and 
impracticable, as some thought it might enlarge the “vulnerable surface” of the 
Committee while potentially endangering its more traditional, limited role.396 But others 
                                                
395 As Chapter 2 illustrated, practical concern for the victims of internal violence, especially for 
detained persons, had older roots for the ICRC. In this sense, debates in the 1950s were resuming 
conversations that had begun earlier. See Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge 
et La Protection Des Détenus Politiques, 94–95. 
396 Moreillon 1973, 118.  
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felt it was equally grave to ignore the fate of political detainees in internal violence, 
hence potentially tarnishing the ICRC’s moral stature.397  
The matter thus did not end there. According to ICRC historian Catherine Rey-
Schyrr, the refusal of the French government to allow the Swiss organization to visit 
detainees in Tunisia in 1952, compounded by the inaction (if not hostility) of the French 
National Red Cross toward them, triggered efforts within the ICRC to set a policy for 
operations in internal troubles.398  A report presented in January 1953 to the International 
Committee’s Legal Commission proposed that while National Societies had the primary 
right to act in situations of internal troubles or tensions, the ICRC should also act if the 
situation met one or more specific conditions: 1) a certain degree of intensity or 
seriousness of violence; 2) a certain duration (i.e. at the exclusion of one-off episodes of 
uprising); 3) a certain level of organization of the warring parties; 4) the violence had 
produced victims.399 The Legal Commission accepted these rough guidelines but 
suggested more study was necessary. Thorny questions remained: Would the ICRC 
actually be able to help political detainees in an unforeseen number of states around the 
world or might it spread itself thin? What exactly was a “political detainee”: a person in 
administrative detention, or one (dubiously) deemed guilty of treason after trial?  
                                                
397 As a product of these efforts a first step was taken in 1952 at the Eighteenth International Red 
Cross Conference in Toronto. Its participants, including not only National Societies but also the 
ICRC, the LRCS and delegates of government parties to the Geneva Conventions adopted the 
revised Statutes of the International Red Cross, which recognized the ICRC as a “neutral 
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troubles [where] it strives at all times to ensure protection and assistance to military and civilian 
victims of said conflicts and their direct results.” The translation is mine. See the entire text of the 
revised 1952 Statutes in Perruchoud, Les Resolutions Des Conferences Internationales de La 
Croix-Rouge, 451. This recognition was important given governmental acquiescence at the 
International Red Cross Conference that approved the Statutes, but did not rise to the level of 
binding international law and was often ignored by states. This language was strengthened later 
on in 1986 and 1995, adding reference to what is known as the ICRC’s “right of humanitarian 
initiative” in any situation or question it may deem to come within its purview  (Art. 5, 3.)  For 
their latest version, see Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/statutes-movement-220506.htm (Consulted 
on September 5, 2013.)  
398 Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta a Dien Bien Phu: Histoire Du Comité International de La Croix-Rouge, 
1945-1955, 317. 
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The organization understood that these puzzles would prove very difficult to resolve. 
Hence at this time the ICRC seemed to oscillate between two positions: whether to wait 
for the revised Geneva Conventions to take root while attempting to create practical 
precedents in new areas, or to move forward with addressing novel concerns formally.400 
This dilemma, as we saw in previous chapters, has pervaded the activities of the ICRC 
since its inception.  
The idea of attaching a protocol on political detainees to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention was entertained but dismissed as too rash given the novelty of the 
Conventions, in addition to the growing politization of the International Red Cross 
Conferences along ideological lines.401 Yet despite being skeptical about the pursuit of a 
new legal instrument right away, ICRC jurists believed the organization should seek to 
create practical precedents to foreground later interventions, which in turn might also 
help to give credence to future treaty-law initiatives.402 ICRC directives also recognized 
the importance of protecting political detainees for the humanitarian mission of the 
organization. Beyond an awareness of the gravity of the issue beyond the Iron Curtain 
and North Africa, ICRC President, Paul Ruegger had recently visited South and Central 
America and privately admitted being struck by its extended incidence there, citing the 
cases of Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Argentina.403  
The path ultimately chosen was to generate further reflection with outside input. This 
tactic was selected after concluding that to convene government representatives from the 
get-go might only lead to very limited protections. The ICRC thus summoned a series of 
private meetings of international legal experts from various regions acting in their 
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individual capacity. The first of these experts meetings took place in June 9-11, 1953.404 
The specific focus of this commission was to discuss the treatment and assistance to be 
given to political detainees in internal conflicts and to help formulate some doctrinal 
basis as guide for ICRC action.405  
In a nutshell, the experts opined that the ICRC should strive to trespass the legal 
limits set by Common Article 3 and seek to protect “all categories of political detainees,” 
a role that they considered appropriate for a neutral organization concerned not with the 
motivations behind prisoner arrest but rather with the conditions of their captivity.  Like 
ICRC jurists months prior, these experts declined to recommend the drafting of a new 
protocol or convention, believing that CA3 was as much as was politically possible at 
that time, but considered nonetheless that the article, the general principles of the 
Conventions and the newly formulated Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR,) 
offered enough basis for attempted ICRC action in internal troubles.406  
It appears that although lacking in binding legal force, the conclusions of this first 
expert consultation facilitated the work of the ICRC during the escalating situation of 
violence lived in Guatemala in 1954.407 Exactly around this time, however, the ICRC 
experienced frustration dealing with British and French authorities regarding Kenya, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, who refused it access.  
                                                
404 ICRC, Commission of Experts for the Examination of the Question of Assistance to Political 
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The organization thus wondered whether it should make public its internal reflections 
so as to cajole reluctant governments. Before doing so, the Committee decided that 
further consultation with influential experts was warranted in order to strengthen its 
emergent doctrine. To this end, a second meeting convened in October 3-8, 1955, seeking 
to clarify more precisely the application of humanitarian principles to internal troubles, 
particularly CA3.408 The experts’ conclusion was that in the absence of two “parties to 
conflict” with some level of organization, CA3 did not apply. Yet they added that, even 
absent a legal basis, all actors engaged in violence should still observe the principles of 
the Geneva Conventions. As a result, while the ICRC should not seek to rely on a legal 
argument or directly object to a government’s response in internal troubles, it may 
nonetheless insist that the humanitarian guarantees of the Conventions be followed, in 
particular the provisions of the Civilians Convention relating to a fair trial, care for the 
wounded and sick, or to the prohibition of mistreatment, torture, reprisals and collective 
responsibility. Moreover, the experts cited the UDHR, the European Convention of 
Human Rights, and the then-emerging work of the UN on the prevention of crime and the 
treatment of delinquents as normative basis for action.409 Finally, they considered that the 
ICRC had by then a well-earned and justified right to offer its services to parties to 
conflicts (usually known as its “right of initiative,”) which enabled it to at least try to act 
in times of troubles and tensions. Importantly, they clarified that its operation in internal 
troubles did not bear implications for the juridical status of detainees. The general 
message was clear: minimum humanitarian principles should apply in situations short of 
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high-level civil wars and the ICRC stood ready to offer its help to captured, wounded and 
sick fighters, and victims of all sides.  
 
b. The protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare in 
international and internal conflicts 
As with the issue of internal troubles, the ICRC resumed its plans to work on limiting 
the effects of warfare on civilians shortly after 1949. In 1950 it issued a circular to all 
states urging states to consider the grave consequences of nuclear and “blind” weapons 
on civilian population, whose use, it justifiably thought, threatened the very essence of 
the Geneva Conventions and of the Red Cross itself.410  
Internal ICRC preparation for the development of rules for such forms of warfare 
began in 1952 through private conversations with American, British and Swiss legal and 
military experts, including pre-eminent names in international law as Cambridge 
Professor Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. These conversations were far from encouraging, 
however. Lauterpacht bluntly recognized that recent belligerent practice had tended to 
eliminate the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and that states were 
unlikely to agree on limits to nuclear weapons and aerial bombardment.411 Beyond the 
experience of WWII, an international conflict, it is worth noting that in the Spanish Civil 
War aerial bombardment was used to cruel effects in cities like Malaga, Durango and 
Guernica.412 The method would also be used in Algeria and Cuba in the 1950s, to 
mention only two other examples of internal conflicts. Concern with imprecise weaponry 
must thus be understood as not only circumscribed to wars between states, even if the 
global context of the time prompted a special focus on East-West tensions.  
ICRC lawyers were not discouraged by initial skeptical soundings, believing that the 
organization was indisputably responsible for setting the normative wheels in motion on 
this issue while greater consensus among states obtained. A first meeting of experts to 
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treat this subject was convened for April 6-13, 1954.413  Like the meetings on internal 
troubles and political detainees, the experts in attendance were invited in their personal 
capacity but this time clearly with a view both to wider regional variation and to their 
home states’ political importance.414 According to the ICRC, at this initial meeting the 
experts reached a consensus on a few important law-of-war principles, including the 
prohibition of attacking non-combatants directly and of causing superfluous harm. They 
also seemed to agree that aerial warfare should be regulated, and that military exigencies 
should not always prevail over the precepts of humanity. (Later events suggest the ICRC 
probably overestimated the level of agreement.) At the same time, however, experts 
seemed to acknowledge the difficulty in translating these aspirations into precise 
dispositions for aerial bombardment and considered the risks of proposing inefficacious 
rules on nuclear warfare, especially if governments were not willing to completely rule 
out their use.415  
On the basis of the 1954 debates in Geneva, the ICRC decided to formulate a draft set 
of guidelines that it hoped would eventually become an international convention.416 This 
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initiative, for shorthand simply known as “Draft Rules,” quickly became the subject of 
one of the most acrimonious and simultaneously less-known disputes in the history of 
humanitarian law. As said earlier, it is important to delve into the history of the Draft 
Rules here in some detail, not only because they purported to apply to all types of 
conflicts, but also because their fate helps explain the attitude of the ICRC in subsequent 
years and foregrounds changes and continuities in certain states’ attitudes toward the 
development of humanitarian law.  
The Draft Rules consisted of twenty articles regulating the conduct of combatants 
during hostilities in both international and internal conflicts. Article 1 provided their 
essential bedrock and summarized their intent well: the right of parties to conflict to 
adopt means of injuring the enemy was not unlimited, and as a result, parties should 
confine their operations to the destruction of the enemy’s military resources, leaving the 
civilian population outside the sphere of armed attacks.417 To the contemporary eye, this 
principle seems unquestionable. And indeed at the time the ICRC took the view that 
Draft Rules were not an innovation in international law; rather, they constituted no more 
than a re-statement of deep-seated and already accepted notions. (ICRC lawyers had good 
grounds to argue this, since these principles could be said to stem from customary norms 
as well as older and widely respected instruments such as The Hague Regulations.) The 
rest of the document fleshed out in greater detail this principle by, among others, 
prohibiting attacks expressly directed at the civilian population, setting out a list of 
objects that could be legitimately considered as military objects susceptible of attack, or 
insisting that attacks should be proportional to the target they intended to neutralize. Most 
controversial would prove to be Article 14, prohibiting weapons whose harmful effects 
“could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the 
control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population.”418 
                                                                                                                                            
Red Cross Societies, which took place in Oslo in May 1954. Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta a Dien Bien 
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417 See the complete Draft Rules text at:  
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The Swiss organization’s hopes for state support of the Draft Rules were high. It 
circulated them in 1955 to National Red Cross Societies and to the experts who had 
attended the first meeting, with the purpose of gathering comments in preparation for 
submission to the upcoming International Conference of the Red Cross Movement, to 
take place in New Delhi sometime in 1956-7.  
The initial feedback from certain powerful states comments arrived like a bad omen. 
The United States, in a detailed legal analysis addressed to Claude Pilloud, now Deputy 
Director of the ICRC, and written by Raymond Yingling and Richard Baxter, two legal 
advisors working for the State Department, quickly took issue with the Draft Rules’ 
underlying principles.419 Their memorandum noted the “general unwisdom” of the Rules 
and offered two main critiques: In attempting to regulate the conduct of warfare, the 
ICRC was overstretching its traditional role, which was to alleviate the horrors of war 
through humanitarian protections.420 Revising the laws of war (by which they meant the 
Hague line of regulation,) was not a matter for the ICRC or the Swiss government. 
Second, the US response claimed that the Draft Rules rested on a fallacy, namely the 
assumption that in times of total war it was possible to differentiate between the members 
of the armed forces and the civilian population. Rules of war needed to be realistic, the 
authors said, and at the time the realities of war made such distinction impossible; indeed, 
they had “wiped [it] out.” Therefore, in their view, to presume that civilians could be 
rendered immune from the direct effects of modern warfare was “fanciful.”  
This did not mean, however, that governments were necessarily indifferent to the 
destruction of civilian life and property; some efforts might perhaps be taken in that 
direction and certain counterproductive terror tactics avoided, but in Yingling’s and 
Baxter’s opinion, moral principles could only be effective if they were militarily sound. 
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Ominously, they declared that “it may be far more effective in winning the war to destroy 
a city like Pittsburgh or Essen than to destroy a battleship or a division, and in the 
destruction of such cities the civilian population cannot remain untouched. This is true, 
unfortunately, of cities in general…” Further, they noted that a revision of the laws of 
war in the absence of inter-state agreement on the ban or restriction of use of nuclear 
weapons was premature, and that “unless the nations principally concerned” reached an 
agreement, “paper prohibitions emanating from any other source” would be 
unsuccessful.421 The US lawyers were doubtless referring to the ongoing efforts for arms 
control within the UN at the time.422  
As we will see, these striking words, coming from key legal advisors to one of the 
two global superpowers (the self-appointed “leader of the Free World,”) effectively 
marked the fate of the Draft Rules. The Soviet Union did not respond to the ICRC and 
thus one may only guess what position it took. As the only other nuclear nation at the 
time, the UK seems to either have agreed with the US stance or to have found additional 
reasons to dislike them.423 
Despite the pushback, the ICRC was still not completely discouraged. By March 1956 
President Leopold Boissier privately counted thirty responses to the Draft Rules project 
from National Societies and states, noting that only three of them, those from the US, the 
UK and Australia, showed a marked opposition to the project. The ICRC hoped that a 
wider diffusion of the Draft Rules and more work of persuasion among the Anglo-saxon 
Red Crosses might get the humanitarian point across.424 To this end, they convened a new 
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meeting of experts in May 14-19, 1956.425 Some critical voices aside, most of the 
participating experts supported the project and after incorporating their feedback the 
ICRC decided to submit the revised Draft Rules for discussion at the upcoming 
International Red Cross Conference in New Delhi, to take place in October-November 
1957. In the meantime the Committee worked to influence the opinion of several Red 
Cross Societies and of experts neutral or sympathetic to the project, believing that they 
could form a majority.426  
American revulsion to the Draft Rules, however, intensified. While the ICRC carried 
out consultations in 1957 in preparation for New Delhi, NATO states led by the US 
began to anxiously coordinate their position vis-à-vis the project. The US government 
admitted in private correspondence with its allies that it was “most desirable if the rules 
did not exist or if they could be conveniently forgotten,” and studied ways to pressure the 
ICRC to drop the Draft Rules from the agenda.427 Yet consultations with the UK and the 
ICRC itself alerted it to the fact that this was unlikely to happen, not only because the 
project was near and dear to the Swiss organization, but also because giving it up might 
put the ICRC in an awkward position in the eyes of Socialist states, which could then 
reason it had given into the wishes of “war-loving” Western countries.428 The US 
debated, as did France, whether to attend the New Delhi meeting at all, wondering their 
absence might take the air out of the initiative. Opinions between the US State and 
Defense departments on this issue were divided, and an initial decision to send an 
observer mission was made but soon upgraded to a full delegation with voting abilities.429 
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(France eventually chose the same course.) The main preoccupation of the US was to 
secure a consensus position among its allies about the undesirability of the Draft Rules, 
and to get other moderate countries to support it. Realizing that some debate was 
unavoidable, NATO countries sought two outcomes: First, and most importantly, the 
Conference should not give formal endorsement to the Rules or summon a Diplomatic 
Conference to sanction them. Instead they were to insist that effective decisions about 
nuclear limitations rested solely with the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee 
sitting in London, not with the Red Cross movement. Second, they had to find ways to 
avoid a detailed article-by-article debate that would provide Socialist countries with room 
for propaganda and opportunities to embarrass them publicly. Overall, absent the 
possibility of a complete dismissal, the best tactic in their view was to press for a general 
resolution expressing vague support for the principles embodied by the Draft Rules, 
urging the ICRC to send them back to governments for their consideration. Such a 
resolution, the US and allies reasoned, would have the virtue of pleasing everyone at the 
meeting while at the same time putting the ball in states’ courts, where it could later be 
ignored and “buried” as desired.430 After much bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
coordination and various meetings prior to the International Red Cross Conference in 
New Delhi, NATO states agreed on this common stance.  
The Nineteenth International Red Cross Conference finally took place in October 
1957 in New Delhi. As colorfully expressed by François Bugnion, member and historian 
of the ICRC, this meeting featured political fireworks and ended in “psychodrama,” 
though for reasons unrelated to the Draft Rules: the issue of whether to allow the “two 
Chinas”, Nationalist Taiwan or the delegates from Communist mainland to seat as the 
legitimate representatives of “the Republic of China” wrought havoc and led the meeting 
to end with several delegations, including the Indian hosts, walking out abruptly.431 More 
relevant to our purposes, after extended debate during the Conference and much political 
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maneuvering behind the scenes, Western delegations succeeded in having their preferred 
resolution text on the Draft Rules passed, declaring that the next phase of the project 
should consist of governmental study and decision.  
The ICRC abided by this mandate and circulated the Draft Rules to states in May 
1958. NATO plans were then carried out faithfully: no Great Power replied, and the 
majority of the replies the ICRC received were merely ceremonial.432 By 1961 only five 
replies (from India, Ireland, Japan, Pakistan and Switzerland) out of approximately forty 
dealt with the substance of the norms. Given such weak results, the ICRC discarded plans 
to summon a further meeting of government experts, and although it continued to 
consider the issue as one of the highest importance, it eventually decided against further 
promoting Draft Rules in the form in which they stood.433 
 
III. Effects of and Follow-up to the Doctrinal Debates in 1950s  
The failure of the Draft Rules was a major blow to the ICRC. The project represented 
several years invested in research, reflection and consultation. Existing histories of 
humanitarian law claim that this loss pushed the ICRC into conservative mode with 
regard to the progressive development of humanitarian rules.434 This appreciation is 
accurate to an extent: states’ private dismissal of the project convinced the ICRC that the 
moment was not ripe for the swift introduction of a new international legal commitment, 
                                                
432 The ICRC organized initial conversations with high-level interlocutors from the US (General 
Alfred Gruenther, then President of the American Red Cross and former Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe/Commander-in-Chief of the US-European Command until 1956, and the 
already mentioned British lawyer Colonel Gerald Draper, then Lecturer of Law at the University 
of London, advisor to the UK government and former Military Prosecutor at the war crimes 
tribunals in Germany. These contacts revealed once again the utter distaste of the US and UK 
governments for the Draft Rules and the unlikelihood of their approval. Conversations also took 
place with West German and Japanese officials, and though less disappointing, they did not give 
confidence to ICRC jurists that the project had legs to stand on. Finally, a meeting organization 
National Red Cross Societies in Athens in November 1959, where the Draft Rules received only 
lukewarm support from few Red Crosses, confirmed the lack of enthusiasm by a majority of 
states. See ICRC Archives B AG 051/Pj-021.07 for the exchanges with Gruenther specifically, 
and all others can be found in the series ICRC Archives B AG 051/Pj. Geneva. 
433 ICRC Archives B AG 051/Pj-024. See especially the minutes of the Legal Commission 
sessions (Commission Juridique) held in 11/30/1959 and in 02/29/1960. Geneva. 
434 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 96. 
  183 
especially dealing with weapons. Yet archival evidence from the highest bodies of the 
Swiss organization suggests that the impact was rather one of momentary delay. That is, 
instead of leading the organization to give up the goal of altering international law 
entirely, the foundering of the Draft Rules forced it to “recoil” and turn inwards and to 
resume the tactic of internal reflection and of engaging in discreet consultation with 
experts. This inward re-turn, in lieu of a flat-out rejection of the ideas underlying the 
Draft Rules, can be explained by two facts: ICRC experts were frustrated by the 
politicization of the debate, but their belief in the need for better protections for the 
civilian population was not diminished.435 Simultaneously, the practical challenges the 
organization faced on the ground continued to remind its members that further normative 
discussion was necessary, if at a slower pace and in low-key settings.436  
Also toward the late 1950s and early 1960s the Committee revisited the topic of 
operating in contexts of internal violence. By then the ICRC felt its policy and practice 
during internal troubles was well founded. Clear ICRC policies, however, were not yet in 
place to deal with situations of political “tensions” or instability that, although lacking in 
armed confrontation, still led governments to engage in arbitrary arrests and detention 
without sufficient judicial guarantees. Some voices within the Committee felt the 
humanitarian mission of the organization justified action to aid detainees in such 
scenarios, while others warned that this surpassed its mandate to act during armed 
conflict.437  
Hoping to attain sharper direction on two issues of such importance, in the period 
from 1960 to 1965 the ICRC resorted again to private expert roundtables, one on the 
provision of aid to and protection of victims of non-international conflicts broadly 
                                                
435 ICRC Archives B AG 051/Pj-024, 11/30/1959; 02/29/1960. In addition, the New Delhi 
Conference had issued a general “invitation” to the ICRC to continue making efforts toward the 
protection of the civilian population against the evils of war. ICRC lawyers took this as a basis for 
their continued work. 
436 ICRC Archives B AG 051/Pj-024, 11/30/1959; 02/29/1960. 
437 Moreillon, Le Comité International de La Croix-Rouge et La Protection Des Détenus 
Politiques, 151–156; Perret and Bugnion, De Budapest a Saigon: Histoire Du Comité 
International de La Crox-Rouge 1956-1965, 443–444. 
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conceived, and another on the legal protection of war victims in all types of conflict, 
against the dangers of warfare.438  
The former, which took place in October 25-30, 1962, reaffirmed the findings of 
previous consultations in regard to the application of Common Article 3, summarized as 
follows: CA3 was legally applicable to conflicts that gave rise to hostilities and where the 
opposing party had a minimum degree of organization.439 Yet even absent these 
conditions, CA3 should still cover internal troubles, albeit not on a legal (treaty) basis but 
rather on its recognized humanitarian practice and right of initiative. Rebels were also 
obliged to observe CA3, but reciprocity was not a condition for states’ own compliance. 
For their part, detained persons should be treated according to the standards set in CA3, 
and be likened to prisoners of war in international conflicts whenever possible.440 And 
although, curiously, experts did not fully zoom into the case of internal tensions, they 
nevertheless concluded that the ICRC could request to aid victims and detainees in the 
post-conflict period (that is, after armed hostilities had ceased,) providing a humanitarian 
entry-point in unstable contexts lacking actual confrontation. Finally, beyond 
humanitarian norms, experts cited recourse to the UDHR and the UN Charter as a basis 
for aiding political detainees in all contexts. 
The roundtable organized to follow-up on the work on the dangers of warfare and the 
victims of conflict met in April 11-14, 1962, gathering an interesting mix of public 
                                                
438 In 1961 during a session of the Board of Governors, the Yugoslavian Red Cross proposed a 
resolution urging the ICRC to focus on improving the legal protection and relief for victims of 
internal conflicts. The resolution was approved and served as the basis for the continued work of 
the ICRC on this subject. See ICRC, Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflict (Item 6 
of the provisional agenda of the International Humanitarian Law Commission,) report submitted 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, XXth International Conference of the Red 
Cross, Vienna, October 1965, Geneva, February 1965, 5. ICRC Library. 
439 ICRC, Commission of experts for the study of the question of aid to the victims of internal 
conflicts, Geneva, October 25-30, 1962, ICRC Library. Geneva. The experts in attendance were: 
Professor Robert Argo, Italy; Professor Frede Castberg, Norway; Paul Cornil, Belgium; Jean 
Graven, Switzerland; Professor Nihat Erim, Ankara; Professor Roger Pinto, France; Professor 
Georges Tenekides, Athens; Professor Erik Husfeldt, Danish Red Cross; J.J.G. de Rueda, 
Mexican Red Cross; Bosco Jakovljevic, Yugoslavia. Gerald Draper, UK and Carlo Schmid, West 
Germany, could not attend but approved the final report.  
440 ICRC, Commission of experts for the study of the question of aid to the victims of internal 
conflicts, Geneva, October 25-30, 1962, ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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opinion leaders, military and legal experts, and prominent scholars on military strategy.441 
All participating experts agreed that the ICRC should continue to pursue its traditional 
work in spite of the threat of total war. They also recommended, however, that the ICRC 
refrain from trying to bind states through international law at that time, considering 
instead that narrower arrangements might be more attainable, for example, on the 
evacuation of civilian populations. They also reaffirmed, in general, the principle of 
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, the prohibition of attacking 
civilian populations as such, and the obligation to take every precaution not to harm the 
civilian population.442 Finally, they argued that while a new treaty was inconvenient, the 
ICRC or the Red Cross Movement could draw up a resolution stating these basic 
principles and circulate it among states, which would then be free to make public 
announcements of their willingness to respect them in spite of their non-binding 
character.443  
Although in the eyes of the ICRC the conclusions from this roundtable had been 
useful to gauge the state of expert opinion on the matter, the overall conclusion was 
nevertheless bleak: in 1965 the organization publicly recognized that “the problem of the 
respect of the civilian population in the event of armed conflict does not yet seem 
                                                
441 Nine experts came to this meeting. Three public opinion leaders: Beuve-Mery, Director of 
French Newspaper Le Monde, Major Adalbert Weinstein, Military Journalist for the West 
German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Urs Schwarz of the Swiss newspaper 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung; Four military strategists: Professor Thomas Schelling, Harvard University; 
Colonel F. C. Miksche, French military; Colonel Gerald Draper, UK; Professor François, 
Netherlands. The ICRC also attempted to consult with Soviet, Asian and Arab experts, to no 
avail. See ICRC, Protection Juridique des Populations Civiles, Rapport sur le consultations 
menées par le CICR depuis 1962 sur le thème « Opportunité et Possibilité de Limiter les Maux de 
la Guerre dans le Monde Actuel, » rapport réservé à l’usage interne, Genève, Janvier 1965, SP 
488. A microfilmed version of this internal ICRC report can be found in ICRC-A A PV Conseil 
de la Présidence 1965, session of 01/21/1965. Geneva. 
442 There were interesting exceptions in this regard. Thomas Schelling was a steadily skeptical 
voice during the meeting, doubting that belligerents waging total war could actually respect the 
principle of distinction. Regardless, Schelling reportedly recognized the humanitarian value in 
reaffirming the principle.  
443 ICRC, The Legal Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers of Indiscriminate 
Warfare (Item 5a of the provisional agenda of the International Humanitarian Law Commission,) 
report submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, XXth International Conference 
of the Red Cross, Vienna, October 1965, Geneva, March 1965, 7. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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anywhere near a prompt solution.”444 Moreover, it acknowledged that “in the field of 
humanitarian law, the Red Cross can but propose agreement and endeavor to persuade 
Governments to conclude them; it has no power over them to do so. The final 
responsibility remains solely with the Governments.” 
 
Theoretical assessment 
Before moving forward it is appropriate to briefly assess, from a theoretical 
standpoint, the events and actions examined so far in this chapter. First, it is clear that 
despite the legal inroads made 1949 through the adoption of Common Article 3, most 
states facing internal violence during the 1950s showed important levels of risk aversion 
to the implementation of the rule. This evidence, however, relates at best indirectly to the 
question of norm emergence, the subject of this dissertation. Inferring from the observed 
widespread (though not absolute) aversion to the application of CA3, one might speculate 
that states would have very likely resisted formal efforts at norm expansion during this 
time. The ICRC reasoned in this way then and there is no evidence to suggest it was 
mistaken. (How a hypothetical Diplomatic Conference to discuss a protocol on internal 
troubles or political detainees might have turned out is a different question, but it is 
doubtful that many states would have supported its summoning in the first place.)  
The dynamics and fate of the Draft Rules serve to further support this impression. 
Even if the major roadblock leading to their demise was the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons, it is evident that states, especially the Western powers grouped under NATO, 
were at this time extremely reluctant to engage in meaningful dialogue about filling the 
gaps left in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This leads to the suggestion that, at least 
during the period studied here, securing the assent of the gatekeeping major Western 
powers was probably a necessary condition for the initiation of new episodes of norm 
emergence, whether for international or internal conflicts. Finally, it is also likely that the 
very recent adoption of the Geneva Conventions militated against the idea that states 
                                                
444 ICRC, The Legal Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers of Indiscriminate 
Warfare (Item 5a of the provisional agenda of the International Humanitarian Law Commission,) 
report submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, XXth International Conference 
of the Red Cross, Vienna, October 1965, Geneva, March 1965, 8. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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would once more be willing to invest extensive efforts to make onerous additions or 
revisions to a just-reformed body of law.  
Beyond states, some observations are warranted about the role of the ICRC as a moral 
entrepreneur on the issue of internal conflicts in 1950-1965. First, it is clear that the 
organization maintained its concern alive and pursued modest ways, from a doctrinal 
perspective, to build and propagate expansive interpretations of CA3. Given its 
expectation that formal extension of the law to cover internal troubles and political 
detainees were unlikely to prosper, it pursued a tactic of fostering an epistemic 
community via the convocation of expert roundtables. These consultations became a 
useful mechanism for legitimating generous readings of CA3 validated by the authority 
of influential international legal experts with varied backgrounds, many of whom also 
operated in or hailed from governmental circles.  Although only generative of “soft” 
guidance, the conclusions emerging from these meetings seemed helpful to justify 
requests for access in some cases of troubles (as the case of Guatemala in 1954 suggests) 
and to clarify and systematize the Committee’s field experience. On the other hand, these 
encounters and documents fell short of paving the road to broader state acceptance via 
triggering an impulse for more treaty law, at least in the near term.  
On balance, it seems fair to say that, in the face of governmental animosity (actual or 
perceived risk aversion) to norm emergence or expansion during this time, expert 
consultations became a “safe” though productive route for the ICRC to take. This being 
said, that an organization traditionally marked by a certain conservativeness (as described 
in Chapter 2) would decide to press on with the task of normative development --if 
through more subdued/limited methods-- after important episodes of frustration, should 
be worthy of credit and seen as an important measure of change. 
 
Hitting a Wall 
On the basis of the new round of expert consultations the ICRC drew up summary 
reports for consideration by National Red Cross Societies and governments at the 
Twentieth International Red Cross Conference to take place in 1965 in Vienna, Austria.  
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Plenary debates on the legal protection of civilians against the dangers of hostilities at 
this Conference were not particularly acrimonious.445 The ICRC report contained a 
suggestion for a “solemn declaration” (as suggested by experts) that National Societies 
and governments could make to reaffirm the following principles: 1) That the right of the 
parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy was not unlimited; 2) That it 
was prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; 3) That 
distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and 
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as 
possible.446 (The Swiss delegation drafted a resolution on the basis of the ICRC report.) 
These ideas constituted the core of the Draft Rules, yet in this version they represented 
only a declaratory suggestion for states to embrace, not a binding commitment.  
Given the modest conclusions presented in the ICRC reports and the Swiss resolution, 
a lack of controversy was perhaps not surprising. However, evidence from other portions 
of the Conference proceedings and confidential US cables confirm sharp divisions 
between neutral and Socialist countries, on the one hand, and Western (particularly 
NATO) states on the other: While the former supported further work on this issue, at least 
publicly, most Western Alliance powers continued to dislike the idea that new rules could 
be imposed. In fact during debates at the Commission level in 1965 various (probably 
Socialist) countries had managed to add a fourth principle to the Swiss draft regarding the 
application of the general principles of laws of war to nuclear and similar weapons. On 
the opposite side, and further confirming the link between issue of warfare regulations 
and internal conflicts, the US delegation had been instructed to oppose any further 
                                                
445 The ICRC considered directly submitting a draft resolution reaffirming the basic principles on 
the protection of civilian populations supported by the experts. However, fearing backlash, it was 
content to simply include the passing of such a resolution as a recommendation of the experts that 
National Red Crosses could then either adopt or set aside. Various National Red Cross Societies 
from neutral and Socialist countries (Austria, Switzerland, East Germany, USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam,) however, introduced their own resolutions reaffirming the basic 
principles. These were eventually merged into one resolution, which received almost unanimous 
approval (128-0-3.) The votes were not recorded but the abstainers probably included the US and 
the UK. See XX International Conference of the Red Cross, Report, Vienna, October 2-9, 1965, 
86-87. ICRC Library (hereonafter 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report.) Geneva. 
446 See the resulting Resolution (XXVIII) in 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 108-109. 
ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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resolutions on the regulation of hostilities because “the nature of much modern warfare, 
as exemplified by guerilla tactics and wars of national liberation, has blurred the 
distinction – already difficult—between the ‘military’ and ‘civilian’.” As a result, so the 
US position paper went, “a declaration along the lines now suggested by the ICRC could 
easily become the propaganda vehicle for precisely those regimes and forces who 
themselves demonstrate utter contempt for civilized rules of warfare and humane 
treatment of civilian populations.”447 In last resort, if the adoption of a resolution on this 
issue was imminent, US delegates were instructed to try to make it “as innocuous as 
possible.”448  
At the same time, however, the US team was told to “strongly support” a resolution 
calling on parties to the Geneva Conventions to strictly abide by Common Article 3 and 
to accept offers of services from the ICRC.449 In addition, the US introduced a resolution 
of its own, drafted in conjunction with the American Red Cross, to call upon all 
authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that prisoners of war were accorded 
the treatment prescribed by the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.450 US views of 
humanitarian law were thus not uniformly conservative, but rather selective and strategic: 
while it considered certain topics essentially taboo (new rules for weapons use,) the US 
saw a certain value in supporting other motions, particularly respect for existing law such 
                                                
447 Correspondence between the State and Defense departments on this position paper was 
interesting. Both agreed on the conclusion, that this type of regulative work was not desirable, the 
reasoning differed: while State Department Legal Advisor Raymond Yingling argued, as he had a 
few years before, that the rules of warfare were not the province of the ICRC, Defense 
Department Assistant General Counsel Benjamin Forman pointed out that this was “debatable” 
and suggested instead using the argument about the impossibility of actually respecting the 
principle of distinction. See folder entitled: XXth Int’l Conference of the Red Cross, “The Legal 
Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, L/SFP,” Rev 
of U.S. Policy on Treatment of P.O.W.s to XXth Int’l Conf of the Red Cross, Box 1, RG 59, 
NACP. Note that instead of new rules, the only alternative acceptable for the US to ameliorate the 
fate of civilians was the introduction of neutralized zones, as contemplated by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 
448 See folder entitled: XXth Int’l Conference of the Red Cross, “The Legal Protection of Civilian 
Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, L/SFP,” Rev of U.S. Policy on 
Treatment of P.O.W.s to XXth Int’l Conf of the Red Cross, Box 1, RG 59, NACP. 
449 United States Position Paper, Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflict, September 
25, 1965, in Briefing Book for the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Rev of U.S. 
Policy on Treatment of P.O.W.s to XXth Int’l Conf of the Red Cross, Box 1, RG 59, NACP. 
450 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 80-81. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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as the minimum humanitarian provisions for non-international conflict contained in CA3, 
as well as the informal extension of guarantees to detained combatants in all armed 
conflicts, not surprisingly at a time when American soldiers were reportedly being badly 
mistreated by their captors in North Vietnam. (More on this below.)  
In general, correspondence between the US and its NATO allies reveal that American 
reticence toward the regulation of warfare was still widely shared by its military allies in 
1965. And although certain European countries such as Denmark, West Germany and 
Belgium felt they could support a declaration of basic principles on the conduct of 
hostilities, they would only do so because it was “the lesser of two evils,” in implicit 
reference to the 1957 Draft Rules, which were meant to eventually becoming binding, not 
simply declaratory.451  
The US was not the only force behind the scenes working to boycott the regulation of 
warfare. During the actual Plenary debates in Vienna, UK delegate Colonel Gerald 
“GIAD” Draper, already a very well-respected British legal scholar and constant 
protagonist of the international debates on the laws of war since the 1950s, attempted to 
shape the text of the draft resolution so as to refer to international conflicts only, arguing 
that the inclusion of non-international conflicts worked only to confuse matters. This 
reaction was consistent with the British government’s past (and as we will see in the next 
chapter, persistent) worry about humanitarian intromission in internal conflicts. The 
ICRC rejected this reasoning, alongside delegates from Poland, East Germany, Iraq, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia, and the British amendment was struck down.452  
The British delegation also attempted to water down an ICRC draft resolution on the 
protection of victims in non-international conflicts, which following recommendations of 
the 1962 expert commission, included language about protections being accorded during 
internal troubles. Draper argued (again) that to include this expression was to confuse the 
                                                
451 See folder entitled: XXth Int’l Conference of the Red Cross, “The Legal Protection of Civilian 
Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, L/SFP,” Rev of U.S. Policy on 
Treatment of P.O.W.s to XXth Int’l Conf of the Red Cross, Box 1, RG 59, NACP. 
452 115 votes against, 7 in favor, 6 abstentions. 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 87. 
ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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legal tenor of the text, but his amendment was once more rejected.453 The resolution 
itself, which encouraged the ICRC to continue its work in strengthening the protection of 
victims of these types of conflicts and recommended that governments and National Red 
Crosses support it, was approved unanimously.454  
As the above shows, by the end of 1965 the ICRC had a mandate to “continue” 
facilitating work on the legal protection of victims against the dangers of warfare across 
all forms of conflict, but faced the clear opposition of Western powers. In contrast, the 
UK notwithstanding, it also appeared to have wide support to continue providing aid and 
working to protect the victims of non-international conflicts, including in internal 
troubles, and to urge the application of Common Article 3 by combatants in such 
conflicts.  
Yet neither situation warranted a swift move toward new binding rules. The 
resolution on the dangers of warfare included mentioned the creation of (yet another) 
committee of experts “with a view to obtaining a rapid and practical solution of this 
problem.”455 Instead of a new roundtable, the ICRC conducted a new round of private 
consultations with 15 experts during 1966 and early 1967.456  
According to the ICRC, on the basis of this “broad survey of opinions,” in Spring 
1967 it decided on taking two measures: 1) endeavoring in the short-term to obtain rapid 
official confirmation by governments of the principles of protection against warfare 
                                                
453 123 against, 73 in favor, 24 abstentions. 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 90. ICRC 
Library, Geneva. 
454 124 vote in favor, none against, 5 abstentions. 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 90. 
ICRC Library, Geneva. 
455 1965 Vienna Red Cross Conference Report, 108-109. ICRC Library. Geneva. 
456 These experts were President Bargatzy, West Germany; Richard Baxter, USA; Mr. A. Buchan, 
UK; Professor Castren, Finland; Mrs. Chakhravarty, India; Mr. Choudhury, Pakistan; Professor 
Gerald Draper, UK; Ambassador El Erian, United Arab Republic; Professor Graefrath, East 
Germany; Ambassador Hambro, Norway; Judge Lachs, Poland; Senator Matine-Daftary, Iran; 
Professor Meray, Turkey; Professor Sahovic, Yugoslavia; Ambassador Tsuruoka, Japan; and 
Professor Wolfers, USA. Professor Arechaga, Uruguay and Professor Tunkin, USSR, were also 
reportedly approached but the ICRC but it was impossible to arrange a consultation. See ICRC, 
Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts, report 
submitted by the International Commission of the Red Cross, XXI International Conference of the 
Red Cross, Istanbul, September 1969, 16-17 (Reaffirmation and Development 1969 hereonafter,) 
ICRC Library, Geneva. 
  192 
contained in the 1965 Resolution, and; 2) as a longer-term measure, to extend the work 
on revising the entire body of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts.457 To this 
effect, the ICRC circulated a memorandum to governments, recalling and requesting 
them to sanction the four basic principles of protection during armed conflict, and “if 
need be develop these general rules in an adequate instrument of international law.” In 
addition, the ICRC invited governments “to reaffirm… through any appropriate official 
manifestations, such as a Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly the value 
they attach” to the principles contained in the 1965 Vienna resolution.458 
Much to the ICRC’s disappointment, this memorandum seems to have fallen on deaf 
ears. The organization blamed this outcome on the fact that a week after the note was sent 
to governments war had broken out in the Middle East between Israel, Egypt (then called 
United Arab Republic,) Syria and Jordan (a conflict known as “the Six Day War.”) 
Undeterred and encouraged by the responses of a dozen states, a representative of the 
ICRC traveled to New York to promote the idea of a submitting a resolution during the 
UN General Assembly in 1967. Yet, in the ICRC’s own words, “there it became evident 
that the Middle East crisis and concentration of efforts on the non-proliferation treaty 
made it impossible to submit such a draft resolution.”459 
The development of the law (for both international and internal conflicts) in the hands 
of the ICRC had thus hit a major roadblock. Beyond the war-related impasse of 1967, it 
was far from evident that a major revamping of existing rules would become possible any 
time soon. Major Western states were skeptical about this course of action, and without 
acquiescence of a substantive number of states, particularly of the usual powerful 
gatekeepers (the US, UK and other European states) consulted formally and informally 
by the ICRC, the project had weak legs and slim hopes for success.  
Yet a short four years later, in 1971, governmental experts were convening to discuss 
just such a revision of the humanitarian rules for international and internal conflicts. 
What happened between 1967 and 1971 to trigger such a change in the course of events? 
                                                
457 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 17. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
458 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 17. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
459 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 18. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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The next section presents an explanation grounded on three major factors, some tied to 
the agency of specific actors and others to changes in the structure of the world polity: 1) 
the emergence of new political entrepreneurs which mobilized concern international for 
this issue, albeit outside the purview of the ICRC and under the alternative banner of 
human rights; 2) major conflict-related shocks of international proportions, which 
directly or indirectly motivated previously unbelieving governmental gatekeepers to take 
up the issue or made it harder for others to publicly deny the urgency of the issue; 3) the 
entry into the international scene of a great number of newly-independent states with 
their strong aspirations for political legitimacy and with the ability to find allies and wield 
decision-making majorities in international organizations, especially the UN. I argue that 
these factors, in addition to the road travelled by the International Committee of Red 
Cross, constituted once again the crucial mechanisms behind the renewed impetus toward 
the revision and development of humanitarian law in the late 1960s and in the early 
1970s. The next section will flesh each of these out in more detail, while the following 
chapter will concern itself with the formal process of preparation and negotiation of the 
new set of agreements, the First and Second Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
IV. Re-setting the Scene: the Mechanisms behind the New Episode of Norm 
Emergence 
 
a. A New Political Entrepreneur: The International Commission of Jurists and “Human 
Rights in Armed Conflict” 
Until now, the overwhelming majority of efforts made internationally to revise the 
body of humanitarian law had been made by the ICRC.460 In the immediate postwar 
                                                
460 This was the case until the late 1950s and mid-1960s. In a 1969 report, the ICRC for the first 
time recognized that there existed “several private national and international institutions showing 
active concern with this problem, holding meetings on the subject,” adding that it was “only too 
pleased to witness the interest appearing in numerous circles on a subject too long left aside.” 
Among the organizations showcased by the ICRC in this report was the Institute of International 
Law, which since 1956 had reportedly been working on the question of the reconsideration of the 
  194 
period, with a revamped architecture of international organization, this task could have 
logically been assigned to the United Nations’ International Law Commission. At the 
time, however, exhaustion with war and correlated hopes for peace were so high that 
thinking about rules for future wars was (in hindsight naively) seen as a political faux-
pas. Moreover, the United Nations quickly became seen as a deeply politicized scenario 
for the prescription of international public policy, particularly for Western states that over 
a short number of years lost the majorities they had once held. In addition, and perhaps 
most importantly, after nearly a century of conscientious and judicious work in the fields 
of practical and legal humanitarianism, the ICRC had secured pride of place in 
international debates about them. The ICRC was after all both the pioneer and the 
guardian of international humanitarian law, and few governments now dared question 
these prerogatives, which the Committee protected fiercely through seemingly 
indefatigable pro-activity. As a result, the Swiss organization had little issue retaining 
control of this branch of the law (not so, as we have seen, with the “Hague” line of the 
rules of warfare.) UN bodies had their hands full regardless, with agendas that included 
the development of human rights law alongside other many other thorny areas of 
international law to resolve, including defining aggression, securing agreements on 
nuclear weapons limitation and drafting principles against war crimes. 
Thus, two branches of global standard-setting that in practice are quite related --the 
laws protecting victims of conflict-related (particularly internal) violence, and those 
regulating governmental conduct toward its own citizens (human rights,)-- for years 
developed almost independently.461 The historical separation of these two sibling bodies 
of law came to a momentary halt in the mid-1960s when a relatively new non-
governmental organization, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ,) began to 
                                                                                                                                            
principles of the laws of war. ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 15. ICRC Library, 
Geneva. 
461 I say “almost” because, as we have seen, the ICRC was mindful of the progress made on the 
human rights front, but still did not dare to publicly or officially “mix” the two, under the belief 
that humanitarian law applied to times of armed conflict (and perhaps even low levels of 
violence,) while human rights law applied chiefly during peacetime. Note that this is not to fault 
the ICRC. Only until decades later did international jurists become comfortable with referring to 
the “overlap” or the “merging” of humanitarian and human rights law. I take up this debate in 
Chapter 6. 
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campaign in the policy circles of Geneva and New York, among others, to bring to fore 
the issue of “human rights in armed conflict.” The ICJ’s intervention as political 
entrepreneur in this area injected renewed impetus to the cause of revising the laws of 
war by sparking a formal political process within the UN that the ICRC itself had been 
unable to ignite. 
The ICJ was founded in 1952 as “a small offshoot of a comprehensive US policy to 
contain Soviet expansion.” According to Howard Tolley Jr., the initial purpose of the 
organization was to recruit intellectuals to oppose communist political influence, for 
which it relied on funds from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA.)462 By the early 
1960s, however, the organization had reportedly turned away from anti-communism, 
transformed itself internally by recruiting professional staff and distinguished jurists, 
established its home in Geneva, opened international offices, and gathered experience 
campaigning worldwide for the respect of the rule of law in countries on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain.463  
In 1963 the Executive Committee of the ICJ appointed Séan MacBride as Secretary-
General of the organization. MacBride was a multifaceted Irish figure with a 
distinguished background. MacBride “was first a journalist. He then rose to become the 
Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army during the early 1930s, which was then in 
combat against the Irish government.”464 He later gave up violence and opted for a career 
as a lawyer, making a career defending IRA members.465 He went on to become a 
member of Ireland’s Parliament and Minister for External Affairs, and in the latter 
capacity he worked as Vice-President of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC,) helped found the Council of Europe, served as president of Council 
of its Council of Foreign Ministers, and jointly sponsored and signed the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the European Convention of Human Rights. After leaving the Irish 
                                                
462 This summary draws heavily from Howard Tolley Jr.’s work, as well as from Keith Suter. 
Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making; Howard B. 
Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
463 Tolley 1994, 92. 
464 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 24. 
465 Ibid. 
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government, MacBride helped found Amnesty International and chaired its International 
Executive Committee through 1975. To this illustrious synopsis one ought to add that a 
decade later, in 1974, MacBride was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (three years before 
Amnesty International received the same accolade in 1977,) along with the Soviet 
Union’s Lenin Peace Prize in 1976. This was clearly a testament to his credibility in the 
Western and Socialist worlds.466  
The appointment of MacBride in 1963 reinvigorated the ICJ’s work on international 
law and institutions, which he made a top priority.467 Among many other activities in the 
international human rights realm, MacBride led an (unsuccessful) ad hoc coalition to 
establish a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and founded a permanent human 
rights NGO committee in Geneva.468 Substantively, around this time MacBride became 
concerned with the allegations of conflict-related atrocity committed against civilians in 
places like Vietnam, the Congo and South Africa, and concluded that the Hague and the 
Geneva Conventions did not provide enough protections for victims of internal conflicts. 
He saw an opportunity to campaign for change when in 1965 the UN General Assembly 
decided to convene the very first International Conference on Human Rights, to take 
place in 1968 as part of the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the UDHR.469 
One of the stated goals of the Conference was to “formulate and prepare a program of 
further measures to be taken subsequent to the celebrations of the International Years of 
Human Rights,” so the occasion was ripe for inserting new ideas.470 Starting in 1965 
MacBride spoke at various high-level international public events and worked to build 
coalitions of NGOs and sympathizers around the issue of increasing the legal protections 
for victims of violence in international and internal conflicts, as well as improved 
international oversight over them. He decried not only how outdated existing law was, 
                                                
466 See MacBride’s biographical note on the Nobel Peace Prize website: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1974/macbride.html (Consulted on July 
15, 2013.) 
467 Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights, 100. 
468 Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights, 100. 
469 In 1963 the UN General Assembly had declared 1968 the first International Year of Human 
Rights.  
470 United Nations, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 
April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3. 
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particularly the Hague regulations of 1907, but also the separate and disparate growth of 
international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law (the Nuremberg Principles, 
chiefly,) a phenomenon that in his view led to lacunae, confusing overlaps and a 
problematic lack of co-ordination between the three bodies of law. Although he was a 
lawyer, MacBride was not encumbered by the legal subtleties and doctrinal differences 
between them, since in his view all three formed part of the broader law of nations and 
ought to operate in tandem. Yet he also seemed aware of the difficulties for realizing this 
objective. In his interventions MacBride recognized the “marvelous work” of the Red 
Cross in trying to update existing regulations, quickly noting that the Swiss organization 
was “often powerless” in the face of governmental stubbornness.471 
Through his capacity in the ICJ and his prominence among international NGOs, 
MacBride decided to help push the process forward. In January and March 1968, prior to 
the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights, he co-chaired respectively a 
meeting of 76 NGO experts in Geneva, and another in Montreal (the “Montreal Assembly 
on Human Rights,) gathering 50 experts. The conclusions to the January NGO meeting 
included explicit references to the need to revise the 1907 Hague Conventions to address 
the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, particularly for civilian populations, 
as well increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions “by 
all involved in a conflict, whether international or internal.”472 With this NGO mandate, 
MacBride flew to Tehran with one of his ICJ associates and set out to lobby governments 
for support to these initiatives. There his ideas for improving implementation and 
compliance mechanisms of the Conventions seem to have been quickly frustrated, 
however.473  
In a private letter to another member of Amnesty International, MacBride explained 
he had instead “decided to concentrate on trying to get proposed a concrete resolution on 
the protection of human rights in armed conflict… which ultimately, with some minor 
amendments, was proposed by India and co-sponsored by Czechoslovakia, Jamaica, 
                                                
471 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 25. 
472 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 27. 
473 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 28. 
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Uganda and the United Arab Republic.” MacBride explained that “it was essential in the 
prevailing atmosphere to secure an ‘uncommitted’ sponsorship and one which was 
representative of the various geographical groupings. My task was greatly facilitated by 
reason of the fact that the leaders of the Indian, Czechoslovak, Jamaican and UAR 
[United Arab Republic, now Egypt] government delegations were old friends of mine. 
This sponsorship in the prevailing situation at Tehran was nearly ideal and probably the 
only political and geographical combination that could have secured a quasi-unanimous 
support for the resolution. The major powers—East and West—were far from happy 
about the resolution, but they could not afford to oppose.”474  
MacBride also confided that his work on the resolution had produced some friction 
with the Swiss delegation and indirectly, with the ICRC. The Swiss, along with the South 
Vietnamese, were in fact the only ones to publicly abstain on the resolution; a curious 
pairing to be sure. Swiss Ambassador explained that his opposition was due to the alleged 
fact that the ICRC had not participated in the drafting of the resolution at Tehran, a claim 
MacBride rejected since he claimed to have personally met with the organization, raising 
awareness of his work prior to the Conference and even suggesting joint action. 
MacBride had reportedly also facilitated meetings between UN Secretary-General U 
Thant and the ICRC. In addition, while at Tehran MacBride also claimed to have 
cooperated with the Swiss Ambassador August Lindt in the drafting of the Resolution, 
and that although “he was most helpful in this respect… he was unhappy because he felt 
that resolution was to a certain extent forcing the hand of the ICRC.”475 
A cursory reading of the resolution that ultimately passed easily explains why the 
ICRC (and with them, Switzerland,) felt uncomfortable. It touched on many controversial 
topics which by 1967 the ICRC had, as we saw, learned to steer clear from: it denounced 
the use of specific means of warfare such as chemical and biological weapons (including 
napalm bombing, then being used in Vietnam;) it included language, habitual for the UN 
but inflammatory for the ICRC, about “minority racist or colonial regimes’” refusal to 
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comply with the decisions of the UN and to respect the UDHR, while decrying the 
inhumane treatment given to “those who struggle against such regimes” who, the text 
asserted, should not only be protected but also treated as prisoners of war or political 
prisoners under international law; and in its operative paragraphs assigned priority to the 
UN General Assembly, through the office of the Secretary General, to work on the better 
application and the development of humanitarian law in all armed conflicts. With this, the 
1968 resolution relegated the ICRC to a consultative role in the process of drawing states’ 
attention to existing regulation, and pending the adoption of new rules of international 
law relating to armed conflicts, to ensure that in all armed conflicts the inhabitants and 
belligerents were protected.476 Despite these contentious aspects, it is clear that the 
resolution went in a direction not inimical to ICRC aspirations, though perhaps too 
aggressively for its taste and without sufficient clarity about the all-important question of 
who would steer the process.  
The document is said not to have provoked much public debate during the Tehran 
Conference. However, the few proposed amendments and their origins merit mention. 
The US delegation disliked an initial version of the text which requested the UNGA to set 
up a committee of experts charged with drawing up revised conventions in consultation 
with the ICRC “in order to secure the better protection of civilians or combatants in all 
armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and 
means of warfare,” an unpalatable motion that removed states’ authority from the 
revisions process, dealt with weapons, and appeared rash.  The Indian delegate achieved 
the deletion of a proposed reference to a committee of experts that would consult with the 
ICRC and report back to the UNGA, and managed to insert the word “possible” before 
“revisions,” introducing some flexibility regarding the fate of the recommendations made 
by the Secretary General’s study. This was a change that likely appealed to most states, 
which probably preferred to be non-committal vis-à-vis the uncertain contents of a future 
expert report.  Beyond these changes and the Swiss abstention due to the alleged lack of 
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consultation with the ICRC, the resolution had a swift passage through the second 
committee where it was discussed, and debate on it was reportedly over in ten minutes.477 
The resolution on “Human Rights in Armed Conflict” was one of the few clear 
accomplishments of the 1968 UN Tehran International Conference on Human Rights. 
General commentary on the proceedings and outcomes of this event is usually quite dour, 
as the Conference appeared to be high on aspirational and denunciatory rhetoric but low 
on concrete ideas on how to push the global human rights program forward.478 Against 
this background, and considering the topic of improving protections during armed 
conflict was not on the original Conference agenda, MacBride’s successful efforts to 
have a Resolution “quasi-unanimously” approved are notorious. Most importantly for our 
discussion, the work of the ICJ had managed to achieve something the ICRC, despite 
tireless action, had not: to mandate the premier intergovernmental organization (the UN) 
to steer a process likely to lead to a revision of the regulation of armed conflicts which 
states could not as easily ignore as they had the ICRC. It created a focal point and 
suggested a way forward. In addition, and although the text slighted the ICRC somewhat, 
the lack of overt state opposition to the Resolution allowed the ICRC to claim that there 
was a renewed interest among governments to develop existing law, and as we will see, 
encouraged it to re-claim its leading role in realizing that project. 
 
b. A Shock: Vietnam and a changed US attitude 
The 1960s were tragically violent decades in many corners of the world, with 
gruesome bloodshed in Algeria, Morocco, Laos, Rhodesia, Rwanda-Burundi, the Congo 
and Nigeria (Biafra,) among others. By 1968 it is not necessarily surprising that the some 
states’ reluctance to revising existing humanitarian rules should have subsided in varying 
degrees as conflict-related brutality continued to produce victims in the thousands, many 
of them civilian. The growing recognition around this time of the right to be free from 
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colonial and racist rule became a decisive force in propelling the legitimacy and means 
for protecting “freedom fighters,” particularly among newly independent nations that 
now populated the UN. I later devote a subsection to explaining these events and 
dynamics more fully as they relate to the process of updating the laws of war. 
But beyond (and quite distinct from) enthusiasm for national liberation, changes in 
the attitude of certain powerful Western states regarding revisions of the Geneva and 
Hague Conventions should come as a surprise and are worthy of examination. Indeed, the 
evidence presented earlier in this chapter demonstrated that the US, alongside many of its 
European allies, opposed the development of new rules and had acted collectively as 
effective gatekeepers by blocking ICRC efforts in that direction, at least until 1965. The 
most an optimistic assessment could claim is that in 1965 the US supported work on 
improving the implementation of existing humanitarian rules, not their reconstruction or 
extension, as seen in American insistence that all combatants in internal conflicts should 
observe Common Article 3, and that prisoners of war in all armed conflicts should be 
granted the full benefits of the Third Geneva Convention regardless of the type of 
conflict.479 
Yet by 1968 US skepticism over revisions seems to have diminished notably. As we 
saw, the US did not vote against the “Human Rights in Armed Conflict” Resolution at 
Tehran. US diplomatic telegrams claimed it had done so because it had a “strong policy 
interest in humane treatment for all persons involved in armed conflict.”480 More explicit 
evidence of a changed attitude, though, can be gleaned from a statement made by Jean 
Picker, US Representative at the Third UN Committee while discussing the Tehran 
resolution in December of that year: There, after expressing a broadly positive attitude 
toward the Tehran text, Picker declared:  
                                                
479 The US proposed, successfully, a resolution on respect for prisoner of war protections at the 
1965 ICRC Vienna Conference. The US delegation admitted in its report to Secretary of State 
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legal issue for the US. Report of the United States Delegation to the XXth International 
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480 State Department Telegram, subject “Tehran HR Conference,” 511-04.10, in folder “ICRC 
Conferences on Humanitarian Law (1972,)” POW/Civilian Internee Information Center, 
Confidential Records, Box 11, P 2, RG 389, NACP. 
  202 
“Mr. Chairman, my Government voted for Resolution XXIII at Tehran and we will vote 
in favor of the present draft resolution… In giving its support to this resolution, my 
Government recognizes that it is not an easy task which we are asking the Secretary-
General to undertake. But we are confident that he will make every effort to produce a 
thorough and objective study in consultation with qualified non-governmental 
organizations such as the ICRC… Perhaps it is not premature to give some preliminary 
consideration at this time to an important procedural question in the event there is a 
recommendation for new or revised international agreements in this field. The question 
is, of course, what body should undertake this most important work. Without discussing 
all possible answers to this question, we would like to call attention to the satisfactory 
procedure followed in 1949. The efforts of the ICRC and the Government of Switzerland 
contributed in large measure to the success of that last major effort to revise international 
law in this field. We would hope that whatever procedure is adopted would have at least a 
good chance to succeed in drafting sound instruments to which a great many, if not all, 
states will quickly adhere. Finally, Mr. Chairman, my Delegation would like to recognize 
the important contributions of concerned individuals, private groups and non-
governmental organizations in calling the attention of governments to the humanitarian 
need for better application and respect for these international rules and to the possibility 
that new or revised international agreements are needed…”481 
 
As is obvious from the above, by late 1968 the US envisioned the clear possibility of 
revisions, even suggesting that the ICRC (not the UN) should take the reins of the 
process. The question emerges: What brought about this change in US attitude?  
In one word: Vietnam. More precisely, US involvement in the conflict between South 
and North Vietnam, which became an essential part of its containment strategy against 
Communism, had markedly increased since the early 1960s, and by 1965, with the 
adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by the US Congress, American aerial bombing 
campaigns and land combat units were being deployed to weaken the National Liberation 
Front (NLF, or Vietcong) and their North Vietnamese supporters.482 With increased US 
participation came allegations of American atrocities against civilians, either through 
indiscriminate or imprecise bombing, or through manhandling by army personnel on the 
                                                
481 Statement by Mrs. Jean Picker, United States Representative in Committee III on Human 
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ground. Allegations of abuse extended to the US-backed South Vietnamese military. At 
the same time, the US denounced cruel treatment and lack of humanitarian guarantees by 
the North Vietnamese with regard to American pilots fallen in captivity, and although 
other US charges of communist atrocity would come later, I suggest that it was the 
concern for the fate of prisoners of war, both those held by its enemies as well as by its 
own forces, that initially moved the US to consider the need for updated humanitarian 
rules.483  
Concerned with the escalation of hostilities, the ICRC wrote in June 1965 to the 
governments of the US, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, as well as to the National 
Liberation Front (NLF, or Vietcong,) to remind them of their responsibilities under the 
Geneva Conventions, particularly the Third Geneva Convention on the treatment of 
prisoners of war.484 The ICRC’s Vice-President Jacques Freymond explicitly referred 
Common Articles 1 and 2 to the Geneva Conventions as the formal legal basis for his 
appeal, thus implying that in Red Cross eyes the Vietnamese conflict was an 
international war, not an internal conflict. This notion was reinforced by Freymond’s 
insistence that the NLF was “too bound by the undertakings signed by Vietnam” without 
an explicit mention of Common Article 3, which suggests that the ICRC was sufficiently 
convinced that the internationalization of the conflict, among others through foreign 
support to the Vietcong rebels, triggered the application of the entire set of Conventions, 
not only the humanitarian provisions of CA3.  
                                                
483 According to Howard Levie, North Vietnam “persists in refusing to provide the names of 
persons held as prisoners of war, refusing to permit correspondence between the prisoners of war 
and their families, and refusing to permit the neutral ICRC delegates to inspect the prisoner of 
war camps so as to be able to determine whether prisoners of war are, in fact, receiving the 
humane treatment to which they are entitled and which that regime long ago committed itself to 
provide. Similarly, the NLF refuses to consider itself bound in any way, even by the limited 
provisions of Article 3 of the [Third] Convention.” Later in his chapter, Levie documents charges 
of reprisals committed by the NLF against captured US civilians, Levie, “Maltreatment of 
Prisoners of War in Vietnam,” 364–365. 
484 All three states had ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and were thus “High Contracting 
Parties” to them. Common Article 3 arguably bound the Vietcong since it operated on the 
territory of states that were party to the Conventions, but this interpretation was not shared by the 
Vietcong itself. The ICRC letters to the US, South Vietnam, North Vietnam were published in 
International Legal Materials 4, 1965, 1171-1174. Responses from the US and the South 
Vietnamese were also included. 
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The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied to the ICRC in August 1965, declaring 
continued American respect for the Geneva Conventions, and announcing plans to aid 
South Vietnam in expanding and improving facilities and procedures to process and care 
for an increased number of captured combatants.485 South Vietnamese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Tran-Van-Do also replied, reassuring the ICRC that it was “fully 
prepared to respect the provisions” of the Conventions, that “Vietcong prisoners have 
always received the most humane treatment from our civilian and military authorities,” 
and vowing to “contribute actively to the efforts of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to ensure their application.”486 A few months later, North Vietnam announced 
it would regard any captured pilots as major war criminals for destroying property and 
massacring its civilian population, but would regardless treat them well. For its part, the 
NLF (or Vietcong) claimed it was not bound by the Geneva Conventions “to which 
others beside itself subscribed” but that, nevertheless, it would treat prisoners humanely 
and collect and care for the enemy wounded.487 
These dissonant responses, as we will see in later, augured some of the principal 
challenges that would pervade the re-making of the law in the 1970s. From an American 
perspective, they highlighted the protective gaps that remained in the separation between 
international and non-international conflicts toward captured combatants (recall that 
Common Article 3 was far less comprehensive than the Third Geneva Convention for 
POWs,) particularly in struggles whose status was disputed by its participants. Although 
for the US the conflict in Vietnam was international, for the North Vietnamese it was 
both a civil war and a war of aggression, during which even the application of the 
minimal provisions of CA3 was in doubt.  More alarmingly still, from the standpoint of 
North Vietnam and the Vietcong, wars of national liberation were to be given special 
recognition, particularly those also fought against external “aggressors” whose behavior -
-they thought-- was invariably criminal. To compound this divergence of views, there 
remained the thorny issue of whether non-state armed groups were or not bound by 
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international humanitarian agreements that, as expressed by the Vietcong, had been 
signed not by them but precisely by the governments they targeted. 
The Vietnam conflict and the violence committed in it by all parties have been amply 
documented and need not all be repeated here.488 It is more important to show how in the 
years 1965-1968 the US grew increasingly dissatisfied with the protections contained in 
the law. Archival evidence from the US Army records confirms that around this time the 
US began to devote resources and studies to the consideration of both its opponents’ 
conduct vis-à-vis- prisoners of war as well as its own. With regard to former, an internal 
memorandum of the Department of Defense dated March 7, 1968 reveals the hurdles 
faced by the US in trying to ascertain and improve the fate of American prisoners in the 
Vietnam conflict: 
“As of February 1968, 959 American military personnel were either prisoners of 
war or missing in action. Of these, 167 are believed held captive by North Vietnam and 
450 are listed as missing in action over the North. The Viet Cong hold 24 known PWs 
and 165 are carried as missing in action in South Vietnam. The Pathet Lao are believed to 
be holding 5 in Laos and there are 71 others missing in that country. Red China holds 2 
men whom we refer to officially as ‘detainees’ and there are 6 carried as missing in 
action in China… Exact figures on PWs held by Communist forces in Vietnam and Laos 
are not available because neither Hanoi, the Viet Cong, nor the Pathet Lao has provided 
lists of names or numbers of prisoners… ”489 
 
The same document, in a subsection entitled “Welfare of PWs” claimed that the 
Interdepartmental Committee formed to deal with prisoner of war issues had 
“concentrated its efforts in attempting to make the enemy aware of its responsibilities as 
outlined in the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of PWs. This is our 
                                                
488 For a variety of sources, see US National Archives, Military Resources: Vietnam War, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/military/vietnam-war.html (Consulted on August 
15, 2013.) 
489 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense in folder 
“Report on the PW Problem (1968,)” Box 33, P 2, RG 389, NACP. Lack of information about 
prisoners of war and personnel missing in action was only one of the problems. As referenced 
earlier in fn. 72, the US was aware of a host of other abuses by its enemies during this conflict. 
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paramount interest. All avenues leading to this goal and to the eventual recovery of our 
captured servicemen are being explored.”490  
With respect to American policy and practice, a memorandum sent by the Office of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the US Army Chief of Staff in December 1967 
reveals that the US Army had since July 1966 decided to assign “a select group of 
knowledgeable military and civilian personnel” to conduct a comprehensive review 
process of this issue. The study suffered delays but was finally completed in November 
1968.491 Among the areas selected for review was a section on international law and the 
related US performance.492  
In November 1967, even before the hired report had been executed, the Army’s in-
house researchers had already identified various problems with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions, thus summarized: “1. The Geneva Conventions are applicable but not 
appropriate to modern warfare. 2. The Geneva Conventions are ‘fuzzy’ in ruling on the 
                                                
490Assistant Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense in folder 
“Report on the PW Problem (1968,)” Box 33, P 2, RG 389, NACP. 
491 Perhaps tellingly, due to an avowed lack of internal capacity within the US Army, this report 
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Department of the Army, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Subject “Prisoner of War Study (U,)” 
December 31, 1967, in folder entitled “Prisoner of War Study (1967),” Box 33, P 2, RG 389, 
NACP. See also enclosure F in folder entitled “Prisoner of War Study (1967),” Box 33, P 2, RG 
389, NACP. 
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legality of certain policies. 3. The Geneva Conventions contain no enforcement 
mechanism.”493 
Importantly, the terms of reference for the international law portion of the study 
assumed from the outset that there were deficiencies across several aspects of an 
international legal regime which “is based in large measure on World War II experience 
and in certain areas may no longer be appropriate in the present state of technology.”494 
Thus, the Army anticipated the study would offer “recommendations for remedying 
deficiencies in international law,” particularly on the treatment of prisoners of war, and 
warned that if its results were ignored, the impact would be the “continuation of 
operations under a body of law which does not recognize the realities of modern 
warfare.”495  
The above makes it quite evident that at least since 1965, a clear sense of urgency 
emerged within the US military to diagnose perceived defects with the Geneva 
Conventions and to proceed with a revision of portions of the existing law. It is also clear 
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that the need for diagnosis and revision on the US side was elicited by the shocks and 
pressures to the deplorable conduct of its enemies during Vietnam, as well as by the lack 
of clarity left in portions of the Geneva Conventions.  
Before moving forward it is important to clarify that I have thus far only highlighted 
one aspect of these “deficiencies” for the US (the treatment of prisoners of war,) which I 
believe was the initial trigger of change in American attitudes. However, as the Vietnam 
conflict dragged on, and with it more allegations of abuse, various other sensitive 
concerns surfaced, not least the protection of the civilian population brought to the fore 
when the March 1968 My Lai massacre became public in late 1969.496 (On March 16, 
1968 at least 300 civilians were brutally murdered in the Vietnamese hamlets of My Lai 
and My Khe by a company of US soldiers, despite being unarmed and unresisting.) I will 
reference these crucial added concerns in the next chapter since they will be shown to 
pervade the drafting and the negotiation of the Additional Protocols during the 1970s. For 
the moment, I claim simply that during the second half of the 1960s the US slowly let 
down its guard regarding the revision of the Geneva Conventions, and that although other 
parts of this process remained controversial for years, notably the regulation of weaponry, 
the American POW-related experience in Vietnam was the principal cause behind this 
internal transformation. This change is even more noteworthy because, as I demonstrate 
in the next chapter, the US went from acting as conservative gatekeeper to becoming a 
fierce “pro-revisions” broker among its Western peers. 
A final and pivotal aspect of the question behind the move to the update the body of 
humanitarian law in the 1960s remains to be fleshed out: the swift arrival of newly 
decolonized states as a revolutionary political force and their ability to wield influence, 
particularly in the UN. It is to this issue that I turn before concluding. 
 
 
                                                
496 Problems with relation to South Vietnamese treatment of civilians and US action to ensure its 
ally’s compliance with international law were to become crucial. Internal US reviews of the so-
called “Phoenix Program,” through which the US transferred captured civilians to South 
Vietnamese authorities, by whom they were mistreated, tortured or killed, found that the 
Americans bore certain co-responsibility in these violations of international humanitarian law.  
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c. A Global Structural Change: The Decolonized World Struggles for Legitimacy 
Between 1945 and 1965 the formal structure of world politics changed. By this I refer 
to the massive official attainment of independent statehood by formerly “non-self-
governing” or colonial territories --the majority of which were African and Asian-- which 
had fought or negotiated their way out of dependent status from their (mostly but not 
exclusively European,) masters.497 While perhaps less significant in the arena of Great 
Power conflict, this revolution in sovereignty was fundamental in international 
organizations where statehood came with a voice and a vote, the paramount example 
being the United Nations. A numerical summary succinctly captures the scope of change 
within the UN: In 1950 the organization had 60 member states, 5 of which had become 
independent since 1945; in 1960, out of 99 states 33 were newcomers; by 1967, 
membership had exploded to 123 states, 56 of them novices. Put in percentage terms, in 
1950 new states represented 8.33% of the UN make-up, in 1960 33.3% and in 1967 
45.5%.498  
As expected, these states brought their own common concerns to the international 
rostrum, foremost among which were decolonization and economic aid and 
development.499 Their ability to wield voting majorities in the UN General Assembly and 
other UN Commissions, for which they could ally with Socialist or Arab states, enabled 
them to get multiple resolutions and declarations passed without much difficulty. This 
was the case notably of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples in 1960, or of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965. As David Kay asserts:  
“One must view as an outstanding achievement of the new nations their successful 
forging between 1960 and 1964 of an international moral consensus against the 
continuation of Western colonialism. By 1964 the impropriety of any defense of the 
continued existence of colonialism was apparent to all except the retrograde regimes of 
southern Africa. Within the United Nations itself the new nations succeeded during this 
                                                
497 Not all the new states were former colonies, i.e. Israel. 
498 Data taken from David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967 (Columbia 
University Press, 1970). 
499 Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, 45. 
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period in making their own uppermost concern, colonialism, the uppermost concern of 
the Organization.”500 
 
The debate about the origins and causes of decolonization continues to be a lively 
one, with different authors expound conflicting views on whether the “international moral 
consensus” to which Kay refers above can be held causally responsible for the demise of 
colonialism.501 What is indisputable, however, is that newly-independent nations excelled 
at using the United Nations, and its General Assembly in particular, as a site of collective 
legitimization in service of their ethical crusade.502 This concern was sometimes 
conveyed in the language of human rights, in what current scholarly assessments deem an 
effective but controversial reappropriation of the term. Reflecting in 1965 on this 
instrumentalization of human rights within the UN, Louis Henkin claimed that: 
“the struggle to end colonialism… swallowed up the original purpose of cooperation for 
promotion of human rights. The gradual elimination of dependent areas and their 
admission to the UN meant an ever-increasing Assembly majority with some agreed 
attitudes, particularly a determination to extirpate the remnants of white colonialism and 
white discrimination.  These attitudes impinged on the human rights program as well. Of 
course, they assured the sharpest scrutiny of human rights in dependent areas…. But it 
was championship of anticolonialism, designed to accelerate “self-determination.” It was 
not an assertion of general standards which other nations, including the champions, were 
prepared to accept in their own countries.”503 
 
The strategic re-appropriation of human rights by new states began to formally 
encompass the realm of humanitarian law in 1968. Recall that the MacBride-authored 
Resolution on “Human Rights in Armed Conflict” was co-sponsored by Uganda and 
Jamaica, two states whose avowed interest at the time lay in denouncing anti-colonialism 
                                                
500 Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, 85. 
501 This debate is addressed in, among others, Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in 
Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: 
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Cornell 
University Press, 1993); Neta C Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Reus-Smit, “Struggles for Individual Rights and the 
Expansion of the International System.” 
502 Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” 
International Organization 20, no. 3 (1966): 369. 
503 Louis Henkin, “The United Nations and Human Rights,” International Organization 19, no. 3 
(1965): 512. 
  211 
and endorsing self-determination.504 The Resolution was also adopted unanimously, with 
only Switzerland and South Vietnam abstaining.  
The question could be raised: Why was there not more overt opposition, especially 
from Western powers, to a text that in addition to calls for improvements on the 
humanitarian legal front also featured obviously incendiary language? One possibility 
that after years of seeing similar resolutions being “steamrolled” at the General 
Assembly, Western states had grown blasé about this practice. US opposition to other 
resolutions at Tehran, particularly those that appeared to legitimate the right to violent 
self-determination, casts some doubt on this hypothesis.  
An alternative is that instead of indifference, US acceptance of this resolution was 
due to diplomatic negligence. Recent historical scholarship endorses this possibility. 
Roland Burke, for instance, decries the fact in the 1968 Tehran Human Rights 
Conference “few states were willing to challenge the assault on traditional human rights 
from the confident, and numerically superior, Afro-Asian bloc. This was especially true 
for the US delegation, who did little to defend the legacy of Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
Universal Declaration. They chose instead to flatter the prejudices of their audience with 
prophylactic doses of self-criticism.”505 This attitude leads Burke, in agreement with 
influential diplomatic figures like Daniel Patrick Mohniyan, to denounce the 1968 Tehran 
Conference as “a key moment in the collapse of US human rights diplomacy.”506 This 
argument overlooks other plausible sources of US conduct in this regard, however.  
Rather than negligence, it may well have been that sensitive American domestic and 
foreign policy considerations, namely its still-thorny racial issues at home and an (ever 
                                                
504 Direct evidence exists for the Ugandan case. In a letter addressed written by that state’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in response to MacBride’s request for continued Ugandan 
sponsorship of the 1968 Tehran Resolution, the diplomat revealed that although his country had 
found it easy to support the text “because we too believe that the present unrevised Laws of War 
are hopelessly inadequate. Our immediate concern in this subject, however, lay in the situation 
prevailing in South Africa where minority racist and colonial regimes refuse to comply with the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We believe that freedom fighters who 
are victims of these regimes should be protected under international law, and when imprisoned 
they should be treated as prisoners of war.” Quoted in Suter, An International Law of Guerilla 
Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 51. 
505 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 103. 
506 Ibid. 
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more) troubled experience in Vietnam, increasingly prompted rhetorical restraint on the 
part of the US delegates. The nature of the speeches US head delegate Roy Wilkins made 
at Tehran supports this view, as noted by Burke, insofar as Wilkins “emphasized the great 
progress made in racial equality, and the steps being taken to grant economic and social 
rights in the United States.”507 At Tehran in 1968 the US seemed therefore more 
interested in deflecting criticism than in raising controversy, which explains the 
acclamation that Wilkins’s “defensive posture” elicited in Washington.508 Moreover, the 
archival evidence presented earlier on the US worries about Vietnam supports this view 
with regarding the concrete issue of revising existing humanitarian rules to better protect 
prisoners of war and civilian populations.   
US rhetorical restraint raises a crucial theoretical point with regard to the effects of 
the public re-appropriation of human rights (and with it, humanitarian law) by an 
increasingly dominant group of new states succeeding in morally and legally legitimating 
their cause in international forums against Western, especially colonial, powers.  In the 
words of Burke:  
“The sheer preponderance of Asian, Arab, and African states also made still 
further collapse in the Western position more likely. Comfortable majorities could now 
be assembled on questions of apartheid and colonialism without consulting the so-called 
West and Others Group, let alone gaining assent. Negative votes or abstentions became 
increasingly embarrassing in such a context, even if the languages proposed bordered on 
that deemed unacceptable. As Ambassador Meyer noted on the Tehran Conference’s 
apartheid text, the US was willing to capitulate on “extreme African demands” simply to 
avoid the humiliation of joining a friendless set of state absentees. The ambassador 
advised the secretary of state that he had in ‘mind the unfortunate impression which 
would be created if we were one of the few absentees.’”509 
 
David Kay’s systematic analysis of the number of negative votes cast by the US, the 
UK and France on issues of self-determination before and after the influx of the newly 
independent nations to the UN provides additional strong support for the above 
hypothesis. Kay’s data showed  “a steady, though somewhat irregular, decline in the 
percentage of negative vote cast by these three states commencing with the eleventh 
                                                
507 Ibid. 
508 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 104. 
509 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 108. 
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session in 1956,” coinciding with the entry of new nations into the organization and their 
fierce campaigning for colonialism.510  Kay goes further to conclude that “the records are 
replete with… cases in which France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have 
since 1956 either acquiesced in or supported anti-colonial resolutions far stronger than 
these three states voted against in earlier years.”511 
Growing rhetorical restraint on the part of Western states, exemplified in their 
abstention or perhaps even in their voting for otherwise unpalatable texts, may thus have 
been an instance of social coercion similar to what occurred in 1949 with Common 
Article 3 and to the political dynamics seen during the negotiation of the Additional 
Protocols in the 1970s, analyzed in the next chapter.512  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has once again demonstrated the operation of a recurrent “impetus-
creating” path to normative development in the area of international humanitarian law, 
consisting of “demonstration” atrocity effects and persistent (or renewed/multiplied) 
moral entrepreneurship.  
This was the case, first, of the ICRC and the issue of internal troubles in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Quickly after the adoption of Common Article 3 in 1949, events on the 
ground in various situations of internal violence triggered renewed debates within the 
ICRC on how to address state reluctance to admitting the existence of “non-international 
conflict” but also how to tackle situations that did not plausibly rise to that level 
(“troubles” or disturbances, and tensions.) Given an expectation that states were unlikely 
to take up new legal commitments on these issues so soon after the revision of the 
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC summoned various dialogues with influential 
                                                
510 Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, 83. 
511 Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, 83. 
512 Keith Suter suggests two additional plausible reasons for the unanimity obtained by the Tehran 
Human Rights Resolution: 1) That states were ostensibly unaware of what the approved text 
implied, or that 2) They saw it as yet another resolution they might be able to brush off in the 
future. Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 34. 
I find the former implausible with respect to Western states, but the latter may get something 
right, which underlines the importance of sustained attention by the ICJ and the ICRC to moving 
the project forward.  
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international legal experts the aim of arriving at more expansive interpretations of CA3. 
This tactic, I have argued, resembles an epistemic community as defined in Chapter 1.  
Generating progressive interpretations of existing law through meetings of legal 
experts seems to have had some policy and practical benefits for the ICRC, but ultimately 
it did not seem legitimize a move among states to create new humanitarian treaty rules, 
whether for internal or international conflicts. This finding was confirmed through the 
documentation of an additional episode of frustrated rule emergence, also built on the 
basis of prior consultations with experts (the Draft Rules.) Further, the demise of the 
Draft Rules suggested what appears to have been, at least at the time, another 
fundamental condition for triggering formal conversations about treaty revisions and 
development: piercing through the skepticism of important Western state gatekeepers. 
Western states’ (especially NATO powers) desire for international humanitarian 
regulations of their conduct during hostilities and their use of certain “means and 
methods” of war (especially nuclear weapons but also aerial bombardment) was low or 
non-existent. The attitude of those powerful states effectively shut down the initiative in 
the late 1950s, confirming that states’ risk aversion toward humanitarian normative 
expansion/emergence was not only perceived (as with internal troubles) but also real (as 
with the Draft Rules.) Finally, I argued that as a result of this frustrating experience --and 
though its interest and efforts did not subside,-- the attitude of the ICRC toward the idea 
of formal legal developments in both international and internal conflicts became more 
circumspect. 
The second half of the chapter addressed the puzzle of why, despite the grim 
prospects for the emergence of new international humanitarian rules around the mid-
1960s, states were soon engaging in official meetings precisely to that end. In particular, 
three key conditions combined to change the fate of the story and led to this striking 
outcome. First, renewed atrocities motivated a new non-state moral/legal entrepreneur, 
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to press for the revisions of the law and to 
insert the issue within the United Nations General Assembly. Second, the ICJ’s actions 
occurred at an auspicious moment during which the international system was expanding 
radically due to decolonization, swelling up the numbers of “new” states with an interest 
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in promoting self-determination and protecting freedom fighters waging wars of national 
liberation. This “revolution in sovereignty” drastically reduced the influence of the West 
within the UN and enabled the newly-decolonized majorities to achieve and propagate an 
international moral consensus around self-determination as a central human right (and its 
corollary, colonialism as an international crime.) The idea of revising humanitarian law to 
incorporate these new concerns was soon folded into the UN’s agenda, at once giving it 
the political impulse it had lacked in previous years and seemingly driving Western --
especially colonial—powers to the international moral “wall.” Finally, unrelated to these 
developments, the interests of another crucial actor had also transformed: a United States 
mired in an abuse-riddled conflict in Vietnam now sought at all costs to protect its 
soldiers suffering abuse in the hands of their Communist captors in North Vietnam. This 
change in American attitudes toward debates about the revision of humanitarian law 
completed a “trifecta” of conditions facilitating a new step of humanitarian norm 
emergence for both internal and international conflicts. 
To be fair, it may be said that by 1968 not all states were perhaps equally motivated 
to engage in a new process of revisions, but that a majority comprising a key major 
power as well as the enthusiastic group of new states was on board. As we will see, 
although effective for opening the door to a new stage of norm development, the distance 
between the interests of different groups of states constituted a highly explosive cocktail.  
The moral entrepreneurs of the story (the ICJ and the ICRC) could not have imagined just 
how protracted and tense negotiations would be in the coming years. 
  216 
Chapter 5 – A Diplomatic Revolution: The Making of the Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions (1968-1977) 
 
“The facts of life in the society of states are however not as sovereignty bravado portrays 
them. Its rhetoric does not fit their reality… Even Titans can find their range of options to 
be disagreeably restricted.” 
Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, 75. 
 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined, in chronological sequence, the most important 
conditions and actors that helped to re-ignite the process of developing international 
humanitarian law around 1968, nearly two decades after the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions in 1949. This process, anchored in the ICRC’s persistent push for better 
legal protection for the victims of armed conflict and ably catalyzed by Sean MacBride of 
the ICJ, ended with a collective sigh of relief nearly ten years later, in June 1977, with the 
adoption by consensus of two Additional Protocols to the Conventions of 1949 (hereafter 
referred to as First Protocol and Second Protocol.) The First Protocol regulates 
international conflicts and wars of national liberation, and makes substantive additions in 
areas where the Conventions were lacking, notably in the controversial field of the use of 
force and the respect owed to civilian persons and objects caught in the midst of armed 
attacks.513 For its part, the Second Protocol is a much shorter treaty that, while 
complementing the principles included decades earlier in Common Article 3, for example 
with respect to the civilian population, civilian objects, or medical transports, omits the 
detailed guarantees of the First Protocol vis-à-vis prisoners of war and covers only 
internal conflicts bearing the characteristics of (high-level) civil wars.  
The sigh of relief at the end of the Diplomatic Conference was not because it had 
“gone well” for all parties involved, but rather because it had ended at all. As this chapter 
details, the drafting and negotiation of the Additional Protocols, lasting over six years, 
were filled with acrimony, uncertainty and tension from beginning to end. This was true 
in particular for some very powerful states sitting at the table, including the United States, 
                                                
513 The First Protocol in fact enshrined many of the precautions and limits to warfare rejected by 
states twenty years earlier when the Draft Rules were abandoned following the Nineteenth 
International Conference of the Red Cross in 1957, as seen in the previous chapter. 
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Canada and most of Western Europe, which in addition to their own often frustrating 
efforts at private coordination, repeatedly fought and lost public battles against majority 
coalitions formed primarily by African, Asian, Socialist and Arab countries. The chief 
controversy during the CDDH (the French acronym for the “Diplomatic Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts,” its official English name) was tied to the insertion of a peculiar 
provision in the most important Article of the First Protocol, which set out the treaty’s 
scope of application. In addition to conflicts between states, paragraph 4 of the First 
Article proclaimed that the Protocol would cover “armed conflicts in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination.”514 
With this provision, signatory states admitted in politically quite charged (from the 
Western perspective quite offensive) terms, that a binding multilateral humanitarian 
agreement would treat as international certain conflict types that until then had been 
considered eminently internal. This “upgrading” of anti-colonial, anti-racist and anti-
“alien occupation” conflicts was not merely nominal. In addition to Article 1, Article 44 
of the same Protocol announced that even if combatants failed to meet the requirement of 
distinguishing themselves from the civilian population, they would nevertheless be given 
protections “equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war” by the 
Prisoners of War Convention (from 1949) and by the First Protocol itself.515  
These two provisions produced a veritable scandal when first raised during 
negotiations. From the perspective of newly-decolonized countries and Arab nations 
supporting Palestine against Israel, they represented legitimate aspirations, already 
enshrined in important legal documents negotiated under the aegis of the United Nations, 
including that organization’s Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
                                                
514 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument  (Consulted on August 15, 2013.) 
515 During the drafting of the First Protocol the Article on POWs was numbered 42. The final 
treaty reorganized the text and it thus became Article 44. In this chapter I refer to it as Article 42 
in keeping with the drafting history. 
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concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (from 1970,) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, finalized in 1966 but not in 
force until 1976.) After waging ruthless wars of liberation against their Western colonial 
oppressors, some of these new states had mobilized effectively in international forums to 
highlight the moral bankruptcy of colonialism, the urgent right to self-determination, and 
the virtuousness of freedom fighters. The Socialist bloc, if for other reasons, echoed these 
sentiments. With few exceptions, however, Western states found the explicit inclusion of 
national liberation conflicts, and the privileging of the “irregular” combatants fighting 
them, to be dangerously regressive in a body of law long agnostic to political 
motivations. Some Western delegations considered these moves as no less than fatal 
affronts to the purported objectivity and universality of humanitarian law, reminiscent of 
outmoded “just war” doctrines. Accordingly, when the Committee discussing Article 1 in 
1974 first took a vote on the controversial language, Western states voiced their horror 
and voted en masse against it. Unable to contain the majority, however, they lost the 
battle.516 Yet, instead of walking out the Conference in disgust, Western states remained 
at the table and a few years later in 1977, when both Article 1 and 42 were put to a vote 
in Plenary for their final inclusion in First Protocol, only one state (Israel) voted against 
them. Western states either supported them or abstained. Why?  
The Second Protocol on non-international conflicts also radically differed from initial 
aspirations, not only those of the ICRC but also of powerful states like United States and 
Canada. While in 1971-2 the ICRC proposed a draft treaty offering ample humanitarian 
treatment to combatants and non-combatants in internal conflicts, roughly defined as 
victim-producing, organized armed hostile actions against established authorities, the 
final negotiated Second Protocol was limited only to conflicts fulfilling a far more 
stringent set of conditions, namely those occurring “in the territory of a High Contracting 
                                                
516 The vote, studied later in detail, was 70-21-13. I use the term “Western” to refer to North 
America and Western Europe. This choice is guided by protagonist states’ own use of the word. 
As we will see, at times the Western Group extended to Australia, New Zealand, and even Turkey 
and Japan. I identify those occasions whenever possible. Latin American states, though located in 
the Western Hemisphere, usually constituted a separate, semi-cohesive group during discussions 
about humanitarian law.  
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Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.”517 These requisites were more demanding than those set out in 
Common Article 3, signed nearly three decades prior. What happened? 
These vignettes capture the two sets of empirical puzzles I take up in this chapter: 1) 
Why and how were provisions privileging wars of national liberation and their 
combatants inserted into the First Protocol? More to the point, if many powerful Western 
countries were so viscerally opposed to their inclusion in a binding humanitarian 
covenant, why did they not consistently vote against them? And when faced with failure, 
why did they not pull out of the Conference altogether? 2) Why and how did the Second 
Protocol transform from a broad instrument intended to develop CA3 to one only 
applicable to civil wars of a very high level?  In addition to these central puzzles, this 
chapter also addresses the critical question of how and to what extent the status, rights 
and responsibilities of non-state armed groups (national liberation movements as well as 
“traditional” insurgents or rebels) under international humanitarian law were considered 
during the 1970s negotiations process—a topic of current scholarly relevance on which I 
expand in the next and final chapter. 
Consistent with the argument presented in Chapter 3 regarding the making of 
Common Article 3, I argue that Western states’ admission of wars of national liberation 
in the scope of the First Protocol was an effect of social coercion. In 1977, the states 
opposing this legal innovation, though powerful, were in the voting minority. They tried 
but were unable to persuade a mixed coalition of states that held the mightily legitimate 
trump cards of self-determination and the fight against racism and occupation. 
Numerically and politically disabled, Western states reasoned they could not walk out of 
                                                
517 The first definition paraphrases the earliest ICRC proposal from 1971 presented to 
governmental experts at the very first formal consultation that year. The second comes from the 
actual Second Protocol. See: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977. See online at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument (Consulted on 
August 15, 2013.) 
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a humanitarian negotiation, fearing not only public opprobrium at home and abroad but 
also the legal “damage” done to a cherished body of international law. Placed between a 
rock and a hard place, Western states opted for accommodating to the majority view 
while strategically seeking to “remedy” the situation in private by making the language of 
the rules indeterminate in certain key places, or by inserting additional articles that 
lowered the likelihood of the Protocol’s application to such wars in the future. In other 
words: although forced to acquiesce to the opposing coalition’s social pressure, Western 
states covertly “pushed back” in the 1970s (as the UK and France had in 1949,) hoping to 
make the most of a profoundly unfavorable situation. With respect to the provision 
granting generous prisoner of war treatment to captured freedom fighters in national 
liberation wars, I argue that social coercion between groups of states was strongly 
complemented by the American delegation’s progressive interest in establishing humane 
treatment for all prisoners of war (a product of US experience in Vietnam, as outlined in 
the previous chapter,) and facilitated by the influence of the ICRC.  
The story of the Second Protocol is also one of pressured compromise between 
clashing groups of entrepreneurs with asymmetric influence. In the 1970s, with the frailty 
of post-colonial states in Africa and Asia, the proliferation of repressive military 
governments in Latin America, the remains of Portuguese, French and British 
colonialism, as well as situations of political conflict and terrorism in parts of Western 
and Eastern Europe, the odds were strongly stacked against the emergence of generous 
humanitarian rules for internal conflicts. Although these states shared little in common in 
ideological terms, given the frailty of their domestic security situation they coalesced in 
their aggressive risk-aversion and in their general defense of national sovereignty and 
non-intervention. Committed to salvaging at least some humanitarian safeguards for the 
most prevalent type of violence around the world (internal conflict,) pragmatic delegates 
reached out to moderates in the opposing coalition and managed to strike a deal which, 
while less encompassing than wished by the most humanitarian in the room, nevertheless 
added substantive protections to those included in CA3.  
Finally, in this chapter as in previous ones, I show that in the 1970s Western states’ 
anxiety with the idea of assigning rights and responsibilities to armed non-state actors 
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(especially national liberation movements, but also “traditional” insurgents) had to do 
with the status and material consequences that might ensue from it, particularly the risk 
of granting them a veneer of legitimacy accompanied by humanitarian protections that 
strengthened their struggle. The opposing majority coalition made it clear that these were 
the goals they sought with regard to national liberation groups, feeding the fears of the 
West. Compounding Western states’ political suspicion was an ingrained conviction that 
the will and the capacity of most armed non-state actors to apply international 
humanitarian norms were utterly weak, such that attempts to afford them responsibilities 
and entitlements would prove foolish and self-defeating. And although Western states --
very grudgingly-- admitted the presence of various liberation groups at the Diplomatic 
Conference, they did so more as a momentary, pressured concession than in the spirit of 
truly negotiating with them. Liberation groups’ seeming disinterest in the actual 
proceedings of the Conference ultimately added to the distrust and sealed the fate of the 
First Protocol as an instrument only nominally equipped to either regulate or protect non-
state groups waging national liberation wars. 
As in previous chapters, these findings both contradict and complement existing 
theoretical arguments about the process of international rule-making and norm 
emergence. They reconfirm that international humanitarian negotiations are not instances 
of simple rational coordination between states, but social contests in which concerns both 
about national (security) interests, moral values and social reputation clash and interact in 
complex ways. In so doing, this chapter once more collapses facile or sharp distinctions 
between “rational” and “social” models of action, showing how these in fact intertwine to 
explain international outcomes. As stated earlier, this chapter further demonstrates the 
explanatory power of social coercion to account for some of the most important political 
dynamics and legal outcomes observed in these negotiations. Finally, this chapter also re-
confirms the finding that legitimacy plays a crucial role for states participating in real-life 
international negotiations.  
The chapter is organized as follows: The first section resumes where we had left off 
historically, describing how the reaffirmation and revision of humanitarian law became 
an active subject of debate within the UN and later in ICRC-facilitated forums toward the 
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late 1960s. It seeks to prime readers for the complex issues that would surface during the 
official pre-negotiation phase, commonly known in international law as the travaux 
préparatoires. The second section clarifies the core dilemmas states faced prior to the 
diplomatic negotiations, zooming into the multiple discussions held by Western states, 
(with the UK and the US at the helm) as they attempted to coordinate their preferences. 
The density of debates among Western states and their failure to arrive at common 
strategies in the pre-negotiation phase, even among long-standing ideological and 
military allies suggests that this process is far more fraught than rational institutionalist 
theories lead to believe.518 This section also captures another recurring finding of this 
dissertation, namely how states’ interests often combine moral and utilitarian elements, 
and how they are dynamically constituted by their domestic experiences and molded by 
international interaction. The next section continues this task but delves into the actual 
negotiation phase of the Protocols over a period of four years, featuring not only the 
proceedings and outcomes of the four sessions of Diplomatic Conference in Geneva but 
also the several additional coordination efforts within the Western Group in London, 
Washington and Bonn. It is this section where I demonstrate the operation of social 
coercion. The conclusion summarizes the findings and brings the conversation into the 
final chapter.  
 
II. Resuming the Road to the Protocols  
As seen in Chapter 4, in the spring of 1968 the ICJ successfully inserted within the 
UN an item contemplating the revision of humanitarian law and the laws of war under the 
umbrella of “human rights in armed conflict.”  The passing of a resolution at a special 
conference promised nothing, however. Sean MacBride knew that unless the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) seized on the subject and instructed the United 
Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) to pursue the work outlined, the initiative might 
remain dead at birth. Thus, as Keith Suter explains, “for much of 1968 MacBride was at 
                                                
518 The assumption of some research on IL/IR along rationalist lines appears to be that preference-
coordination among ideological/political allies is either relatively uncomplicated or that it can 
eventually be overcome. See Koremenos and Hong 2010; Koremenos 2013. The story told here 
demonstrates the opposite on both counts.  
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the centre of a network of frenetic correspondence, with him as the co-coordinator of the 
five governments [Uganda, Jamaica, India, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt, then United Arab 
Republic,] as well as trying to get U Thant and Marc Schreiber [Director of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights] more actively involved in this subject, trying to win the 
support of other governments, and trying to get NGOs to pressure their governments to 
support the Tehran resolution when it came before the 1968 General Assembly”.519 In 
April 1968, even before the Tehran Conference ended, UNSG U Thant replied positively, 
saying he had been in close touch with the ICRC on this issue and that he only wished 
governments would take an interest and support such difficult work.520 MacBride 
responded with gratitude and made himself available to assist in accomplishing the 
operative portions of the resolution.521 In the meantime, the ICRC seized on the 
opportunity created by the Tehran resolution and contacted U Thant in September 1968 
to remind him that its work on the subject was “very similar” to the studies with which 
his office had been entrusted, and that it was prepared to help.522 
With this note, the ICRC presented the UN with an offer it could not refuse, that is, 
with years of experience, research and reflection UN lawyers could hardly hope to attain 
on their own in a short period of time.523 In October 1968, the ICRC Director Claude 
Pilloud traveled to New York to follow the UNGA discussions on the matter and 
managed to persuade the sponsoring governments to incorporate the principles 
proclaimed by the 1965 International Red Cross resolution in a text for presentation to 
states at that year’s UNGA sessions. India introduced the draft resolution, which was co-
                                                
519 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 50. 
520 U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, Letter to Séan McBride, Secretary-General, 
International Commission of Jurists, April 25, 1968. On file with author. 
521 Séan McBride, Secretary-General, International Commission of Jurists, Letter to U Thant, 
Secretary-General, United Nations, May 17, 1968. On file with author. 
522 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, report submitted by the International Commission of the Red Cross, XXI International 
Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, September 1969, 18, 23 (Reaffirmation and Development 
1969 hereonafter.) ICRC Library, Geneva. 
523 Although the office of the UNSG eventually hired consultants for the preparation of the 
mandated reports, these exchanges signaled the beginning of the ICRC’s “re-taking” over the 
project of revisions.  
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sponsored by a mix of newly independent, Socialist and Scandinavian states.524 The text 
did not raise much controversy and was adopted unanimously both in Committee and in 
Plenary.525 Unlike the original Tehran resolution (and likely at the prompting of the 
ICRC,) this one did not include mention of “minority and racist regimes,” although it still 
referred to “the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other 
appropriate legal instruments to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and 
combatants in all armed conflicts.”526 With regards to future action, this UNGA 1968 
resolution was in keeping with the Tehran text.   
                                                
524 Afghanistan, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Morocco, Norway, 
Philippines, Sweden, Uganda, United Arab Republic (Egypt,) Yugoslavia and Zambia. The 
Indian delegate rightly presented this mix as “a cross-section of the membership of the United 
Nations” representing “the widespread concern felt throughout the world for the preservation of 
human rights in armed conflict.” Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global 
Politics of Law-Making, 53. 
525 The full text is as follows: “The General Assembly, recognizing the necessity of applying basic 
humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts; Taking note of resolution XXIII on human rights 
in armed conflicts, adopted on 12 May 1968 by the International Conference on Human Rights; 
affirming that the provisions of that resolution need to be implemented effectively as soon as 
possible 1. Affirms resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross 
held at Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following principles for observance by all 
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: (a) That the right of 
the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;(b) That it is 
prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; (c) That distinction must be 
made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian 
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible; 2. Invites the Secretary-
General, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other appropriate 
international organizations, to study: (a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better 
application of existing humanitarian international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts; (b) 
The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate legal 
instruments to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed 
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare; 3. 
Requests the Secretary-General to take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions of 
the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on the 
steps he has taken; 4. Further requests Member States to extend all possible assistance to the 
Secretary-General in the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 above; 5. Calls upon 
all States which have not yet done so to become parties to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
526 Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, 54. 
Interestingly, this Resolution also dropped any direct reference to the limitation of nuclear 
weapons, since as the ICRC admitted it “raised difficulties” and “could be interpreted as not 
categorically forbidding all employment of nuclear weapons.” This shows the ICRC had learned 
from past “mistakes” and internalized Western (NATO) distaste for this idea after the Draft Rules 
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The ICRC quickly convened the announced meeting of private experts in February 
24-28, 1969.527 The meeting touched on every substantive aspect of the law needing 
revision: the use of weapons and means of war; the protection of civilian populations 
against hostilities and their consequences; behavior between combatants with a view to 
limiting unnecessary suffering; and enforcement issues and mechanisms.528 The ICRC 
also asked experts to review the types of armed conflicts to which these rules should 
apply, including not only international and non-international conflict but “hostilities 
conducted by the United Nations, guerrilla, and finally, by extension, situations of 
internal disturbance and tensions.” Importantly, the ICRC framed the meeting to be 
exclusively about revisions to the law, setting aside questions about the application of 
existing rules, which it deemed so comprehensive to merit separate treatment.529 
The outcome of the February 1969 experts meeting bears some importance because it 
formed the basis of the first substantive document to which states would react. The ICRC 
was straightforward about the need to pay special attention to non-international conflicts 
both due to their prevalence in recent decades and the few humanitarian rules devoted to 
them.530 Two crucial gaps were singled out in Common Article 3 (CA3): a lack of clear 
definitions and general normative (substantive) underdevelopment. The ICRC urged that 
                                                                                                                                            
fiasco. In addition, it suggests that talk about  “limiting” (instead of fully banning) nuclear 
weapons was not acceptable to non-Western states. The wisest decision was probably to extirpate 
it from these discussions. The nuclear issue, however, would prove to be a recurrent specter with 
lasting consequences for the ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols. 
527 In attendance was a combination of experts from Western, newly decolonized, Third World 
and Socialist states: General A. Beaufre, France; M. Belaouane, President of the Algerian Red 
Crescent; Mr. A Buchan, Director for the Institute of Strategic Studies, UK; General E.L.M. 
Burns, Canada; Prof. B. Graefrath, East Germany; Ambassador E. Hambro, Norway; Prof. R. 
Hingorani, India; Judge Keba M’Baye, Senegal; Ambassador L.E. Makonnen, Ethiopia; General 
A.E. Martola, Finland; Senator A. Matine-Daftary, Iran; Séan MacBride, Ireland; Prof. S. Meray, 
Turkey; Prof. J. Patrnogic, Yugoslavia; Prof. B. Roeling, Netherlands; Marc Schreiber, UN 
Commission of Human Rights; Prof. R. Taoka, Japan; Baron C.F. von Weizsaecker, West 
Germany. Three experts were consulted in writing: Judge Christopher Cole, Sierra Leone; 
Ambassador E. García-Sayan, Peru and Prof. Nagendra Singh, India. See ICRC, Reaffirmation 
and Development 1969, 25-26. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
528 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 32. ICRC Library, Geneva. In the end, due to 
time constraints, the experts focused on the specific issues of: weapons, protection of civilians, 
non-international conflicts, and guerrilla warfare. 
529 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 21. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
530 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 98. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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it should not be up to states to decide when CA3 was triggered: rather, the article ought to 
apply whenever armed forces produced hostilities.531 This definition echoed the 
“progressive” interpretation experts had honed through the various commissions and 
dialogues held during the 1950s and 1960s, as discussed in Chapter 4. The experts at this 
meeting agreed, claiming that “the conditions to be fulfilled by a non-international 
conflict to be considered as such should not be too restrictive.”532 They also concurred 
with the ICRC’s idea that if a foreign party intervened to support any party to an internal 
conflict, the situation became international and the whole body of humanitarian law was 
applicable.533 They were less certain, however, about whether international humanitarian 
law could regulate situations of “troubles” or “disturbances,” where states might be 
particularly averse to external intromission.534 Other solutions could perhaps be sought in 
those contexts via explicit agreements by governments allowing ICRC intervention, 
through resort to human rights law, or via UN resolutions requesting the ICRC to act 
which governments would accept. (A “complementarity” approach between humanitarian 
law and human rights is prescient of current debates on the interaction between the two 
legal regimes, as the next chapter will explain.)  
The ICRC also argued that non-state groups should be bound by the text and seek to 
follow its considerations.535 Controversy ensued on the issue of whether wars of national 
liberation constituted international conflicts or internal ones, but unable to agree, experts 
set it aside momentarily.536 Although the ICRC report claimed the voices favoring 
                                                
531 The ICRC’s own conclusions and proposals on the subject of non-international conflict were 
presented at the International Red Cross Conference at Istanbul in two separate documents, one 
on the general reaffirmation and development of the law and another on non-international 
conflicts specifically. This highlighted already the political challenges in legally splitting 
international and internal conflicts, at a time when categories were increasingly confused and 
resisted. See XXI International Conference of the Red Cross, Report, Istanbul, September 6-13, 
1969. ICRC Library, Geneva. Besides the general Conference report, the associated ICRC 
submissions are also housed in the ICRC Library in Geneva. 
532 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 100. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
533 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 101. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
534 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 110. ICRC Library, Geneva.. 
535 One idea that the ICRC circulated at the time was to draft a model agreement which parties to 
the conflict might sign on an ad hoc basis. CA3 encouraged this but provided no specific 
template, something that the ICRC thought should be remedied. 
536 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 102. ICRC Library, Geneva. 
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national liberation movements were in the minority, the document bristled with examples 
of the tension between the wish to extend humanitarian protections to these fighters and 
their stated inability (or the lack of military realism in asking them) to observe basic 
restraint. Some experts argued, for instance, that to compel rebels to respect the rules of 
war from the outset of their resistance “would sometimes deprive them of means of 
action.” Others suggested that “no attempt at liberation had the slightest chance of 
success unless it were backed by the civilian population,” making distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants particularly difficult.537 These opinions offered a hint of 
the hurdles to be continuously faced in the coming years, as detailed below.  
In the end, the ICRC dared to draw only three general conclusions from this debate: 
the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention (created to protect 
partisans in the image of the anti-Nazi resistors during WWII) should be interpreted “as 
broadly as possible when the guerrillas respect fundamental humanitarian principles in 
combat.” Second, prisoners on either side should be treated humanely. Third, terrorism 
should be clearly forbidden when inflicted indiscriminately against the civilian 
population.538 
As the above illustrates, the meeting of experts in February 1969 did not resolve 
many of the thorniest issues; indeed, as seen previous chapters, experts attending these 
meetings acted on their private capacity and hence could not “make” positive law even if 
they managed to come to a consensus. That privilege remained restricted to government 
delegations in the context of “plenipotentiary” Diplomatic Conferences. This informal 
ICRC-convened meeting, however, offered a useful exercise for laying out the stakes of 
the upcoming debates.  Procedurally, the report left it up to states to decide how the 
process would unveil and who would steer it, but by highlighting its long tradition and 
unique neutral character as well as its ideal position for facilitating the preparatory work, 
the ICRC diplomatically marked it its territory. On substance, the report claimed that 
while the ICRC would not lead the way on nuclear issues which were the providence of 
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the UN, “as regards the other subjects to be studied, in particular the conduct of hostilities 
or those applying to internal wars, these have been considered by the ICRC for a long 
time past.”539 (This was a thinly-veiled reference to the Draft Rules.) Therefore, a certain 
division of labor between the two organizations seems to have been worked out by 1969.  
States had two opportunities to begin shaping and voicing their views more clearly 
that same year. The first and most important of these, already mentioned, was the XXI 
International Red Cross Conference that took place in Istanbul in September 6-13. This 
Conference, which gathered participants from nearly a hundred countries, unanimously 
approved the ICRC reports on the revisions of the law and urged the organization to 
continue studying and acting quickly toward the drafting of new instruments in dialogue 
with governmental experts and the UN. The Swiss delegation supported the idea that the 
ICRC should handle the revisions process and offered to convene a Diplomatic 
Conference when the time was appropriate. The Algerian Red Crescent, however, raised 
some hackles when it introduced a new resolution (XVIII) asking the Conference and the 
ICRC to pay special attention to combatants and members of resistance movements in 
non-international conflict, urging that they be given treatment similar to prisoners of war. 
The Danish and Swedish Red Crosses later amended the Algerian resolution, and a joint 
draft was approved in Commission and in Plenary, though with a vote of 97 in favor, 22 
against, and 11 abstentions, its adoption was far from unanimous.540  
The second forum for discussion was the 1969 UNGA Session in November. This 
meeting saw the very first UNSG report on “Human Rights in Armed Conflict,” which 
consisted of a lengthy review of the existing law and the gaps within it, most of them 
                                                
539 ICRC, Reaffirmation and Development 1969, 28. ICRC Library, Geneva. On the nuclear issue, 
the ICRC warned that it “take into account the work proceeding on the subject in the United 
Nations” but reserved “the possibility of making its voice heard on these matters.” The division 
was clear: it wished to leave the political work to the UN, but this would not mean giving up its 
moral/institutional authority. 
540 XXI International Conference of the Red Cross, Report, Istanbul, September 6-13, 1969, 77-
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those against came from Western delegations. See handwritten note, “Resolution No. 9, 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,” in folder entitled “ICRC Conference on 
Humanitarian Law (1972),” POW/Civilian Information Center, Confidential Records, Box 11, P 
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already made evident in the ICRC reports discussed earlier. Like those documents, the 
UNSG’s report referenced the legal inadequacies and tensions regarding guerrilla warfare 
and national liberation movements, suggesting to increase the protection of captured 
freedom fighters by granting them prisoner of war-like treatment. The crosspollination 
between the ICRC and the UNSG reports was evident; the latter in fact referenced the 
former, confirming that for its preparation the UN remained in contact with the ICRC and 
with the experts it had consulted for its own meeting in February.541 The UNSG report, 
however, was circulated only when the UNGA 1969 Session was far advanced and thus 
relatively few states had a chance to react. The UN Third Committee, where the topic 
was debated, prepared a draft resolution adopted at the UNGA on December 16 
requesting the UNSG to continue working on this subject with particular attention the 
protection of civilians and wars of national liberation, and to submit another report a year 
later.542 Importantly, two of the experts directly involved in the research and writing of 
the 1969 and 1970 UN reports on human rights in armed conflict, Hans Longva and 
Georges Abi-Saab, would become key protagonists as government delegates (for Norway 
and Egypt, respectively) during the preparatory process and the actual diplomatic 
negotiation of the Additional Protocols. Both Longva and Abi-Saab believed that national 
liberation struggles were international, (not internal,) conflicts, and that freedom fighters 
deserved enhanced protection as prisoners of war when captured. Not surprisingly, as 
seen here and later, the UN reports echoed these controversial concerns approvingly.  
Public debate at Istanbul and the 1969 UNGA session was slim and as such it is 
difficult to infer the position of every state attending these early Conferences. It is clear 
that the bulk of work on drafting resolutions to move the item forward was taken up by a 
mix of newly decolonized and Socialist states, with neutral and Western states in the 
minority. The resolution approved at the XXI International Red Cross Conference in  
Istanbul, for instance, was coordinated by an adhoc Committee composed by Algeria, 
                                                
541 United Nations General Assembly, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Report of 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/7720, 1969, 8. 
542 The unrecorded vote was 91 for and 21 against. Suter claims that the resolution “was adopted 
without debate or explanation of vote.” Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The 
Global Politics of Law-Making, 59. 
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Bulgaria, Upper Volta, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Canada and Yugoslavia. In addition, the Commission report noted that many 
(likely non-Western) delegations “warmly approved the ICRC’s traditional mission of 
protecting war victims to include the safeguarding of the human person, these two 
questions being inseparable under the threat of the use of new weapons.”543 Moreover, 
the Yugoslavian and Romanian delegations explicitly supported the idea of drawing up 
new legal instruments related to the conduct of hostilities, while the Algerian Red 
Crescent, as said earlier, presented its own text on improved treatment for members of 
liberation movements. 
It is not difficult to see why certain non-Western delegations wished to play such a 
prominent role in steering debate toward expanding the law to conflicts of self-
determination. As shown, Algeria was noteworthy in this regard. Having waged (and 
won) a brutal war of liberation against the French a mere decade earlier explains why this 
country’s representatives held such an ardent interest in securing protections for fellow, 
still active freedom fighters across Africa and Asia. The critical efforts the Algerians had 
made years prior to legitimize their own struggle, especially within the UN, have been 
much cited and recently well documented.544 Algerians’ sophisticated legal and political 
work has also been directly connected to the process of revising humanitarian law in the 
1970s, though more focused archival research remains a task for the future.545  
For their part and with few exceptions, until the turn of the decade major Western 
states seemed to be operating on the defensive, reacting with veiled disapproval (that is, 
abstaining, or voting against when not on the record) to others’ initiatives. Government 
archives reveal this to be the case of waning colonial powers like France and the United 
Kingdom, both of which recognized the importance of the subject and the presence of 
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gaps in the law (though frowning upon ideas favoring national liberation movements,) yet 
who had not yet really begun to craft specific proposals or views toward revision.546 It 
was for example not until August 1970 that an officer of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) expressly recognized in an internal memo,  
“that the movement for a revision of the Laws of War is now very strong. We can 
no longer, therefore, rely on our former position, namely that, if existing law of War were 
properly observed, there would be no need for any revision… We are now trying to 
formulate specific proposals for changes in the Geneva Conventions.”547 
 
Archival evidence also reveals that although in 1969 the official American position 
continued to stress the better implementation of existing regulation, there was now a clear 
willingness to extend some of the rules, especially those improving the treatment of 
captured combatants and the protection of civilian populations to internal conflicts. As 
illustrated in the previous chapter and elaborated further below, the experience of atrocity 
in Vietnam had a transformative effect on US interests.548 For instance, American 
instructions for the XXI International Red Cross Conference in Istanbul authorized the 
delegation to accept and strongly support the extension to internal conflicts of Article 23 
of the Fourth Geneva Conventions limiting the blockade of essential goods to civilian 
population, a practice that had caused thousands of civilian victims in the Biafran 
secessionist conflict in Nigeria just two years prior.549 The general attitude of the US at 
                                                
546 TNA: PRO DEFE 24/1748; Nations-Unies et Organisations Internationales (NUOI) 1970-
1973, Carton 1296, Cote S. 50.3.8.4.6, Diplomatic Archives, La Courneuve, France (hereonafter 
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this time was to seek an extension or interpretation the Conventions as applicable to all 
armed conflicts, not only international ones.550  
Archival evidence also confirms, however, that sections of the US administration, 
particularly within Department of Defense (DoD,) continued to think in 1969 that the 
ICRC should not manage debates on the means and methods of warfare, considered 
separate “law-of-war” matters appropriate for governments or other forums like the UN 
to address.551 This was an older concern, which as we saw in the last chapter successfully 
spelled the demise of the Draft Rules in the late 1950s. Yet within the responsible US 
bureaucracies (DoD and DoS, mainly,) weapons-related concerns now seemed to be 
slowly decoupling from other aspects of humanitarian law, preventing a possible new 
norm emergence “failure.” Evidence of this comes in the fact that the Defense and State 
Departments agreed that efforts should be made to improve Common Article 3. A State 
Department memo instructed the US delegation to the ICRC Istanbul Conference in 1969 
to 
“support a resolution calling for further consideration of strengthening the 
protection afforded to prisoners under Article 3 of the Convention. The [ICRC] proposals 
do not purport to change the legal status of such prisoners and as such should not really 
be objectionable to established governments. The intent is to substitute prisoner of war 
[POW] treatment for the minimum guarantees for POW treatment in international 
conflicts… while at the same time not extending prisoner of war treatment to, for 
example, individuals who carry isolated terrorist activities… In the present conflict in 
Vietnam, the [Government of Vietnam] GVN and its allies, have as a matter of policy, 
given prisoner of war status to many Vietcong soldiers who would not otherwise qualify 
for POW status under Article 4. The United States has found this to be in its national 
interest and, therefore, could support a proposal calling for further consideration of these 
issues.”552 
                                                
550 Memorandum for Mr. Charles W. Havens III, Special Advisor (POW Affairs,) OASD/ISA, 22 
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to ICRC Istanbul (1969)” Box 25, P1, RG 389, NACP.  
552 United States Position Paper, Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts, XXIst 
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The US had in fact since 1967 conceded prisoner of war status to all detainees in 
Vietnam, including Vietcong fighters, through the stewardship of the ICRC.553 But 
beyond prisoner treatment, the Defense Department had additional concerns. Another 
internal memo pointed out that what the US had not applied “but probably should have… 
is a liberal interpretation of civilian internee status under the IV (Civilian) Convention, an 
action which might have resulted in avoiding GVN executions… Therefore it is 
recommended that the United States restrict itself to generic support of a liberal 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, with strong support for the proscription of 
guerrilla terrorism… A protocol which would modify article 3 toward these ends would 
be advantageous.”554 These documents reveal another important aspect: the US did not 
wish to “amend” the Geneva Conventions themselves for fear of a massive watering 
down at the behest of new states (this was a “Pandora’s Box,” in the words of the State 
                                                                                                                                            
distinction should nevertheless be drawn between legitimate acts of guerrilla warfare and those of 
“pure terrorism” (i.e. those indiscriminately directed against the civilian population.)  
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Department,) instead endorsing the idea that any further developments of the law should 
come in new additional instruments, or protocols, for which further study was still 
needed.555 The UK and France agreed. 
The ICRC and the UN increased their liaison in 1970.556 On April 13-17 of that year, 
the UN Human Rights Division organized a small meeting of government experts and 
various international organizations to address, for the first time, prospects for revising the 
entire body of humanitarian rules.557 Also present, the ICRC offered to further collaborate 
in the preparations by conducting another survey of expert opinion, this time focusing 
specifically on non-international conflict and guerilla warfare.558 The ICRC then wrote 
and circulated a preliminary report, in essence a summary of the factual, legal and 
procedural questions asked to the experts, without offering trends or conclusions.559 In 
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Armed Conflicts, Preliminary Report on the Consultation of Experts concerning Non-
International Conflict and Guerrilla Warfare, July 1970, Geneva, D 1153b, 1, ICRC Library, 
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general, this report re-emphasized the importance and the complications entailed in trying 
to define and distinguish among types of conflicts (international, mixed, non-
international, or disturbances or tensions, etc.,) types of combatants (regular or irregular,) 
types of warfare, between combatants and civilians, and for setting out acceptable criteria 
for making decisions on these aspects and the protections to be afforded. At this stage, 
the ICRC was probably looking to convey complexity, raise awareness and begin 
sparking reflection among states.  
It was at this April 1970 UN meeting that the ICRC announced it would convene a 
conference of government experts in the spring 1971, the first “official” 
intergovernmental encounter to consider the eventual development of the law. To pave 
the diplomatic road, high-ranking members of the ICRC also began to contact certain 
states informally (including the US, UK, Canada, the USSR and the Netherlands) hoping 
to gauge their interests with relation to the budding process. This resembled the pathway 
followed in Chapter 3 leading to the revision of the Geneva Conventions in the 1940s.  
 
III. The Travaux Préparatoires Begin: An Analytic Frame 
Having introduced the general contours of the early debates about revisions to the 
Geneva Conventions, it may be useful to provide a more precise analytical framing of the 
main stakes with regard to internal conflicts for the variety of actors involved. This 
section attempts to do so as it distils the essential from three-year long (1971-1973) 
preparatory phase of a process now officially entitled “reaffirmation and development of 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,” leading up to the 
Diplomatic Conference that opened in February 1974.560 
                                                                                                                                            
Geneva. The ICRC probably felt the UN was better placed to issue conclusions, and wanted to 
avoid the political costs of potential controversy while still gathering the feedback that emerged.  
560 This section is based on a veritable sea of (mostly public) documentation produced by the 
ICRC in preparation of or as the outcome of the various meetings it sponsored in 1971-1973 
(prior to the opening of the start of the official Diplomatic Conference,) as well as from the XXII 
International Red Cross Conference of 1973 in Teheran. It also relies on a deep study of the 
similarly voluminous confidential internal government documents relating to the preparatory 
process found in the archives of the UK, the US and France. Some key ICRC documents, all of 
which may be found at the ICRC Library in Geneva, are: Conference of Government Experts on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International  Humanitarian Law Applicable  in  Armed  
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Clarifying stakes and positions 
Stripped to basics, in the 1970s the major dilemma once again facing states with 
regard to “humanizing” internal conflicts related to deep disagreements about the 
extension of legal protection to their armed non-state counterparts and its symbolic and 
material consequences. A lot hinged upon a deceivingly simple question: Who would be 
afforded what humanitarian protections in what contexts?  
Unsurprisingly, most governments approached this puzzle through the lens of their 
own interests, a category that once more combined security and moral, as well as 
domestic and internationalist dimensions. The diversity of state interests at the turn of the 
decade was striking and the stakes seemed extremely high, as shown below. Different 
groups of states can be discerned, each with a “positive” (constructive) and a “negative” 
(destructive) agenda to push for various types of internal conflicts.  
Foremost was the newly-decolonized world gathering most of Africa and Asia, keen 
on cementing the idea that national liberation, even if waged violently, was a legitimate 
international cause that ought to accrue special legal recognition and heightened 
humanitarian protection—a mix of symbolic and material benefits that they specifically 
wanted enshrined in international law. This was I term their “positive” agenda.  
Traditionally, as seen in Chapter 4, conflicts pitting anti-colonial armed groups 
against colonial governments were considered internal conflicts.561 This is so because 
they (largely) took place within the boundaries of territories officially belonging to 
imperial powers. The legal consequence of this factual-territorial (“objective”) 
                                                                                                                                            
Conflicts (Geneva,  24 May - 12 June  1971,) Report on the Work of the Conference as well as the 
eight volumes submitted to that Conference by the ICRC, dated January 1971; Conference of 
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International  Humanitarian Law 
Applicable  in  Armed  Conflicts, Second Session (Geneva,  3 May - 3 June  1971,) Report on the 
Work of the Conference, Vols. I and II, Geneva, July 1972; Draft  Additional  Protocols to  the  
Geneva  Conventions of August  12,  1949, Commentary, Geneva, October 1973; XXII 
International Conference of the Red Cross, Report, Teheran, 8-15, 1973. This list is not 
exhaustive, however. The coordinates for locating the governmental documents is included in the 
bibliography. In later sections of this chapter relevant sources as regards precise statements are 
provided. 
561 Georges Abi-Saab, “Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War,” in International Law: 
A Contemporary Perspective, ed. Richard A. Falk, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, and Saul H. 
Mendlovitz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 410–437. 
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assessment was that only the international rules applicable to non-international conflicts, 
namely CA3, regulated those struggles (unless the colonial power recognized the 
belligerence of the non-state armed group, an unlikely occurrence.) This was the accepted 
international view, but it was one that seemed inherently biased in favor of Western 
colonial powers, which in any event seldom permitted the application even of CA3, as 
seen in the previous chapter.  
Starting in the 1940s (but only crystallizing from the mid-1950s onwards,) this 
traditional perspective became challenged by the increasingly larger numbers of post-
colonial states, especially within the UN. The core of the argument was that self-
determination had become an international human right and colonialism an international 
wrong. As asserted earlier, myriad instruments stood as evidence; from the UN Charter to 
the Human Rights Covenants and declarations and resolutions passed within the UN, all 
had (so the argument went) transformed national liberation from a domestic into an 
internationally sanctioned cause.562 As a result, the decolonized world demanded that the 
entire body of international humanitarian law should become applicable to national 
liberation wars, not only CA3. As the previous chapter showed, since the mid-1960s this 
demand was part of the “international moral crusade” the newly independent world 
waged against colonialism through processes collectively legitimization, especially 
within the UN. 
Characterizing national liberation conflicts as international wars had obviously 
crucial political dimensions, most notably pressuring colonial powers and their allies by 
discrediting imperial rule and precipitating their retreat from their occupied territories. 
But it also entailed more specific legal demands with symbolic and material 
consequences. Perhaps most importantly, decolonized states sought to proclaim the 
application of international safeguards for so-called “freedom fighters” that fell in the 
                                                
562 Two of the most prominent precedents were United Nations General Assembly, Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 / UN GAOR, 
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 / UN Doc. A/4684 (1960) 66, and; United Nations General Assembly, 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. res. 2625, Annex, 25 
UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970). 
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hands of their enemy. Since in this view such fighters were waging international (not 
internal) conflicts, they deserved both the status and the treatment granted to prisoners of 
war through the POW Geneva Convention of 1949 (plus those of whatever new 
instrument emerged from the ongoing revisions process to complement it.)  
It is important to understand what being considered a prisoner of war (compared to a 
captured rebel, for example) entails. Put simply, the label carries with it sophisticated 
privileges under international humanitarian law. In terms of treatment, it activates a 
plethora of substantive protections contained in the 143-article POW Geneva Convention, 
including detailed guidelines on proper questioning, conditions of internment, work, 
food, clothes, and even recreation and right to canteens. The POW Geneva Convention 
also authorizes the verification by a third state of the treatment of prisoners (called a 
“Protective Power,” in IHL legalese.) Symbolic benefits also accrue to POWs. First, 
governments and the general public usually afford them honorific, if not heroic, status 
that is denied to other fighters, especially to terrorists. In the framework of humanitarian 
law, additionally, the legal status of prisoner of war presupposes that, once detained, a 
combatant cannot be punished by their opponent solely for having participated in the 
conflict. They must also be released at the end of the hostilities. All of these symbolic and 
material benefits were absent in the rules for internal conflicts, in which governments had 
preferred to withhold rebels any legitimacy or entitlements beyond the important but 
basic guarantees of CA3. What is more: states had historically been extremely prickly to 
even allow the use of the terms “combatant” and “prisoner of war” in the context of 
internal conflict, fearing that to utilize such words might give not only legitimize the 
rebels but suggest that the conflict they waged was international, hence triggering more 
expansive regulations. In sum, until the 1970s, prisoner of war treatment and status (two 
separate but often inter-related dimensions) only figured in the international law 
regulating conflicts between states. Wherever states had decided to grant one or both to 
guerrilla fighters facing them (as the US had since 1967, or the French in Algeria in 
1958,) this was done on an ad hoc “policy” basis, without necessarily recognizing that the 
conflict was an international war.  
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The above might already suggest why the proposal of legally transforming national 
liberation wars into international conflicts and giving detained freedom fighters the status 
and treatment of prisoners of war met with broad opposition, at once political and legal. 
The potentially disruptive consequences to the existing framework of IHL were 
prominent. Most importantly, it challenged three of its bedrock principles. First, the 
notion of conflicts “against colonial domination,” “alien domination” or “racist régimes” 
appeared to bring back political motivation into a body of law that had long been agnostic 
to ideas of “just” or “unjust” war, and which had sought to decouple the question of why 
combatants go to war from that of how they fight once war erupts. (This is the essence of 
the oft-cited difference between the jus ad bellum and jus in bellum.) In other words, it 
appeared to single out a specific type of conflict (wars of liberation) and to attribute it 
privileged status alongside wars fought between states.  This might seem like a general 
and legalistic concern, but it was one that carried enormous force amongst the learned 
audiences of IHL and the laws of war at the time (the bulk of whom, it should be said, 
were Western.) It also brought other thorny questions to the table: How might non-state 
actors devoid of international legal personality accede to international treaties? Can they 
be expected to actually apply the law in the same way that states are? Later I will 
demonstrate how these contentious puzzles were addressed during the official negotiation 
of the Additional Protocols. 
Additionally, in order to qualify as prisoners of war the 1949 POW Geneva 
Convention required combatants to fulfill four requirements: 1) be commanded by person 
responsible for his subordinates; 2) bear a fixed distinctive recognizable at a distance; 3) 
carry arms openly; 4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. Of these, the second and third requirements were geared to compel combatants to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, which per the customs of war, 
enjoyed general protection from attacks (this is known as the principle of non-combatant 
or civilian immunity.)  
Yet, as expressed by some experts during the 1969 and 1970 ICRC/UN meetings, 
since in conflicts of national liberation the colonial power held the conventional military 
advantage over freedom fighters, to require the latter to distinguish themselves at all 
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times by wearing distinctive signs or carrying their weapons openly might easily translate 
into facilitating their annihilation, thus hampering the cause of national liberation.  
As a result of this alleged military bias in the law, the decolonized world wanted these 
requirements to be relativized or eliminated. To do so, in their view, was both realistic 
and humane.  However, from traditional legal and humanitarian perspectives, to do away 
with these requirements threatened both to increase the risk of violence to non-
combatants, whom colonial armies might be more likely to find suspect --hence 
targetable-- as freedom fighters in civilian guise (violating the principle of distinction and 
harming civilians.) It might also put state militaries at a formal disadvantage, violating 
the idea that the law should apply to combatants equally, regardless of their motivation 
(often known as the “equality of belligerency” principle.)  
These were all critical consequences in legal, symbolic and material terms, and it is 
not hard to understand why they were unpalatable to certain audiences, especially 
Western colonial powers. Moreover, they strongly suggest that in the 1970s the 
decolonized world was less interested in subjecting freedom fighters to regulations than 
in facilitating, even protecting their actions, to the obvious detriment of the colonial 
authorities and perhaps of civilians themselves. Theoretically speaking, one may 
characterize this “positive” side of the postcolonial world’s agenda as a strategic 
(international) social construction combining moral and utilitarian elements.  
Yet the newly independent countries also had a “negative” agenda relating to internal 
conflicts. At the same time that they supported wars of national liberation outside their 
borders, many decolonized states were extremely fragile internally and found themselves 
waging conflicts of their own against rebellious or secessionists groups. For this reason 
most of them proved intensely allergic to the idea of committing to humanitarian rules 
applicable to any conflicts happening within states’ boundaries other than those of self-
determination or against “foreign” occupiers. This was doubtless an expression of a 
“sovereignist” risk-averse impulse and domestic self-interest. To be clear, this distaste 
was not reserved for the idea of regulating “internal troubles” or “disturbances,” but also 
included efforts to complement the principles of CA3 in key areas such as the use of 
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force. In fact, during the Diplomatic Conference a radical fringe even opposed the idea of 
a protocol applying to high-level civil wars.  
The perspective of the decolonized group was one that found some total or partial 
sympathizers. Soviet bloc countries, for instance, supported it wholeheartedly. On the one 
hand, as seen during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference and other international forums, the 
Soviets and their satellites were bent on embarrassing the declining Western empires and 
their allies, and wasted no occasion to cheer the anti-colonial agenda at international 
forums. On the other hand, since internal repression was a backbone of their regimes’ 
political viability, they held great revulsion for efforts to expand humanitarian law further 
into their domestic realm, whether for those that might considered to fall under CA3 or 
those better characterized as “internal troubles” or disturbances. The same may be said 
for much of the Arab world that, with few exceptions, rejected colonialism and external 
occupation (Israel being the main culprit in their case) but also disliked intromission into 
their internal violent affairs. These groups of states thus found themselves largely sharing 
the “positive” and “negative” agendas of the decolonized world vis-à-vis internal 
conflicts.  
 Partial support for the wishes of the decolonized world also surfaced from other 
geographic areas. Although they were not necessarily fierce anti-colonialists, Latin 
American states were in the 1970s similarly fragile (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, 
among others) or conflict-ridden (Colombia) internally, and in a period when 
authoritarianism was on the rise in the region, ideas for increasing humanitarian restraint 
in the fight against internal organized dissent were unwelcome. Latin Americans’ 
approach to the revisions process thus proved mostly negative or reactive.  
On the other side of the spectrum lay the Western world, which, interestingly, was 
fractured in its attitudes toward legal developments toward internal conflicts. Most 
Western states, but especially colonial powers like Portugal, the UK and France, fiercely 
opposed the classification of national liberation wars as international conflicts. To them 
this move irreparably disrupted the structure of humanitarian law, tarnished its credibility 
and further imperiled its practical application. Finding it hard to publicly espouse 
political arguments that would embarrass them as being morally retrograde, these 
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countries preferred to emphasize the legal dangers behind this innovation. The most 
important of these were described earlier—namely the violation of three core principles 
of the IHL, as well as the difficulties in crafting an instrument applicable both to states 
and non-state actors, especially the latter’s unwillingness or inability to effectively 
implement the exigent rules and provisions essentially designed for states.  
At the same time, however, Western powers (colonial states included) seemed to 
understand that better rules might be desirable for taming the atrocities committed against 
civilians in internal conflicts of a high level, as punctuated by the Biafran secessionist 
war in Nigeria, among others. Some areas, particularly the limitation of armed attacks on 
civilians remained at best implicit and at worst unaddressed in the extant legal framework 
(CA3.) The Western-colonial “solution,” in this regard, was to continue to consider 
liberation conflicts as internal, and to create a protocol with stringent and precise 
conditions applicable simultaneously to Biafra-style wars and conflicts for self-
determination. These conditions were similar to those discussed Chapter 3 during the 
1940s: non-state groups would need to have an organized army under responsible 
command and exert sufficient territorial control enabling them to conduct their operations 
and to respect the body of humanitarian law. Any other “internal” conflicts failing to meet 
these requirements, according to the Western-colonial view, should remain outside of the 
scope of the new protocols and only be regulated by CA3, or for the case of troubles and 
disturbances, by domestic law or (perhaps) by other instruments of international law such 
as human rights. The UK, privately concerned with Northern Ireland, was especially 
hostile to the idea that the internal conflicts below a certain level (that of CA3) should be 
covered by a new legal instrument. Preventing the application of any new instruments of 
humanitarian law to Northern Ireland was, in fact, the Brits’ most important goal 
throughout the revisions process in the 1970s. 
Yet, as hinted, not all Western states clung to these beliefs. Most radically (and for 
reasons that remain unclear,) Norway came out strongly in favor of qualifying liberation 
wars as international, in fact arguing that there should be no distinction between 
international and internal conflicts, and that any new rules should apply to all types of 
conflict. The Norwegians’ vocal support for the agenda of the decolonized proved to be a 
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persistent thorn on the side of the West, not least because Norway was a member of 
NATO. The position of Norway may be momentarily be characterized as essentially 
moral-idealist, at least until other motivations can be adduced. 563  
Although far less drastically, other countries besides Norway differed from the 
Western-colonial agenda. Canada and the US spoke strongly in favor of creating a 
protocol for non-international conflicts that expanded the principles of CA3 but that also 
would be more or less automatically applicable once a conflict broke out within a state, 
whether it was waged for self-determination or not. In this they squarely confronted the 
British and French. The reasons for the fierce Canadian position remain obscure, but with 
regard to the United States, it was the war in Vietnam that compelled them to press for 
the improvement of humanitarian regulation across types of conflicts, whether internal or 
international. And as noted earlier, specifically as concerned the treatment of captured 
irregular fighters in Vietnam, the US military had in 1966, with the guidance of the 
ICRC, changed its policy to allow for the application of the POW Geneva Convention to 
all persons who had been detained while carrying arms openly during a military 
engagement.564 The US rationale during the 1970s process was that it was best to offer 
protections to most participants in the conflict than to leave loopholes that might enable 
communist regimes to mistreat American personnel, whom they invariably considered 
criminals.  
Domestic politics at home buttressed the conduct of the American delegation in 
Geneva. Beside intense public opinion pressures, it was around this time (1971-4) that the 
US Congress became increasingly vocal on human rights and humanitarian legal issues. 
The Subcommittee hearings organized by House Representative Donald Fraser (a 
Democrat from Minnesota) constituted a landmark example of Congressional pressure in 
this regard. Fraser’s office was aware of the humanitarian negotiations in Geneva, 
requested the DoS to inform him of the American views, and issued recommendations for 
                                                
563 The causes for Norway’s peculiar interest in this issue are unclear, and a subject for future 
research. 
564 Forsythe, The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners After 9/11, 
18–19. Also see Aldrich, “Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols.” 
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them in the ensuing report.565 In addition to the Fraser hearings, Senator Ted Kennedy 
eventually traveled with the American delegation as Congressional advisor to the first 
session of the Diplomatic Conference in 1974, where he gave a progressive speech 
setting out the American line.  
American concern with extending humanitarian protection to most detainees matched 
well the aspiration of the new African and Asian states to protect freedom fighters, but it 
clashed with those of other Western states who refused to protect those they considered 
terrorists. To be clear, both Canada and the US rejected the legal legitimization of 
national liberation as international conflicts, which they considered as unnecessarily 
political, polemical and indeed harmful in law and practice. But both delegations were 
keen on extending humanitarian law many victims of internal conflict lacking protection. 
Their position can thus be characterized as simultaneously self-interested and moral. The 
challenge lay in how this could be achieved given the diversity of opinions about what 
was politically desirable and militarily “practicable.”  
As described in the next section, due to the disparities over such crucial matters, the 
years (1971-1974) leading up to the Diplomatic Conference saw furious efforts at 
coordination among North American and Western European states to arrive at common 
positions, efforts that --perhaps surprisingly-- never fully succeeded. Given their 
interests, Canada and the US emerged as brokers on matters relating to internal conflicts 
and extended prisoner of war treatment (though not status) to all combatants. On the 
contrary, due to its legalistic conservative views on most aspects of the revisions process, 
the UK became a force for restraint among its peers, hoping in particular to avoid making 
changes that its experts in many cases saw as no more than unrealistic humanitarian 
niceties.  
One belief appeared to be widely shared by all Western states (except for Norway,) 
however: an ingrained conviction in the inability and the will of national liberation 
movements or other insurgencies/guerilla groups to actually apply humanitarian rules. 
                                                
565 House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Human Rights in the 
World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership: Report, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, March 27, 
1974, Washington, D.C, GPO, 1974, 33-37.  
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Profound distrust regarding the ideological and institutional “inadequacies” of such 
groups supported this view. This was one additional reason why Western colonial powers 
were so reluctant to design a new protocol for international conflicts (or the Geneva 
Conventions, more broadly) applicable to national liberation struggles. NLMs, they held, 
could also not become official “high-contracting” parties to the conventions. As such, in 
this perspective, to accept the inclusion of national liberation wars in the draft protocols 
for inter-state conflicts, and to find ways to allow them to accede to the treaties, might 
only serve to legitimize and empower them without truly achieving the goal of binding 
them. It would constitute no more than a harmful unilateral commitment.  
Aware that these complications were similarly present with regard to the Second 
Protocol on other (non-liberation) internal conflicts, which they favored, the US and 
Canada proposed that the instrument should contain fairly simple and “eminently 
humanitarian” principles that no state would find it hard to apply, whether or not rebels 
chose to embrace them in return. Conditional reciprocity, in the view of the US and 
Canada, should not derail the adoption of the Second Protocol. As expected, Western-
colonial states and most of the non-Western world repealed these ideas, which to them 
still seemed like unilateral overtures in situations they considered to be no more than 
terrorism and organized crime. 
Caught in the crosshairs of these complex manifold positions was the ICRC. From the 
perspective of the Swiss organization, it was desirable to extend humanitarian protections 
to as many types of internal conflicts as possible, including troubles and disturbances. 
This desire shaped its proposals for an instrument complementing CA3 without stringent 
conditions for application. But with regard to conflicts for self-determination and national 
liberation, despite the fact the ICRC publicly recognized the “strong movement” and 
moral force behind their re-consideration as international conflicts, it did not seem 
persuaded that the legal bases that enshrined these ideas (that is, UN declarations and 
other resolutions) provided a robust enough basis to do revise humanitarian law 
accordingly or that the legal extension might effectively improve conduct on the ground. 
This said, the organization was also aware that to fail to take into account the strongly-
held beliefs of the non-Western states might jeopardize its relations with them and with 
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national liberation movements, possibly hampering its access to victims on the ground. 
Ultimately, the ICRC refrained from inserting language referring to liberation wars in its 
draft First Protocol, merely mentioning it as an “option” for states to sort among 
themselves. In doing so, they also heeded the formidable pressure Western states exerted 
against the revolutionary ideas of the decolonized world.  
 
An Exhausting Road to 1974 
The positions and stakes outlined above surfaced slowly in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as a series of public and private encounters took place at the behest of the ICRC, 
the UN or states themselves. It is important to convey just how time- and energy-
consuming the process of “dialogue about revisions” was between 1969 and the first 
months of 1974, lest one still believes that international law-making ranks as a low 
priority for governments. The focus here is placed on both inter-governmental debate in 
public forums and, to the extent that archival resources have allowed, of private meetings 
hosted by the ICRC, or by the UK, the US, or Western-NATO states.  
Governmental experts and delegates participated in at least twelve official or semi-
official group meetings prior to the start of the Diplomatic Conference (which itself 
lasted four years and had a multiplicity of break-out processes/parallel sessions.) See the 
following table for an (incomplete) summary:566  
 
Table 5.1. Some State Encounters post-UN Human Rights Tehran Conference, 1968 
Meeting 
# Type of Meeting Where/When 
1 Expert Roundtable Geneva, Feb. 28-29, 1969 
2 XXI International Red Cross Conference Istanbul, September 6-13, 1969 
3 UNGA 1969 New York, November 1969 
                                                
566 This table is built on the basis of the plethora of documentation cited in fn. 560 above. Despite 
my efforts at exhaustiveness, the table is not complete. For example, it does not include the 
annual meetings of experts (including those acting as government delegates during the CDDH) at 
the San Remo International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which were crucial not only for 
academic debate but for the negotiation of various articles of the Protocols in the years 1974-
1977.  
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4 Expert Roundtable New York?, April 13-17, 1970 
5 UK-ICRC London, July 1970 
6 UNGA 1970 New York, November 1970 
7 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Conference The Hague, March 1-6, 1971 
8 ICRC Conference of Government Experts, First Session Geneva, May 24-June 12, 1971 
9 Bilateral US-UK Washington, September 9, 1971 
10 Bilateral UK-ICRC November 25, 1971 
11 Bilateral US-UK London, November 29, 1971 
12 UNGA 1971 New York, November-December 1971 
13 NATO Meeting Brussels, April 6-7, 1972 
14 ICRC - Conference of Government Experts, Second Session May 3-June 3, 1972 
15 UK-ICRC August 1972 
16 Bilateral US-UK August 7, 1972 
17 Western Group Meeting London, September 11-14, 1972 
18 ICRC Small Government Expert Consultation Geneva, January 15-20, 1973 
19 ICRC Small Government Expert Consultation Geneva, March 5-9, 1973 
20 Western Group Meeting London, October 15-19, 1973 
21 XXII International Red Cross Conference Tehran 8-15, 1973 
22 UNGA 1973 New York, November-December 1973 
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23 Western Group Meeting January 1974 
24 Western Group Meeting September 2-3, 1974 
25 Western Group Meeting September 18-20, 1974 
26 Western "Inner Core" Meeting January 13-14, 1975 
27 Western Group Meeting January 27-30, 1975 
28 Western "Inner Core" Meeting Washington, November 17-19, 1975 
29 Western Group Meeting London, March 15-17, 1976 
30 Western "Inner Core" Meeting Bonn, November 1976 
31 Western "Inner Core" Meeting Brussels, January 1977 
32 Western "Inner Core" Meeting Geneva, March 14, 1977 
33 Western Group Meeting Geneva, March 15-16, 1977 
 
Some of these preliminary were events devoted to issues beyond the development of 
humanitarian law (as the UNGA sessions and the International Conferences of the Red 
Cross,) but the topic was either important or central to many of them. In addition, 
although with three exceptions all events were public, not all states were invited in every 
occasion. Hence in the 1970s, as in previous episodes of legal revision or construction, 
the ICRC approached the process “cautiously” by inviting a smaller group of delegations 
to the initial preliminary meetings and then slowly expanding attendance. This tactic 
reportedly provoked some criticism against the ICRC, since in some of the early meetings 
the balance of opinion privileged Western voices and their views.  
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Although as said the ICRC’s initial interest lay in generating debate among 
governments experts to arrive at semi-consensual drafts for submission to the 
Conference, given the deep divisions that surfaced and the risk they represented 
(“watering down” the proposals to low common denominator,) the organization decided 
against taking votes at preliminary meetings. Hence, the ensuing conference reports only 
hinted at trends of opinion and attached (but did not rank) experts’ varied proposals. The 
ICRC used its “drafting power” whenever it could, however, trying to reconcile many 
governments’ conservative views with its own “wish-list” of progressive changes. As in 
the 1940s, this practice generated discomfort (and sometimes serious tension) between 
the organization and certain groups of states.  
In addition to public and private inter-governmental debate organized by the ICRC or 
within the UN, states (individually or collectively) held multiple private meetings with 
the Swiss organization. Most of these were regular exchanges of views, but some also 
took on unpleasant, even threatening, tones. For instance, Western governments in at 
least one occasion tried to pull their weight and “deliver a cold jolt” to the ICRC, hoping 
to force it to steer clear from controversial (to them polemical, unrealistic, or militarily 
“unworkable,”) suggesting that unless it did so they “might not be in a position” to attend 
the treaty-making Conference. Not all efforts are influencing the Swiss organization were 
as forceful, however; a few involved sharing Western states’ preferred textual versions 
for its consideration.  
It should not be thought that only the West tried to force the hand of the ICRC, 
however. The newly-decolonized world did as much, not surprisingly with regard to the 
national liberation wars. Although a complete study of the “behind the scenes” process 
cannot be performed until the ICRC archives for the period are fully open to researchers, 
documents found in governmental archives provide sufficient evidence of the fact that 
since the early years of the travaux préparatoires the ICRC found itself between a rock 
and a hard place, trying to accommodate the deeply-held views of various groups of 
governments with its own humanitarian project. It can be generally asserted that most 
groups of states actively tried to privately influence the ICRC’s views through multiple 
tactics and with varying degrees of success. The ICRC had to play its hand carefully and 
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acquiesce on some fronts, but in any event it reminded governments that that the last 
word was theirs in the context of the Diplomatic Conference. Reasserting this allowed the 
ICRC to stand its critical legal-humanitarian ground but also to give states a sense of 
ownership and responsibility over the process. 
Domestically, it was in 1971 that states’ bureaucratic machineries progressively 
began to ruminate their views on the plethora of issues on the table. There surely was 
much variation in the speed, mechanics and intensity with which different states 
approached legal revisions, depending their degree of capacity and salience of the topic 
on their agenda. Major Western powers seemed to rank high on both counts, as the US, 
UK and France had assembled interdepartmental teams to prepare for and exert influence 
during the slew of exploratory meetings laying ahead.567 The teams formed in 1971 
resembled those working on the revisions in 1946-1949, combining civilian and military 
staff from a variety of relevant ministries. In the US the State and Defense Departments 
(and within them, various subdivisions) bore most of the work. The UK team included 
mainly officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO,) the Home Office and 
the Defense Office. Staff from the Ministries of Justice, Defense, Interior and Public 
Health and Social Security, as well as from the National Red Cross formed the French 
team.568 
As noted earlier, the UK and the US emerged as crucial brokers among their Western 
political and military allies around in 1971 and 1972. They constituted the heart of the 
Western group and jointly determined whom to invite and whom to exclude. Since the 
views of some NATO states proved so distant (Norway and Sweden, for their respective 
views on national liberation wars and weapons regulations,) their delegates earned 
colorful epithets and were only brought in when politically convenient. By 1973 Western 
coordination efforts broke the NATO “mold” to form larger and smaller groups of 
fluctuating membership: a Western Group composed more or less permanently by the 
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US, UK, Denmark, Belgium, Netherland, France, Canada, West Germany and Italy,569 
and a smaller “Inner Core” (UK, US, France and Canada, later expanded to West 
Germany as well.)  Participants in the smaller group were asked to be tight-lipped 
regarding their meeting plans and in-group views, so as to avoid creating jealousy and 
embarrassment among the expanded circle of allies.  
Interestingly, not even the closest “inner core” of Western allies saw eye to eye on 
key issues. Although France usually held more stringent views that the UK and the US, it 
often acquiesced to their ideas and threw tantrums in private. A concern for social 
reputation shone through the interaction between states holding progressive views (either 
for moral or alleged self-interested reasons,) prompting anxiety and sometimes policy 
change on skeptics. West Germany, for instance, shamed the Brits for their restrictive 
view on certain topics, including the protection the civilian population. In view of these 
reactions, the UK reasoned that it might have to moderate its position “to avoid a 
damaging isolation on positions which many people, including some of our friends, find 
over-rigid and inhumane.”570  
Relations among groups of states were also ripe with tension. The UK (and the 
Western group more broadly) was annoyed by the Soviet Bloc’s posturing as “the 
champions of protection for the civilian population.”571 The British had some reason to 
suspect insincerity, since “certain of the delegates, e.g. those of Hungary and Yugoslavia 
[who] told us in private conversation that their aim was, quite simply, to make the rules 
so difficult that war would be virtually impossible.”572 This attitude in the 1970s 
resembles that taken by the Soviet delegation in the 1940s, as seen in Chapter 3.573 That 
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said, attitudes varied across issues and some within the Western group eventually found it 
convenient to coordinate with the Soviets. Inter-group relations were thus not monolithic, 
but rather issue-dependent and variable across time. The US attempted to exert influence 
over the Latin American delegations, as the UK did with Australia and New Zealand. 
And the nominally “Western” group, whenever convenient, expanded to include non-
Western countries such as Turkey and Japan. 
Yet it was the interaction (or lack thereof) between the Western group and the 
delegations from the so-called “Afro-Asian” nations that was perhaps most curious. As 
noted above, it should have been obvious to the West from the earliest debates at the 
UNGA or during ICRC-sponsored events that those states would constitute a majority 
with positions radically different from theirs in many (though not all) key areas. In spite 
of this, the Western group made no discernable efforts to spark joint dialogue with or 
influence the decolonized world prior to the start of negotiations. Once the first session of 
the Diplomatic Conference closed in the spring of 1974 (to very inconvenient results for 
the West, as shown shortly,) the British delegates concluded that the Western group had 
spent too much time talking to itself, not to others whose voices were decisive. (One 
potential explanation for this is that Western states found it hard to agree on a given 
position in their own camp, leading them to overlook the need to reach out to others. 
“Afro-Asian” states were sometimes referred to derisively in Western diplomatic 
documents, suggesting that there was also a certain arrogance underlying the lack of 
contact.) 
In the end, after almost three years of intense coordination efforts, little Western 
consensus emerged on the quagmire of how to revise or develop the law vis-à-vis internal 
conflicts.  Except for a shared understanding that national liberation wars should not 
qualify as international conflicts, Western states could not agree on exactly how to deal 
with captured fighters or with the threshold and protections to include in the Second 
Protocol to regulate (non-liberation) internal conflicts. Rational attempts at coordination 
had proved frustrating, time-consuming and ineffective, accommodation was uncertain, 
and legitimacy anxieties were foremost. Although rational strategizing had pervaded the 
travaux preparatoires, moral and social concerns were a fundamental part of the 
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confused picture. Western allies knew there were “problems” to solve, but they could not 
be “rationally” overcome in the face of deeply-held mixed (security and humanitarian) 
motives.  
Unfortunately for Western allies, the situation during the actual Diplomatic 
Conference would get even more complicated. 
 
The Politics of Procedure 
Procedural politics became critical leading up to the treaty-making Conference, to 
open in February 1974. As described earlier, inter-governmental discussions about 
revisions in the late 1960s re-ignited within the UN, suggesting that organization might 
play some substantive role in the process. Over time, however, the ICRC regained the 
formal reins of the process, carefully conceding protagonism on the issue of weapons 
regulation to the UN.  
The Western group participated actively in the efforts to put the ICRC back at the 
wheel of revisions due to the heavily politicized nature of the UN. Curiously, however, 
these Western states seemed to have been oblivious to the fact that the International Red 
Cross movement (alongside the Diplomatic Conference with universal attendance,) 
would be prone to exactly the same political dynamics within the General Assembly. In 
terms of rational “forum shopping,” this was a surprisingly naïve attitude.  An apparent 
belief that what was customary practice within the UN would not travel across 
organizations with similar members and voting rules only a short time later is indicative 
of the rootedness of IO-specific bureaucratic culture, as Erik Voeten has recently 
suggested.574  
The West also faced frustration on another key procedural issue. In the summer of 
1973 Norway began pressuring the Swiss government to invite national liberation 
movements (NLMs) to the Diplomatic Conference. UN practice at the time was that 
liberation movements recognized by regional organization could attend the General 
Assembly sessions as observers, without a voice or a vote. The thought of allowing 
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NLMs to come and play an active role at a plenipotentiary Diplomatic Conference on 
humanitarian law horrified Western states, however. The British plainly believed their 
presence might kill the meeting altogether.575 Given strong pressure and precedent, 
however the UK resigned itself that observer status for NLMs was the best they could 
expect, calculating to receive Portuguese, Israeli and South African protests as a result.576  
On October 13 the Organization of African Unity (OAU,) however, announced 
African states’ desire for NLMs to participate “fully in their own” right at the Diplomatic 
Conference.577 Despite great efforts from the Swiss hosts to manage NLM participation 
through recognized international organizations (the OAU itself or the Arab League,) they 
learned that NLMs had dismissed that option, an outcome in which Norway’s Longva 
claimed to have been instrumental.578 The US delegation was so upset that it publicly 
announced it might reconsider its decision to participate in the Conference.579 
In late 1973, alarmed Western states such as the US, UK, France, West Germany and 
the Netherlands set their diplomatic machinery in motion trying to get Norway to 
relent.580 On balance, although the British saw some “educational value” in having NLMs 
at the Conference, they were adamant about not conferring them an inappropriate 
status.581 A Kenyan resolution that the 1973 UNGA, however, “urged” the invitation of 
NLMs to the Diplomatic Conference.582 Western states were again unable to oppose the 
                                                
575 TNA: PRO FCO 61/1090. 
576 The British also pushed against giving non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International (AI) or the ICJ (who were a “nuisance” in Gerald Draper’s words) speaking rights, 
and even wished the ICRC’s role were restricted to brief introductions, believing “they had 
already done enough.” TNA: PRO FCO 61/1090. 
577 Press Release No. 473, the Organization of African Unity, Addis-Abba, 13, October, 1973, 
attached to Department of State Airgram, December 5, 1973, in Central Foreign Policy File, 
1970-1973, SOC 3 Red Cross, Box 3013, Entry 1613, RG 59, NACP.  
578 It was unclear whether Longva was following government instructions or acting on his own 
initiative. Norwegian Head of Delegation Ofstad privately said that Longva was going further 
than instructed, which Longva denied.  
579 See folder entitled “ICRC Conferences on Humanitarian Law (1972,)” in POW/Civilian 
Internee Information Center, Confidential Records, Box 11, P1, RG 389, NACP. 
580 TNA: PRO FCO 61/1091. 
581 TNA: PRO FCO 61/1092.  
582 Kenya was supported by Indonesia and more annoyingly for the US and UK, by Australia. 
  255 
outcome and the Americans once more threatened the Swiss with their absence.583 As a 
last-ditch effort at a compromise, the worried Swiss hosts decided to attend an OAU 
seminar with NLMs taking place in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania in January 21-23, from 
which a final African line might ensue.584 Swiss efforts in Tanzania found no 
sympathizers, however, and NLMs requested to be invited in the own right reproaching 
the Western retrograde attitude.585 Flummoxed and unwilling to make the call for 
themselves, the Swiss left the decision on NLM admission to the Diplomatic Conference 
itself. 
A related but even more explosive issue worried the American delegation. The 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG,) formed 
by members of the Vietcong and smaller groups and recognized by the 1973 Paris Peace 
Accords signed between the parties to the Vietnam conflict as the “other” government of 
South Vietnam, had just acceded to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and was now 
requesting to be invited as a participating state at the Diplomatic Conference. (Guinea-
Bissau, which had recently declared its unilateral independence from Portugal, had done 
likewise.) Unlike the Swiss, the US could not let the PRG affair run its course and began 
a separate private diplomatic campaign to rally support.586 For the Americans the PRG 
was but a front for North Vietnam, without legitimacy or territorial control. Yet privately 
American delegates recognized that their recognition of the PRG under the Paris Accord 
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weakened their argument.587 The Americans worried about the precedent set by PRG 
attendance, and threatened to pull out. Uncertainty was great and their projected vote 
counts seemed to constantly change prior to the start of the Conference.588 
Powerful though they were, major Western states were until the very last minute 
scrambling to protect their status and retain control over the Conference from the 
materially far weaker but politically and numerically stronger Third World and the armed 
non-state groups it supported. The situation was fluid, with the real contest about to 
begin. 
 
IV. A Revolution Unleashed: the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 
Following two days of conversation by the heads of delegations, the 1974 Session of 
the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH) officially opened on 
February 20, gathering 125 state delegations and 30 observer international 
organizations.589 Quiet efforts at conciliation did not calm the waters. During the very 
first Plenary session the only head of state present at the meeting (from Mauritania,) 
inaugurated the political fireworks by arguing for the recognition of just wars, claiming 
that “it was quite obvious that it was the Zionists who wanted to throw all Arabs into the 
sea.”590 The Israeli delegation immediately walked out in protest.  
Given this start, the Conference disbanded for a few days of intense negotiation 
between different regional groups to again see whether compromises could be struck on 
the issue of invitations. The records of these meetings are unavailable, but state 
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correspondence suggests that these efforts were possible on two of the three knotty 
issues. First, most states accepted the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the Conference, 
which, despite pressure from Lisbon, proved problematic for others to deny. The question 
of NLMs was also resolved behind the scenes, with Western states being coerced to 
concede that movements recognized by regional organizations (the OAU and the Arab 
League, in this case) could participate directly in the deliberations with the ability to 
make statements and circulate amendments, but without the vote.”591 Resolutions on 
these two agreements were announced at second plenary meeting and eventually adopted 
by consensus on March 1st. With this, ten NLMs were admitted to the Diplomatic 
Conference: the African National Congress, African National Council of Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique Liberation Front, Angola National Liberation Front, People’s Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola, Palestinian Liberation Organization, Panafricanist 
Congress, Seychelles’ People’s United Party, South West Africa’s People’s Organization, 
and the Zimbabwe African National Union. 
The potential attendance of the PRG, however, remained open. In private negotiations 
US diplomats had managed to separate it from the decisions on NLMs or Guinea-Bissau, 
thus increasing their odds of securing a positive vote. In the end, and despite being unsure 
until the last minute of what the outcome would be, a vote of 37 for admission, 38 
against, with 33 abstentions, formally denied a seat to that entity.592 Additional battles 
were fought during the election of officers for the Conference and on the definition the 
rules of procedure, and by the time political-procedural quarrels had finally extinguished, 
nearly half of the first session of the Conference had been spent on issues other than the 
substance of the treaty revisions. 
 
The Rest Against the West: National Liberation War as International Conflicts 
Although the 1974 session of the Conference was not prolific in the number of 
provisions debated or adopted, from it emerged perhaps the most one crucial of all: 
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Article 1 of the First Protocol, which defined the international armed conflicts to which it 
would apply.  
The worst fears of the West were quickly realized. Various groups of states 
introduced different amendments (see options 1-5 in Table 11) all with a view to making 
national liberation wars international. These featured important variations in language, 
ranging from political-incendiary (“colonial and alien domination against racist 
regimes,”) to more legal-technical (“armed struggles waged by peoples in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination,” per the Egyptian phrasing.) Egyptian legal scholar and 
diplomat Georges Abi-Saab sharply reminded his colleagues in Committee that there was 
“abundant proof” providing juridical footing to notion that wars of national liberation 
should be considered international conflicts, which was a “social phenomenon affecting 
millions of human beings,” not just an issue of semantics. “Participants were thus not 
being asked to accept anything new; it was merely proposed that they should affirm 
explicitly in the field of humanitarian law what they had already accepted as binding law 
within the United Nations and within general international law.”593  
Table 5.2. Proposed Amendments to Article 1, First Protocol, 1974 
Option Amendment Co-Sponsors Proposed Language 
1 
Algeria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Morocco, 
Poland, USSR, Tanzania 
“The international armed conflicts 
referred to in Article 2 common to the 
Conventions include also armed conflicts 
where peoples fight against colonial and 
alien domination and against racist 
regimes.” 
2 
Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Australia, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, 
Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, 
Libyan Arab Original: English 
Republic, Madagascar, Morocco, 
Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, United Republic of 
Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire 
“The situations referred to in the 
preceding paragraph include armed 
struggles waged by peoples in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations and defined by the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
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3 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Federal Republic of, Italy, Netherlands, 
Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
“In cases not included in this present 
Protocol or in other instruments of 
conventional law, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection 
and the authority of the principles of 
international law, as they result from 
established custom, from the principles of 
humanity and the dictates of public 
conscience." (Martens Clause) 
4 Romania 
"... and in armed conflicts in which the 
people of a colony, a Non-Self-Governing 
Territory or a territory under foreign 
occupation are engaged, in the exercise of 
the right to self-determination and the 
right to self-defence against aggression, 
with a view to ensuring more effective 
protection for the victims of aggression 
and oppression." 
5 Turkey 
“The present Protocol shall also apply to 
armed conflicts waged by the national 
liberation movements recognized by the 
regional intergovernmental organizations 
concerned against colonial and foreign 
domination and racist regimes in the 
exercise of the principle of the self-
determination of peoples as set out in the 
Charter of the United Nations." 
6 
(Merger) 
Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, 
People's Democratic Republic of 
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, 
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Sultanate of Oman, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, United Republic of 
Cameroon, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
Zambia 
"The situations referred to in the 
preceding paragraph include armed 
conflicts where peoples fight against 
colonial and alien domination and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
of self-determination, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and defined 
by the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations". 
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Differences of language and tone aside, all these amendments fell like cold water on 
most Western delegations.594 In their defense, they relied on legalistic and utilitarian 
arguments, claiming that it was entirely inappropriate to insert motivations into 
humanitarian law, and that since decolonization was on the wane, permanent 
consideration of these struggles in international law was even less necessary. Moreover, 
Western skeptics raised the inability of national liberation movements to apply the law, 
something that the representative of the Mozambique Liberation Front sharply countered, 
noting that “cases were known where States had departed from the established rules far 
more grossly than the liberation movements,” a sentiment echoed by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization.595  
The Western Group was publicly and privately stunned. UK representative Gerald 
Draper sentenced that these amendments amounted to “damaging the structure of The 
Hague and Geneva Conventions and would involve the need to reconstruct the whole of 
humanitarian law.” Behind the scenes, the British delegation cabled London, alerting 
them that with this text there might be “nothing to prevent the IRA from addressing the 
requisite declaration to the depositary and the Northern Ireland situation would thereby 
become an international conflict.”596 The French representative agreed that “the goal of 
humanitarian law was to alleviate suffering, not to make statements on conflict 
motivations” and that “his Government was not prepared, under any circumstances, to 
sacrifice that basic principle.”597  
The US also found the move “disturbing,” since “it would make the determination of 
the protections to be accorded to a combatant depend on a political judgment about the 
nature of the cause for which he was fighting… The result is totally inconsistent with the 
basic premise of the Geneva Conventions.”598 The Americans so disliked the amendment 
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that they pressured the Australians (who were co-sponsoring one of them, see option 2,) 
to desist: “We believe that for [the Government of Australia] and other governments 
which are concerned about effective application of international humanitarian law to 
participate in undermining of basic foundations of that law for short-term political gain 
would be highly irresponsible.”599 Belgium reacted swiftly and with the support of a few 
others proposed an alternative amendment that hoped to allay the concerns of the 
opposing coalition by recurring to using the older but well-accepted legal formula known 
as the “Martens clause” used in the 1899 Hague Conventions to “deal” with thorny issues 
where consensus among states was elusive (see option 3.) Canada, Switzerland, Italy, 
Uruguay, Spain and the Netherlands and Monaco supported this view, while Denmark 
preferred the original ICRC text.600 
After much debate without resolution, the ICRC proposed setting up a working group 
to find a compromise that “would be accepted by the greatest possible number of 
parties.” Although that working group’s verbatim records are unavailable, private 
government correspondence suggests this effort did not succeed. UK cables revealed that 
after long discussions, the coalition of African and Asian countries were unwilling to 
compromise on their “extreme” resolutions.601  
The British considered three options, worth detailing. First, to hold their legalistic line 
that national liberation wars should not be included in the First Protocol. Second, to 
accommodate and modify some of the less offensive versions of the amendment on the 
table, or third, wait to see if any better options emerged through the work of other states 
interested in including self-determination but in neutral terms.602 More importantly, the 
British recognized the political/social risk in showing themselves intransigent:  
“If we refuse to budge on the point of principle we shall be in a fairly small 
minority and efforts will be made to blame us for any failure of the Conference, but to 
concede the point will be the thick end of a pretty long wedge since a number of 
consequential amendments will be put forward for the rest of [the First and Second 
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Protocols] will probably disappear. The consequences for international law in general 
and the Geneva Conventions in particular would clearly be very serious.”603  
 
British security concerns intermingled with social reputation as reasons for refusing the 
inclusion of national liberation in the First Protocol. They feared that the IRA might 
derive at least some propaganda (if not demand the protection) through the amended First 
Protocol, that remaining British colonies might get word and be empowered to pursue 
self-determination through violence, and even terrorist groups might “enjoy or at least 
claim” enhanced status.604 Legal Advisors in London thus recommended seeking a 
compromise short of accepting the explicit inclusion of special conflict cases “until the 
last possible moment.” However, if the undesired proposal came to vote, “they should 
vote against [it,] provided at least one [European Economic Community] partner is 
prepared to do likewise.”605 Avoiding legitimating armed groups and preventing a public 
loss of face via isolation were thus fundamental woes for the British.  
Within the special Working Group the Canadian delegation introduced a motion to 
summon an Inter-sessional Group of thirty states from all regions of the world to consider 
the issue. The Western Group liked this idea but knew it was unlikely to be taken up by 
the opposing coalition, which really wanted their proposal put to a vote.606 And indeed, as 
feared, a “railroaded” vote on the contentious amendment (Table 11, option 6,) happened 
a day later, leading to its adoption with 70 votes to 21, with 13 abstentions, as follows:607  
In favor: India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Uganda, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Arab Republic of Egypt, Libyan Arab Republic, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Viet-Nam, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
German Democratic Republic, Khmer Republic, United Republic of Cameroon, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sultanate of Oman, Chad, 
Czechoslovakia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, USSR, Venezuela, Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, 
Albania, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
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Republic, Bulgaria, Burundi, China, Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Cuba, El Salvador, United 
Arab Emirates, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary. 
 
Against: Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Korea, UK, Switzerland, Uruguay, South Africa, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, United States of 
America, France. 
 
Abstaining: Ireland, Philippines, Holy See, Sweden, Turkey, Australia, Austria, 
Burma, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Guatemala. 
 
Except for Australia, Sweden, Ireland, Greece and Turkey, the Western Gorup 
members voted against the text, and lost. 
A single step remained to final approval but it was uncertain whether the sponsoring 
coalition would bring its text to a Plenary vote.608 In the end this did not occur, and to 
Western relief, the coalition of “Afro-Asian” states decided to only to present a report on 
the proceedings in Commission “welcoming the adoption of Article 1” but postponing the 
ultimate fight until later.609 Counting its losses, the Western Working Group agreed to 
join in the consensus acceptance of the Commission report, an outcome that though far 
from ideal was welcomed as the best temporary solution.  
 
Living to Fight Another Day 
The UK delegation’s last cable from Geneva illustrated the Western mood at the end 
of the 1974 CDDH session perfectly: This was “an untidy and not very satisfactory 
conclusion but it could have been much worse. We have shown ourselves to be 
conciliatory; we avoided further confrontation and we live to fight another day though the 
chances of our seriously altering the amended text are pretty slight.”610 Post-Conference 
attitudes were generally gloomy. The French delegation was “depressed,” the Americans 
noted that “the record of accomplishment… was not one of which the participants could 
be proud,”611 and the British quipped that the results, “as far as there were any, they were 
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lamentable.”612 Even the Swiss, less prone to dramatic rhetoric, thought the session was 
“deplorable” and declared they were ready “to do what they can to pick up the pieces.”613 
A few weeks later, the British Interdeparmental Committee reconvened to consider 
the road ahead.614  Despite being greatly exercised by what had taken place, the UK was 
determined to take leadership within the Western Group since, as Gerald Draper noted, 
“the limits of Western resourcefulness may not yet have been reached.”615 The West, it 
was said, had been well prepared legally but not politically. The burning question now 
was: What next?  
 
Why Stay? Assessing Interest and Motivation 
It is worth pondering why powerful Western countries, feeling mistreated and forced, 
decided to continue negotiating in hostile environment, particularly when the prospects 
were not exactly bright. The UK report noted that “a number of smaller countries (but 
who have the votes) show signs of wanting to impose such restrictions on the conduct of 
warfare that no military authority could possibly accept them, or if they did would break 
them the first day of hostilities. The results would be either protocols not accepted by any 
serious military power and/or agreements of no value. Either way they would tend to 
destroy the force of the Conventions of 1949 and we would be worse off than before.”616 
Some rational theories of IR in fact posit that in the face of unfavorable outcomes, 
powerful states, enjoying an “exit option” (unlike their weaker counterparts,) can easily 
threaten or actually leave the negotiating table; they can choose to “bargain hard.”617 
Given what emerged from first session of the CDDH, one could have reasonably 
expected Western states like the US or the UK to adopt such an attitude. 
Contra these conjectures, the British had some revealing words on their motivation to 
remain involved: 
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“No state except the small has a material interest in the emergence of new 
protocols – certainly no Great Power. (For the Russians they can be positively tiresome.) 
But the political value for the Third World and vague humanitarian desiderata will 
probably keep up the momentum. The real danger is that the basic fabric and 
assumptions of the Geneva Conventions will be threatened… it is important that the 
Geneva Conventions, which do after all provide the main safeguards, should not be 
endangered.” 618 
 
The UK team recognized that encouraging signs for the future were few. Yet 
preserving “the fabric” of international humanitarian law had become part of their 
national interest, and they did not dare imperil it through brinkmanship or rash departure. 
In addition, the British explicitly cited the “great anxiety on all sides not to want to seem 
unsympathetic to the Africans or to appear racialist (sic),” as well as solidarity owed to 
the Western camp and to the Swiss.619 This combination of motivations can only be 
described as “eclectic,” both rational and social. Deciding to stay involved due to 
anxieties to avoid seeming racist in public, furthermore, resonates as an effect of social 
coercion as I have defined it.  
Compounding the above, the British in fact acknowledged that their decision to stay 
on board and be proactive was a risky gamble, recognizing that “by [making] genuine 
attempts to negotiate” a compromise version of Article 1, “we might be making our 
position far more difficult” if an unacceptable Protocol emerged forcing them not to 
ratify.620 Still, “if the Diplomatic Conference is a complete failure as far as the Western 
Group is concerned, the rebounding damage done to the Geneva Conventions could be 
considerable.”621 
Crucially, the US shared British concerns almost verbatim. To their mind, “it would 
be a tragedy if the divisiveness shown at the Conference should endanger the fragile 
fabric of the existing humanitarian law,” that is, if “the fragile community of roughly 135 
states that are now parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949” were “shattered by the 
interjection of political considerations that could lead a number of states, including some 
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of the world’s major military powers, not to become parties to the two Protocols.”622 
Beyond this, the US continued to identify several specific interests, most related to 
improving the law regulating inter-state war but also extending to respect for basic 
human rights in internal armed conflicts.623 Again, a mix of security and humanitarian 
concerns operated to keep the powerful American team involved in the process.  
For the US it was important that in the interim opportunities were increased for 
participants to reflect on the desirability of adopting protocols that commanded broad, if 
not universal, acceptance. Despite the American delegates being dismayed by others’ 
ability to “pin paper flower on the text” (as Richard Baxter creatively phrased it,) 
mustered enough motivation to return to Geneva for a second round in 1975.624 Before 
the second CDDH session opened in February, however, additional Western Group 
preparations were needed to secure a unity of position on all or most issues, as well as 
bilateral efforts to “educate” a number of Latin American and other developing 
countries.625 
The US, the UK and France all recognized there had been slight overtures to 
compromise by a few moderates in the “Afro-Asian” coalition, particularly Egypt, 
indicating that the text adopted in Commission was not set in stone and that there “may 
be a way of separating out the issue of wars of national liberation… without necessarily 
accepting that obligation.”626 Regardless, the Western Group had to assess the impact of 
accepting wars of national liberation into the First Protocol “to avoid any formulation 
which permits unequal application of the Protocols and the Convention to different 
parties to a conflict.”627 Finally, the US retained an interest in the Second Protocol, for 
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which a majority of delegations had shown disdain during the first session. The Chinese 
delegation, for example, upon the adoption of the “Afro-Asian” amendment, stated 
plainly that the Second Protocol was unnecessary and could now be considered an 
improper intrusion in internal matters.628 
Continuing to play the role of brokers among Western states, in mid-June 1974 the 
British drew up and circulated a memo with four options: 1) Postponing the 1975 session 
of the Diplomatic Conference, slackening the momentum of the opposite coalition and 
allowing for some of the ongoing conflicts in Africa to end; 2) Negotiating an 
amendment acceptable to the West and liaising with the Third World coalition to 
compromise; 3) Discussing options for re-shaping the protocols (and the Geneva 
Conventions) to make them applicable to national liberation wars; 4) Accepting the 
amended Article 1 as a fait accompli and agreeing collectively on what amendments to 
make. The British also floated the idea of holding informal talks at an upcoming meeting 
of the San Remo International Institute of Humanitarian Law, planned for September 6-9, 
1974. To British eyes, this forum provided an “ideal cover” since it was not highly 
monitored and allowed a semblance of informality as many of the same negotiators from 
all regional groups were likely to attend. An eventual negotiation at San Remo, however, 
had to be preceded by a further meeting of the Western Group and by diplomatic 
exchange. Besides San Remo, contacts could be established during a weapons conference 
in Lucerne or at the UNGA sessions in New York. They knew that if their tactic was to 
work, they needed “a great degree of ingenuity” and liaisons with friends.  
From their list the British preferred the first option. Realizing postponement was 
implausible, they decided to support the second alternative, while the third and fourth 
were only to be tried at last resort.629 Interestingly, although most others in the Western 
camp agreed with the UK on this, eventually the opposite occurred and the fourth option 
was chosen. I show how below.  
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The Swiss were asked to take soundings on attendance to San Remo, hoping to secure 
attendance by representatives from the Third World coalition. ICRC officials also 
encouraged the Western Group to seek compromises prior to the 1975 session, and urged 
in particular contact with Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria and India.630 A new round of 
Western Group coordination meetings were scheduled in September.631 These meetings 
allowed it to gauge how Third World delegates reacted to their initial outreach, and to 
decide how to move ahead.  
 
A “Solution” Emerges 
Western demarches to Third World delegates at San Remo failed. The session 
revealed that the majority of the “winning” coalition felt extremely sensitive about 
yielding the gains made during the first session of the Conference, and despite a few 
isolated signs to compromise, they were firmly opposed to making concessions.632  
At the September Western Group meetings, however, surfaced another possible tactic 
to face Third World “intransigence.” The American head delegate, George Aldrich, 
suggested that if the text were not modified, a so-called cordon sanitaire could be 
introduced in order to prevent its application to cases beyond the specific ones that 
interested the Afro-Asian coalition (i.e. African anti-colonial struggles and Palestine.) 
This might come in the form of additional articles negating the application of the First 
Protocol to just wars or via other juridical means that compensated for Article 1.  
These American proposals were the seeds of the Western Group’s strategy of 
inserting “antidotes” in the text of the Protocol so as to undo the “damage” done by the 
contentious amendment, as illustrated later. Following these September 1974 
consultations the Western Group agreed to continue exploring this solution, and tasked 
the UK with a study on the consequences of the adopted Article 1 for the entire First 
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Protocol. It also occurred to Western countries that demonstrating an accommodating 
attitude toward the Third World regarding the First Protocol might increase the chances 
of the Second Protocol, provided that its threshold of application was increased and its 
contents abbreviated to ward of those states’ fears. Canada was thus entrusted with 
drafting a new “minimalist” version of that instrument, which as we will see, resurfaced 
years later and played a critical role.633  
The Swiss report summarizing both September Western Group consultations closed 
with the telling conclusion that, although heavy fights laid ahead, most within the 
Western Group were willing to “swallow the Article 1 pill."634 A new round of Western 
consultations, first restricted to the “Inner Core” (US, UK, France and Canada) and 
another gathering the entire Western Group, were scheduled to take place in January in 
Washington D.C. prior to the second session of the Diplomatic Conference.  
 
A Crucial Meeting 
The four-state Western “Inner Core” consultation occurred in January 13-14, 1975.635 
These conversations evinced that the American strategy regarding the dreaded Article 1 
had taken root.636 In George Aldrich’s own words: “If we questioned the principle of the 
amendment to Article 1 we would have to take responsibility for the break-up of the 
Conference. We could afford to be cynical about Article 1 which would never be applied 
in NLM conflicts.”637  
The contours of what I have labeled covert pushback were thus emerging. According 
to the American view, the Western Group should continue negotiating a militarily 
acceptable protocol applicable to conventional (i.e. inter-state) international conflicts, 
while also inserting a few crucial provisions that neutralized the just/unjust war 
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distinction and that made the First Protocol’s application to wars of national liberation 
subject to de jure and de facto conditional reciprocity by the non-state armed groups 
waging them. The Norwegians had recently circulated a proposal allowing NLMs to 
commit themselves the instrument, and although Norway likely suggested this text to 
enable NLMs to become parties to the First Protocol (gaining in status and protection,) 
the US cleverly reasoned Western states might use this opportunity to exactly the 
opposite end. 
Other delegates reacted with some reservation to the American proposal. The UK and 
Canada, though wishing to be cooperative, were unsure to simply accept Article 1 and act 
as if it did not matter, “sweeping so many problems under the carpet” and perhaps 
complicating ratification later on. Privately, France displayed discomfort about what it 
perceived as a “ruse” leading to impracticable treaties, but recognized that opposing the 
Americans would spell isolation from both the Third World and the Western group. 
Indeed, in the end the weight of the American presence within the Western group locked-
in the approach suggested by Aldrich. The French could not but acquiesce while quietly 
trying to liaise with friendly Third World delegations to craft an improved text.  
Yet the consequences of the Western Group’s “pragmatic” decision not to make 
efforts to adapt the First Protocol to national liberation wars were serious in humanitarian 
terms, given the potential protection such an instrument might provide to the victims of 
those conflicts. In a chilling private memo, the West German exposed their utilitarian 
ethical calculus like this: modifying the First Protocol and the Geneva Conventions 
would produce such a large amount of work and elicit such resistance that it was unlikely 
to be achieved. In addition, a First Protocol adapted to wars of liberation would “only” 
benefit “about 25 million people of the total world population.”638 Moreover, since by the 
negotiations’ end some of the ongoing liberation conflicts might have finished (with 
fewer people standing to enjoy the First Protocol’s protections,) the Germans concluded 
it was “unjustifiable” to have delegations from more than 120 countries devote their 
energy to the task.639 The UK and Canada, for their part, agreed that proposing a flurry of 
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amendments in order to make the protocol suitable for wars of liberation was just not 
politically expedient. 
As the above suggests, a key reason buttressing the West’s “cynical” line was tied to 
world political changes unfolding at the time. Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” at home 
in April 1974 indicated that that country’s colonial holdings would soon attain 
independence, thus “resolving” one of the major sources of impetus behind the African 
initiatives. Attentive to these developments, the majority of the Western coalition 
believed that the issue of national liberation was temporary and soon to end, thus 
limiting, if not completely foreclosing, the dangers of accepting Article 1 or the eventual 
ratification of the First Protocol.640 
The entire Western coalition reunited as planned in January 27-30, 1975 and with 
some behind-the-scenes reticence from France and Japan, approved the American tactic 
the amendment to the First Protocol.641  They also agreed, upon Canadian insistence, that 
the West should force the Conference to at least consider the Second Protocol, albeit in a 
“more attractive” version “to other groups… as well as to ourselves,” with reduced 
content and conditions for application.642 
 
A New Round 
The Vietnam conflict had not yet come to ahead when the second session of the 
CDDH opened on February 3, 1975. Accordingly, the US remained worried that the PRG 
would again attempt to participate. The Western group had agreed to press the Swiss 
hosts to maintain the previous year’s status quo, and that if the PRG requested to reopen 
the issue, they should demand a 2/3 majority vote as necessary. Behind the scenes the US 
campaigned again for adherents, and prepared a temporary withdrawal statement in case 
the PRG won the battle (so serious was the matter.) Luckily for the US delegation, and 
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despite much maneuvering over two days, the PRG failed to secure the majority it needed 
to reopen debate on its admission.643  
Despite this initial alacrity, the rest of the Conference proceeded unaffected. To 
Western relief, in 1975 the coalition of African and Asian states seemed uninterested in 
polemics. Instead “the second session [was] a simple continuation of the first… and the 
Conference avoided all but the most passing tactful references” to the issue.644 The UK 
mused that this denoted not just Third World awareness of a changing Western attitude, 
but also a marked loss of interest on the part of many countries that, having secured the 
political gain they sought, did not much wish to meddle into the technical/substantive 
improvements of the law.  
Although some important provisions of the First Protocol were long debated and 
adopted at the second session of the CDDH, for our purposes the relevant development in 
the 1975 session dealt with Second Protocol. Negotiations on the scope of that instrument 
attracted extensive presence by Third World states and proved among the most heated of 
the Conference. A mixed coalition pushing for high barriers to application and few 
humanitarian protections came out in full force, including Latin American (Argentina, 
Honduras, Brazil and Mexico,) African (Nigeria,) Asian (Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Philippines) Arab (Egypt, Iraq) and Socialist states (USSR, Yugoslavia, Romania, East 
Germany.) France joined their ranks, while the UK, secretly pleased, did not need to 
expose its intentions. The most radical proposals came from India and Iraq, which 
questioned the entire raison d’être behind a protocol for (non-liberation) internal 
conflicts as an unhelpful attack on state sovereignty, while Brazil seemed to be the only 
state to openly propose what others had in mind, i.e. that “draft [Second Protocol] could 
not be applicable unless its applicability was recognized both by the High Contracting 
Party in whose territory the armed conflict was considered to exist, and by the adverse 
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party.”645 In addition, Socialist states proposing high conditions for application sought 
ways to undermine Common Article 3, either by declaring that the scope of the Second 
Protocol should supersede the “vague but generous” one of CA3, or by inserting 
clarifying language that prevented CA3 from applying to conflicts below a high civil war 
level.  
Western states (among them Austria, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia and 
Belgium) tried to contain these adverse efforts, to no avail. Taking a pragmatic line, the 
US and Canada put forth the idea that the Second Protocol should only contain a few 
fundamental humanitarian provisions with low conditions for application so as to cover a 
broader range of internal conflicts. However, Norway, Finland and Sweden opposed both 
these perspectives, declining to water down the Second Protocol’s contents, or to give 
into the demands of the "extreme sovereigntists.”646  
A working group comprising 28 delegations was set up to discuss the scope of the 
Second Protocol, and after six meetings arrived at a compromise formula, as follows:647 
“The present Protocol, which develops and supplements article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of 
application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by article 1 of 
Protocol I and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between 
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which 
under responsible command exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement the present Protocol. 
2. The present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, as not being armed conflicts.”648 
 
The working group proposal was presented to Commission II, where it was adopted 
by consensus.649 With this, the debate on the scope of the Second Protocol was almost 
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sealed, completely transforming the original wishes of the ICRC by including a series of 
stringent formal conditions for application that would only apply to high-intensity civil 
wars. The open question now related to what substantive provisions it might include.  
The Americans, British and French reacted variously to these outcomes. In the eyes 
of the US, the proceedings of the 1975 session had dealt the Second Protocol a serious 
blow, since it would no longer apply to the conflicts where it was needed most. In 
addition, the insistence of the Scandinavians to overburden the text with obligations 
unpalatable to the powerful opposing coalition threatened ultimately to bring the 
downfall of the entire instrument. For their part, the British were satisfied with a 
threshold high enough to meet their security concerns. Yet they too decried Scandinavian 
gestures, which were seen as reducing the chances for the Second Protocol’s wide 
acceptance and application. It was now for the West to generate sympathy for as minimal 
a Second Protocol as possible, in order to salvage it. (Less altruistically, securing this 
version of the scope of application was fundamental to British eyes, fearing that its 
frustrated Western allies might prefer to negotiate a separate, more protective instrument, 
outside of the Diplomatic Conference.)  
Lamenting once more the cynical Western approach to the scope of the First Protocol 
and the seemingly heavy-handed approach of the Americans to obtain compromises 
behind the scenes, the French offered a sharp analysis of the negotiations up to that point. 
In their view the Conference was an awkward encounter between two very different 
groups of self-interested states (the Western and the non-Western,) and the idealist 
humanitarianism of the Scandinavians.  This clash of views had for France led to treaty 
texts riddled by safeguards, idealistic prohibitions, tautologies and otherwise 
“surprisingly pious vows” whose complexity and ambiguity would not facilitate practical 
application.650 The frustrated French concluded their confidential report bitterly: “It is up 
to the supporters of adapting the law of 1949 to new forms of conflict to define their 
concepts, and to its authors, most of whom are Western, to help them without looking to 
ambiguity and non-applicability as a way-out, which would do a durable disservice to the 
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whole of international humanitarian law.”651 What the French analysis missed was that 
the “glue” keeping the West at the Conference was as much social or relational as it was 
self-interested. Yet it was clear that all the Third World’s social pressure had not 
achieved a sincere (persuasive) change within the West, but that its coercive character 
had led to deceptive or covert form of reaction.  
Following the 1975 Conference session, conversations on the Protocols themselves 
resumed at a meeting of the “Inner Core,” which now included West Germany, in 
Washington, DC on November 17-18.652  
After the developments at the 1975 Conference session, the US wondered whether the 
Second Protocol was becoming a “white elephant,” demanding too much energy but 
unlikely to be applied in the end, given its high threshold.653 Canada bemoaned the 
Scandinavian-induced over-elaboration of the clauses but worried that further pressing 
for its simplification might be misconstrued as ant-humanitarian in public. The idea to 
propose a separate instrument of like-minded states surfaced anew, with US support. 
Perturbed by this thought, the British replied that it was “too soon to totally give up 
hope.” Rather, the Western line should remain to argue for a simplified text, waiting to 
see what emerged. The West Germans agreed but American delegate Aldrich remained 
unpersuaded, suggesting that they might want to leave the negotiation of the Second 
Protocol until after the First had been adopted.  The Canadians, who reportedly saw the 
Second Protocol as tied to their prestige,654 stood their ground noting that this would be 
the “kiss of death” for the instrument and shrewdly pointing out “how unfortunate it 
would be if the impression were created that the US had washed its hands of [the Second 
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Protocol.]”655 (Notice the social-reputational threat/argument here.) The Germans 
remarked that this unfortunate situation was due to a “bad” Article 1 for the First 
Protocol, and the French, though sympathetic, decided to hold back comments “since it 
would have been in poor taste.”656 
 The entire Western Working Group reunited again in London on March 15-17, 1976 
to prepare for the upcoming Third Session of the Conference (CDDH3,) set to begin a 
month later.657 The most contentious issues were reviewed, and despite some French 
venting, the Western compromise on Article 1 was maintained. 
 
Resolving the POW issue 
The third session of the CDDH opened on April 21, 1976. The end of the Vietnam 
conflict in 1975 meant that the PRG admission issue did not re-emerge (there was only 
one Vietnam from then on,) yet progress this year proved slow due to the complex nature 
of articles under consideration. One of these was the critical provision offering POW 
protection to irregular combatants in international conflicts (i.e. within the Draft First 
Protocol in Article 42, paragraph 3.) American Head of Delegation George Aldrich 
reportedly acted again as the essential Western broker, liaising behind the scenes with 
representatives of the opposing coalition (an interesting mix:  possibly Norway, Algeria, 
Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Palestine Liberation Organization.)  
Continuing with its role as moral entrepreneur, the ICRC seemed to have helped these 
delegations to devise a solution. According to the ICRC Director of Principles and Law at 
the time, Jacques Moreillon, sometime between the 1975 and 1976 session officials of 
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that Swiss organization contacted Aldrich and provided him with the legal formulas 
through which US in Vietnam (and the French in Algeria before it) had allowed for the 
application of POW treatment (and in the American case, status,) to most detained 
“irregulars,” so long as they had been carrying arms openly before and during military 
engagements. The US delegate then used this template as basis for a compromise text that 
set out the conditions under which combatants could receive POW status and offered 
“POW-like” treatment to anyone who was captured while carrying arms openly.658 
Importantly, in American eyes this text contained various ambiguities that allowed the 
West to believe it could ultimately deny status to national liberation fighters, thus 
facilitating their prosecution as criminals for their wartime offenses. (More on this 
below.) These ambiguities were probably not evident to Norway, Algeria, the 
Vietnamese, Egypt or the Palestinians, to whom the compromise text appeared 
satisfactory, but they would soon create controversy within the Western camp. (See 
Appendix 4 for the full text of the draft Article 42.)  
The study of the Second Protocol was once again made difficult in 1976 by persistent 
criticisms coming from Latin American states alongside India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Iraq. Each of the 13 articles debated and adopted that year gave rise to 
contestation at the Committee level. Certain states were so allergic to the consequences of 
the Second Protocol for their sovereignty that even the legal ability of the ICRC to do its 
humanitarian work during internal conflict was imperiled. Two of the opposition’s 
leaders (India and Iraq) believed that giving the ICRC a legal “right to intervene” opened 
the door to unacceptable outside meddling in their internal affairs, and might operate to 
benefit the rebel side.  
                                                
658 For first-hand corroboration the American delegation’s role in the drafting of this article, see 
Aldrich, “Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols”; George H. Aldrich, 
“Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,” American Journal of International Law 85, no. 1 (1991): 1–20; George H. Aldrich, 
“The Laws of War on Land,” American Journal of International Law 94, no. 1 (2000): 42–63. On 
the role of the ICRC in persuading the French and the US to treat and/or consider captured rebels 
as POWs in Algeria and Vietnam respectively, and the importance of these experiences for the 
drafting of Article 42/44 of the First Protocol, see Morgan, “The Protection of ‘Irregular’ 
Combatants: An Enduring Challenge for Humanitarian Action,” 49–50, 76–77; Forsythe, The 
Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners After 9/11, 19. 
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The turmoil of the proceedings, the frail compromises and in general the uncertain 
future of the Second Protocol had not escaped the Swiss hosts. Just before the third 
session of the Conference closed on June 11, 1976 the Swiss Foreign Office organized a 
series of private interviews between the President of the Conference (Swiss Foreign 
Minister Pierre Graber) and select important delegations. Conversations with Iraq, 
France, Algeria, Mexico, India, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Egypt, the UK, US, Sweden, 
USSR, Brazil, Tanzania and Venezuela confirmed the fears of the West: the animosity 
toward the Second Protocol was pervasive and only a simplified, non-threatening text 
would be adopted; the compromise on Article 1 of the First Protocol was seen as a 
precious gain for the “Afro-Asian” states, and attempts to alter it were said to have dire 
consequences; and the article on POWs would be among the most difficult up for debate 
in 1977.659 
The Swiss also maintained contact with the ICRC on the future of the Conference. 
Interestingly, a conversation between ICRC Vice-president Jean Pictet and Swiss 
diplomat Jean Humbert in mid-July 1976 revealed that the ICRC was aware there were 
efforts in motion to minimize the Second Protocol, yet the delegations in charge (Canada, 
Pakistan, mainly) had reportedly not invited it to participate in such work. The ICRC was 
concerned about the substantive outcome but, as seen earlier, also knew full well that the 
current draft stood little chance of adoption during Plenary. In general, the ICRC worried 
that the following year Third World delegations would come en masse to the closing 
session of the Diplomatic Conference and “impose their will.” As the aide-memoire of 
the ICRC-Swiss conversation appropriately noted: “Next year is the moment of truth!” 
 
Military Fears Surface 
In late 1976 and early 1977 the Western Group zoomed in on the military 
implications of the Protocols for NATO. West Germany had grown increasingly worried 
about the restrictions and confusions that in its view were being introduced, and recent 
German-commissioned security analyses had suggested that the First Protocol’s 
                                                
659 See various documents, beginning on June 7, 1976, in “Consultations Presidentielles,” Swiss 
Federal Archives, Bern. 
  279 
obligations might in fact make the alliance vulnerable to attacks from the East.660 At 
German instigation, new “Inner Core” meetings were held in Bonn in November 1976 
and in Brussels in mid-January 1977 to discuss these matters.  
These encounters showed that West German security concerns had diffused to the 
UK. During the preparation of the official briefs for Ministers, the British Defense staff 
began to express sharp disagreements with the American view that by crafting 
indeterminate texts on NLMs and POWs, among others, they could actually safeguard 
their legal and military position.661 The risk existed that opposing parties to conflict 
would interpret the text to their convenience. Further bilateral contacts confirmed that 
others in the Western camp shared British worries, encouraging them to challenge the 
American line shortly before the opening of the Conference. 
These attempts came to naught, however. At February and March 1977 Western 
Group meetings, George Aldrich made it clear that the US would continue to support the 
current version of the article granting POW protection to irregular combatants. 
Suspecting that Aldrich’s view might not be shared by the US DoS, UK officials 
privately inquired with DoD staff in the American delegation “whether the Pentagon was 
really prepared” to endorse the text. These officials responded that though “they were 
unhappy” about it, there was high-level agreement to accept it, on the condition that 
American interpretation of draft’s two major ambiguities were inserted in the negotiating 
record.  
The ambiguities specifically related to the meaning of two words within the text: 
“deployment” and “protection.” The working text recognized that although “that there are 
situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot… distinguish himself” from the civilian population, a combatant could 
retain his status as long as he carried his arms openly “during each military engagement” 
                                                
660 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives; TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. 
661 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. Head Delegate Aldrich later recognized in print that given these 
ambiguities, “the protection accorded by this article to irregulars may be less than it seems 
because it is the captor Power and its tribunals that have to interpret them.” See George H. 
Aldrich, “Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 
Geneva Protocol I,” Virginia Journal of International Law 26, no. 3 (1986): 708. 
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and “during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.” The UK 
feared that this required liberation fighters only to distinguish themselves immediately 
prior to executing an attack, hampering a states’ ability to neutralize them and leading to 
potential civilian deaths. The American team insisted, however, that “deployment” 
should be given a broader meaning, covering “all the period of time (and distance in 
space)” elapsed between a guerrilla member or group leaving their posts until that attack 
took place, thus permitting a state wide latitude to target them. In addition, the Americans 
believed that the legal protection for these combatants did not imply immunity from 
criminal trial.662 Moreover, the US felt that although the risk to civilians existed, it was 
“likely exaggerated,” and revealed again that their primary interest in this article lay in 
securing protection for all combatants, even those believed to have broken the rules of 
war.663 Complicating things, at the February meeting Aldrich had announced that the 
Soviet Union would agree to support the draft text on POWs. This alarmed the British not 
only because they knew a consensus US-USSR view would be difficult to crack, but 
because Soviet acceptance of the text fed into their fear of an attack from the East. A 
recent secret military report confirmed these concerns, and added to them threats from 
“international extremist terrorists against targets in Europe.”664  
Frustrated, the British Defense staff believed Aldrich himself was responsible for this 
“incredibly naïve” line, stating that “Pentagon thinking seems to be in the same direction 
as our own, the main difference being that they have to operate within the constraints 
imposed by a draft proposal prepared by their own Head of Delegation.”665 In their view, 
                                                
662 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. This was Martin Eaton’s (UK) paraphrasing of his conversation 
with US General Walter Reed on February 22, 1977.  
663 Ibid.  
664 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1125. 
665 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. American naiveté, according to the British Defence Ministry, lay in 
hoping that their draft would prevent Vietnam-style arbitrariness against POWs. “No matter how 
an Article of this sort is drafted, it is always open to State to twist the law, taking advantage of the 
drafting to reach a conclusion which is totally contrary to the intention behind the Treaty.” FCO 
legal advisors agreed, claiming that although “Mr. Aldrich has sought to allay Western fears by 
saying that we can feel perfectly free to exploit the ambiguities against the guerrilla… two can 
play at this kind of game.” 
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“the US has gone out on a limb and their military now wish to extricate themselves from 
an impossible position.”666 They also found that the Pentagon’s interpretation of 
deployment gave the word “a totally different, artificial and inappropriate” meaning, and 
that as a whole, even if amended, “the result would not be a good article. The whole 
framework appears to be designed to encourage guerrillas and this would seem to be 
against our national interest.” Yet given that any amendments were unlikely, and 
reopening discussion might make the text worse, the UK decided the best course in the 
short-term was to associate itself with the American interpretive statements, even if these 
were “quite contrary to the apparent meaning of the Article and thus unlikely to get any 
wide acceptance.” The long-term solution for the UK was to consider making a 
reservation prior to ratification.   
A final Western coordination round before the fourth session of the Diplomatic 
Conference took place with meetings of the “Inner Core” on March 14th, 1977, and of the 
extended Western Group on the 15-16. The “Inner Core” meeting served to air the 
recurrent grievances.667 Americans led the meeting and expressed satisfaction by the fact 
that they knew of few (if any) countries opposed the text on POWs. The UK reacted 
immediately, voicing their many problems with exactly that text: “Guerrilla activity was 
seen as an increasingly serious threat in Europe by NATO; it was very important the text 
of Article 42 did nothing to encourage this activity.”  
Aldrich acknowledged the concerns about the exploitation of the wording’s ambiguity 
but believed that a “clear, satisfactory and agreed” interpretive statement in the 
negotiating history would suffice to overcome the problem. It was foremost, in Aldrich’s 
view, to find a compromise acceptable to the majority. The West Germans agreed that 
interpretive precisions were indeed necessary, but the French doubted their legal validity. 
Instead, they should strive to uphold the principle of distinction through clear means, 
preferably by the use of a distinctive sign. To this, the American replied that forcing 
distinction by such means would inhibit guerrilla activity completely and prove 
unacceptable to the Third World majority. In the end, the UK reminded the Americans 
                                                
666 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. 
667 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. 
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that no article would be able to ensure the protection of captured combatants, and 
although the US admitted that strict adherence was never guaranteed, “it would be useful 
to have a statement of law in the books which would be helpful to our personnel.” The 
UK proposed a smaller “sub-Inner Core” group to work on possible changes to the text. 
The Americans acquiesced, but emphasized that it would be procedurally difficult and 
potentially dangerous to re-open discussion of this text at the Conference.668 Despite 
intense quarrels on this point, Western states agreed on tightening the language or 
inserting interpretive statements on other areas of the protocol with potentially negative 
security implications for the alliance.669  
These decisions were confirmed in the enlarged Western Group consultation a day 
later but behind the curtain the UK retained its unease. The British Interdepartmental 
team had met in early April with Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Evan Luard, to 
receive final approval of their delegation brief.670 At this meeting the British delegation 
made two telling decisions. First, although still maintaining a reserved position on the 
controversial Article 1 of the First Protocol, they vowed not to oppose it publicly, and if it 
were put to a vote: “On balance, abstention, at least in respectable Western company, 
appears preferable; a negative vote by us might have prejudicial consequences for 
developments in southern Africa as well as provide ammunition for the Third World and 
East European militants, and there seems to be no prospect of securing a blocking third… 
It is unlikely that a vote can be avoided. If it can be, the Delegation should not oppose a 
consensus.”671 With respect to the article on POW protections British tactics were less 
                                                
668 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. The British Defence Ministry instructed its defense staff in 
Washington to persuade the Pentagon to put pressure on Aldrich, hoping to secure amendments to 
the text or to at least to insert interpretive statements in the negotiating record. TNA: PRO FCO 
58/1125. 
669 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1127. 
670 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1125. 
671 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1125. Interestingly, Luard displayed a far more humanitarian view than 
those under him toward the Second Protocol, arguing that a high threshold including territorial 
control was an illogical demand in view of the reality of guerrilla warfare. Notwithstanding fears 
about the Protocol’s applicability to Northern Ireland, Luard thought the UK should support 
language that would apply to as many internal armed conflicts as possible. However, being 
reminded that at that stage of the negotiations the existing compromise was what seemed 
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clear, noting the stubbornness of the US and stating that the delegation should work to 
uphold the principles of equality of belligerence, of distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants, and of the loss of combatant status if these conditions were not 
observed.672 
The conditions for social coercion thus seemed present: an acknowledgement of 
political isolation, the recognition of social costs and the inability to leave the negotiating 
room. What occurred?  
 
The Moment of Truth 
The fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference opened formally on March 17, 1977. 
The procedural matters that had stirred controversy in previous years no longer troubled 
the start of the CDDH4, yet with so much weighty legal matter to hash out, delegates set 
promptly out to debate and adopt the remaining articles in Committee, which then passed 
to review in Plenary. After the article-by-article adoption in Plenary, states would be 
presented with the finished Protocols and decide to finally adopt them either by roll-call 
vote or consensus vote.  
Draft Articles 1 of the First Protocol and Second Protocols, setting out their general 
scope, had been respectively adopted in 1974 and 1975, and thus only awaited 
consideration in Plenary. Draft Article 42  (of the First Protocol, on POWs) still needed 
examination. On the morning of April 22 and without much ado, the Egyptian Chairman 
of Committee III framed the (American-brokered) compromise draft as the product of 
“two years of hard work, official and unofficial contacts and prolonged discussion and 
meditation,” and although he explicitly voiced his wish to see the article adopted by 
consensus, the Israeli delegate disagreed and requested a roll-call.673 The results were as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                            
attainable, the delegation ultimately decided not to depart from it. Luard also had far less 
stringent stances on other issues contained in the Protocols or regarding weapons regulations.  
672 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1125. 
673 Howard S. Levie, ed., Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
Volume 2 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1980), 485–486. 
  284 
In favor: Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Republic 
of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United 
Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland,· France, German Democratic Republic, Germany 
(Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory 
Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon. 
 
Against: Brazil, Israel. 
Abstaining: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Japan. 
 
With 66 votes to 2 and 18 abstentions, the controversial Article 42 of the First 
Protocol passed its first test. Many interesting questions emerge from the above vote, but 
in terms of the analysis pursued here the most striking aspect is that despite all the 
behind-the-scenes turf within the Western camp, no state opted for publicly opposing a 
text they all found suspect (with the exception of the Scandinavians and the US, which 
actively supported it.)  
Given their consistent frustration with the legal muddle and military risk this article 
brought, it is surprising that France and West Germany voted for, not against. Why? 
French cables provide an answer. The Western Group had in fact held meetings on this 
question in Geneva. American Delegate Aldrich had reiterated his support for the text and 
circulated a text with an interpretive statement addressing other states’ worries, to be 
submitted after the article had been adopted. Western states could then decide whether to 
openly support the Article or to abstain—a negative vote, crucially, was foreclosed. 
Some, including the UK, insisted in attempting to modify the text, against Aldrich’s will. 
In the end, the American line persuaded only a few (West Germany, Austria, Belgium,) 
with West Germany reportedly finding it undesirable to oppose the US. France felt 
uneasy to oppose a near-consensus position, and received further instructions from Paris: 
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“Bearing in mind the political importance of Article 42 and given the protection it 
affords to combatants of resistance movements, it is convenient… to support it in despite 
of the textual imperfections and to join the consensus or, as the case may be, to cast a 
positive vote.”674 
 
A flurry of explanations followed the Committee vote, with most Western states, even 
those voting in favor, inserting the interpretation they had agreed to privately.675 
On May 23 the Plenary sessions resumed to consider, first, the Articles of the First 
Protocol, followed by those of the Second. The contentious Article 1 of the First Protocol 
took center stage after three years of its original adoption.676 Algeria suggested 
proceeding with adoption by consensus but Israel again demanded a roll-call vote. The 
outcome was as follows: 
In favor: Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, 
Morocco, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, 
New Zealand, Oman, Uganda, Pakistan, Panama, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Korea; German Democratic Republic, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Republic of 
Tanzania; Romania, Holy See, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, United Republic of Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ivory Coast, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Libyan Arab Republic, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. 
 
Against: Israel 
Abstaining: Monaco, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Spain, United States of America, France, 
Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan. 
 
                                                
674 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives. Telegram DELFRA 
GENEVE No 304/05. 
675 Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Volume 2, 
487–513. 
676 Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Volume 1, 62–
80. 
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An outcome similar to that of draft Article 42 emerged, and after a vote of 87 for, one 
against and 11 abstentions, no Western state had dared to publicly oppose the dreaded 
Article 1. As we have seen, among the Western skeptics only the US appeared to hold a 
firm line, and the UK and France felt particularly irritated to accept it. Regardless, a 
desire to avoid straying from the US-brokered Western consensus led them to abstain. 
The UK clarified that although “we found… and still find this to be a regrettable 
innovation… our understanding of the reasoning behind the amendment and our 
determination [were] not to see the protocol founder on this difference of opinion.”677 In 
private France was even clearer about its motivation: 
“Article 1… is of capital importance for Third World countries since their 
essential goal during the conference is to make humanitarian law applicable to national 
liberation wars. It would thus be politically harmful for us to cast a negative vote on this 
subject which would be poorly received and would ruin the very favorable impression 
produced by our positive vote on Article 42 relative to the new category of prisoners of 
war, for which we were warmly thanked by Vietnam, the Arab states and several African 
states. The representatives of the United States, UK, West Germany and Canada, with 
whom I consulted, indicated they would abstain on Article 1.”678  
 
For France it was again a social reputational concern that ultimately dictated their 
decision to abstain. Following the vote, most Western skeptics again proceeded to issue 
explanations that clarified, in polite legal terms, their disagreement with the Article’s 
underlying principle.  
Article 42 of the First Protocol (on POWs) resurfaced in Plenary on May 26.679 After 
another Israel-requested roll-call vote, results went as follows:  
In favor: Czechoslovakia, Tunisia. Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
Venezuela: Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Afghanistan, Algeria, Saudi 
Arabia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, United Republic of Cameroon, Cyprus, 
Ivory Coast, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, United States of 
America, Finland; France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Jamaica; Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, 
                                                
677 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1124. 
678 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives. Telegram DELFRA-
GENEVE No. 1604-10. My italics. 
679 Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Volume 2, 
514–545. 
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Mozambique, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Uganda; Pakistan, Panama, Netherlands, Peru, 
Poland, Qatar; Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Korea, German Democratic Republic) 
People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Republic of 




Abstaining: Thailand, Uruguay, Federal Republic of Germany, Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada; Chile, Colombia, Spain, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Switzerland. 
 
With 73 votes to one and 21 abstentions, the controversial POW article passed its 
final test. There were no surprises this time, and the pattern of voting and explanations of 
vote corresponded to what we had seen in Committee.  
The final decision on the entire First Protocol came in the afternoon of June 8, where 
it was swiftly adopted by consensus.680 A day before, the UK delegation had requested 
instructions from London on how to proceed: 
“If a vote is requested, we recommend we should… vote in favour. We think it unlikely 
that any WEOG delegations other than France… might abstain on Protocol 1.”681 
But France did not request a vote or abstain, as the British expected. French cables 
show that this decision was not made until the last minute, however. Only few weeks 
earlier, on May 20, the delegation in Geneva had in effect received explicit instructions to 
abstain given the “confusions” introduced in the text and the fact that several provisions 
were incompatible with French national security policy.682 As the debate approached, 
however, the French Head of Delegation wrote back to Paris with a plea: 
“Although the Department instructed the delegation to abstain… I feel I must call its 
attention about the fact that we are risking to find ourselves distressingly isolated 
(eventually with Israel) if we adopt such an attitude. Third World countries would give 
this vote a political meaning it does not have, that of a complete dismissal of the 
                                                
680 Summary Record of the Fifty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, in Federal Political Department, Records 
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Volume 7. (Bern, 
Switzerland.) 
681 TNA: PRO FCO 58/1124. 
682 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives. Telegram DELFRA-
GENEVE No. 450/54. 
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extension of humanitarian law to national liberation wars... Moreover, we would be 
lynchpins of the opposition against the humanitarian progress [in other parts of the First] 
Protocol… Finally, how could we continue to manifest so much reticence to a text that 
we have ourselves contributed to improve… Our positive vote – preceded by a general 
declaration expressing our reservations – would not at all prejudge the future attitude of 
the government as regards signature: In a comparable situation, I was authorized to vote 
for the International Covenants on Human Rights, which we have not yet signed… 
Bearing in mind the previous considerations, I would be grateful if the Department 
authorized the delegation not to disassociate itself from an eventual consensus on the 
First Protocol, and if a vote were requested, to cast a positive vote.”683 
 
The French government acquiesced, and the delegation avoided opposing the motion 
to adopt API by consensus, not without issuing a statement detailing its discomfort with 
various portions of the text. 
 
(Un)binding Liberation Groups 
A final key provision of the First Protocol remains to be considered here, namely the 
article offering the possibility for NLMs to “undertake to apply the Conventions and this 
Protocol”, by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the Swiss depositaries. This 
was now branded Article 96. While the article stated that by depositing a unilateral 
declaration “the said [NLM] authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those 
which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this 
Protocol,” it clarified that the “High Contracting Parties” (states) were “bound by this 
Protocol if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.”684  
As explained earlier, the inclusion of the language providing for NLM “participation” 
in the First Protocol had been an initiative of a coalition of African, Socialist and Arab 
                                                
683 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives. Telegram DELFRA-
GENEVE No. 1878-83. 
684 The italics are mine. My paraphrasing here is an amalgamation of the paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the text. National liberation movements are not named as such, but rather referred to as an 
“authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of 
the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4.” For the original text see Article 96, “Treaty 
relations upon entry into force of this Protocol,” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470?OpenDocument (Consulted on 
August 15, 2013.) 
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countries (plus Norway, Finland and Australia) similar to that supporting the amended 
Article 1. From the perspective of the Western Group, however, a situation whereby 
states assumed unilateral humanitarian commitments without binding national liberation 
movements to the same obligations was unacceptable. At the same time, all along the 
perplexed West had agreed that such groups, not being states, should not be entitled to 
accede or become “High Contracting Parties” to the Protocol. For that reason, since 1975 
(when it was first introduced by the opposing coalition) this article had become an 
attractive alternative for achieving the “commitment without legitimizing” goal. Some 
within the Western Group, however, were against the idea that liberation forces could be 
entitled to legal benefits simply by issuing a unilateral declaration.  
After internal deliberations and without much public debate, the majority of the 
Western Group was pleased to see that the amendment clause on national liberation 
movements contained in Article 96 was taken to “complement” the rest of the text, which 
as indicated above, ensured that contracting states would only be bound to non-parties 
(including liberation groups) if the latter accepted and applied the provisions thereof. 
This made de facto as well as de jure conditional reciprocity a requisite for the 
application of the law to liberation groups-- a tall request that states believed only very 
few armed non-state movements could aspire to. Deceptively pleasing to most of the 
critical actors in the room, this Article was adopted by consensus in Committee, and 
again thanks to an Israel-requested roll-call vote, it was overwhelmingly adopted in 
Plenary by 93 votes for, 1 against (Israel) and 2 abstentions (Thailand and Spain.)685 
 
What Fate for the Second Protocol? 
Before ending, let me turn to the final negotiation of Second Protocol. A high 
threshold of application had been preliminary adopted in 1975. Under discussion in 1977 
were multiple matters of substance, many of which were debated by working groups (and 
                                                
685 Various states issued explanations of vote. Some wished to emphasize that only declarations 
made in good faith by groups truly implementing the law in practice could be valid (Netherlands, 
Canada, UK, Israel,) while West Germany clarified that until this type declaration was made, 
Common Article 3 applied. Howard S. Levie, ed., Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, Volume 3 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1981), 481–500. 
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sub groups) whose verbatim conversations went unrecorded. According to the available 
evidence, however, it appears that these discussions evinced Scandinavian efforts (plus 
the Holy See) to produce a Second Protocol for internal conflicts that was as similar as 
possible to the First, for international ones. That desire, however, was unacceptable to 
most states thus as it stood the Second Protocol appeared to stand little chance of 
adoption during Plenary review. A French telegram dated June 1 was straightforward on 
this point:  
“The outcome of this debate seems very uncertain. In effect, many Third World 
delegations are extremely reticent about draft [Second Protocol] which they resent, on the 
one hand, for placing governments and rebels on a level of juridical equality, considering 
both to be parties to conflict. This constitutes, in the eyes of many… an affront to state 
sovereignty… and involving overtly detailed provisions and thus too constraining, which 
can again constitute an affront to state sovereignty. African delegations confirmed to 
us… their concerns on this subject.”686 
  
Coordination among Western states, as we have seen, confirmed that they too were 
worried about the future of Second Protocol. Although the strict threshold had allayed the 
original fears of the UK and France such that they were no longer viscerally opposed to 
the project per se, they continued to believe that a demanding protocol, placing too many 
burdens on states and on rebels unable to respect them, would sink. Canada and the US, 
until now consistent supporters of the Second Protocol, agreed with this “realistic” 
argument (even if they preferred a lower threshold.) The Canadian delegation had in 
particular worked for years on a simpler, more widely acceptable version of that 
instrument, which the Conference, on Scandinavian impetus, had not embraced.  
Such was the state of affairs on May 31, 1977, when the Second Protocol was sent to 
Plenary for review. A day later (and a week before the Diplomatic Conference was 
scheduled to close,) the Pakistani delegate, Mr. Hussain, tabled an amendment consisting 
of an entirely different, much shorter Second Protocol. During his public presentation of 
the project on June 2nd, he recognized that there was “considerable dissatisfaction” 
among developed and “under-privileged” countries with the length of the text as well as 
                                                
686 NUOI 1974-1979, Carton 1678, Cote F. 6.8.1.2., French Archives. Telegram DELFRA-
GENEVE No. 1864-69. 
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with the fact that “it ventured into domains which they considered sacrosanct and 
inappropriate for inclusion in an international instrument.” In this view, the Protocol 
entered, into “unnecessary details, rendering it not only cumbersome to understand and to 
apply in the peculiar circumstances of a non-international armed conflict.”687 Hussain 
noted that his project was “partly inspired” by previous Canadian drafts, and that it was 
based on the following theses:  
“Its provisions must be acceptable to all and, therefore, of obvious practical benefit; the 
provisions must be within the perceived capacity of those involved to apply them and, 
therefore, precise and simple; they should not appear to affect the sovereignty of any 
State Party or the responsibility of its Government to maintain law and order and defend 
national unity, nor be able to be invoked to justify any outside intervention; nothing in the 
[Second] Protocol should suggest that dissidents must be treated legally other than as 
rebels; and, lastly, there should be no automatic repetition of the more comprehensive 
provisions… found in [the First Protocol.]”688 
 
Although the simplified draft was well received by many states including Canada, the 
Soviet Union, Nigeria and Egypt, the President of the Conference decided that the 
Plenary would examine the two projects side by side. Subsequent debates secured the 
retaining of the high threshold of application, despite last-minute demands by Colombia 
(with Brazilian and Saudi support) to make it even more stringent.689  
After detailed discussions and much Scandinavian, Iraqi and Indian frustration (for 
different reasons,) what emerged was a Second Protocol that roughly corresponded to the 
Pakistani proposal. Gone was the language referring to the “parties to conflict,” (which 
might legitimize rebels,) the assurance of quarter, the delay of the death penalty, the 
ability to sign special agreements, or the provisions allowing the ICRC and similar 
humanitarian organizations to offer their services.690 After so many years of wrangling 
                                                
687 Levie, The Law of Non International Armed Conflict: Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 4. 
688 Levie, The Law of Non International Armed Conflict: Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 5. 
689 Levie, The Law of Non International Armed Conflict: Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 74. 
690 Notable articles retained (in modified form) due to pressure from the ICRC, Scandinavian 
states, Austria and the Holy See, were those related to the protection of the civilian population, 
the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and the protection 
of works and installations containing dangerous forces. 
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and final statements from a multitude of states, this version of the Second Protocol was at 
last adopted by consensus on June 8, 1977.691  
The details on the behind-the-scenes negotiation of the simplified Second Protocol, to 
which some delegations referred as a “gentleman’s agreement,” are not known with 
precision and might be the subject of future research. But it is sufficiently clear that what 
emerged was the product of arduous Canadian and Pakistani efforts that, acting as 
moderates, liaised with their respective groups of influence and secured the adoption of a 
halfway compromise treaty they both saw as desirable and necessary. 
The Diplomatic Conference, in keeping with its contentious proceedings over four 
years, ended with drama when the NLMs requested that they should be allowed to sign 
the Final Act of the CDDH. After much protest from the West, anxious about the 
legitimating consequences of such a gesture, it was decided NLMs would sign a different 
piece of paper attached to the Final Act, to include the following disclaimer: “It is 
understood that the signature by these movements is without prejudice to the positions of 
participating States on the question of a precedent.”692 This provides a final piece of 
evidence of the power of legitimacy-related struggles and anxieties to which I have 
referred throughout.  
 
Conclusion 
The description and analysis offered here, as in the previous chapter on Common 
Article 3, has sought to make several points of theoretical importance to this dissertation. 
Most importantly, I have demonstrated once more how the combination of anxieties over 
political isolation, an inability to force an outcome through the vote, and the perceived 
dangers to image, social reputation and to the institution of the Geneva Conventions, 
socially coerced skeptics to accept some of the principal demands of the opposing 
                                                
691 Summary Record of the Fifty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, in Federal Political Department, Records 
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Volume 7. (Bern, 
Switzerland.) 
692 Federal Political Department, Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-
1977, Volume 1. (Bern, Switzerland.) 
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coalition. The fact that the coalition of Third World states held the voting majority and 
the legitimacy “trump card” of the right to self-determination (a card that Western states 
found it hard to reject in public for fear of appearing racist) was fundamental in securing 
the ultimate acceptance of wars of national liberation in the First Protocol. These 
conditions also helped the inclusion of generous POW protections for liberation fighters, 
but they were compounded –crucially-- by the flexible American stance, itself a product 
of the Vietnam experience, and by ICRC advice.  
The American example confirms a consistent finding: While in most cases “interests” 
(in this case domestic interests) did shape the initial public position of their delegations in 
Geneva, one cannot limit that conceptual category singly to self-interest. Moral and 
humanitarian concerns clearly mixed with security concerns and constant strategizing. 
The making of the Second Protocol provides further evidence of this. Despite the widely-
shared strong pull of national security against introducing rules for (non-liberation) 
internal conflicts, which toward the end of the Conference made that Protocol 
implausible, various groups of states nevertheless found a way to produce an instrument 
containing important additions to Common Article 3, albeit one applicable only to high-
level civil wars, through the sustained liaising of diplomats acting as strategic 
humanitarian brokers (Canada and Pakistan.) Exactly how and why those two strategic 
brokers operated behind the scenes to secure the acceptability of the Second Protocol 
remains unknown, but it is clear is that absent the humanitarian pressure to produce some 
set of rules applicable to the most prevalent type of armed conflict (a belief some held 
strongly during the Conference, even as they were in the minority,) this Protocol would 
not have seen the light of day. For this reason I also explain the negotiation of this 
instrument as the combined result of social pressure and mixed-motive strategic action.  
Writing about other international norm-setting processes occurring in the 1970s 
Stephen Krasner sentenced summarily: “Decolonization eroded American influence.”693 
This chapter supports but also qualifies this statement. To say that the Third World 
managed to socially coerce powerful Western states (the US included) does not mean that 
                                                
693 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism 
(University of California Press, 1985), 10. 
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these lost their strategic vision and their power. Rather, as illustrated here (and in Chapter 
3 with regard to Common Article 3,) under circumstances of social pressure the 
“coerced” Western states found deceptive ways to insert “antidotes” within the First 
Protocol hoping to “undo” the damage done by the language of national liberation. This 
may be a defensive and reactive form of power, but it is still a form of influence. (The US 
also held a clear leading role among its allies.) In the end, covert Western efforts 
succeeded, since the adoption of an article (Art. 96) setting an extremely high standard 
for NLMs, effectively prevented the First Protocol from ever applying to any such 
groups.  
Importantly, outcomes during the Diplomatic Conference with regard to the 
regulation of non-state armed actors proved disappointing and revealing. As shown, in 
the 1970s the majority coalition of African, Asian, Arab and Socialist states were more 
interested in privileging liberation movements than in placing restraints on their conduct. 
Western states’ opposite concern for avoiding the legitimatization and correlated 
empowerment of freedom fighters (or of rebels acting in non-liberation conflicts) 
foreclosed any genuine efforts to engage the groups that forced their way into the 
conference. Political distrust and an engrained belief among diplomats about non-state 
actors’ inability and unwillingness to respect the law did away with any opportunities for 
meaningful interaction. Western states also cynically/strategically discounted the 
humanitarian benefits that might come from adopting humanitarian law to liberation 
conflicts. National liberation movements’ reported loss of interest and widespread 
absence during the actual proceedings only reinforced Western lack of interest in 
producing instruments fit for those actors, and in the end, the cycle of distrust provoked 
states to introduce veiled safeguard mechanisms or “antidotes” referenced above. This 
was surely a missed opportunity, with regrettable humanitarian and political 
consequences. 
That said, the inclusion of these mechanisms enabled the West to set the liberation 
movements issue aside and continue negotiating a First Protocol with extremely 
important humanitarian contents (if only applicable to  “traditional” inter-state conflicts,) 
notably for the protection of civilians against the dangers of hostilities. This is crucial to 
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note because it suggests that (some) states’ deception strategies can and do mix with a 
serious interest in improving humanitarian rules, albeit in ways deemed expedient or at 
least marginally acceptable.  
On theoretical balance, given the demonstrated presence of strategic and instrumental 
concerns alongside social pressures, rationalist tools for understanding international legal 
design will remain useful. Yet what should not be assumed, as some analyses do, is that 
rational states acting collectively will more or less unproblematically produce “rationally 
efficient” outcomes. In short, the plurality and mixed nature of “interests,” as well as the 
types of social pressures described in this analysis, debunk simple behavioral 
assumptions and conclusions. The section on the tense, drawn-out, frustrating, and 
largely ineffective process of coordination among Western allies should --if anything-- 
serve to buttress this claim. 
In addition, the expectation that before coming to the negotiating room states will 
have figured out which type of “problem-structure” they will be faced with and hence 
will come ready to rationally craft flexible or imprecise language, has in this case turned 
out to be flat-out wrong. “Imprecision” here was the veiled result of sustained frustration, 
not the starting position of states. It was certainly a rational choice in the end, but also 
one made under strenuous circumstances of social pressure. What this suggests is that 
IL/IR scholars should not focus solely on studying outcomes but need to carefully 
investigate the process through which those outcomes are arrived at. Otherwise the 
portrait, and thus our understanding, of international law-making will be greatly distorted. 
Beyond these theoretical issues, it must be emphasized that the Additional Protocols 
were multidimensional conventions regulating state behavior across a number of areas. 
For reasons of space I left out of my discussion the plethora of other very contentious 
issues raised during negotiations: the protection of civilians; the regulation of combat 
practices; the design of various mechanisms of enforcement (reprisals, Protecting Powers, 
the optional Fact-Finding Commission for the First Protocol;) the definition of grave 
breaches and war crimes; reservations, etc. These are all matter for future research. Based 
on my preliminary analysis, however, I submit that many of these regulations emerged as 
compromise products of social coercion, that is, in a modified form that displeased 
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Western states but that, through a variety of textual techniques, ultimately safeguarded 
their interests. This suggests that the argument I have presented may have broader 
applicability. 
In the end, pressured compromises aside, Western states found much to like in the 
resulting treaties, particularly with regard to more “technical” aspects such as the 
protection of medical aircraft. The US delegation was particularly jubilant at the end of 
the Diplomatic Conference.694 The fact that among NATO states, at least in the 
immediate aftermath of the negotiations, the thorniest issues to hash out before 
ratification were not those relating to the scope of the First Protocol or prisoners of war, 
but rather to ensuring the exclusion of nuclear weapons and retaining the use of reprisals 
under limited circumstances, serve as additional evidence of this.695  
Indeed, over time the First and the Second Protocols have become widely accepted 
treaties, with 194 and 166 ratifications respectively, and many of the principles they 
embody, though initially controversial, seem to have taken root, even in the initially 
hesitating West. Although compliance patterns may leave much to be desired, for 
instance with respect to protecting civilians, the principles themselves now seem publicly 
and privately unquestionable in a way that they were not a half century ago. This suggests 
that, in spite of the deception tactics and sheer hypocrisy observed during the negotiation 
of these rules, with the passage of time and through the operation of other mechanisms 
(i.e. rule institutionalization via military training materials, normative “grafting” to other 
international treaties, or rule mobilization via international and domestic courts and 
publics,) they have become subject to a certain “decoupling from their origins,” with the 
                                                
694 George H. Aldrich, “New Life for the Laws of War,” American Journal of International Law 
75, no. 4 (1981): 764–783. The US government attitude toward ratification, eventually answered 
in the negative, is more complicated. Despite the fact that in 1977 the delegation at the 
Conference counted its results as a success, years later the Reagan administration decided to 
publicly decry Protocol I as “terrorist law” due to its treatment of national liberation wars and 
prisoners of war. This story is well (and bitterly) told by its principal protagonist, George Aldrich, 
in Aldrich, “Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.” Crucially, as noted earlier, Aldrich’s depiction of the pressures and deals made by 
the Americans at the CDDH corroborates the analysis presented in this chapter. 
695 The French recalcitrant attitude during negotiations survived the end of the CDDH, and they 
continued to be the most skeptical among NATO states, delaying the ratification of the First 
Protocol until 2001.  
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potential of changing not only shared values but material practices, especially in and 
among liberal democracies.  
The broadest and perhaps most obvious concluding point to make is that although 
understanding a rule’s origins is interesting and crucial, the story does not end there. 
Indeed, since the 1970s, with the growth and development of previous unsuspected trends 
in criminal law, the diffusion of ideas about the human rights responsibilities of non-state 
actors, and the spread of transitional justice, the world has witnessed what Sean 
MacBride had envisioned back in 1967, a mutually-reinforcing cross-pollination between 
three bodies of law previously thought distinct: international humanitarian law, 
international criminal law, and human rights. This provides a bridge to the next and final 
chapter of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 6: Norm Emergence Multiplied: The Intertwining of International 
Humanitarian, Criminal and Human Rights Law (1977-The Present) 
 
I. Introduction 
Legal scholar Sandesh Sivakumaran recently claimed that “until the early 1990s, 
there was a minimum of international law rules applicable to internal armed conflict. 
Today, the situation has changed almost beyond recognition with a healthy body of 
international law applicable to internal armed conflict.”696 The hyperbole of this 
statement can hardly escape the reader of this long dissertation. Sivakumaran is correct to 
say, however, that by the time the “Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts” 
(CDDH) closed in 1977, the treaty rules governing internal conflicts were rather slim 
relative to those regulating international war. As shown in the previous chapter, the 
Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions complemented important aspects 
of Common Article 3, but stricter conditions of application (“threshold”) formally 
undercut its potential. And although the First Protocol contemplated robust legal 
protections for wars of national liberation qua international conflicts, the Protocol never 
became applicable to any such situation, as cleverly anticipated by the Western 
delegations that privately rejected Article 1 and supported Article 96-- its so-called 
“antidote.”697  
By 2013 this legal landscape had certainly changed, and this chapter is an attempt to 
show how and why it has done so.698 The most contrasting aspect of the recent normative 
                                                
696 S. Sivakumaran, “Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict,” European 
Journal of International Law 22, no. 1 (April 2011): 219–264. 
697 Although various national liberation movements issued declarations of commitment to the First 
Protocol and the Geneva Conventions, these never entered into force formally because they did 
not meet the strict requirements set out in Article 96. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict, 221. 
698 Owing to the recent nature of these developments in this chapter I rely more heavily on 
secondary materials instead of primary documents. This limits the level of detail I was able to 
obtain in comparison to previous stages of norm emergence and development, particularly 
through confidential diplomatic documents. For this reason some of the claims I make here (for 
instance about the negotiations of the Rome Statute in the 1990s) remain tentative, and 
adjudicating on them with more precision will only be possible as archival documents become 
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transformation regarding internal conflicts with respect to the past is that it has come 
largely from several interpolating actors and sources operating more diffusely, alongside 
and within states, and not all strictly related to international humanitarian law. Whereas 
previous episodes of norm emergence usually originated through Red Cross initiatives 
(sometimes aided, as seen, by other non-governmental organizations like the International 
Commission of Jurists,) later re-shaped and codified by states in plenipotentiary 
diplomatic conferences, in the last three decades it is perhaps international (mostly 
criminal) tribunals drawing not only on treaty commitments but increasingly on 
arguments about customary law that have made most impact in developing the rules 
applicable to internal conflicts. The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) are two seminal examples.699 As shown 
below, the importance of these ad hoc courts was not only soon felt but also reinforced at 
the most transcendent treaty-making diplomatic encounter to occur since 1977: the 1998 
Rome Conference that established the International Criminal Court (ICC.)  
These and other international tribunals exemplify the “revival” and development of 
international criminal law “from above.”700 Yet bottom-up domestic demands for justice, 
truth, memory and reconciliation, inter alia, coincided and interacted with international 
dynamics and precedents. Since the early 1980s truth commissions emerged in the global 
South and began to proliferate as a mechanism of “transitional justice” in the aftermath of 
authoritarianism and of internal conflict around the world.701 Similarly, since the 1970s, 
in a somewhat quieter but persistent fashion, domestic human rights trials, propelled by 
victims’ demands, with support from local and foreign lawyers and NGOs, emerged in 
                                                                                                                                            
publicly available. I try to compensate for this lack whenever possible through the use of 
published participant memoirs and scholarly analyses. 
699 The International Court of Justice, existing since 1946, is another. 
700 Theodor Meron terms this the “criminalization” of international law. Theodor Meron, 
“International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,” American Journal of International Law 89, 
no. 3 (1995): 554–577. 
701 The seminal and most comprehensive account on the history and operation of truth 
commissions is Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge 
of Truth Commissions (Routledge, 2010). 
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Southern Europe and Latin America and swiftly diffused to most parts of the world. 
Foreign (sometimes civil) trials have accompanied this “justice cascade.”702  
Human rights (HR) doctrine and practice have also undergone important change, to 
become inter-connected with the law regulating internal conflicts. Regional human rights 
institutions in Latin America and Africa have in various reports and decisions 
increasingly relied on humanitarian law as normative source. United Nations bodies and 
UN-appointed “special rapporteurs” or representatives have left similar marks while 
working on various issues and country cases, simultaneously restating and (perhaps 
unwittingly) developing existing international law in ways that intertwine two normative 
bodies previously considered separate (HR and IHL.) For their part, following a period of 
learning and reflection, international human rights non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) began in the late 1970s and early 1980s to draw on international humanitarian 
law to complement their advocacy work in conflict areas, also expanding their focus to 
include the conduct of non-state armed actors over time. Other types of organizations 
(what one could call “engagement” NGOs,) have tried with apparent success to approach 
armed non-state actors directly to elicit their commitment to international norms, 
sometimes going beyond the internationally sanctioned legal instruments studied so far.  
The growing convergence and overlapping of the three normative regimes 
(humanitarian, human rights and criminal law,) originally envisioned in the 1960s by 
Séan MacBride, has increasingly led scholars to speak of a single body of norms: 
“atrocity” or “humanity” law.703 
This multiplication of relevant sources and entrepreneurs makes the task of scholars 
analyzing norm emergence more difficult than before. “Pinning down” exactly who is 
responsible for observed developments, ascertaining why this is so and how they have 
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operated to diffuse their ideas certainly becomes more elusive than when one 
organization more or less centralizes the process. But difficult does not mean impossible, 
and this chapter attempts to provide a step in that direction. Kathryn Sikkink, for 
example, has identified the seminal Greek, Portuguese and Argentine cases, victims and 
allies that shaped the initial demand for trials against officials of repressive regimes, 
eventually “chipping away” in important ways at the norm of sovereign immunity, with 
the correlated rise of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human rights 
violations.704 Priscilla Hayner has documented the rise and diffusion of truth 
commissions since the late 1970s and early 1980s.705  
In this chapter, while staying mindful of the “bottom-up” trends just noted, the focus 
lies upon the major international norm-setting developments over the past thirty years, 
that is, on those described earlier as coming “from above.”706 I argue that a great majority 
of these has emerged as the combined result of the work of various legal entrepreneurs 
and epistemic communities. One set of legal experts, dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
1974-1977 treaty-making experience with regard to internal conflicts and situations of 
troubles and disturbances, and after writing in some of the most influential international 
law journals and teaching at elite institutions, arrived at positions of international legal 
power that enabled them to propagate their ideas, particularly about the criminalization of 
abuses committed in internal conflicts. They did so by relying on at least four tactics of 
influence. First, they encouraged the progressive interpretation of existing black-letter 
treaties. Second, with the passage of time and the accumulation of legal precedents issued 
by various reputable international bodies, these lawyers argued for the attribution of 
“customary status” to various rules in internal conflicts, including parts of the much-
embattled Second Protocol. These tactics may be termed inter-institutional validation and 
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customification.707 Third, as said earlier, these scholars’ academic accolades and 
influence enabled them to arrive at some of the highest echelons of a reinvigorated 
international legal system, where their ideas gained traction and became embroidered in 
authoritative jurisprudence through opinions and decisions of lasting impact. I term this 
tactic normative re-inscription.  
The epistemic community of scholars-cum-judges was not operating alone. The ICRC 
itself appeared to share others’ disillusionment with formal treaty-making processes 
attempting to develop the body of humanitarian law, preferring to advance the existing 
framework through research initiatives and expert working groups, or through 
accompaniment and support of others’ law-making initiatives in related areas. The first of 
these methods resembles the ICRC tactic of convening experts commissions seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5, with a twist: through resort to arguments about customary law, the 
Swiss organization “side-stepped” larger interstate conferences as necessary end-points 
for norm emergence or revision processes. Although many reputed international 
audiences have embraced the revival of customary law and the circumventing of positive 
(treaty) law, some of these initiatives present a degree of uncertainty as to whether (and 
which/how many) actors effectively accept them as valid.  
For their part, international NGOs, scholars and legal institutions at various levels 
have also recently become protagonists of their own academic and policy debates on 
more expansive understandings of human rights as obligations, for example with regard 
to armed non-state actors. Moreover, in the face of challenges brought about by the “war 
on terror” since 2001, they have staunchly opposed skeptics’ charges about the 
inapplicability or inability of existing law, helping to maintain its legitimacy or engaging 
in processes of normative defense. 
                                                
707 I adopt the term “validation” from Theodor Meron, The Making of International Criminal 
Justice: A View from the Bench: Selected Speeches (Oxford University Press, 2011), 242. I am 
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Given the plethora of “alternative” pathways to norm emergence outlined above, 
some of which (at least initially) “skip” explicit state sanction, the focus and arguments 
of this chapter differ from preceding ones. This is not to say that states have not been part 
and parcel of the stories told below, either as supporters or as gatekeepers, and their role 
and attitude are examined whenever relevant. Yet the fact remains that, with the 
exception of a few weapons-related treaties and the negotiation of the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC, analyzed here,) the importance of 
Diplomatic Conferences as traditional mechanisms for humanitarian law-making has 
diminished, and diffuse, transnational standard-setting has prevailed.708  
This being said, in this chapter I make efforts to show how central points made earlier 
retain their applicability and “carry over.” For instance, and since transnational norm-
setters obviously have not operated in a contextual vacuum, I again highlight the 
demonstration or “shock” effects exerted by war atrocities in the spurring of norm 
expansion episodes. I also argue that social coercion may have plausibly operated in the 
negotiations that established the International Criminal Court in 1998. Finally, I continue 
to insist on the importance of states’ fear of legal legitimization in this issue-area, which 
though somewhat effaced in recent years, continues to pervade the debate on the alleged 
human rights responsibilities of non-state actors, or human rights and terrorism. With the 
respect to the latter, and given prominent debates about the impact of transnational 
terrorism and counterterrorism policy on the robustness on “humanity law” since 2001, I 




                                                
708 Arguably the only “core” such instance is the 1998 Rome Conference leading to the creation of 
the International Criminal Court. However, I do not wish to overstate the “separation” between 
different types of issues/instruments on human rights, weaponry, criminal or humanitarian law 
and the conferences that produced them in the post-1977 period since the central point of this 
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That said, I believe it is also correct to characterize the Rome Conference as the one most directly 
developing the “Geneva” line of regulations (the Conventions and its Additional Protocols) by 
finally introducing permanent international criminal accountability for the grave breaches and 
war crimes that long figured in those treaties. 
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II. The Aftermath of the CDDH 
As shown in the last chapter, the Second Protocol that emerged in 1977 was a 
compromise text that disappointed the aspirations of many. Sympathetic readers, 
however, found that “in terms of rights stated” it constituted a “significant advance” over 
the contents of Common Article 3 and various human rights instruments.709 The biggest 
letdown dealt with its high threshold, which made it inapplicable to proliferating low-
intensity internal conflicts. Among concerned audiences there seemed to be a certain 
disillusionment with diplomatic conferences as mechanism to reaffirm and revise the law: 
“International lawmaking and various diplomatic conferences, for example, the 
conference that adopted the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, 
have, on the whole, been unsympathetic toward extending the protective rules applicable 
to international wars to civil wars- an attitude that has dampened prospects for redress 
through orderly treaty making. Because conferences often make decisions by consensus 
and try to fashion generally acceptable texts, even a few recalcitrant governments may 
prevent the adoption of more enlightened provisions.”710  
 
 This aftertaste soon led to renewed interest in normative development, through other 
means. Two prominent scholars who had participated in some official capacity during the 
1970s treaty-making episode, Antonio Cassese and Theodor Meron, offered two different 
alternatives for such development.711 In a chapter of a book he edited in 1979 assessing 
the then-new law of armed conflict, Cassese offered the following words regarding the 
attitude of scholars in the future, worth quoting at length:  
“I submit that those who have the lot of humanitarian law at heart should not 
overemphasize the deficiencies and pitfalls of the Protocols. Stressing the (inevitable) 
demerits and loopholes of these international instruments can only lead to increased 
skepticism about international humanitarian law… I therefore believe that scholars… 
should do their utmost to strengthen the possible role of these momentous treaties… 
Legal scholars can serve a useful purpose in their expert capacity as well, by 
                                                
709 Charles Lysaght, “The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments,” American University Law 
Review 9 (1983). Charles Lysaght had been part of the Irish Delegation to the CDDH, which had 
shown support for a Second Protocol with fewer conditions for application.  
710 Meron, “International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,” 555. 
711 Meron had acted as Legal Advisor for the Israeli Foreign Ministry at the initial ICRC 
preparatory meetings of experts. Cassese had formed part of the Italian delegation, which 
supported a strong Second Protocol with few conditions for application and substantive protective 
content, opposing the conservatism of Western-colonial powers like Britain and France. 
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propounding interpretations of the Protocols that aim at emphasizing the humanitarian 
purpose of their rules. As neither international law in general nor the Protocols 
themselves entrust anybody with the task of giving authoritative interpretations of their 
provisions, there is much room in this area for forward-looking jurists. The Protocols 
offer much space for interpretation… many rules… are therefore open to divergent 
interpretations.”712  
 
For his part, in a 1983 article tellingly entitled “On the Inadequate Reach of 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument,” Theodor 
Meron proposed formulating a single set of “minimum” fundamental guarantees to 
account for the gaps found in humanitarian and human rights instruments.713 “It would… 
appear that the international community needs a short, simple, and modest instrument to 
state an irreducible and nonderogable core of human rights that must be applied at a 
minimum in situations of internal strife and violence (even of low intensity) that are akin 
to armed conflicts.”714 Meron envisioned, as a first step, a “solemn declaration, which 
would not require formal accession or ratification by states.”715  
This particular idea was not new, as the ICRC had itself proposed a similar 
declaratory alternative in 1971-2 after states made it clear they would not accept binding 
rules for internal “troubles” and disturbances.716 But resubmitted a few years after the 
CDDH Meron’s proposal was welcomed by scholars in other places and eventually 
crystallized in 1990 declaration approved by a group of distinguished experts meeting in 
                                                
712 Antonio Cassese, “A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and the New Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict,” in The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, ed. Antonio Cassese (Editoriale 
scientifica, 1979), 500–501. Italics are mine. 
713 In 1983 the ratification of the human rights covenants and of the Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions was still fledging, further punctuating the need for alternative sources of 
protection. In addition, states could file declarations, interpretations or reservations that limited 
the impact of these instruments, which worried norm proponents. 
714 Theodor Meron, “On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the 
Need for a New Instrument,” The American Journal of International Law 77, no. 3 (1983): 589–
606; Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Strife: Their International Protection 
(Grotius Publications, 1987). 
715 Meron, “On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a 
New Instrument,” 606. 
716 ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts Geneva, 24 May - 12 June 1971, 
Vol. V - Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts. 
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Turku (Finland.) The “Turku/Abo Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards” 
was inserted into the agenda of the UN Sub-commission and Commission of Human 
Rights in the 1990s, where it was kept alive until 2005 without successfully transcending 
elsewhere.717  
Ultimately, the “Cassese” approach prevailed. Beyond proposing progressive 
scholarly interpretation, Cassese soon began taking steps through his own writing toward 
clarifying the aspects of international humanitarian law that could be said to represent 
customary law for internal conflicts despite being contained in treaty instruments not 
universally applied like Common Article 3, or not yet widely ratified like the Second 
Protocol.718 This is what one may call a customification tactic.719 The latter factor 
weighed particular heavily given the contentiousness of the Additional Protocols, which 
threatened to foreclose or delay their formal ratification. By the end of 1982, only 27 
states had ratified the First Protocol, and 23 the Second.720  
Some clarifications regarding contemporary international customary law are 
warranted before moving ahead. The first is that it has undergone important 
transformation since the nineteenth century. With regard to internal conflicts in 
particular, doctrines of belligerence fell out of use, and since its adoption in 1949, 
Common Article 3 has provided the basic treaty-based standard for non-international 
conflicts. (The question posed in the 1980s, as seen below, was whether CA3 also 
constituted customary law.) Second, contemporary customary law has a special status in 
international law, namely that states cannot “opt in” or “out” of it at will. Rules that attain 
customary status are considered fundamental (“peremptory”) international principles 
                                                
717 Martin Scheinin, “Turku/Abo Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1990,) 
Workshop ‘Standard-setting: Lessons Learned for the Future,’ Geneva, 13-14 February 2005” 
(International Council on Human Rights Policy and International Commission of Jurists, 2005). 
718 Antonio Cassese, “The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 
and Humanitarian Law,” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 3 (1984): 55–118. 
719 Historian and ICRC member François Bugnion agrees that Antonio Cassese must be given 
credit as one of the earliest authoritative voices claiming the customary status of humanitarian 
law for internal conflicts. François Bugnion, “Customary International Humanitarian Law,” 
African Yearbook of International Law (2008): n. 85.  
720 This ratification data comes from Meron, “On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument,” 591. 
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from which derogation is not possible. This gives them a particularly important place in 
the family of international norms. Third, international lawyers usually look to two 
sources to ascertain whether a given rule has attained customary law status: the 
consistency and density of relevant state practice with respect to said rule, and the opinio 
juris, or the statements of highly-regarded or authoritative bodies that indicate general 
normative acceptance. In the area of humanitarian law, as seen below, many international 
lawyers and tribunals, at least initially, tended to emphasize opinio juris over patterns of 
practice, and they have generally held abusive conduct to be the exception, not the 
norm.721  
Writing in 1984 with the goal of suggesting an initial list of customary rules for 
internal conflicts, Cassese opined that the “most innovative” provisions of the Second 
Protocol, as well as those that had elicited the most resistance during the CDDH, might 
not yet have attained that status. Among these figured the guarantees to be accorded to 
children; the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; 
the protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces; and the prohibition 
on the forced movement of civilians.722  
These and other important exclusions aside, Cassese drew a list of customary rules for 
internal conflicts that was far from negligible: the contents of Common Article 3 had in 
his view clearly attained the status of peremptory norms, as well as the provisions of the 
Second Protocol that seemed to “improve” or develop the general principles of CA3, for 
instance the prohibition of denying quarter or the “indirect regulation of the conduct of 
hostilities” such as the ban on deliberate attacks on civilian populations. Cassese was 
                                                
721 There has been some resistance to this move to customary law among equally prominent legal 
scholars. Frits Kalshoven has for example expressed skepticism about whether customary law can 
bind non-state actors in internal conflicts, or whether their practices should or should not be 
considered customary law as well. Frits Kalshoven, “Development of Customary Law of Armed 
Conflict,” in Reflections on the Law of War: Collected Essays (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007), 321. Kalshoven, it should be noted, was a crucial figure during the CDDH as 
part of the Dutch delegation, and remains one of the foremost IHL experts alive. Likely for other 
(i.e. political) reasons, key states such as the United States and Israel have joined in the 
skepticism regarding the customary status of certain parts of IHL with regard to internal conflicts, 
especially the regulation of hostilities.  
722 Cassese, “The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and 
Humanitarian Law,” 57. 
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aware that states and rebels had at times failed to apply these rules in practice, but 
asserted that this did “not disprove the general character of the rule.”723 Furthermore, 
with regard to Common Article 3, he claimed that “even when it was disregarded in 
practice, no State admitted violating it” such that “it seems… it has become legally 
impossible for any State to deny the applicability of those fundamental safeguards to civil 
strife.”724 This argumentative strategy would recur later on.  
Cassese’s idea were soon echoed in 1986 in part by a landmark opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua vs. the United States, which 
among others determined that Common Article 3 represented “elementary considerations 
of humanity.”725 Although the case did not specifically require the Court to rule on the 
application of the Geneva Conventions, the sitting judges considered it appropriate to 
bring in a brief discussion of CA3 as the “minimum yardstick” for armed conflicts, 
whether internal or international, deeming it a “fundamental general principle of 
international humanitarian law.”726 
Later jurisprudence time and time again referenced this opinion as a real watershed. 
In 1987, however, and at the time still preferring the “non-binding” standard-setting 
approach, Theodor Meron fiercely critiqued the Court’s decision “for the virtual absence 
of discussion of the evidence and reasons supporting this conclusion,” as well as the 
strategy of deeming certain rules to be customary law without judicious attention to 
counter-practices. In his view, “the teleological desire to solidify the humanizing content 
of the humanitarian norms clearly affects the judicial attitudes underlying the 
"legislative" character of the judicial process” such that courts “tribunals have been 
guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by the degree of offensiveness of certain 
                                                
723 Cassese, “The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and 
Humanitarian Law,” 55. 
724 Cassese, “The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and 
Humanitarian Law,” 55. 
725 In 1984 Nicaragua sued the United States for aiding Salvadorean paramilitary groups (the 
“Contras”) in their effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan socialist government. The court ruled 
against the United States, which withdrew from the Court and refused to pay the damages 
determined by the court. See I.C.J., 14 - Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Vs. United States of America), 1986. 
726 See Ibid. Especially para. 216-220. 
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acts to human dignity; the more heinous the act, the more the tribunal will assume that it 
violates not only a moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary 
law.”727  
Although critical of it, Meron acknowledged that this “method cannot but influence 
future consideration of customary law in various fields, including the Geneva 
Conventions.” Moreover: 
“Despite perplexity over the reasoning and, at times, the conclusions of a tribunal, states 
and scholarly opinion in general will probably accept judicial decisions confirming the 
customary law character of some of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as 
statements of the law. Eventually, the focus of attention will shift from the inquiry into 
whether certain provisions reflect customary law to the judicial decisions establishing 
that status.”728 
 
Meron was prescient: the customification tactic with regard to internal conflicts 
endured, and although he continued to urge other tribunals should pursue it in more 
rigorous fashion than the International Court of Justice in 1986, he embraced the tactic in 
short order through the study of the complementarity between human rights and 
humanitarian law.729  
Until the late 1980s, however, the ideas of Cassese, Meron and others remained but 
prominent scholarly opinions published in academic journals and books. It was unclear 
whether and how they would actually make a dent in “actual” customary law. Meron 
continued attempting to persuade broader audiences of his project of a minimum 
declaration of standards. However, as shown below, it was only through the tragic events 
that occurred a few years later, and the impressive impetus they provided both 
normatively and institutionally, that these ideas definitely transformed the outlook of the 
international law of internal conflicts.730 
 
                                                
727 Theodor Meron, “The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law” 81, no. 2 (1987): 362.  
728 Ibid, 363. Italics are mine. 
729 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Clarendon 
Press, 1989).  
730 Exactly how Meron and Cassese later came to occupy the positions of international legal 
power they did (described below) and why their ideas (and not others’) resonated so strongly at 
the time, remains subject of future research.  
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III. Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Criminalization of International Law 
With end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, ethnic tensions in the 
Balkans heightened.  Multiple conflicts erupted within a disintegrating Yugoslavia as 
different regions sought to secede; an emboldened Serbia attacked Slovenia and Croatia 
in 1991, and later nationalist Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats in 
Bosnia. By mid-July 1992 1.1 million people had been killed, and when the war ended in 
1995, the figure had reached 200.000 victims.731 
In 1992 as in the 1940s and 1960-70s, publicity of the atrocities committed prompted 
proposals for action. Western states hesitated and ultimately proved unwilling to 
intervene military to curb the violence. That year various international expert and NGO 
reports (Human Rights Watch, notably) coincided in calling for the creation of an 
international tribunal to punish war criminals and genocidaires. Soon the idea of such a 
court, which had a much longer history, regained traction.732 In May 25, 1993 the UN 
Security Council, acting under the Chapter VII of the Charter, unanimously adopted 
Resolution 827 establishing an International Criminal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY,) 
the first such tribunal since World War II. The Security Council tasked the ICTY with 
prosecuting four types of offenses: 1) Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; 
2) violations of the laws and customs of war; 3) genocide; 4) crimes against humanity.  
Two years later, after genocide in Rwanda had become painfully evident in the spring 
of 1994 and multilateral military intervention was (again) not forthcoming, the Security 
Council agreed to create a second tribunal to deal with the atrocities committed there.733 
                                                
731 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 210. In this section 
I draw from Bass’ narration of these events. 
732 The story behind the emergence of the ICTY (and other ad hoc tribunals) is more complex and 
told at length elsewhere. See Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals; Michael J. Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: 
NGOs, Discourse, and Agency (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
733 That humanitarian intervention was not pursued and instead international ad hoc criminal 
measures were taken to address the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggests that 
there was a political “underbelly” in the turn to international justice in the early 1990s, at least by 
the states sitting in the UN Security Council. This is another crucial link of the story to which I 
cannot devote sufficient attention in this dissertation. See, however, Bass, Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals; Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: 
The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals.” Various explanations for the unanimity of decision 
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Unlike with the ICTY, the 1994 resolution establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) expressly determined that the court had jurisdiction over 
“serious violations” of Common Article 3 and the Second Protocol. This was another 
watershed moment in the history of international law, since this resolution became the 
first instance in which atrocities committed in internal wars were explicitly criminalized. 
The importance of this cannot be overstated: Only twenty years before, while negotiating 
the Additional Protocols, speaking of war crimes during in internal conflicts was thought 
incongruous and out of the question.734 
And yet whether this Resolution could be deemed applicable to cases beyond Rwanda 
remained unclear— after all, one statement did not customary law make.  
This uncertainty was soon mitigated. In October 1995 the ICTY, through the Appeals 
Chamber presided a now Judge Antonio Cassese, delivered another landmark decision in 
the context of a challenge brought by the defense of Dusko Tadic, a presumed Bosnian 
war criminal. Tadic’s appeal questioned the tribunal’s jurisdiction over acts committed in 
internal conflicts, arguing that its founding charter only authorized it to prosecute abuses 
perpetrated in international conflicts, and since violations of Common Article 3 were not 
technically “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, the ICTY could not proceed.735 
The Appeals Chamber responded that while internal atrocities could not be deemed grave 
breaches, they could still constitute “violations of the law and customs of war,” a distinct 
category of acts considered under a separate article of the Tribunal’s charter. By resorting 
to an argument about the customary nature of Common Article 3, the tribunal set a clear 
legal precedent that would resonate in later decisions.  
The touch of Antonio Cassese was evident here. Years later he told an interviewer 
that during discussions about the ICC:  
                                                                                                                                            
behind these Security Council resolutions might be tentatively offered: 1) That there was a rush 
motif whereby the major powers, in a desire to avoid military intervention, created a “less” costly 
legal mechanism but not fully foresee what the consequences of the ICTY and ICTR might be; 
and/or that the tribunals’ narrow geographical reach served to allay their political-sovereigntist 
risk-aversion. I thank Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for noting these points. 
734 Rudolph 2001.  
735 George H. Aldrich, “Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,” American Journal of International Law 90, no. 1 (1996): 64–69. 
  312 
“I was told there was also this fear of the ‘Cassese approach’, namely judges 
overdoing it, becoming dangerous by, say, producing judgments that can be innovative. 
For example, at the ICTY, we said for the first time that war crimes could also be 
committed in internal armed conflicts. This was breaking new ground. You go beyond 
the black letter of the law because you look at the spirit of law.”736 
    
The entrepreneurial, “overactive” role of prominent legal scholars-cum-judges like 
Cassese had thus proved essential to the development of the regulation of internal 
conflict. 
The Tadic decision brought with it another crucial innovation. As some noted at the 
time, in its response to Tadic’s claims, instead of asserting its jurisdiction in internal 
conflicts with recourse to customary law, the ICTY Appeals Chamber could have simply 
determined that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was international. This would have 
resolved the controversy in that particular case and allowed the tribunal to continue 
pursuing its work without entering the murky waters of determining conflict status. Yet a 
further response by Tadic’s defense, claiming that in fact no armed conflict was taking 
place at the time in the former Yugoslavia, enabled the judges to take the daring step of 
providing a positive definition of armed conflict, as one occurring “whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”737  
This phrasing, credited directly to Presiding ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese, became 
immediately noteworthy.738 Recall that Common Article 3 famously featured a “vague 
but generous,” negative notion of internal conflict (as “armed conflicts not of an 
international character,”) while the Second Protocol came with several restrictions related 
to territorial control, organization, and actors’ ability to carry out sustained attacks and to 
respect the law. In contrast, this ICTY definition offered some parameters (“protraction” 
                                                
736 Cassese as interviewed in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons, The Prosecutor and 
the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese - Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam 
University Press, 2010), 52–53. 
737 ICTY, “The Prosecutor V. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995,” 1995, para. 70. 
738 Colin Warbrick and Peter Rowe, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The 
Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case,” 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 03 (January 1996): 697. 
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and “organization”) without an indication that these had to reach the high levels of the 
Protocol, and dropping territorial control. The ICTY definition also included, for the first 
time, violent conflicts between non-state armed groups within the same state, long 
considered a gap in the black letter law of treaties.  
The most prominent international legal circles immediately seized upon the Tadic 
text, considering it, alongside the ICTR statute, to herald the new era of the 
criminalization of internal atrocities. Meron himself, a former critic, now agreed that this 
decision demonstrated “the renewed vitality of customary law in the development of the 
law of war.” In his view, “the clarification of customary law on this subject is the most 
important normative contribution of the decision.”739 Providing support for the claim 
made here about how critical the move to prominent judicial settings has been in the field 
of humanitarian law, the Tadic opinion continued to make waves over the following 
years. Conversely, the ICTY definition of conflict, as will be immediately shown, would 
soon play a crucial role during the creation of the ICC, reflecting the normative re-
inscription looping from international tribunals back to traditional inter-state 
negotiations.740 
Before moving forward, and given the important norm-entrepreneurial roles Antonio 
Cassese and Theodor Meron played on the developments studied in this first section, 
some elaboration may be warranted as to their influence after the mid-1990s. Cassese was 
the President of the ICTY until 1997 and continued acting as a judge of the same tribunal 
until 2000. Later the UN Secretary General elected him as Chairperson of the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, after whose report the Security Council referred the 
case to the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity against both the government and various armed non-state actors. He was also 
the first President of the UN Special Tribunal for the Lebanon from 2009 until his death 
                                                
739 Theodor Meron, “The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International 
Humanitarian Law,” American Journal of International Law 90, no. 2 (1996): 238–9. 
740 There is some debate among international lawyers regarding the differential importance given 
to the statements and decisions of various international courts. The “hierarchy” of decisions 
among various judicial institutions is key, and still contested, at the international level. I cannot 
delve into this complex discussion here, but I thank Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for bringing it to my 
attention. 
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in 2011. He was extensively published in his academic career and taught at the University 
of Florence and the European University Institute, among others. 
Theodor Meron has been especially prolific throughout his career in the leading 
academic journals and presses in international law. Since the 1990s he has likewise 
played important practitioner roles. He served a member of the US Delegation to the 
Rome Conference establishing the ICC in 1998, where he was involved in the drafting of 
provisions on war crimes and crimes against humanity. In 2000-2001 he was Counselor 
on International Law in the US State Department. In March 2001 the UN General 
Assembly appointed him as judge to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, serving in the Appeals 
Chamber to both the ICTY and ICTR. He has been twice President of the ICTY (2003-
2005 and 2011-present.) 
These credentials speak for themselves, and many of the decisions taken by these and 
other ad hoc tribunals after the seminal Tadic case have made contributions to the general 
development of humanitarian law through progressive interpretation, often building and 
drawing upon earlier precedents (inter-institutional validation.) The aim here is not to list 
all such contributions exhaustively, but rather to make the point that these international 
lawyers, naturally operating alongside many other colleagues in these and other judicial 
institutions, have played a crucial role in the emergence and extension of the international 
rules governing internal armed conflicts. Let me now turn to one particularly crucial 
instance of the tactic of normative re-inscription, inspired precisely on the ideas of Meron 
and Cassese: the inclusion of atrocities committed in internal conflicts in the Rome 
Statute establishing the ICC. 
 
IV. The International Criminal Court 
Throughout the first half decade of the 1990s the United Nations’ International Law 
Commission (ILC) had discussed the establishment of an international criminal court. 
Though the idea of such a tribunal was over a century old, these immediate efforts were 
the result of a proposal by Trinidad and Tobago for addressing drug trafficking from 
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1989.741 This request paralleled work within the UN on a “Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind.” Together these initiatives evolved into a full-fledged 
draft statute for an international court by 1994.742 The tragedies of Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda experiences, thus by the ICTY and ICTR, no doubt propelled and quickened the 
process.743  
The 1994 ILC draft statute, however, did not include references crimes in non-
international conflict. According to the chairman of the Working Group, Cambridge 
Professor James Crawford, the team of experts behind the draft “had set its sights low” 
due to fears of states’ reactions to such a radical encroachment on sovereignty.744 Some 
have noted that “the drafting of the Rome Statute was, in fact, ‘contrary to the trend in 
many other negotiations in which the initial draft is often watered down to accommodate 
a variety of State positions, in this case, the Statute adopted in Rome is much stronger 
than the ILC Draft in many significant respects.’”745  
One of these respects was the inclusion of internal atrocities. During the discussions 
of an Ad Hoc Committee of states established in 1994 by the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) to further consider the idea of a court, participants disagreed about the inclusion 
of these crimes, opting temporarily to simply refer to the ambiguous category of “war 
crimes” without specifying what these were or where they were committed. This 
controversy arose again in the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) set up by the UNGA in 
1995. By then, however, and with the precedents set by the ICTR founding Resolution 
and the ICTY’s Tadic decision, it became increasingly difficult to delay the conversation. 
Amnesty International, an international human rights NGO, had recently argued in a 
                                                
741 In this section I am drawing on William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a 
Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
742 For a description of the background behind these efforts since the 1970s, and the crucial role 
of Cherif Bassiouni in them, see Sikkink 2011a, chap. 6. 
743 In the early 1990s The US and UK also entertained the idea of a criminal tribunal to deal with 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, upon which European states seized later on. To that extent, the 
eventual ICC has roots in the interests of both powerful Western and less developed countries like 
Trinidad and Tobago. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, 12–13. 
744 Ibid, 18. 
745 Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson cited in Ibid. 
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briefing paper on the ILC Draft (around its time of presentation before the UN General 
Assembly) that “it would be unthinkable for any permanent international court” to omit 
crimes against Common Article 3 or the Second Protocol, letting off the hook the 
perpetrators of atrocities in the most prevalent type of armed conflict.746 NGO pressure 
mounted ever since 1994, transforming in a very short time into a broader network of 
actors bent on the establishment of a robust ICC, known as the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC.)747 The CICC worked insistently on influencing 
state delegations to improve (from their perspective) the design of the court, with 
noticeable impacts as scholars have suggested.748  
In 1995 states sitting in the PrepCom held diverse views on the subject. The US 
proposed a three-part typology: category “one comprised of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions (but not [the First Protocol,]) category two consisted of ‘other serious 
violations’ committed in international armed conflict, and category three covered serious 
breaches of Common Article 3 (but not of [the Second Protocol.])”749 Others like 
Switzerland and Sweden suggested incorporating certain provisions drawn from the 
Second Protocol, without mentioning the treaty itself. The American proposal endured, 
but the third category (on internal atrocities) was nevertheless put in square brackets as 
optional. Later, the PrepCom further divided this third category on internal conflicts into 
two: one for violations of CA3, and another for “other serious violations,” reserved for 
the texts inspired in the Second Protocol. Importantly, as William Schabas notes, this 
division “reflected to some extent, a substantive distinction between ‘Geneva law’ and 
‘Hague law,’ the former concerning victims of armed conflict… the latter concerning 
means and methods of warfare.”750 It is noteworthy, however, that in the resulting draft 
statute both categories were put in square brackets, continuing with the “prudent” 
                                                
746 This comes from a 1994 memorandum/report from Amnesty International, cited in Struett, The 
Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency, 91. 
747 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, http://www.iccnow.org/  
748 See especially Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, 
Discourse, and Agency; Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of 
Persuasion in the ICC Case.” 
749 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome Statute, 197. 
750 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome Statute, 197. 
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approach of the ILC. By 1998 it was thus unclear whether the eventual ICC would 
actually address internal conflicts. NGO pressure on states through the CICC (with 
around 500 participating organizations) had risen dramatically by this point, however, 
which undoubtedly worked to counteract the caution shown by the ILC and the PrepCom. 
The Diplomatic Conference opened in Rome on June 15 of that year. Three weeks 
into the month-long negotiations, the Chair of the “Committee of the Whole” and head of 
the Canadian delegation, Philippe Kirsch prompted his colleagues to express their 
countries’ views, among others, on whether the sections on crimes within internal 
conflicts should be included and what the threshold would be set for them.  
Nearly a hundred diplomats spoke in succession on this topic on July 8, 1998. The 
positions revealed in these statements certainly would have surprised the members of ILC 
and PrepCom years prior: the great majority (59) of the delegations expressed unqualified 
support for the inclusion of all the forms of internal atrocities under consideration, with 
several deeming this an “essential” decision for the credibility of the court. A non-
negligible minority (25) expressed some doubts about this attribution, but of it roughly a 
third (9) declared itself completely opposed; the rest were either “open” to consider 
alternatives or seemed only truly allergic to the inclusion of crimes directly inspired on 
the Second Protocol, that is, violations of the means and methods of war. 
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Table 6.1. Opinions on Including Internal Atrocities in the ICC Statute, 1998751 
First Debate, Rome Conference, July 1998 - Opinions Expressed (Not a Vote) 
  Should Internal Atrocities (drawn from CA3 and the Second Protocol) be included in the Rome Statute? 
Yes 
Andorra, Australia ,Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Mali, Malta, Namibia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, UK, 
Uruguay, USA, Venezuela 
Only partially, or with amendments 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Comoros, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nepal, 
Russia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen 
Definitely Not Algeria, Burundi, India, Iraq, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
 
Any analysis of these debates must begin by noting how striking an outcome this was. 
That by 1998 states overwhelmingly supported something they had found absurd just 
twenty years prior no doubt evinced a transformation of international society. This 
change of opinion owed much to the legal precedents set decades earlier, to the more 
recent creation of the ICTY and ICTR and to the tragic spectacle of internal violence that 
plagued the 1990s. Yet these changes themselves were embedded in broader, interrelated 
global transformations, among others: 1) the “third wave” of democratization and the 
attendant decline of authoritarianism; 2) the demise of formal empire; 3) the end of the 
Cold War and the ebb of “proxy warfare”; 4) the endurance of political, economic and 
security communities in Europe and elsewhere; 5) the rise of human rights in world 
                                                
751 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II (New 
York: United Nations, 2002). 
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politics, helped in no small measure by the striking proliferation and interlocking of 
domestic and international advocacy groups.752  
These global and domestic changes, not surprisingly, had an effect on the balance of 
power and purpose within international negotiations. A more detailed study of states’ 
positions bears this out. To begin, this time no Western country opposed the provision. In 
particular, former colonial powers France and Britain no longer played the conspicuous 
role of dismissing the regulation of internal conflicts as an intrusion in their sovereignty. 
The minority of staunch opponents was formed almost entirely of authoritarian states 
(including Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Libya,) many of which were facing 
unrest at home. Formal but “conflicted” democracies such as India, Sri Lanka or Turkey, 
also facing long-standing armed turmoil, joined them.753 Yet crucially, and in contrast 
with what had transpired during the CDDH, a few fragile African states also combating 
rebels, among them Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, pleaded emphatically for the 
inclusion of internal atrocities; the Bissau-Guinean delegate explicitly claimed that he 
attached “prime importance” to this issue “since his country continued to suffer from 
non-international conflicts.”754  
On balance, there seemed to be a split between weaker conflict-ridden states that had 
trouble countering rebellions militarily at home (which were ready to commit their 
internal affairs to the Court’s jurisdiction,) and stronger authoritarian states better able to 
clamp down rebels (which rejected the idea.) Yet as noted earlier, voices for total deletion 
were the utter exception: even Syria, Sudan, Yemen and China showed a measure of 
                                                
752 See among many others, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
20th Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., 
Security Communities (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond 
Borders. 
753 On the concept of “conflicted democracies,” see Fionnuala Ni Aoláin and Colm Campbell, 
“The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies,” Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 
172–213; Moira K. Lynch, “Seeking Justice During War: Accountability in Conflicted 
Democracies,” Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science (University of Minnesota, 2012). Turkey 
and Sri Lanka did not speak in the July 8 debate but later revealed their staunch opposition to the 
proposal for inclusion. 
754 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II, 
Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 
312. 
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moderation by suggesting that the criterion of “total state collapse” could allow for the 
triggering of the clause, or that only certain crimes (inspired in Common Article 3) might 
be considered, but not those arising from Second Protocol. In sum, these positions 
revealed that the real discussion was truly about how, not whether to include these crimes 
in the statute.  
Similar to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference then, in 1998 social pressures in Rome 
worked for and not against the regulation of internal conflicts (as they had in 1974-1977.) 
Subsequent developments in the debate allow for an assessment of this claim. Noticing 
the resistance of the minority with respect to the crimes inspired on the Second Protocol, 
the Bureau of the Conference proposed modifying the threshold of application, to read as 
follows:  
“Section D of this article applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and 
thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed 
conflicts that take place in a territory of a State Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations.” 
 
The reader may notice that this text is lifted in its entirety from the (demanding) 
Article 1 of the Second Protocol. One might have expected that this phrasing, sticking so 
closely to the highly conditional scope of the treaty from which the controversial crimes 
were drawn, might have been welcomed in Rome as an expedient compromise. Yet upon 
its presentation in public, most delegates were unhappy: of the 39 who spoke, only 3 
(China, Jordan, and Indonesia) dared express some support for it. For the great majority 
the new text was quite unsatisfactory: those endorsing a progressive approach (22) found 
it too limiting of the Court’s scope, while the rest were divided between those advocating 
partial or total elimination of the proposal (the latter being the utter minority position.) 
There appeared to be little room for persuasion between supporters and detractors of 
inclusion, but deletion also seemed foreclosed. 
A second compromise emerged during the debate. The Sierra Leonean delegate, Fode 
M. Dabor, noting how “very restrictive” the proposed threshold was (since it effectively 
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excluded his country’s ongoing conflict,) suggested that the category of internal atrocities 
inspired in the Second Protocol apply to "armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a 
State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups."755 
This formulation reproduces almost verbatim the Tadic definition of armed conflict 
issued by the ICTY, studied earlier.756 This Sierra Leonean compromise drew public 
praise from a few delegations and was ultimately incorporated into the final text 
approved of the Rome Statute on July 17, the closing day of the Conference. 
The available records do not yet allow for a detailed study of the behind-the-scenes 
politics at Rome as in the negotiations of the Geneva Conventions or the Additional 
Protocols decades prior. Assessing with empirical certainty which social mechanisms 
worked to produce the observed outcome thus becomes difficult at this time. However, 
one can with some plausibility suggest that social coercion produced by the persistent, 
overwhelming majority of states pressing for the inclusion of internal atrocities in the 
Rome Statute was operative on the skeptics. There is also the possibility, as some 
scholars studying other aspects of Rome negotiations have suggested, that persuasion 
(moral and/or deliberative) through the work of the powerful NGO/like-minded coalition, 
might have helped produce this less restrictive outcome.757 (Both mechanisms, social 
coercion and persuasion, could certainly have operated together.)758 The fact that the 
compromise language came from the representative of a war-torn country (Sierra Leone,) 
with the moral authority that this presupposed, may have also helped garner support. 
                                                
755 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II, 355. 
756 There is some debate among international experts about whether a slight change in wording 
(“armed violence” in Tadic and “armed conflict” in this text) introduced a meaningful difference. 
See Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian 
Law. The prevailing interpretation seems to be that it does not. 
757 Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and 
Agency; Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in 
the ICC Case.” 
758 Some state delegations included bona fide advocates of strong and encompassing international 
justice mechanisms such as Theodor Meron for the US or Andrew Clapham for the Solomon 
Islands; the latter’s work is discussed later in this chapter. 
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There is some additional reason to suspect that social coercion might have been 
present, however. The final compromise language included two words that appeared to 
condition the consideration of the most controversial internal atrocities: the armed 
conflict in which they occur needs to be “protracted” and must feature “organized” armed 
groups fighting a government or one another. The precise meaning of these terms, 
however, was not fixed there and then, leaving some interpretive “wiggle” room 
(indeterminacy) to be dealt with later. Moreover, these two conditions (protraction and 
organization) appeared to raise the armed conflict “threshold” somewhat, not quite as 
much as the Second Protocol had but presumably somewhere above the Common Article 
3 language.759 They can thus still be read (without it being express) as a political balance 
between the humanitarian supporters of the idea and its detractors, detractors that were 
aware that total deletion was unlikely anyway. Put otherwise, as was the case during the 
making of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols (Chapters 3 and 5,) the 
inclusion of these conditional words could be plausibly be understood as a sort of 
“antidote” produced through behind-the-scenes “pushback.”  
As said, a robust empirical assessment of these claims is postponed until further 
archival and interview research can be conducted. Yet beyond the possible operation of 
social coercion in this instance, the ICC case also illustrates what I called earlier 
normative re-inscription, that is, how ideas can first emerge in one setting (the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY,) gain prominence and be “validated” in international legal venues, 
and eventually “circle back” to be incorporated in the black letter of a binding treaty. This 
connection of events and mechanisms constitutes an important alternative pathway 
deserving study by scholars of norm emergence in international relations.  
 
V. Enduring Entrepreneurship: Recent ICRC Initiatives 
In contrast to earlier periods during which the ICRC played the role of propelling 
revisions to humanitarian law almost exclusively, so far this chapter has emphasized the 
                                                
759 For a different interpretation of the threshold introduced in the Rome Statute relative to CA3 
and the Second Protocol, see Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law.  
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proliferation of various other sources and actors producing normative developments over 
the last three decades. But it should not be assumed that the International Committee 
withdrew from pursuing an entrepreneurial role in this field. This section argues that the 
ICRC has preferred to lead lower-profile initiatives combining in-house research with 
expert consultations, jointly constituting another authoritative epistemic community.  
Framed simply, the major goal of the ICRC in recent decades has been to craft 
consensus documents that become authoritative interpretations/elaboration of existing 
treaty law, usually by drawing on other respected sources like scholarly opinion or 
arguments about humanitarian norms’ customary status. This suggests that, as some of 
the other entrepreneurial efforts studied in this chapter, these projects represent attempts 
at progressive interpretation and customification. It should by now be clear that resorting 
to meetings of experts is not at all a new practice for the ICRC: such events have in fact 
preceded most, if not all, episodes of norm emergence and development. Yet in recent 
times, contrasting with the past, the ICRC has shied away from forcefully spearheading 
new major inter-state conferences to develop or revise the substance of the law. The only 
exception one might cite was a Diplomatic Conference held in 2005 to adopt an 
additional emblem (the Red Crystal,) resolving some historical controversies regarding 
the use of the Red Cross in certain contexts.760  
This relative “shying away,” as claimed earlier, may have had to do with 
disillusionment in the ability of major conferences to develop the entire body of law. The 
embattled political context that followed the Al Qaeda attacks on US soil in September 
2001, a moment in which the Geneva Conventions seemed to be “under assault” due to 
the aggressive onslaught of transnational terrorism and the US-led response to it, likely 
also fed into the ICRC’s “risk aversion” toward formal inter-state revisions.761 That said, 
the perceived or actual challenges to the existing law in the post-9/11 moment have 
                                                
760 The text of the instrument, known as Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 
December 2005, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/615 (Consulted on July 30, 2013.) 
761 David Wippman, “Introduction: Do New Wars Call for New Laws?,” in New Wars, New 
Laws? Applying the Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts, ed. David Wippman and Matthew 
Evangelista (Transnational Publishers, 2005), 1–30; Sarah Perrigo and Jim Whitman, “The 
Geneva Conventions Under Assault” (New York: Pluto Press, 2010).  
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nonetheless clearly influenced ICRC research and expert consultations –and/or certain 
governments’ reaction to their findings,-- as explained below. 
To the above factors one should add the Swiss organization’s awareness of and 
interaction with a growing international community of discourse and practice in the areas 
of humanitarian law and human rights, supported by a growing institutional architecture 
(UN as well as regional human rights commissions and courts,) with their own ability to 
push norms in related fields forward through traditional/formal treaty means. In fact, UN 
bodies, certain entrepreneur states (Canada or the Netherlands, for example) and various 
NGO networks have --often together-- starred in the great majority of recent such 
initiatives complementing IHL, such as the creation of ICC, but also in the regulation or 
prohibition of weapons (an area that since the Draft Rules experience of the 1950s had 
proven difficult for the ICRC to assume.) These recent initiatives include new treaties on 
chemical weapons (1993,) landmines (1997,) cluster munitions (2008) or the global arms 
trade (2013,) as well as revisions to older agreements like the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (1981, 1996,) or in related areas such as the protection of children 
in armed conflict (2000.)762 In all of these varied processes the ICRC (and the Red Cross 
movement) has certainly laid critical groundwork and acted as force multiplier, but it has 
not protagonized them in quite the same way as before. 
Much excellent research has been conducted on the origins of some of these various 
IHL-related treaty initiatives.763 For that reason this section devotes its energy to two of 
the most important and less well-known projects (for IR audiences, at least) of norm 
development recently led by the ICRC with implications for internal conflicts: a major 
                                                
762 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical 
weapons and on their destruction, Paris 13 January, 1993; Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 
September, 1997; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in armed conflict, 2000; Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May, 
2008; United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April, 2013. For greater background, see: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/weapons/index.jsp  
763 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”; Maxwell 
A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford University Press, 1998); John Borrie, Unacceptable Harm: 
A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won (United Nations Publications 
UNIDIR, 2009). 
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study on the clarification of customary law applicable to armed conflicts, and the 
elaboration of a guidance text intended to help parties to conflict understand the 
conditions under which civilians might “directly participate in hostilities” and thus 
become lawful targets. Both of these proved to be thorny, and the latter in particular 
garnered some heavy governmental backlash. After describing and analyzing the politics 
behind these, I close by laying the contours of the other two recent and still ongoing 
ICRC-led initiatives.  
 
The Customary International Humanitarian Law Project 
After a two-day International Conference on the Protection of War Victims convened 
in August 1993 by Switzerland (in response to the grave violations of humanitarian law 
experienced at the time,) participants called for the creation of an Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts which, among others, asked the ICRC to prepare a report on clarifying 
the entire body of customary norms applicable in both international and non-international 
conflicts.764 This effort represented a mammoth endeavor for the ICRC, requiring over a 
decade and a multitude of international and in-country experts from all regions of the 
world.765 Establishing the range of customary norms was especially important with regard 
to the Additional Protocols of 1977, parts of which remained controversial decades after 
their negotiation.  
ICRC legal expert teams carried out their research drawing from the organizations’ 
own archives as well as national sources of nearly 50 states (9 in Africa, 11 in the 
Americas, 15 in Asia, 1 in Australasia and 11 in Europe,) and international organization 
resolutions and reports.766  States’ physical as well as verbal acts were considered to 
                                                
764 This idea was proposed in a January 1995 meeting of the Intergovermental Expert Group and 
endorsed at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent later that year.  
765 The rationale and process behind the report are well documented in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
“Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and 
Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 
857 (2005): 175–212. 
766 Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,” 179. The ICRC researchers 
were careful to clarify, however that not every statement or resolution mattered, yet “the greater 
the support for the resolution, the more importance it is to be accorded.” 
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establish whether a practice was “dense” enough to be “virtually uniform” as was 
required. Norm-confirming as well as contradictory practices were taken into account, yet 
the latter were not used as standard setting if it could be established that it had faced 
condemnation by other states or denied by the government itself. “Through such 
condemnation or denial,” explained one of the report’s authors, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
“the rule in question is actually confirmed.”767 Importantly, Henckaerts commented, “this 
is particularly relevant for a number of rules of international humanitarian law for which 
there is overwhelming evidence of State practice in support of a rule, alongside repeated 
evidence of violations of that rule.” In effect, 
“Where violations have been accompanied by excuses or justifications by the 
party concerned and/or condemnation by other States, they are not of a nature to 
challenge the existence of the rule in question. States wishing to change an existing rule 
of customary international law have to do so through their official practice and claim to 
be acting as of right.”768 
 
According to the study, furthermore, state discourse and conduct did not have to be 
“universal” for establishing custom, only “extensive” and “representative.” Of special 
attention for creating custom was the practice of “especially affected states” with regard 
to specific rules, although for such practice to count the majority of other states had to 
have “at least” acquiesced to it. Finally, the ICRC decided not to study the practice and 
“doctrine” of non-state armed actors, declaring that “while such practice may contain 
evidence of the acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts, its legal 
significance is unclear.”  (As I show later in this chapter, other non-governmental 
                                                
767 The authors noted that separating behavior and legal conviction had been “very difficult and 
largely theoretical” because the same act often reflected both. States’ military manuals provided 
the best example of this according to the ICRC, since they were indicative of legal belief and 
state practice. In cases of ambiguous practice, opinio juris helped to adjudicate the formation of 
custom. Finally, since many rules of humanitarian law relied on states’ abstention from a certain 
conduct, the challenge was to prove that abstention had not been coincidental but rule-driven. 
768 Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,” 180. This language draws 
directly on the definitions of custom as provided in the Nicaragua vs. United States opinion of the 
International Court of Justice. See I.C.J., 14 - Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Vs. United States of America). It also echoes the 
ideas of constructivist IR scholars writing on international norms around the same time. Friedrich 
Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization  : A State of the Art on an Art of 
the State,” International Organization 40 (1986): 753–775. 
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organizations have disagreed with this assessment and paid more attention to non-state 
armed actors’ statements and documents.)  
The results of the consultative process, published in 2005 as a 5000-page three-
volume report, proved noteworthy and contested to a degree. This was because, of over 
161 rules considered by the experts, nearly all (146) were deemed to be applicable as 
customary to both international and internal conflicts.769 A few merited the “arguably 
applicable in non-international armed conflict” qualifier, and there were important 
differences on civilian protection and prisoner of war guarantees, but by and large the 
proposed lists were nearly identical.770  
What reaction did the ICRC study elicit? How did states view its results? Legal 
scholars have widely praised the report’s findings, empirical depth and 
comprehensiveness. Very few states made their opinion public, however. An American 
memorandum issued to the ICRC in late 2006 provides the best-known response so far. 
In it legal advisors John B. Bellinger III (DoS) and William Haynes (DoD) recognized 
the value of the project but partially critiqued its method and its conclusions. Among 
others, Bellinger and Haynes decried the ICRC’s tendency to privilege military manuals 
as evidence of practice supportive of customary states, as well as the choice to include 
“non-binding resolutions” of the General Assembly and NGO statements.771 Instructions 
contained in manuals, these US lawyers argued, often represented “policy” decisions that 
while going beyond formal international commitments, should not be taken as proof of 
                                                
769 Bugnion, “Customary International Humanitarian Law.” 
770 For example, the ICRC found insufficient evidence to brand customary the rule that armed 
actors in internal conflict should, when in doubt during their military operations, assume that 
persons were civilians and thus refrain from attacking them. Conversely, the ICRC study did not 
find a sufficiently shared, thus customary, interpretation of what it means for a civilian to be 
“directly participating in hostilities,” which according to Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II is the sole legal reason through which a civilian forfeits his immunity and becomes a 
legitimate target. As noted, a separate project of ICRC-led clarification, explored below, was 
conducted on this crucial issue to intensely disputed results. Moreover, other provisions dealing 
with the thorny areas of combatant and prisoner of war status were also left untouched. 
Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict.” 
771 John B. Bellinger III and William J. Haynes II, “A US Government Response to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 89, no. 866 (2007): 443–471. 
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widely accepted, binding law. The US memo also claimed the experts had not paid 
counter-practice enough relevance, particularly that of states that were not party to certain 
treaties. The ICRC responded swiftly to these and other critiques, standing its ground.772 
Although Bellinger and Haynes’ personal roles in the Bush government’s legal decisions 
leading to the violations of humanitarian law in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and other 
places seems to have markedly differed (and receive excellent research treatment 
elsewhere,) on the whole the skeptical American response to the ICRC customary law 
findings is not surprising, given the IHL-undermining climate pervading that 
administration’s legal counsel.773  
Beyond the US, only Egypt and Finland have referred (approvingly) to the study.774 
Whether the quiet reaction of states may be interpreted as proof of acceptance or 
consensus is up for debate, but the opinion of prominent scholars suggests the ICRC 
report commands a measure of normative authority and seems likely to become a key 
interpretive source in this area.  
 
The Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) Study 
An additional ICRC initiative toward norm development with relevance to internal 
conflicts in recent years was a consultative process intended to offer interpretive 
parameters for determining when a civilian was directly participating in hostilities, thus 
forfeiting non-combatant immunity. Common Article 3, it may remembered, protects 
“persons taking no active part in hostilities,” while the Additional Protocols prohibit 
attacks on civilians “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” 
Both these provisions beg the obvious question (Under what conditions can civilians be 
seen as “directly participating in hostilities”?) prompting the ICRC’s desire for greater 
                                                
772 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Customary International Humanitarian Law  : a Response to US 
Comments” 76, no. 866 (2007): 259–270. 
773 For reasons of focus and space I cannot delve in this issue further. For an excellent account, 
covering (among many others) the roles of Bellinger and Haynes, see Forsythe, The Politics of 
Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners After 9/11. 
774 In the context of the presentation of the report to the 30th International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. ICRC, Report of the XXX International Conference of the Red 
Cross and the Red Crescent, Geneva 23–30 November 2007 (Geneva: ICRC, 2007). 
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clarity. Distinguishing civilians from combatants is difficult in most wars, but it is a 
particularly acute problem in internal conflicts.  
Yet conducting a major research project on the topic of lawful targeting likely went 
beyond the goal of clarifying thorny legal meanings in the abstract. The nature of the 
project, its findings and the responses they elicited should be understood in the post-9/11 
context. The Bush administration had since 2001 argued that it was involved in a “global 
war on terror” toward which the Geneva Conventions were ill-fitting, and inapplicable in 
cases (more on this below.) These claims, along with the dubious legal justifications 
crafted by some within the State Department’s Office of Legal Counsel led to many grave 
abuses, as is now recognized. The mistreatment of captured persons (alleged or actual 
terrorists) is the best-known case. Yet beside prisoners, at stake was also states’ legal 
ability to target persons (including extra-territorially) that they presumed were “posing” 
as civilians while actually involved in combat (i.e. participating in hostilities.) 
Controversy about US drone attacks on alleged Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen brought 
this issue back to the fore in 2002, and it remains lively to this day.775 
The “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
(hereafter DPH,) as the project became known, was once again drafted through the 
method of expert consultations. Five informal meetings were held in The Hague and 
Geneva between 2003 and 2008, bringing together 40 to 50 legal experts from military, 
governmental and academic circles.776 The resulting document was issued in May 2009 
and presented by the ICRC as a “balanced and practical solution that takes into account 
the wide variety of concerns involved and, at the same time, ensures a clear and coherent 
interpretation of the law.”777 Although the ICRC clarified that the end product was a non-
binding guide, it hoped it would be “persuasive to States, non-State actors, practitioners 
                                                
775 Many other issues are involved in the legal discussions about targeting, including the treatment 
of private military contractors or civilian employees. 
776 See Overview of ICRC’s Expert Process (2003-2008,) available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/overview-of-the-icrcs-expert-process-icrc.pdf 
(Consulted on August 2, 2013.) 
777 Ibid, 4. 
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and academics alike and that, ultimately, it will help better protect the civilian population 
from the dangers of warfare.”778 
The ICRC’s hopes for a persuasive consensus document were sorely dashed, 
however. In a public academic symposium hosted in 2010 by New York University’s 
Law School (eventually published as the Spring 2010 volume of NYU Law’s 
International Law and Politics journal) four experts among those who participated in the 
DPH process (three of them as unofficial representatives of the US, Canada, the UK 
governmental opinion) exchanged some scathing comments with the ICRC’s Nils 
Melzer, the principal author of the Interpretive Guidance.779 The four experts, W. Hays 
Parks (US,) Kenneth Watkin (Canada,) William Boothby (UK,) and Michael N. Schmitt 
(UK) agreed that while the project’s intent was important, various conceptual decisions 
taken by the ICRC doomed the resulting text to failure.780 
These experts’ critiques are complex and broad ranging, but all can summarized in 
the idea that, in attempting to strike a balance between humanitarian protection and 
military necessity, the ICRC had “erred” far too much on the side of the former, limiting 
the latter unacceptably and unrealistically. Through the insertion of notions allegedly not 
grounded in existing law, for instance the idea that to become lawful targets civilians 
have to perform a “continuous combat function” which they could enter and leave in the 
manner of a “revolving door” (Watkin,) the notion that there must be one causal step 
between a civilian’s action and a harmful attack negatively affecting one side to the 
conflict for direct participation to occur (Schmitt and Boothby,) or that even as lawful 
targets civilians should be approached using law enforcement (and not necessarily law of 
                                                
778 Ibid, 4. 
779 The entire volume of the journal may be found online freely at: http://nyujilp.org/new-issue-
forum-on-direct-participation-in-hostilities/ (Consulted on August 2, 2013.) 
780 W. Hays Parks, among others, is a retired Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel, 
International Affairs Division, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 to 
2010; Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Office of The Judge Advocate General of the 
Army, 1979-2003. Colonel Kenneth Watkin is retired Brigadier-General and a former Deputy 
Judge Advocate General/Operations for Canada. Bill Boothby is the retired Deputy Director of 
Legal Services, Royal Air Force, UK. Michael Schmitt is currently Chairman of the International 
Law Department at the United States Naval War College. Schmitt also served 20 years in the 
United States Air Force as a Judge Advocate specializing in operational and international law. 
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war) standards, the ICRC appeared to have unduly narrowed states’ ability to respond to 
offending non-combatants, not only exposing soldiers but potentially putting bona fide 
civilians to risk. Comments of such nature, alongside claims of a “troubling ignorance of 
the realities of 21st century warfare,” intimations of breaches of confidence and 
suggestions of ethical missteps by the ICRC, colored initial government reactions to this 
ICRC initiative. It remains to be seen to what extent these experts’ views are more widely 
shared by other states.781  
The ICRC engaged and confronted these experts in the same public manner. This 
bolder attitude contrasts with the private reaction seen in prior experiences, including the 
Draft Rules in the 1950s, or during the contentious drafting of the Additional Protocols in 
the 1970s.782 Nils Melzer, author of the DPH guidance, did not hide his discomfort when 
he responded that “all four authors attempt to remedy practical difficulties in identifying 
and engaging the enemy through the flexibilization and expansion of the legal criteria 
permitting direct attacks against individuals under IHL… As has been shown, even when 
applied in good faith, these proposals result in an extremely permissive targeting regime 
prone to an unacceptable degree of error and arbitrariness.”783 In other words, Melzer’s 
response was that while the experts criticized the ICRC for overemphasizing 
                                                
781 The list of participant experts was seemingly withdrawn from publication given the resistance 
from many to be associated with it. Moreover, although these authors highlighted the level of 
experts’ dissent toward the ICRC’s alleged overtly humanitarian stance, Nils Melzer quipped that 
“other participants advocated an opposite, almost exclusively humanity-driven perspective, which 
sometimes tends to disregard legitimate concerns of military necessity. The Interpretive 
Guidance, faithful to the ICRC’s role as a neutral and impartial intermediary, does not give either 
consideration preference over the other, but proposes a balanced approach, which takes all 
legitimate concerns into account, while at the same time aiming to ensure a clear and coherent 
interpretation of IHL consistent with its underlying purposes and principles.” Nils Melzer, 
“Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques 
of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,” New 
York University Journal of International Law and … 42, no. 3 (2010): 914. 
782 The ICRC’s more robust public defense of its approach may have had to do with a perceived 
slippage of respect for international humanitarian standards post 9/11. Consistent with this, the 
Swiss organization had been engaged in a protracted and more-public-than-usual dispute with the 
US regarding its treatment of detainees in Guantanamo and other places. I thank Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin for highlighting this point. 
783 Melzer, “Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities,” 913. 
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humanitarianism, they appear to have done their share by privileging military necessity 
instead.  
On balance, and since the stated purpose of the exercise was to draft a non-binding 
“guidance” on the basis of multistakeholder consultations but ultimately prepared by the 
ICRC, it should have surprised no one that the outcome sought to move the law 
“forward,” subtly or not, in the humanitarian direction rather than in the “military 
necessity” sense. However, the public controversy during the NYU-Law Conference 
suggests that both the ICRC and states understand “the power of precedent” well, and 
that both realize that soft law can and often does turn into “hard law” over time. 
Differences in degrees of animosity regarding the Customary Law study and the DPH 
guidance may well mark each initiative in their separate future standard-setting 
“success.” 
Two additional and still ongoing ICRC projects bear briefer mention. The first is a 
new attempt at ascertaining the adequacy of the existing law (treaty as well as customary 
rules,) in view of the realities of contemporary armed conflict. After an in-house two-year 
study of over 36 legal subjects, in September 2010 the ICRC concluded that although 
existing humanitarian legal frameworks are indeed adequate and most problems stem 
from their faulty implementation, certain areas might require strengthening and 
elaboration. These were: 1) the protection of the natural environment during armed 
conflict; 2) the implementation of the law and reparations to victims of armed conflict; 3) 
the protection of internally displaced persons; and 4) the treatment of persons deprived of 
their liberty. (Note the relevance of the last one in the post 9/11 context.) 
Having identified them, the ICRC submitted a report to states to determine to what 
extent they agreed with its conclusions and to gauge the possibilities for working toward 
normative strengthening, either in all four areas or some of them.  States’ responses have 
not been made public, but according to the ICRC’s latest (November 2011) update on this 
initiative, states suggested that “it would not be realistic to work simultaneously on all 
four” areas, and that instead priorities should be set. The majority of governmental 
responses seem to have indicated that reparations as well as the protection of the 
environment and of displaced persons were not yet “ripe” for elaboration. The two topics 
  333 
that according to the ICRC “most attracted attention” from states were 1) the protection 
for persons deprived of liberty and; 2) international mechanisms for monitoring 
compliance with international humanitarian law. The latest International Conference of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, held in Geneva in late 2011, mandated the 
ICRC to continue pursuing “research, consultation and discussion in cooperation with 
States and, if appropriate, other relevant actors, including international and regional 
organizations, to identify and propose a range of options and its recommendations to: i) 
ensure that international humanitarian law remains practical and relevant in providing 
legal protection to all persons deprived of their liberty in relation to armed conflict; and 
ii) enhance and ensure the effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance with international 
humanitarian law.”784 The ICRC was tasked with reporting on its progress to the next 
International Conference, scheduled for 2015.  
Finally, in 2012 the ICRC decided to embark on a revamping of the Official 
Commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to 
account for the practice and interpretation accumulated since the treaties were signed. 
The Commentaries are essentially guidance documents, produced by the ICRC some 
years after the negotiations of these instruments (in 1952-1958 and 1987, respectively.) 
Although not legally binding, they are widely considered to be authoritative sources of 
interpretation for lawyers, scholars, judges, advocates and governments. Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, ICRC legal adviser (and co-author of the 2005 Customary Law project) 
currently leads this initiative. Like the customary law study, the updating of the 
Commentaries will draw from a range of sources “including military manuals, legislation 
and case law, as well as academic commentary and the ICRC’s own field experience. In 
addition, consultations with practitioners will take place. The project also uses the 
ICRC’s customary law database, in particular for access to State practice with respect to 
the application and interpretation of humanitarian law.”785 Given this combination of 
                                                
784 Resolution 1 in ICRC, XXXI International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Geneva, 28 November – 1 December 2011 Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, Resolutions (Geneva, 2011), 26. 
785 See an online interview with Jean-Marie Henckaerts titled “Bringing the Commentaries on the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols to the 21st Century” at: 
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factors (the author and sources utilized) it can be expected that the new Commentaries, 
schedule to appear progressively after 2015, will seek to advance the black letter law by 
incorporating the wealth of practical and jurisprudential developments of the past half-
century, most of which were identified through the prior research on customary law. This 
project is likely to once more stir controversy amid states, and it remains to be seen how 
far the ICRC will dare go with its progressive thrust when revising the Commentaries. 
Before closing this section, it is worth reflecting once more on the changing tactics 
adopted by the ICRC during the last three decades and their normative effects. As noted, 
a move away from self-initiated Diplomatic Conferences in the vein of the 1949 and 
1974-1977 negotiations has been accompanied by participation in processes held under 
the aegis of other organizations and actors. There is no indication at present that this 
attitude will change in the near future, given that the additional forms and pathways to 
standard-setting have proved at least partially successful. That said, the uncertainty 
produced by states’ reluctance (or silence) to acquiesce to the ICRC-steered interpretative 
guidances and studies might dampen their crystallization as truly authoritative. 
Conversely, armed actors’ conduct on the ground may not change, and both these 
outcomes could prompt a new wave of binding treaty-making on subjects of special 
concern.  
Either way, it is apparent that states have been and continue to act as normative 
gatekeepers. The decision to “leave for later” three subjects of evident importance 
(reparations, environmental protection and IDPs) and to continue “studying” the topics 
that were chosen (particularly two as old and well-known as the problem of 
compliance/monitoring mechanisms and the thorny one of detainees treatment) suggests 
that the path toward new humanitarian treaties may be long and difficult, or that impetus 




                                                                                                                                            
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/geneva-conventions-commentaries-
interview-2012-07-12.htm (Consulted on August 2, 2013.) 
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VI. Human Rights Revolutionizes Humanitarian Law 
One theme of this chapter has been the surfacing of many new actors with an interest 
in improving legal protective regimes for rights violations occurring within a state’s 
borders. Phrased this way, the lines separating the traditional domains of humanitarian 
and human rights law become blurred. As seen in Chapter 5, however, well into the 
1970s conflict-ridden or repressive states were wary to blend the two, refusing to mix 
peacetime with wartime protections or to grant their rebellious citizens too many 
guarantees, especially in humanitarian instruments that did not allow for derogation.786 
Yet a few international lawyers and activists, beginning with Séan Macbride in the 
1960s, had proposed holistic approaches to the international regulation in the fields of 
humanitarian, criminal and human rights law. In the 1970s still these voices were 
isolated, however. Historical path-dependence supported by encroached state interests 
and the persistence of separate institutions, rules and principled/epistemic communities 
for each body of law, probably worked to secure the distinction between human rights 
and humanitarian law until around the 1980s. This state of affairs soon became 
transformed, such that it is now nearly impossible to speak of internal atrocities without 
reference to human rights (or international criminal law, as we have seen) standards and 
institutions.  
This process of normative “crosspollination” has occurred in complex ways and 
comes from various sources, some of which I have discussed earlier. Some international 
and regional human rights courts and commissions have begun referencing humanitarian 
law in their reports on country rights situations and specific legal cases. UN human rights 
institutions and special rapporteurs appointed to study diverse issues have done their part, 
further legitimating the idea that human rights (and not just humanitarian law) are 
applicable in armed conflict. Human rights NGOs have also played a major role, 
progressively deciding to incorporate humanitarian law standards into their advocacy 
work on internal violence. The relationship has thus been bidirectional: humanitarian law 
                                                
786 The two human rights covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) allow for broad derogation during 
times of public emergency, except for the few most fundamental among rights: the right to life, 
the right to be free from slavery, the right to be free from torture and the right to be free from 
retroactive application of penal laws. 
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has become part of the human rights repertoire, and human rights have been deployed to 
complement and expand protections during armed conflict, formerly the sole province of 
the laws of war.  
As can by now be expected in this contentious issue-area, agreement on this cross-
pollination has not been swift or uniform. Indeed, the interaction between the two 
regimes, and the adoption of the humanitarian law language by certain actors remains 
fraught and poses potentially challenges moving forward.787 States, for instance, have at 
times criticized NGOs for not looking at the human rights abuses of non-state actors.788 
At other times, however, states have refused to use such language due to the perennial 
fear of legitimating rebels by affording them statist prerogatives.789 Regional courts have 
at times opted not to use human rights law to deplore non-state actor conduct, shedding 
some uncertainty on earlier precedents.790 Human rights NGOs did not always or 
automatically want to draw from humanitarian law, fearing that to do so might “distract” 
them from pressuring the perceived main culprits (states,) that it might place unfair blame 
on “legitimate” rebels, or that it could simply lead to institutional overstretch. But 
persistent war-related violations in the late 1970s and early 1980s continued to fuel 
internal debate, and after a few years the major human rights NGOs officially determined 
that they should take on internal armed conflict. Nowadays, even with the accumulated 
practice in the advocacy world, the discussion on non-state armed actors among respected 
academics remains lively, with some insisting that they can and do bear legal (not only 
moral or social) human rights responsibilities, and others asserting that this is not the 
case. This debate, as I show, represents thus one among other “normative frontiers” in 
                                                
787 Human rights NGOs’ embrace of IHL is not necessarily an unalloyed good given the dangers 
that it might present for their ability to use HR standards to critique states’ conduct. I thank 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for raising this point. 
788 Carrie Booth Walling and Susan Waltz, eds., Human Rights  : From Practice to Policy, 
Proceedings of a Research Workshop (Ann Arbor: Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 
University of Michigan, 2011), 39. 
789 Walling and Waltz, Human Rights  : From Practice to Policy, Proceedings of a Research 
Workshop, 37. 
790 Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38–54; Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict, 503–505. 
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this issue-area. In the meantime, various initiatives and NGOs have emerged that directly 
attempt to persuade violent non-state actors to abide by international norms, whether 
drawn from humanitarian or human rights law. 
Despite political and scholarly disagreements about the notions that human rights can 
protect during armed conflict, and that humanitarian rules can or should complement 
human rights, these ideas seem to have achieved a notable degree of legitimacy, if still 
fraught and contested in part. The following section presents a panoramic view of these 
developments and trends. As with the rest of the initiatives considered in this chapter, 
tracing the precise steps along a plethora of intermingling sources and actions can be 
difficult, especially when attributing causality to individual entrepreneurs or institutions 
at specific times. I thus only attempt to do so when possible and as such, the portrayal 
below should be read as comprehensive in scope but partial in its details, inviting further 
research and reference to other sources. 
 
Regional and International Human Rights Institutions 
The first trend worth tracing is the extension of human rights concerns to armed 
conflict situations. That such a move remained controversial by the late 1970s may strike 
readers as odd since, after all, the original 1968 UNGA resolution that triggered the 
comprehensive revision of humanitarian law in the several years was entitled precisely 
“Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict.” Yet at the time many interpreted this as 
something of a misnomer rather than as a substantive claim. During the CDDH human 
rights language was avoided by many (especially governments) who found it politically 
dangerous, and became instead “translated” into discussions about “legal rules applicable 
to non-international conflicts.”  
It is also true that most international lawyers and military jurists were well 
accustomed to thinking about the laws of war or humanitarian law and found human 
rights less familiar.791 For their part, international human rights lawyers, as acknowledged 
                                                
791 In an autobiographical essay Theodor Meron notes that in 1977 “human rights was not 
regularly taught” at important United States law schools such as that of New York University. 
Meron was appointed there that year, first as visiting faculty and later permanently, and chose to 
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in 1981 by the renowned American jurist Thomas Buergenthal (who would later become 
a judge in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,) had long “avoided concerning 
themselves with humanitarian law” in part due to “the hope that wars would soon become 
obsolete” or on the assumption that “wars were dirty business, that it is difficult enough 
on the international plane to obtain compliance with human rights standards in peacetime, 
and that the enforcement of humanitarian law was an even more hopeless task.” Yet, as 
Buergenthal added, “neither our wishful thinking nor our desire to shrug off our 
responsibilities has had a significant effect on the realities of contemporary international 
life… the realities are that we live in a period of history in which, in many parts of the 
world, we have neither peace nor war in the traditional sense.” Thus, he concluded:  
“Here the demarcation between humanitarian law and international human rights 
law disappear for all practical purposes, and the only question of significance that 
remains is: what can be done to stop or ameliorate the vast human suffering that engulfs 
our globe today?” The answer given was that both humanitarian as well as human rights 
lawyers should “embark on a massive joint educational effort… we face an immense 
task.”792 
  
Seminal contributions to this task were already being made at the time Buergenthal 
was writing. Indeed, the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s proved to be particularly 
germane to this conversation, and not just in scholarly circles. The Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights began reporting on the human rights situation of countries 
facing armed rebellion (Nicaragua in 1978 and 1981, Colombia in 1981) and by 1983 
was explicitly cited the Geneva Conventions in its reports (on Guatemala, for 
instance.)793 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights moved in a similar 
direction in 1981 by appointing a special representative on the human rights situation in 
El Salvador responsible for site visits, fact-gathering and producing reports. Increasingly, 
though still intermittently, Common Article 3 and the Second Protocol began being cited 
                                                                                                                                            
teach human rights, still an “uncharted territory.” See Meron, The Making of International 
Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench: Selected Speeches, 7. 
792 Thomas Buergenthal, “Introduction, The American Red Cross - Washington College of Law 
Conference: International Humanitarian Law,” American University Law Review 34 (1981): 805–
807. 
793 See these reports online at: http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humright/digest/inter-american/ 
(Consulted on August 2, 2013.) 
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as normative basis in appeals by human rights bodies. The same may be said of the UN 
General Assembly after the negotiation of the Additional Protocols in 1977.794 Although 
there were cases where the UNGA could have but did not mention instruments of 
humanitarian law (Chad, Cyprus, East Timor, Grenada, Kampuchea and Nicaragua,) after 
1981 it seems to have done so more consistently (with regard to Afghanistan, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Israel-Palestine or Namibia.)795 Beyond Latin America, the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights have also applied and enforced humanitarian 
law.796 Unlike its Latin American and African siblings, however, the European Court of 
Human Rights has not used humanitarian law, aside from occasional borrowing of IHL 
language.797 One may conclude that since the mid-1980s there has been a growing trend 
in the use of humanitarian law by inter-governmental organizations as they report on 
human rights situations during armed conflict, but that there also appears to be important 
regional variation.  
In terms of international precedent-settings, however, without a doubt the watershed 
moment came in 1986 with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case Nicaragua vs. 
United States, already mentioned, which determined that Common Article 3 was a 
“minimum yardstick” reflecting “elementary considerations of humanity.”798 The 
reverberations of that statement, as seen, were later felt during the making of the various 
international criminal tribunals and their jurisprudence. 
 
Non-governmental Organizations 
Chapter 4 highlighted the important role of a particular international non-
governmental legal organization, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ,) in 
reigniting global interest on human rights in armed conflict. Besides the high-level 
                                                
794 Weissbrodt, “The Role of International Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict.” 
795 Weissbrodt, “The Role of International Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict,” 327–331. 
796 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, 503. 
797 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, 503. 
798 I.C.J., 14 - Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua Vs. United States of America). 
  340 
diplomacy of Séan Macbride, the ICJ researched and published statements and reports on 
various conflict situations (Vietnam and Pakistan, for instance) drawing on humanitarian 
law. The ICJ was still an isolated case, however. By the mid-1970s the international 
human rights NGO movement as we know it today was still fledging, with the few major 
protagonists focusing on specific issue-areas (Amnesty International and political 
prisoners, for instance,) without making systematic connections to the laws of war.  
This situation began to change in a matter of years. Amnesty International (AI) 
reports in 1977 and 1978 (on Ethiopia and Somalia) contained scattered mentions of 
Common Article 3, but it was not until 1981, through an open letter to the US Secretary 
of State in relation to the Salvadorian conflict, that AI seems to have started taking 
humanitarian law more seriously in its advocacy work in internal conflicts. This episode 
triggered process of internal reflection and debate within AI’s highest organs on whether 
to expand its mandate to consider internal armed violence through the humanitarian legal 
lens, including the political question of documenting non-state actors’ abuses and 
pressuring them as well as states.799 These would eventually be answered in the 
affirmative, but the decision was not easy and would take a few years.  
Amnesty’s early steps coincided with a similar process inside another budding 
international human rights organization at the time: Americas Watch, which later merged 
with other “Watch” committees around the world to become Human Rights Watch. 
According to Aryeh Neier, founding member of Helsinki Watch, Americas Watch had in 
fact “led the way” in starting to monitor armed conflicts in accordance with humanitarian 
law “and, over time, others followed.”800 Americas Watch, like AI, had been studying the 
grave situation in El Salvador, and upon the US Congress passing of legislation in 1981 
mandating the President to “certify” the human rights conduct of states receiving 
American foreign aid, made plans to pressure the Reagan administration. “Quickly 
                                                
799 David Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 1984; Weissbrodt, “The Role of International 
Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of 
Armed Conflict.” 
800 Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History (Princeton University 
Press, 2012), 131. 
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pulling together information that had been gathered over a period of several months by a 
number of researchers, America’s Watch published a book-length report on January 26, 
1982 demonstrating that certification was not warranted… though less than a year old, 
Americas Watch had put itself on the map and, from that moment on, was a leading voice 
internationally on human rights in Latin America…”801 The practice of reporting on 
abuses committed by all parties to armed conflict, according to Neier, became their 
staple: “As Americas Watch initiated reporting on violations of international 
humanitarian law, which applies to both sides in international armed conflicts, and to 
guerrilla forces as well as to government forces in internal armed conflicts, it soon began 
reporting on guerrilla abuses. This helped the organization make clear that it was not 
aligned with one side in such conflicts. It was a critic of abuses, regardless of who 
committed them.”802  
The process within AI, as mentioned, was less swift. In 1982, after a meeting of its 
International Council in Rimini, Italy, the organization decided to mandate its 
International Executive Committee to “initiate a study into the problem of AI’s function 
in situations of armed conflict and internal strife.”803 Aware of Americas Watch’s 
experience, AI wondered to what extent its mandate too covered such cases, what 
problems existed when trying to research them and what effectiveness they might expect 
to see from including them their reports. Another goal of the study was to help Amnesty 
“shed light” on its attitude “with regard to human rights abuses by non-governmental 
entities” and to identify the rules of humanitarian law that AI could use to complement its 
human rights approach. David Weissbrodt, then working in the legal office of AI while 
on leave from his professorship at the University of Minnesota Law School, was asked to 
conduct this research. The 101-page report, circulated internally in August 1984, was an 
exhaustive review of Amnesty’s past work in armed conflict as well as its occasional use 
of humanitarian legal norms. The conclusions were clear: “More regular use of 
                                                
801 Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History, 210. 
802 Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History, 211. 
803 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 2. AI’s initial concerns about this issue are said to have 
arisen in 1979 during discussions of AI’s Mandate Committee.  
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international humanitarian law could provide Amnesty International with additional legal 
foundation… in some cases [IHL] may even provide a stronger basis for Amnesty 
International’s work.”804 This was so not only because at the time the Geneva 
Conventions were more widely ratified treaties, but also because they made “certain non-
governmental entities the subject of regulation and AI may wish to review humanitarian 
law to determine if there are lessons for AI’s work in this respect.”805 The report reasoned 
that the fact that humanitarian law was better known to the military (active or retired) 
than human rights might open up new possibilities for influence. Despite these 
opportunities, however, the report cautioned that “before embarking on this ambitious, 
difficult and relatively new topic… AI must continue to work within its mandate and not 
to expand that mandate in periods of armed conflict and internal strife. Just the discussion 
of humanitarian law and human rights in armed conflict may create inappropriate 
expectations that AI will broaden its mandate and pursue all sorts of humanitarian law 
issues. These expectations must be narrowed at the outset.”806  
The reason for caution was not inherent conservatism, but rather a desire to avoid 
sudden overstretch owing to the comprehensiveness of humanitarian norms vis-à-vis the 
relatively limited number of issues AI worked on at the time: 1) detention of prisoners of 
conscience; 2) failure to provide prompt and fair trials for political prisoners; 3) torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 4) the death penalty; 5) 
extrajudicial executions and; 6) disappearances. The precise goal was to maximize 
normative influence in places where there was clear complementarity, either because both 
bodies of law offered similar protection but one was better known/more accepted than the 
other, or because one “filled in” grey or underdeveloped areas in another, such as in 
situations of low-intensity violence. In other places IHL was deemed less helpful, as on 
the issue of extrajudicial executions, where it was found that it could ‘provide very 
                                                
804 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 3. 
805 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 3. 
806 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 4. 
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limited guidance as to what killings fall within AI’s mandate,” particularly given the 
difficulty for AI researchers to establish indisputably that a population had been targeted 
deliberately, and that they were non-combatants.807  
With regard to which humanitarian standards to use, the report drew from all the 
principal instruments of IHL, including the Additional Protocols. Anticipating the issue 
of controversy over different “thresholds” for different rules (CA3 and the Second 
Protocol, notably,) the author recommended to “avoid making explicit, public 
assessments about the kind of armed conflict” that was occurring, as well as citing 
specific provisions except when this seemed expressly useful.808 Indeed, humanitarian 
law should be cited “not as a primary source… but as a point of reference” which would 
“obviate the need for characterizing” conflict situations.809  
As a final area of interest, the report encouraged AI to reconsider its decision not to 
take action in regard to non-state actors.810 Although Amnesty had declared that abuses 
by those entities fell under its concerns, had deplored them and documented them in 
cases, it had also consistently clarified that its focus would remain on government abuse. 
In AI’s view at the time, and as set out in human rights law, governments bore primary 
responsibility for guaranteeing the protection of its citizens from abuse by third parties, 
among which were guerrillas and other non-state armed actors. The report recommended, 
however, that the organization should rethink this rationale, especially vis-à-vis “certain 
                                                
807 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 14. The report also advised AI to avoid creating a 
semblance of likeness between itself and its work during armed conflict and the International 
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quasi-governmental entities… that... are sufficiently similar governments [such] that AI 
may have a reasonable expectation of obedience to human rights standards.”811  
AI’s policies eventually changed in 1991 after a meeting of the International Council 
Meeting in Yokohama, Japan, where its mandate was formally extended to focus on non-
state abuses, both under human rights and humanitarian law. It appears that “peer 
pressure” created by Americas Watch’s reporting on internal conflicts drawing from 
humanitarian law was a key motivating factor for AI’s change of policy. Even so, AI’s 
changed policy came after almost a decade, a “lag” likely due to organizational reasons 
(Amnesty’s global multi-tiered governance structure compared to HRW’s less complex 
architecture.) The broader analytical point is that humanitarian/human rights normative 
“merging” within international human rights NGOs was neither automatic nor sweeping, 
but incremental. It represented a simultaneously strategic and principled move aimed at 
increasing advocacy leverage whenever possible/desirable. Over time this practice 
became well established within these and many other human rights NGOs.812 
 
Human Rights Responsibilities for Non-State Actors? 
As we saw, in the 1980s human rights NGO reports began referring to non-state 
armed groups’ human rights abuses and violations, as though that body of norms applied 
as a matter of law to them, not merely as a moral or social expectation. Over the past two 
decades, other types of actors have begun to use this language. Regional and international 
human rights bodies, UN special rapporteurs and even the Security Council (on 
Afghanistan, Guinea Bissau, Liberia) have inserted such references in various statements, 
resolutions or reports.813 Truth commissions, especially in places where non-state abuse 
                                                
811 Weissbrodt, Study of Amnesty International’s Role in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
Internal Strife, AI Index: POL 03/04/84, 90. 
812 For more on the history of HRW and AI’s approach to internal armed conflict and non-state 
armed groups, see Walling and Waltz, Human Rights  : From Practice to Policy, Proceedings of a 
Research Workshop, 15–20; 36–39. 
813 For detailed examples, Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International 
Law; Andrew Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors in Conflict Situations,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 88, no. 863 (2006): 491–523. Another prominent instance 
is the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Philip Alston, particularly his 2006 report on Sri Lanka.  
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has been especially egregious, have done likewise. It is hard to assess to what extent 
these varied institutions were consciously formulating new legal human rights obligations 
for non-state actors in their work (thus challenging the traditional state-centered view,) or 
simply assuming them. 814 
Their growing practice, however, eventually elicited lively academic debate among 
international legal scholars, with contending schools of thought soon emerging. Lindsay 
Moir and Liesbeth Zegveld, professors of law in the UK and the Netherlands 
respectively, are two prominent voices still unconvinced about the notion of affording 
human rights legal obligations to non-state actors. They have argued that this use of 
human rights “legal talk” has been occasional, loose and sometimes contradictory. 
Zegveld has claimed, for instance, that “the examples of international bodies imposing 
human rights obligations on armed opposition groups are limited in number and not very 
authoritative… Furthermore, the practice asserting the applicability of human rights law 
to armed opposition groups is confined to unsupported statements. The practice 
disclaiming this applicability, on the other hand, is validated with detailed reasoning.”815 
More substantively, these authors doubt that non-state actors should be attributed 
responsibilities under human rights law since they often lack the capacity to guarantee 
them (Moir.)  
Prominent legal scholars and law professors Christian Tomuschat and Andrew 
Clapham have argued in the opposite direction. In Tomuschat’s view, for instance, one 
need not claim that a new obligation exists; rather, non-state armed actors must be seen as 
having such responsibilities by virtue of the fact that they are embryonic states who, in 
                                                
814 As an interesting counter-example, during the 1990s the UN General Assembly debated the 
issue of “human rights and terrorism” at the urging of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights. Though initially uncontroversial, as Romaniuk indicates this discussion stalled in 1994 
within the Commission on Human Rights because “several Western states, along with others, 
voiced opposition to the view that terrorist groups could ‘violate human rights’ as such, arguing 
that human rights are impressed upon states, and that states and non-state actors should not be 
equated… By 2000 the Western bloc actively voted against the proposed resolution, arguing 
again for a clear distinction between state obligations to observer human rights and the criminal 
acts terrorists.” Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of 
Cooperation and Contestation (London: Routledge, 2010), 61–62. See also Walling and Waltz, 
Human Rights  : From Practice to Policy, Proceedings of a Research Workshop, 37. 
815 Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, 82. 
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aspiring to legitimate statehood, are subject to similar obligations that “every State must 
shoulder in the interest of a civilized state of affairs among nations.”816  
Clapham, recognizing the political challenges that such an argument might face, not 
least states’ persistent reluctance to afford any legitimacy or recognition of “state-
likeness” to rebel groups, has rejected Zegveld’s claim that the accumulated practice of 
international actors is weak or inconclusive. Instead, he argues that the proliferation of 
human rights language on non-state actors signals an emerging trend in the direction of 
normative acceptance, albeit one that will continue to find political resistance. In his own 
words, “perhaps is time for a radical rethink…  once we rid ourselves of the assumption 
that human rights only cover the relationship between individuals and governments there 
is no danger that accusing an armed group of human rights violations lends it automatic 
or quasi governmental status. If we fail to address our human rights concerns to these 
non-state actors we fail the victims of abuses. It is time to feel comfortable talking about 
the human rights obligations of non-state actors.”817 To these normative goals, Clapham 
has added that human rights law applies even in cases where states deny the existence of 
armed conflict (thus negating the application of IHL) and that human rights rely on better 
accountability mechanisms than humanitarian norms, including monitoring by Special 
Rapporteurs of the UN Commission of Human Rights and the field offices of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.818  
Conversations among international lawyers are important since, as we have seen, they 
have sometimes paved the way for eventual changes in treaty and customary law. If the 
recurrent example of Séan MacBride does not suffice anymore, one could note that 
Andrew Clapham was also a member and active participant of the Solomon Islands 
                                                
816 Cited in Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors in Conflict Situations,” 
501. 
817 Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors in Conflict Situations,” 511, 523.  
818 Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors in Conflict Situations,” 505. These 
mechanisms would operate, of course, in addition to a plethora of other “hard” and “soft” 
measures, including trials, truth commissions, reparations, reconciliation programs, etc. Some of 
these, however, blur the distinction or combine human rights and humanitarian norms, so the 
alleged additional “leverage” provided by the human rights frame may not be as strong.  
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delegation at the Rome Conference that established the ICC in 1998.819 Tomuschat 
served on the UN’s International Law Commission in the early 1990s at the time when 
that body debated early drafts of the ICC statute. He was also rapporteur of the UN 
Human Rights Commission on the human rights situation in Guatemala between 1990-
1993, and later coordinated that country’s Commission for Historical Clarification. 
Liesbeth Zegveld, for her part, is the co-author (with revered IHL scholar Frits 
Kalshoven) of one of the most-used short introductions to international humanitarian 
law.820 These academic debates, and the positions taken in them by renowned legal 
academics, should be included in any analysis of emergent rules; the oft-traveled 
“scholar-to-legislator” (and back) pathway suggests that they are sometimes central to 
norm emergence.  
Furthermore, besides “legislating,” scholars can also be practical protagonists. From 
his positions as Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 
Clapham has for a number of years led a research project on the “ownership of 
humanitarian norms by armed non-state actors.” His research team, in addition to 
academic discussion, has drafted instruments (in the form of a code of conduct) 
containing an extensive mix of human rights and humanitarian standards and brought 
them to non-state armed groups to elicit their commitment.  
The outcome of the Clapham-led initiative is not yet known, but it is only one among 
a host of other similar efforts, some of which can be documented. In fact, over the last 
decade and a half a different genre of NGO that may be branded “engagement NGOs” 
has surfaced in the humanitarian field, with the mandate of liaising directly with armed 
non-state groups in order to establish a dialogue about international norms, hoping to 
eventually persuade them to accept and abide by specific rules. Given their current 
                                                
819 Clapham is a student of Antonio Cassese, with whom he co-authored legal articles. As 
mentioned earlier, Philip Alston is another prominent legal academic who has played important 
policy roles on the issue of human rights and non-state actors within the UN and elsewhere. See 
among others Philip Alston, “Non-State Actors and Human Rights” (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
820 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War  : an Introduction to 
International Humanitarian Law, 2001. 
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importance, I devote some elaboration about their work before moving to the next and 
final section of this chapter. 
The best example of an engagement NGO in this field is Geneva Call.821 This 
organization was founded in 2000 by members of the Non-State Actors Working Group 
(NSAWG) of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL, a coalition of over a 
thousand NGOs in over 60 countries in that proved essential to the drafting and adoption 
of the Landmine Ban Treaty in 1997,) in response to the treaty negotiators’ failure to 
impute formal responsibility to non-state actors.822 The members of the Working Group 
were convinced that non-state actors should be prohibited from using, producing, 
stockpiling and transferring landmines since, due to the relatively low cost and simplicity 
involved in producing this type of mines, such actors were known to be active users with 
a significant risks to civilians.  
Geneva Call was specifically conceived to provide a mechanism through which these 
actors could directly express their commitment to various rules from international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. For this purpose, the organization devised a 
small code of conduct known as a “Deed of Commitment,” (DoC) which it brings to the 
armed groups in conflict areas in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The DoC explicitly 
recognizes that “international humanitarian law and human rights apply to and oblige all 
parties of armed conflict” and urges the signatory non-state group to adhere to a total ban 
on this weapon. Moreover, through the DoC armed groups are obliged to disseminate to 
cooperate with other organizations in the destruction of stockpiles, mine clearance and 
victim awareness, or to undertake these actions themselves. The “deed” also provides for 
monitoring and verification visits, and reserves Geneva Call’s right to publicize a groups’ 
compliance (or lack thereof) with the text. Finally, in addition to committing them to 
existing standards, the DoC contains language recognizing non-state actors as 
                                                
821 See http://www.genevacall.org/ Andrew Clapham, it should be noted, has been a member of 
the board of the Geneva Call. 
822 For a well-known treatments of the landmine ban campaign, see Price, “Reversing the Gun 
Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”; Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To 
Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Certain states (Colombia among 
them) raised the idea of including non-state armed groups in the treaty during the negotiations but 
this was ultimately rejected.  
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“participants in the practice and development of legal and normative standards for such 
conflicts,” while also clarifying that signing the document shall not affect their status, 
pursuant to the clause contained in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.823  
Once the armed group has verbally agreed to be bound, the DoC is signed between by 
the parties (Geneva Call, the armed group and the Canton and Republic of Geneva) in a 
public act held at the “Alabama” room where the First Geneva Convention of 1864 was 
established, casting a symbolic dimension to the commitment. The Canton and Republic 
of Geneva acts as the “custodian” of the deed.  
The experience of Geneva Call, thirteen years after its creation, appears to have been 
quite positive. The organization’s website claims to have elicited commitments from 42 
non-state armed groups with reportedly high levels of compliance. In addition to official 
signatories, Geneva Call has also conducted sustained dialogue and partial mine 
clearance exercises with other groups that have stopped short of formally accepting the 
DoC.824 Geneva Call’s relative success so far has led it to develop new DoCs on the issue 
of child protection and sexual violence by armed groups, and to consider similar efforts 
in areas such as the protection of internally displaced persons.825 
Outside of the Geneva Call example (and perhaps due to its success,) attention to 
mechanisms of commitment outside of the formal web of treaties has sharply risen in 
                                                
823 Soliman Santos Jr., “A Critical Reflection on the Geneva Call Instrument and Approach in 
Engaging Armed Groups on Humanitarian Norms: A Southern Perspective, Paper Presented at 
Conference ‘Curbing Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups,’ Vancouver, 14-15 November 
2003,” 2003. 
824 An example of the latter is the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN.) Although this 
group has engaged quite extensively in conversations with Geneva Call and has collaborated in 
limited mine clearance, it ultimately decided against signing the DoC, not wishing to commit to 
an exacting standard it could not fully live up to. This suggests that armed groups can take these 
initiatives as more than “cheap talk” geared to increase their reputation, instead rationally 
calculating the costs and benefits of binding themselves publicly. See http://www.genevacall.org/  
(Consulted on August 16, 2013.) 
825 Another example of engagement NGO is the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre,) 
based in Geneva. This organization is the spin-off of the Henry Dunant Center, a now-
disappeared ICRC entity devoted to pursuing and publishing research on humanitarian law and 
issues. The “new” HD Centre resorts to humanitarian persuasion with armed groups (on issues 
such as safe access and protection of civilians, the special needs of women and children, 
displaced populations and any affected minority groups,) but in addition, carries out mediation 
and peacemaking support in Asia and Africa. See http://www.hdcentre.org/en/home/ (Consulted 
on August 2, 2013.) 
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recent years. Increasingly, humanitarian scholars and practitioners are prone to cite the 
wealth of “voluntary” commitments by armed non-state actors, whose history in fact goes 
far back.826 According to Sandesh Sivakumaran, “ad hoc commitments can be sub-
divided into unilateral declarations; bilateral agreements between the parties or between 
one of the parties and a UN entity or non-governmental organization, or trilateral 
agreements between the parties and an outside entity; codes of conduct, instructions, or 
regulations that are internal to the group; and legislation.”827 Basic research on this 
plethora of mechanisms is only beginning, with scholars and organizations now devoting 
some effort to their collection and analysis of their emergence and effectiveness. 
The evident excitement amid concerned academics and activists on the virtues of 
“soft” or non-traditional non-treaty forms of eliciting commitment from non-state armed 
groups seems to support a trend identified earlier toward pathways other than traditional 
treaty-making. The inability of Diplomatic Conferences to meaningfully engage non-state 
actors in the law-making process, the limited (and underutilized) formal mechanisms 
included for securing their commitment contrasts with this type of targeted, less formal 
but still encompassing approach.  
In other words, the use of localized agreements such as Geneva Call’s “Deed of 
Commitment” appears to avoid the political traps and legitimacy pitfalls that are the 
enduring trait of “Conference diplomacy,” allowing non-state actors to become the 
protagonists of their own commitment and norm-design processes. These conditions --
supporters hope-- might lead to greater “ownership” of normative commitments by these 
groups, and thus to their increased compliance with international law. Some authors, 
including current academic and policy entrepreneurs Andrew Clapham, Marco Sassòli 
and Sandesh Sivakumaran, go as far as to suggest that the signing of these types of 
documents might give rise to international legal responsibility and thus be used by 
                                                
826 Early examples include ad hoc commitments between states and rebels in a variety of contexts, 
including during the Spanish reconquista of Colombia in the 1820s, the Swiss Civil War of 1847, 
the American Civil War, as well as multiple others. For an extensive, though still preliminary list 
see Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. 
827 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, 107. 
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international tribunals during potential criminal cases against armed groups and their 
members, though it is unclear just how widely accepted that view is.828  
This clever way of “skipping” global politicking without skewing international law 
(actually often going beyond existing law) resembles the intent and effects of the 
progressive interpretation and “customification” of international law studied earlier in 
this chapter. And although enthusiasm for securing traditional binding international 
treaties has not gone away (the Cluster Munitions and the Arms Trade treaty being the 
most recent examples) and is unlikely to do so, practitioners and other stakeholders seem 
to be turning increasingly to alternative forms of “governance” that circumvent rigid 
traditional structures. This trend can not only be observed in the field of humanitarian 
law, but rather appears to proliferate across issue-areas, from environmental protection 
and climate change to business and human rights, where the combination of diverse types 
of regulation has given over time rise to “regime complexes” rather than traditional 
international legal regimes tout court.829  
 
VII. Terrorism, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights  
A final major facet of the debate on humanitarian law over the past three decades has 
been mentioned but deserves separate treatment: the relationship between terrorism and 
humanitarian law, and the incorporation of human rights law and norms into that 
relationship. As said, the challenge of terrorism to international law was made evident 
most pointedly after the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on the US and the ensuing response of the 
Bush Administration. But this discussion requires some clarification on a few basic 
background issues relating to: 1) whether and how international humanitarian law 
regulates terrorism in internal conflicts, 2) what responsibilities accrue to violent non-
state actors for terrorist acts, and 3) whether and how suspected terrorists in those 
                                                
828 For this debate, see generally Andrew Clapham, The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed 
Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape and Issues Surrounding Engagement (Geneva, 2010); 
ICRC, ed., Understanding Armed Groups and the Applicable Law, International Review of the 
Red Cross, vol. 93 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict. 
829 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” 
Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011): 7–23. 
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conflicts are protected or not by international humanitarian law. At the crux of the 
discussion lies what/who is labeled as terrorism/terrorist. I do not pretend to fix those 
meanings here, but only to present the most relevant debates and observable trends as 
clearly as possible.830 
Until the 1970s terrorist activity remain largely unregulated internationally.831 
Previous protocols (from 1898 and 1904) had succeeded in triggering moves toward 
inter-state police and diplomatic cooperation, and a later treaty negotiated under the aegis 
of the League of Nations, finalized in 1937 foundered over sovereignty concerns related 
to forcible extradition and asylum. (An embattled political atmosphere in Europe, 
skepticism over the League in the US and the proximity of another war probably did not 
help to foster a cooperative environment over such delicate matters.)  
Attempts at inter-state cooperation against terrorism re-emerged within the UN in the 
1970s.  That decade saw several prominent international terrorist acts in Europe and 
elsewhere, prompting debate about the creation of a comprehensive international regime 
anew. At that time, however, Western states seemed to understand the risk involved in 
negotiating a consensus definition of terrorism with non-Western majorities, supportive 
of freedom fighters and national liberation (even through violent means,) and interested 
in delegitimizing the remaining colonial powers and their allies. Absent pressure from an 
organization like the Red Cross in the field of humanitarian law, Western states avoided 
entering into a formal negotiation process about terrorism in general, and pushed instead 
for a piecemeal approach (which arguably still prevails,) prohibiting specific acts of 
terrorism such as the unlawful seizure of aircraft and safety of civil aviation, the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against protected persons or the taking of hostages. 
In the field of (international) armed conflict proper (i.e. beyond isolated non-war 
related acts of terrorism,) the 1949 Geneva Conventions still remain pioneer agreements, 
being the first to explicitly prohibit “measures” of terrorism as set out in Article 33 of the 
                                                
830 For a comprehensive review of international law and terrorism, see Helen Duffy, The “War on 
Terror” and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
831 The history of multilateral counter-terrorism has been told at more length elsewhere. See 
Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and 
Contestation.  
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Fourth Convention protecting enemy civilians or civilians living in occupied territory. 
(The exact language was that “collective penalties and likewise all measures of 
intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”) This language, however, referred only to 
certain types of civilians in international conflicts. Common Article 3 prohibited various 
violent acts against persons “taking no active part in hostilities” or rendered hors de 
combat in internal conflicts, which to the contemporary eye amount to terrorizing 
civilians in practice (mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, hostage-taking, among 
others.)832 But terrorism as such was not explicitly mentioned. During the 1950s and 
1960s, as we saw in Chapter 4, international concern quickly surfaced with respect to the 
effects on civilians of certain weapons and of armed hostilities more broadly, which after 
moments of failure (i.e. the Draft Rules) and very heated debates during the CDDH, 
finally led to the inclusion of a prohibition of terrorist acts against civilians in both 
Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.  
The definition given in both Protocols was that “the civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence 
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” This provision more or less clearly determined that terrorist acts intentionally 
perpetrated against civilians are prohibited both in international as well as in non-
international conflicts (at least those that rose to the high level of the Second Protocol.)833 
Though far from uncontroversial, this general notion was accepted by the various state 
coalitions during the CDDH.  
Yet vexing issues lay behind this surface. Were rebels terrorists? Could civilians 
become terrorists too? Could combatants who engaged in terrorist acts lose their 
protections and become “unlawful”? These three questions struck at the heart of internal 
conflicts (especially those featuring guerrilla warfare, which are most) and wars of 
national liberation. And recall that although in the 1970s both these situations presented 
                                                
832 I say “to the contemporary eye” because in 1949, strictly speaking, some of these acts were 
either only beginning to be outlawed internationally, while others would take years to be 
considered internationally accepted norms.  
833 For a more complex exegesis of this provision, see Frits Kalshoven, “‘Guerrilla’ and 
‘Terrorism’ in Internal Armed Conflict,” American University Law Review 33 (1983): 67–81. 
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grave humanitarian problems, only the latter relied on a high level of international 
legitimacy and political urgency. 
In the end at the CDDH the first question was answered in the negative. That is, states 
agreed that in conflicts that fulfilled certain exigent characteristics, captured rebels were 
entitled to humane treatment. To this end, Article 4 of the Second Protocol set out a list 
of “Fundamental Guarantees” that applied to them among “all persons who do not take a 
direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has 
been restricted,” which also included acts of terrorism (and threats thereof.)834  
Regarding the second question, as mentioned earlier, civilians were given the 
obligation not to take direct part in hostilities; if they do they may become lawful military 
targets (First Protocol, Art. 51; Second Protocol, Art 13.) The precise conditions under 
which they can be considered direct participants in hostilities are, as seen earlier in this 
chapter, still disputed. Yet it is clear that at the CDDH drafters negotiated a text allowing 
for the possibility that civilians might partake in the conflict, perhaps becoming terrorists 
themselves. However, and although civilian immunity was not deemed absolute, states 
also agreed that upon capture non-combatants in high-intensity civil wars had to be 
treated humanely, as per the “fundamental guarantees” laid out in Article 4 of the Second 
Protocol, mentioned above. 
The third question was more controversial. As noted in the previous chapter, national 
liberation movements and the coalition supporting them argued that to force such groups 
to always distinguish themselves from civilians was to thwart one of their principal 
methods of war, to the benefit of the (colonial, racist, occupying) regimes they fought. As 
seen, the compromise formula inserted in the First Protocol (providing that even in cases 
where combatants failed to meet the requirement of distinction, they would be given 
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war) pleased the 
                                                
834 This crucial article is essentially an expansion of the basic protections originally listed in 
Common Article 3. Article 5 of the Second Protocol expands these guarantees further. Although 
apparently “generous,” the fact that most states did not expect the Second Protocol to apply may 
have relieved their fear of accepting these articles. Moreover, rebels in civil wars could still not 
be considered either “combatants” or “prisoners of war” in the legal sense, given the prestige, 
legitimacy and the extensive protections that such statuses entailed.  
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non-Western coalition and the United States for different reasons, but utterly displeased 
others. This was one of the ways in which the CDDH managed to “deal” with the 
international political pressure to accommodate freedom fighters in Africa and the 
Middle East.835 Nevertheless, those POW protections had little bearing on the prohibition 
of terrorism: intentional attacks on civilians were still banned, and there were other 
requirements that combatants had to abide by, such as avoiding perfidy. In short, in 
international conflicts, including national liberation struggles, “any combatant who 
chooses to engage in guerrilla warfare remains bound to respect all rules on the conduct 
of military operations and the protection of civilians. There will be no excuse if he 
combines (legitimate) guerrilla warfare with a (criminal) terrorist campaign.”836 
Summarily, this was the state of affairs with regard to the relationship between 
terrorism and humanitarian law in the late 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, continuing with 
the piecemeal approach to international rule-making on terrorism mentioned earlier (and 
not in direct connection to humanitarian norms,) states adopted various additional 
conventions in the context of the UN to deal with specific forms of terrorism, inter alia, 
on the physical protection of nuclear material (1980,) on the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of maritime navigation (1988,) on the marking of plastic explosives for 
the purposes of detection (1991,) on the suppression of terrorist bombings (1997,) and on 
the suppression of the financing of terrorism (1999.)837 A further crucial development 
                                                
835 Recall also that certain “safeguards” were inserted to make sure this clause applied in very 
specific circumstances, but these did not deter opponents, notably during the Reagan 
administration, from deeming Protocol I “terrorist law.” Such critiques were misguided because 
they missed the contextual politics that had given rise to the text and the clever ways in which 
drafters (with the US at the helm) had shaped it.  
836 Hans-Peter Gasser, “Acts of Terror , ‘Terrorism’ and International Humanitarian Law,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 84, no. September (2002): 563. 
837 During the 1990s, in fact, the UN General Assembly, especially through the Sixth Committee, 
discussed plans for a general convention on terrorism. These efforts foundered then as they did in 
the 1970s, due to states’ sharply different views on the phenomenon, giving way to agreements 
on specific issues just mentioned. Note that the exclusion or inclusion of self-determination 
struggles in the definition of terrorism continued to be a divisive issue, chiefly between countries 
supporting Palestine and Israel. Notably, the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism incorporates language clearly drawn from humanitarian law, defining terrorism as 
“any… act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
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was the international criminalization of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
war crimes through the 1998 Rome Statute, which, as we saw earlier, included acts 
committed in internal conflicts. 
Overall, as Weissbrodt and de la Vega claim, “despite the seemingly piecemeal 
manner in which the conventions address terrorism, most legal scholars agree that 
virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of these conventions, in addition to 
the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.”838  
With the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, the application of 
existing law appeared to face enormous challenges. The George W. Bush administration 
argued that the attacks of Al Qaeda on US soil brought about a “global war on terror” in 
which the law of armed conflict seemed “quaint” or only (very) partially applicable. One 
principal claim of the US government was that established definitions of “international” 
and “non-international” allegedly did not sit well with the transnational and non-state 
nature of such a conflict. After the invasion of Afghanistan, importantly, Bush officials 
argued that neither captured Taliban nor Al Qaeda personnel were entitled to POW 
protections, but that they were nonetheless to be treated humanely. These positions were 
backed by legal memos drafted by the Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC,) which not 
only denied these persons POW protections but also willfully re-defined torture in order 
to avoid the application of international human rights law (especially the Torture 
Convention.) It is now known that the commitment to treat captured enemy personnel 
humanely was amply violated.839  
What impact did these decisions and conduct have on established international 
humanitarian law? Eventually, and though much debate occurred among international 
                                                                                                                                            
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” (Article 2.) 
838 David Weissbrodt and Connie de la Vega, International Human Rights Law: An Introduction 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 235. Regional conventions were also signed in Europe 
(1977,) the Arab world (1998,) and the Americas (2002.) 
839 This story has been told well elsewhere. See Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of 
How The War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (Knopf Doubleday Publishing 
Group, 2009); Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics; Forsythe, The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners 
After 9/11. 
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lawyers on the adequacy or potential irrelevance of international humanitarian law, Bush 
administration officials failed to persuade authoritative domestic or international 
institutions of their reasoning, and in particular the revelation of egregious acts of 
prisoner abuse generated a strong reaction of a plethora of domestic and international 
actors.  
Domestically, in a series of crucial rulings, the US Supreme Court deemed that the 
Geneva Conventions did apply, and specifically with regard to Al Qaeda personnel, 
Common Article 3, including its protections of personal dignity and basic fair trial 
rights.840 International authoritative bodies clarified that humanitarian law applied even 
with regard to presumed terrorists, as well as human rights law.841 The UN, though 
Security Council 1456 (2003) urged states to comply with all their obligations under 
international law, and to adopt counter-terrorism measures in accordance with 
international law, in particular, with international human rights, refugee, and 
humanitarian law. That same resolution established a Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) tasked with considering human rights in its work.842 Furthermore, in 2003 the UN 
Secretary-General initiated a High-Level Panel, which later offered a definition of 
terrorism that included various references to the provisions of Geneva Conventions, the 
                                                
840 Some of the crucial decisions were Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004,) Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466 (2004,) Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557 (2006.) See David Weissbrodt and 
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, “The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and 
Developing Humanitarian Law,” Minnesota Law Review 95 (2010); Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 
chap. 5. 
841 Another crucial domestic judicial precedent was set when in 2006 the Israeli Supreme Court 
determined that the Israeli targeted killings policy toward suspected Palestinian terrorists violated 
humanitarian law and human rights law. The Court opined that although civilians-cum-terrorists 
could be lawfully targeted under specific circumstances, state authorities should seek to arrest 
them instead whenever possible, following human rights standards. For a discussion of this case 
and a comparison with the decisions of the US Supreme Court, see: Marko Milanovic, “Lessons 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the 
Israeli Targeted Killings Case,” International Review of the Red Cross 89, no. 866 (November 14, 
2007). 
842 Criticism exists regarding the level of marginalization of human rights issues within the CTC, 
however. I thank Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for pointing this out to me. 
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Additional Protocols, war crimes and crimes against humanity.843 Regional precedents 
have likewise been set in the European and Inter-American Human Rights systems.  
The thrust of these decisions suggests that the crucial legal debate now lies in 
determining how humanitarian law and human rights relate to one another to protect not 
only victims of terrorism but also alleged terrorists, whether one prevails or supersedes 
the other according to their special vocation (for instance, whether in times of armed 
conflict humanitarian rules are the only guide, as lex specialis) or whether they 
complement one another to provide “the most coverage” possible in any situation. This is 
a complex and prickly legal debate on which I cannot elaborate here, but suffice it to say 
that the consensus appears to have emerged pointing toward the latter conclusion (most 
protection that is legally possible.) As such, even in the case of suspected terrorists in 
non-international conflict, minimum standards apply, usually by virtue of Common 
Article 3, human rights and other rules of customary law. 
Before closing it should be said that, notwithstanding greater international concern 
and regulation related to terrorism, states have historically tended to cope with it through 
domestic means. Put otherwise, and as scholars have noted, at the same time that states 
have taken on international humanitarian and human rights commitments, many have also 
introduced stringent domestic criminal or and anti-terror legislation for dealing with 
suspected terrorists in times of “troubles,” disturbances, or “national emergency.” 
Moreover, many governments have ably and consistently resisted or “relativized” the 
application of international standards and mechanisms, whether inspired in human rights 
or humanitarian norms, for treating those they label terrorists. The picture is thus much 
more fraught that portrayed above.844 Yet even with this caveat it seems possible to 
                                                
843 Over time concern for human rights violations committed in the pursuit of counter-terrorism 
has sharpened, with various UNGA resolutions requesting the appointment of a special rapporteur 
to this issue. A 2004 report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights determined that there 
were significant gaps in the consideration of counter-terrorism measures by the UN human rights 
system. This normative strand, though important, is only of relative relevance to this 
dissertation’s topic, so I set it aside here. However, see generally Romaniuk, Multilateral 
Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation, chap. 3.  
844 For a more detailed analytical discussion, see Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in 
Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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conclude that there is now a much more encompassing web of international protection 
norms in the area of terrorism than ever before. 
 
Conclusion 
Legal scholar Ruti Teitel recently claimed that “what the waging of the ‘war on 
terror’ has made abundantly clear is that humanity law need not run out—that, indeed, 
there is no category of persons on the globe that is not covered and protected. And, by 
turning to the overlapping regimes, coverage can be ensured.”845 This chapter comes to a 
similar conclusion after analyzing several of the most important normative developments 
with regard to the regulation of internal conflicts through international law that have 
taken place in the last three decades. A variety of legal entrepreneurs, epistemic 
communities and institutions have in recent times utilized a host of non-traditional tactics 
and pathways to advance the legal regimes protecting persons against internal atrocities. I 
have referred to these tactics as progressive interpretation, customification, inter-
institutional validation. Some of these ideas have “circled back” and --through social 
pressures among diverse actors- become re-inscribed into treaty law, as seen in the case 
of internal atrocities of the ICC.  
Strikingly, none of the formal treaty-making processes that have occurred since the 
CDDH in the 1970s were meant to revamp the Geneva Conventions or the Additional 
Protocols. Rather, these have emerged from “adjacent” issues such as human rights, 
international criminal law and weapons regulations. This has elicited a growing and still-
developing “cross-pollination” between humanitarian law and other bodies of law 
previously thought distinct. Finally, recent initiatives have surfaced to address the 
persistent failure of inter-state conferences to bring non-state actors meaningfully into the 
normative fold, through attempts to elicit their political “ownership” of various 
international norms directly. Early reported rates of patterns of success merit praise and 
invite further research.  
                                                
845 Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 133. By “humanity law” Teitel means the framework that spans the 
law of war, international human rights law, and international criminal justice. This is akin to what 
David Sheffer calls “atrocity law” in Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: Personal History of the War 
Crimes Tribunals. 
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Yet to any informed observer international law and politics even vaguely aware of the 
live controversies, among others, about the treatment of detainees, the targeting of 
presumed terrorists or so-called ”unprivileged belligerents,” the use of drones, prolonged 
occupation of territory, or massive reprisals against the civilian population by state and 
non-state actors alike, an optimistic conclusion like the above cannot suffice by itself. 
Political disputes and deep institutional challenges related not only to interpretation but 
also implementation/enforcement have and continue to accompany the recent swift 
expansion and overlapping of international regimes to protect persons in the midst of 
internal armed conflict and related situations of “troubles,” disturbances or “emergency.” 
If claims about the coming of “humanity” or “atrocity” law are to be sustained and 
further legitimized, those challenges must be acknowledged and tackled. 
With regard to the interpretative challenges, as noted in this chapter, the turn to 
customary law in the humanitarian legal field is a move with great promise but also one 
marred by uncertainty. Uncertainty of course is not absent when dealing with black letter 
treaty law (the previous chapters on Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols have 
made just this point,) but in terms of normative expansion, the tactic of “customification” 
opens even larger questions. As Theodor Meron has noted, “customary law is… a major 
vehicle for alignment, adjustment and even reform of the law. In many other fields of 
international law, treaty making is faster than the evolution of customary law. In 
international humanitarian law, change through the formation of custom might be faster, 
but less precise in content, than the adjustment of law through treaty making. It is all the 
more necessary, in view of the critical role of customary law, that its currency not be 
devalued by facile assumptions and sweeping generalizations. The test for the 
advancement of humanitarian norms lies in their acceptability.”846 It remains to be seen 
whether the many claims about customary law explored in this chapter meet this test, not 
only in the courts but also in the practice of the actors engaged in armed conflict.  
Besides the turn to customary law, another major shift observed in the past two 
decades involves the growing means of international accountability for wrongs 
                                                
846 Meron, “The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian 
Law,” 247. 
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committed during armed conflict. The biggest novelty deals perhaps with holding non-
state actors responsible for their abuses, as reflected most prominently in the cases 
against various rebel group leaders and militias before the ICC. Four of the seven cases 
currently or recently considered by the court (Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Central African Republic, Sudan) included leaders of violent non-state groups operating 
in such contexts, and some of these have already produced guilty verdicts.847 With these 
ICC precedents, it may now be fair to say that the normative frontier with regard to these 
actors lies not in the broader question of whether they can be held responsible but in more 
complex legal questions, such as whether only individual leaders or members can be 
tried, or instead group responsibility can be imputed.  
Indeed, it may now be concluded that the core underlying idea of non-state armed 
actors’ responsibility under international law has become well established, despite 
disagreements about the precise contents and sources of those normative obligations. This 
is an important change relative to previous episodes in the history of the rules for internal 
armed conflicts, where non-state actors’ responsibility was either assumed or discounted. 
Yet older questions and even bigger challenges endure with regard to how these 
international expectations will actually “travel” and become effective downward, helping 
to improve or restrain future non-state armed conduct and to redress victims for those 
actors’ past wrongs, i.e. not only after conflict but during it, or in the midst of peace 
negotiations. As with the move to customary law, this is an area of political uncertainty 
and controversy.848 For the moment, the leading scholarly research suggests that the most 
effective answers will (continue to) come “from below,” inter alia via domestic justice 
                                                
847 For more on these cases, see the website of the International Criminal Court: http://icc-cpi.int/ 
(Consulted on August 16.) 
848Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies 
of International Justice,” International Security 28, no. 3 (2004): 5–44; Hunjoon Kim and 
Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for 
Transitional Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2010): 939–963; Tricia D. Olsen, 
Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010). 
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mechanisms, political negotiation and pressure from local advocates, with international 
means, including the ICC, operating as “back-up” complementary forces.849  
                                                
849Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics; Sikkink, The 
Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics; Hyeran Jo and 
Beth Simmons, “Peace, Justice, and the International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment 
of the ICC’s Impact,” 2012. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has examined the historical construction of international 
humanitarian rules for internal conflicts. It has demonstrated in great detail how this 
construction has unveiled through a drawn-out political process punctuated by periods of 
conflict-related atrocity. After nearly 140 years since Gustave Moynier’s first words on 
the subject, this process of rule-making appears to have come full circle. The Council of 
Delegates of the most recent International Conference of the Red Cross itself concluded 
that the body of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international conflicts is 
so well developed that its formal revision is not pressing and only tailored elaboration in 
certain areas is necessary.850 Intense ongoing debates about the use of unmanned weapons 
and extraterritorial targeting prevent us from taking this claim at face value, but the 
general point stands: most of the “core” legal regulations are reasonably well established 
and encompass a broad number of areas of concern (from protections for civilians or 
detained, sick or wounded fighters, as well for medical personnel,) and now rely on 
“hard” accountability mechanisms, including international judicial measures actively 
deployed in various conflict and post-conflict situations.  
This outlook is reason for both admiration and concern. From one perspective, the 
story told in the preceding chapters if anything conveys just how difficult, protracted and 
contingent international norm emergence has been with regard to internal conflicts. The 
recurrence of the “shocks plus moral entrepreneurship” pathway to international norm 
emergence is notable, but the intensely contested political negotiation of the actual rules 
(both their scope and content) preclude the inference that any point an outcome was easy 
or assured.851 Although enabling (“crisis”) conditions for promoting international debate 
about making rules may have been present at different times, were it not for the 
indefatigable insistence of key organizations, especially the ICRC, or for the social 
                                                
850 ICRC, XXXI International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Geneva, 28 
November – 1 December 2011 Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, Resolutions. 
851 Except perhaps in 1998 during the Rome Conference that created the ICC, where as we saw 
the great majority vouched for the inclusion of internal atrocities in the statute, and Western 
powers were no longer in the opposition. 
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pressures exerted by groups of states on their sovereignty-obsessed colleagues, one would 
not be able to speak of much normativity. Experts working as epistemic communities 
have also contributed to fostering new understandings of appropriate conduct during 
internal conflict. And more recently, the turn of international lawyers and courts to 
customary, criminal and human rights laws has filled in important gaps even if some 
claims remain contested or and their broad acceptance is uncertain, as suggested in 
Chapter 6.  
Theoretically, this confirms two simple points long made by constructivist IR 
scholars: “Crises do not come with instructions” and “ideas do not float freely.”852 
Further, even when those factors (windows of opportunity, moral mobilization) have 
operated together, powerful gatekeepers had to be taken into account and multiple points 
of pressure operated to actually propel serious consideration of the issues among states. 
Given all these myriad moral pressures, sovereignty fears, and public and private political 
clashes, I have argued that it is ultimately through social coercive dynamics that much of 
the international treaty law dealing with internal armed conflict has managed to see the 
light of day. Humanitarian regulation in this field, then, cannot be understood as states’ 
rational and efficient collective response to objective “problems,”853 but rather as a 
deeply conflicted and imperfect process of social construction. Further, as I hope the 
dissertation demonstrates, it cannot be said that this process of social construction is 
easily explained by hegemonic or offensive drives, domestic group interest, emulation, 
persuasion or reasoned communication mechanisms.854 
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From one perspective, the fact that the push for international humanitarian regulation 
of internal conflicts has overcome so many hurdles seems outstanding. This appreciation 
of the “road traveled,” however, is unfortunately very quickly sobered by the dire reality 
of the many gruesome atrocities committed in internal conflicts active now around the 
world. The perceived or actual inability of the law to temper the conduct of combatants 
and protect civilians and detainees in Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan or Sudan, to name a 
few, strongly suggests that one critical direction for the scholarly and policy agendas is 
the study of enhancing implementation and enforcement to improve compliance with the 
web of treaty and customary rules that now exists.855  
In these concluding pages I will expand on the above claims by reviewing the 
dissertation’s main findings and reflecting on the various research “frontiers” that they 
offer both for scholars of international relations and law, as well as for those specifically 
interested in the history and application of international humanitarian norms to internal 
conflicts. 
 
Reviewing the Core Argument and Key Findings 
The central argument of the dissertation may be quickly summarized. I have proposed 
a two-stage explanation for the emergence of the norms under study. The first stage 
addresses the question of normative impetus. Where does the idea that internal conflicts 
should be regulated through international law come from? What actors mobilize for this 
idea, why and how? Under what conditions does the idea of international humanitarian 
regulation arise, and what discernable factors help “trigger” formal debates and 
negotiation of rules? Through a careful review of primary and secondary sources the 
dissertation identified three plausible necessary conditions: one or various persistent 
moral entrepreneurs with institutional leverage, a background of recent conflict-related 
atrocities motivating their concern (and helping them justify it to others,) and the 
                                                
855 Today, unlike in the 1970s, most interested stakeholders (including states) seem to share the 
belief that the problem lies not in more legal development but in the effectiveness of the existing 
rules. A theory-driven history of states’ unwillingness to construct credible enforcement 
mechanisms for humanitarian law, however, remains to be written. 
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acquiescence (or at least lack of pro-active aversion) of the major powers to the idea of 
engaging in international humanitarian rule-making.  
These “first stage” findings confirm a venerable tradition of international relations 
research of norms’ origins and do not seriously depart from it, except in one major 
respect: by analytically separating out the issue of normative impetus from that of 
normative negotiation, they open up space for documenting and theorizing in great detail 
the contentious politics of norm construction through diplomatic intercourse.856 These 
diplomatic politics comprise the “second stage” of the argument, offering perhaps the 
most interesting empirical and theoretical findings.  
In particular, I have made a strong argument for the role of one particular causal 
mechanism, social coercion, in the emergence of international humanitarian rules such as 
Common Article 3 or the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Chapter 1 
defined social coercion as the mechanism that captures why and when states (individually 
or collectively) are cornered by an opposing group of actors and are forced to 
accommodate to a clearly unpalatable outcome for fear that publicly refusing to do so 
might carry important moral or social-identity costs. Chapters 3 and 5 demonstrated its 
operation through recourse to a vast amount of primary material in multiple archives.  
I submit that social coercion is a valuable addition to the battery of mechanisms IR 
scholars have used to explain norm emergence. Drawing on different traditions, as 
surveyed in Chapter 1 and mentioned earlier, studies of international norms’ origins 
hedge their bets on various explanatory factors, including hegemonic power (realism,) 
interest in eliciting reciprocity (rational institutionalists,) emulation (world polity,) 
persuasion or deliberation-based arguments (constructivism.) Yet as the historical record 
evaluated here showed, none of these captures in isolation the complex political 
dynamics observed during the making of the international rules for internal conflicts. 
Specifically, these arguments cannot explain how and why powerful reluctant states with 
a high stake in the regulatory outcome acquiesced to norms and terms they perceived as 
unpleasant and risky. Rhetorical coercion provides a useful point of departure here, but 
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given its strong focus on public discursive relations and contests, it misses the felt 
identity-related social and affective anxieties so pervasive during the making of Common 
Article 3 or the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.857  
This being said, it is important to clarify that the operation of social coercion does not 
exclude the role that other mechanisms can play in parts of the emergence story. I strived 
to highlight in the detailed empirical cases just how pervasive rational interest, either in 
its risk-averse or reciprocity-inducing modalities, was during most of the debates on this 
type of regulation since at least 1912. Conversely, the conduct of the Soviet Union in 
Chapter 3 during the making of the Geneva Conventions suggests that hegemonic or 
“offensive” drives may not be discounted from the equation entirely. (Others could 
characterize the animus of the Afro-Asian coalition in the 1970s as “offensive,” but it 
was hardly “hegemonic” in the traditional sense of the word.) Further, as seen in Chapter 
6 while analyzing the creation of the International Criminal Court, there is room to think 
that persuasion through the work of an NGO/like-minded state alliance may have 
weighed on the inclusion of internal atrocities in the Rome Statute. A number of states in 
1949 and the 1970s (notably the Scandinavian and Swiss delegations) also came to the 
table already deeply persuaded of the appropriateness of creating rules for internal 
conflicts, and their collective belief certainly mattered. And finally, states could 
simultaneously hold pragmatic-instrumental and moral interests, as the United States did 
in the 1970s while in the thick of controversy about Vietnam. In the end, if anything, I 
hope the empirical research presented in this dissertation demonstrates that the creation of 
international humanitarian rules has historically been a complex mixed-motive enterprise 
combining moral and security, domestic and international concerns. Conversely, analytic 
accounts built to explain complicated outcomes such as these could hardly treat the 
operation of mechanisms as though it were a straightforward zero-sum affair.  
In this sense, this dissertation is one among a growing number of works that insist on 
the benefits of “eclectic” theorizing for understanding international political outcomes.858  
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Seeing value in and combining insights from different theoretical traditions has arguably 
been a staple in the academic study of international human rights origins, diffusion and 
compliance for some time, but recently scholars have more consciously underlined the 
virtues of this approach relative to traditional attempts at pitting hypotheses derived from 
rationalist theories against those that stress social factors.859  
Yet there are some who persist in applying seemingly uni-dimensional or mono-
mechanistic explanations to questions about the origins and design of international law 
and institutions.860 This line of work sidelines learning about how states come to have an 
interest in resorting to international law; its focus is on the design of the agreements that 
emerge.861 In this perspective, with respect to human rights states are said to rationally 
choose to construct imprecise treaties in the face of strategic cooperation problems that 
feature distributive domestic consequences but lack motive for international 
coordination.862 Imprecision is then conceptualized as a rational solution for large and 
heterogeneous groups of states with various cultures, ideologies and institutional 
differences facing the challenge of cooperating via international law to regulate their 
conduct vis-à-vis their citizens.863  
As Chapters 3 and 5 explained, imprecision is indeed a characteristic of certain 
important humanitarian rules, particularly Common Article 3, but also the First Protocol 
as regards wars of national liberation.864 Yet, given the extensive historical material 
evaluated, may it be persuasively claimed that the states participating in their negotiation 
(both for and against it) were from the outset prepared to settle for imprecise terms?  
Contrary to this, it appears that most delegation initially sought to design the rules as 
clearly and precisely as possible, and that it was only because of the strong social 
pressures among negotiation groups that imprecision became an attractive option. Lest 
                                                
859 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance, 13, 289. 
860 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” 
861 Koremenos, “Institutionalism and International Law,” 69. 
862 Koremenos and Hong, “The Rational Design of Human Rights Agreements.” 
863 Ibid. 
864 Not all treaties for internal conflicts are uniformly “imprecise.” Recall the very precise and 
stringent scope of the Second Protocol.  
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one is willing to “flatten” the anxious politics and arduous arguments exchanged between 
participating delegations into a more or less simple case of rational choice, it is necessary 
to be attentive to social inter-action and pressures originating from identity and moral 
anxieties as crucial influences on strategic choice. This has been a consistent rallying cry 
of constructivist IR scholars, one to which I subscribe. Thoughtful scholars of 
international cooperation have also hinted in this direction before, but have rarely 
elaborated upon it or included in their explanatory models.865 A deeper engagement with 
history, particularly through recourse to bounds of previously unavailable archival 
material, may serve to enrich our understanding of norm emergence and rule negotiation 
to complicate standard assumptions of rational state choice. This has been one of the 
wagers of this dissertation, and a challenge it hopes to have met. 
 
The aftermath of social coercion 
Proposing an explanatory mechanism immediately elicits interesting follow-up 
questions. What are its scope conditions? Is it domain-specific or can its logic resonate 
across diverse issue-areas? Is it historically-bound or can one conceive it as transcending 
a particular world-time context?   
I have proposed four conditions for social coercion to operate: First, the state or states 
that are its target must believe themselves unable to effectively change the majority’s 
opinion and/or block their vote. They must know they are isolated in a minority facing an 
obtuse majority unlikely to change its position through further debate or material 
inducement. Second, as stated earlier, target states must believe that there are serious 
moral or social opprobrium costs attached to their public refusal to acquiesce with the 
majority. Such costs may be more or less plausible in reality, but what matters is that the 
target state believes they exist and that they may be exacted by an international or a 
domestic audience. Inherent to this is target states’ belief that the majority’s public 
position carries such legitimacy that maintaining their recalcitrant minority stance will 
bring them shame and derision. Third, target states must believe that outright 
                                                
865 See for example Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society (Cornell University Press, 1994), 132. 
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disengagement may lead to even worse outcomes, and so that it might make sense to 
remain at the table to contain further damage. Fourth, for social coercion to operate states 
must be interacting in a relatively institutionalized setting whose processes and outcomes 
are deemed important by participating states and are believed to carry some degree of 
scrutiny by a cherished audience or reference group. 
It may be appropriate at this stage to specify the above further and suggest avenues 
for future inquiry. One strong possibility is that social coercion is more likely to occur in 
one specific type of institutional setting: universal-membership international 
organizations that grant a voice and vote to all its participants, with equal formal 
weighing. It is probable that powerful (Western) states may ultimately not have been 
forced to “give into” social pressures in institutional contexts that attributed their vote or 
preferences more importance by virtue of their relative economic resources or political 
standing. This is why the United Nations General Assembly between the mid-1950s and 
until the late 1970s constituted a key forum for the airing of grievances by the so-called 
“Third World” in a plethora of issue-areas, especially decolonization and development.866 
Similarly, the International Conferences of International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
movement or the Swiss-convened treaty-making encounters where the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols were negotiated, given their universality and 
the attribution of equally-weighted votes to all participants, facilitated the formation of 
majorities able to “corner” skeptics against a political wall. In more restricted or “club”-
style international organizations, where members are allocated differential voting power 
or veto abilities, the operation of social coercion, while not impossible, is likely made 
much more difficult.867  
In terms of domain-specificity, it is possible that the distinctly “moral” nature of the 
humanitarian issue-area may be especially prone to bring out social-identity anxieties 
among different groups of states. In this regard the sibling area of human rights is an 
excellent case to which to apply the insights of this dissertation. The operation of social 
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coercion thus may be restricted to certain fields. This said, there are other fields unrelated 
to humanitarian law or human rights that may bring out similar anxieties, such as 
concerns about equality and justice in the international regulation of the environment and 
climate change. Comparative research to assess these possibilities seems desirable. 
Can social coercion operate on all types of states, or will it only tend to exert effects 
on a select “kind”? Although the negotiations studied in this dissertation were not all 
simple or neat cases of “the West vs. the non-West,” it is true that on the whole Western 
states, especially colonial powers, were consistently on the defensive due to the 
dissonance produced by the clash of their professed embrace of liberal democratic 
politics and values, and the increasingly illegitimate political practice of holding 
“dependent territories.” Moreover, these Western states were particularly anxious 
because they cared about the consequences of public embarrassment to their self-image 
and external reputation—they were “socially vulnerable” because they wished to be seen 
as “good” standing members of the “international community.”868 Yet it is reasonable to 
think that this type of social-identity concern and vulnerability will vary across time and 
type of states. Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, for example, may be 
comfortable to ignore attempts at international public shaming, suggesting they are 
reconciled with their egregious conduct at home, that they are confident that information 
about their bad behavior will not easily emerge, and/or that they simply place little value 
on how such conduct reflects internationally. Besides appearing aloof or careless, other 
such states may simply choose to accept international norms insincerely, or “fight back” 
publicly by pointing the moral or social failures of their democratic counterparts at home 
and abroad.869 Although assuming that authoritarian or non-democratic states will be 
uniformly impermeable to international social pressures is probably going too far, it is 
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reasonable to expect that social coercion will not easily “work” on them. As illustration, 
human rights scholars have shown recently that even China has fought hard to avoid 
resolutions emerging from the UN Human Rights Commission that condemn it.870  
The above are interesting questions that might illuminate the potential generalizability 
of social coercion and help refine its scope conditions. Others in the same vein might be 
proposed: Since East-West Cold War tensions have now evaporated and decolonization 
has largely finalized, might other global disputes over legitimacy and standing conduce to 
social coercion? A provisional answer with respect to this is yes – if international politics 
is rightly understood to be not only about the distribution of material capabilities but 
about the contested construction of legitimate social purpose, then it is likely that disputes 
involving identity and image-related arguments and pressures will resurface in 
international public debate.871  
Returning to the humanitarian issue-area, it is entirely possible, and an evident next 
step, to probe the operation of social coercion to explain other counterintuitive outcomes 
beyond the emergence of Common Article 3 and the aspects of the Additional Protocols 
that were studied in Chapter 5. One could, for instance, ask why and how other highly 
controversial provisions were attained, including the regulation of hostilities, the 
inclusion of war crimes or the construction of enforcement mechanisms within the 
Conventions and the Protocols, some of which seemed unpleasant to Western states in 
their finished form. As suggested earlier, one could also adopt a comparative lens and 
assess how the political dynamics behind the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocol resemble the negotiation of human rights instruments signed almost at the same 
historical time and by the same protagonists, from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) to the two International Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights, and 
Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, in the 1950-60s. Such comparative research would 
                                                
870 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance, 289. 
871 For more on global politics as being about the construction of “legitimate social purpose” 
beyond material capabilities, see Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization; Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of 
Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics 61, no. 1 
(2009): 58–85. 
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strengthen and complement the theoretical findings of this dissertation as well as the 
broader literature on norm emergence. 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to study in more depth the manner in 
which “socially coerced” states behave after they (grudgingly and provisionally) sign off 
on unpalatable rules at international forums. As Chapters 3 and 5 show, just as skeptical 
states resign themselves to having to acquiesce to social pressures during diplomatic 
conferences, they also engage in a variety of “compensation” tactics or plans to help 
offset the consequences of pressured normative accommodation. One central tactic 
occurring as negotiations are still ongoing is what I referred to as covert pushback, that is, 
strategic efforts to shape the language of the resulting rules in ways that reduce the 
likelihood of their implementation in practice.  
Beyond this, however, coerced states also seem to engage in interesting calculations 
for dealing with future costs in the post-negotiation moment. Most commonly, reluctant 
states can place doubts on their ability to ratify controversial international instruments, 
propose to insert interpretative statements or deposit reservations and declarations upon 
ratification, bet that the “trump card” of sovereignty will help them prevent the 
application of an unpalatable new norm, or simply hope that changed political conditions 
will lessen the relevance (and hence the costs) of their commitment. The range and 
dynamics of “compensation” mechanisms that states utilize humanitarian conferences 
disband is not well known and deserves attention. 
Domestic political battles over ratification and implementation of the international 
treaty rules for internal conflicts offer particularly interesting research opportunities. Do 
social-identity arguments exert any weight in states’ decision to ratify an instrument they 
were unable to oppose internationally? As said, although “coerced” states may be forced 
not oppose a rule or treaty during negotiations and may even sign it at the closing 
ceremony, they still retain the ability to ratify it or not. Yet to assume that “coerced” 
states will uniformly opt for not ratifying is unfounded: France and the UK ratified the 
Geneva Conventions in 1951 and 1957 respectively, and they did not deposit reservations 
or interpretations of Common Article 3. And although these same states did not ratify the 
First Protocol for decades, provisional archival evidence gathered for this dissertation 
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suggests that the concern about national liberation wars was not the principal reason for 
delaying that decision, but rather NATO-wide preoccupations with nuclear weapons and 
the prohibition of reprisals against civilians. One is thus well-advised to dig further into 
the historical record and question assumptions that often seem intuitive or self-evident. 
Studying the factors influencing states’ decision to ratify is a popular enterprise among 
IL/IR scholars, yet it is one that they rarely if ever deploy with attention to the 
government archives.872 Doing so wherever possible may, I believe, serve as a helpful 
contribution and a healthy corrective to simple models of under-socialized rational 
choice. 
 
Sincerity and insincerity in international law-making 
Another interesting finding of this dissertation is that sincerity is not necessary 
condition for the emergence of “progressive” (liberal) humanitarian norms. That 
hypocrisy may be pervasive in international politics is of course not a new claim.873 Yet 
what is most striking about the empirical work presented here is the suggestion that the 
political pressure of illiberal (and quite likely insincere) states was critical and productive 
for norm construction; Soviet rhetoric weighed especially heavily on the British decision 
to accommodate, as their confidential cables during the 1949 negotiation suggest. In the 
1970s, although Western states were convinced that the opposing coalition of African, 
Asian and Socialist states was deep down only interested in scoring political legitimacy 
“points” (with their proposal to make liberation wars international conflicts,) they were 
still unable to contain it for fear of appearing racist.  
Although as a theoretical claim this is peculiar and worth noting, there appear to be 
obvious downsides to rules promoted or adopted insincerely. As suggested above, their 
effective acceptance and implementation in the post-negotiation stage may be 
                                                
872 The most nuanced and cutting-edge theoretical work on why states commit to human rights 
treaties (or not) is Beth Simmons’, although without recourse to governmental archives. 
Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, chap. 3. 
Archival research in this area, though time-consuming, is desirable and possible in many cases.  
873 Prominent statements are offered in Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy; Finnemore, 
“Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All 
It’s Cracked Up to Be.” 
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jeopardized, and even when the coerced states (and the insincere among the “coercers”) 
have ratified them, they may still constitute instances of “cheap talk.” Yet I submit that 
here again one should be careful not to jump to conclusions. As illustration, some 
scholars have found that even insincere commitments may have discernible behavioral 
effects, although these may only occur through sustained/combined top-bottom and 
bottom-up reputational and institutional pressures to comply.874 In the field of conflict 
studies, scholars are beginning to reconsider “cheap talk,” concluding that it may have 
some effects.875  
Beyond this, as in the cases of Common Article 3 and the First Additional Protocol, it 
is important not to assume that pressured acquiescence will necessarily plant a “kiss of 
death” on controversial international rules. While it is reasonable (and realistic) to expect 
that in the short-run the implementation of these international rules may prove lackluster, 
the passage of time and normative uptake by other domestic and international actors and 
institutions may generate a “decoupling” from their contested origins. Inclusion of 
humanitarian rules in military manuals is one example of a mechanism through which 
rules may permeate conduct on the ground and bypass legal discussions about whether to 
comply at other higher levels of a states’ bureaucracy. Legal and civil society 
mobilization of these international commitments are two other critical mechanisms 
through which initially reluctant states may be pushed to respect, even if partially, rules 
they initially committed to insincerely or under international social pressure.876 
Just as it may be premature to conclude that insincere commitments may not lead to 
important changes on the ground, it also does not follow that imprecise or 
“indeterminate” rules are necessarily doomed to failure. While Britain and France were 
successful (the former more than the latter) in holding back the application of Common 
                                                
874Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Heather Smith-Cannoy, Insincere Commitments: Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States, and 
Citizen Activism (Georgetown University Press, 2012); Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. 
875 Dustin Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, “Can Cheap Talk Deter?: An Experimental Analysis,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 6 (August 23, 2011): 996–1020. 
876 See fn. 23 above. 
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Article 3 in Kenya, Cyprus, Northern Ireland or Algeria, arguing that the violence there 
did not rise to “non-international” conflicts, CA3 nonetheless provided the ICRC and 
other audiences with a legal tool to knock on states’ doors and contributing to producing 
at least partial effects, such as facilitating visits to and improved treatment for prisoners. 
Indeed, scholars have suggested that just as CA3’s “vague and generous” threshold was a 
problem in some cases, in others that did not indisputably amount to “conflicts” it may 
have actually facilitated ICRC operations.877 ICRC officials have for this reason 
sometimes referred to CA3’s scope as a “blessing in disguise.”878 Imprecision can thus 
have both damaging and salutary effects, and it seems critical in the future to study the 
conditions that might explain this interesting variation. 
 
Other Research Frontiers 
Norm Implementation and effects 
This dissertation has very deliberately kept its focus on international norm emergence 
and has thus only indirectly touched on the crucial aspect of norm effects. Yet as the 
previous pages suggest, moving forward certain questions will have to be addressed 
head-on: What is the pattern of application of the humanitarian rules for internal 
conflicts? How do we properly theorize implementation, effectiveness or compliance in 
internal conflicts? What concrete mechanisms exist for the implementation of the law? 
How have they fared? Which areas of legal protection enjoy greater respect than others 
and why?  
Surprisingly, rigorous examination of these issues is still rare in the social sciences. 
Part of the problem is the understandable dearth of reliable data about acts committed in 
the fog of internal wars. Yet it appears that a lack of interest has also played a role in this 
silence. In recent years a booming research program (especially through comparative 
                                                
877 Forsythe, “Legal Regulation of Internal Conflicts: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International 
Armed Conflicts,” 277. 
878 Jelena Pejic, adviser to the Legal Division of the ICRC, quoted in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and 
Susan Breau, eds., Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 85. 
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civil war studies,) has quickly begun to reverse this trend, but international norms have 
rarely figured into its analytical concerns.879  
This provides an opening for IR and humanitarian law scholars. A focused mapping 
and assessment of the formal and informal mechanisms of implementation of the law is 
lacking and seems of profound urgency, from analyzing the effects of the ICRC’s “quiet 
diplomacy,” to systematizing its pattern of visits to detainees, studying the evolution and 
quality of legal and military training by armed groups of all stripes, compiling and 
explaining cases of domestic legal incorporation/accountability, or taking more seriously 
the work of National Red Crosses or of NGO actors drawing on humanitarian norms.  
In terms of monitoring actual patterns of respect or abuse, it remains to be seen what 
emerges from an ongoing ICRC-led process of reflection among states. In the meantime 
new academic projects are striving to construct databases aiming to fill that important 
gap.880 Various research sources, both secondary accounts of myriad civil conflicts and 
uprisings as well as untapped archives of various states, inter- and non-governmental 
organizations around the world, stand as invaluable means for evaluating these questions. 
This dissertation has made in particular a case for the importance of archives in the 
context of norm emergence and construction, but archives clearly also offer a goldmine 
of information for the study of diffusion, implementation, effectiveness or compliance 
puzzles.  
 
International law, legitimacy and non-state armed actors 
Traditionally, policy and scholarly concern in IL/IR has been placed on the behavior 
of states. Yet, as the Chapter 6 showed, the idea that international standards also apply to 
armed non-state actors has gained momentum and legitimacy. In contrast with this 
                                                
879 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Jeremy M Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). For new IR research on civil wars that does incorporate 
international humanitarian law into the equation, see Jo and Bryant, “Taming the Warlords: 
Commitment and Compliance by Armed Opposition Groups in Civil War.” 
880 One example is the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict” (RULAC) project at the Geneva 
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/index.php (Consulted on August 5, 2013.) 
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development, little systematic investigation exists of when, why, how and how often non-
governmental armed groups actually decide to respect international standards or not.881 
Practices of respect or disrespect to international standards vary across areas of 
responsibility or protection, but few studies try to unpack such variation. Research 
conducted both on historical cases and on contemporary conflicts seems pertinent here; 
from the already mentioned decolonization wars in Algeria and Kenya through Cold War 
proxy conflicts in Vietnam, to civil wars in El Salvador, Peru, the Philippines or 
Colombia, academic and policy debate can only be enriched through a careful assessment 
of the mechanisms and conditions under which non-state actors decide to embrace and 
abide by international rules. 
It may be apt to close the dissertation by discussing one of its most consistent 
findings, namely the persistence with which governments have resisted the regulation of 
armed non-state actors through international law. That such resistance has been fiercely 
driven by fears of politically legitimating rebels, coupled by the corollary assumption that 
legitimization will somehow translate into material empowerment, should give analysts 
pause. On the one hand, it is theoretically interesting given the belief among many 
scholars that states resort to international law-making to pursue instrumental ends. From 
this perspective, the fact that legitimacy appears to “get in the way” of goal-oriented 
rational action so often merits acknowledgment.  
From a constructivist standpoint, however, arguing that legitimacy-induced fears 
“disturb” rationality does not go far enough and may actually misconstrue the 
phenomenon. At least in this issue-area, legitimacy is not simply an annoying 
“intervening variable.” Rather, legitimacy concerns are part-and-parcel of international 
law-making because of its constitutive effects, that is, its ability to created the subjects it 
seeks to regulate. This insight helps to understand why most states have consistently 
                                                
881 For valuable recent contributions to this agenda, see volumes 882 and 883 of the International 
Review of the Red Cross, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-
review/index.jsp (Consulted on August 5, 2013.) Also see in general the work of Geneva Call, 
and the collection of statements by non-state armed groups they have recently made available. 
“Their Words: the Directory of Armed Non-State Actor Humanitarian Commitments,” 
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refused to engage and commit rebels through international legal mechanisms, fearing the 
political recognition that might ensue.882 To recognition one must naturally add concerns 
about the security and material consequences that derive from enshrining international 
rules that promise to “bind” rebels but may actually fail to deliver on that promise. Yet 
the prevalence and intensity of concern about recognition cannot be explained by material 
or security concerns alone and should lead scholars to take seriously the constitutive and 
casual role of legitimacy in studies of international law.883 
On balance, however, state reluctance to regulate non-state armed actors via 
international law has not impeded the growth of a consensus about their responsibility. 
Yet whether, why and how normative “ownership” or a sense of legal obligation arises 
within insurgent or paramilitary organizations on the ground are still open debates. 
Efforts such as those of Geneva Call to commit armed groups directly through 
localized/tailored agreements, “involving” them in the norm-creation process while 
circumventing the controversial “legitimizing/constitutive” effect, may in fact prove more 
successful in practice than direct appeals to international legal tools. More research and 
policy resources should be devoted to investigating this phenomenon, since insurgents 
and paramilitaries are probably the non-state actors with the greatest negative impact on 
the humanitarian and human rights situation of civilian populations around the world.884 
More profoundly, however, what the above suggests is that as long as states continue to 
believe that by engaging non-stated armed actors through international mechanisms they 
will grant them political legitimacy, the international normative system will remain 
handicapped in tending to urgent humanitarian concerns on the ground. A mix of 
initiatives (a type of “regime complex”) may in this case be the next best regulatory 
substitute.885 
                                                
882 For a persuasive critique of the “rational” school of international legal design, attentive to 
identity and legitimacy, see Reus-Smit, “Politics and International Legal Obligation.” 
883 Finnemore and Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics.” 
884 The other are transnational and other types of business corporations. See Giovanni Mantilla, 
“Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations,” Global 
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Appendix 1. Comparison of Attendance at Key Meetings, 1912-1949. (“RC” stands 
for National Society, “G” for government delegation.) 
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Appendix 2. Various Formulas on the Inclusion of Internal Conflicts in the Geneva 
Conventions, 1946-1949 
  Working Text on Internal Conflicts Notes 
1946 (Conference 
of National Societies) 
"In the case of armed conflict within the 
borders of a State, the Convention shall 
also be applied by each of the adverse 
parties, unless one of them announces 
expressly its intention to the contrary." 
This was the 




"In case of civil war, in any part of the 
home or colonial territory of a 
Contracting Party, the principles of the 
Convention shall be equally applied by 
the said Party, subject to the adverse 
Party also conforming thereto." 
This was the 




For the Wounded and Sick Conventions: 
"In all cases of armed conflict not of an 
international character which may occur 
in the territory of one or more of the 
High Contracting Parties, each of the 
adversaries shall be bound to implement 
the provisions of the present Convention. 
The Convention shall be applicable in 
these circumstances, whatever the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict and 
without prejudice thereto." For the POW 
and Civilians Conventions, the following 
phrase was inserted: "subject to the 
adverse party likewise acting in 
obedience thereto." 
This was the 
text produced at the 
meeting. 
1949 (Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949) 
See Stockholm formula for Wounded 
and Sick Conventions above, but add: 1) 
government recognition of belligerence 
of rebels; 2) rebels should present 
characteristics of a state, i.e. An 
organized military force under the 
direction of a civil authority, control of 
territory, governmental functions over a 
population, explicit and actual 
compliance with the laws and customs of 
war, and the means of enforcing the 
Geneva Conventions. Protecting Powers 
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  In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimurn, the 
following provisions: 1. Persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, captivity or any other cause, 
shall be treated humanely in all 
circumstances and without any 
discrimination. To this end, the 
following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited with respect to the above- 
mentioned persons: a) violence to life, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of 
hostages; c) outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; d) the passing of 
sentences and carrying-out of executions 
without a previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly-constituted court, 
affording all guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 2. The wounded and sick shall 
be collected and cared for. 3. No adverse 
discrimination shall be practised on the 
basis of differences of race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth. An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the 
Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the 
conflict should further endeavour to 
bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the 
precedingprovisions shall not affect the 
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.  
Second Working 
Party Text (“French 
Proposal”)  
  A. Wounded and Sick and Maritime 
Conventions."In the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character 
Soviet Proposal 
(Similar text for the 
Prisoners of War 
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occurring in the territory of one of the 
States, Parties to the present Convention, 
each Party to the conflict shall apply all 
the provisions of the present Convention 
guaranteeing:Humane treatment for the 
wounded and sick; prohibition of all 
discriminatory treatment of wounded and 
sick practised on the basis of differences 
of race, colour, religion, sex, birth or 
fortune." B. Prisoners of War 
Convention."In the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the 
States, Parties to the present Convention, 
each Party to the conflict shall apply all 
the provisions of the present Convention 
guaranteeing:Humane treatment for 
prisoners of war; compliance with all 
established rules connectedwith the 
prisoners of war regime; prohibition of 
all discriminatory treatment of prisoners 
of war practised on the basis of 
differences of race, colour, religion, sex, 
birth or fortune."C. Civilians 
Convention."In the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the 
States, Parties to the Convention, each 
Party to the conflict shall apply all the 
provisions of the present Convention 
guaranteeing:Humane treatment for the 
civilian population; prohibition on the 
territory occupied by the armed forces of 
either of the parties, of reprisals against 
the civilian population, the taking of 
hostages, the destruction and damaging 
of property which are not justified by the 
necessities of war, prohibition of any 
discriminatory treatment of the civilian 
population practised on the basis of 
differences of race, colour, religion, sex, 
birth or fortune." 
and Civilians 
Conventions.) 
  408 
Appendix 3. Summary of States’ Public Positions on Common Article 3 at Start 
of the 1949 Conference and Changes Observed during It 
 
Debating States' Public 





toward CA3, and possible 
reasons why 
Did Early Position 
Change during 
Debates? How? 
Delete       
United Kingdom Democracy High (Colonial power) - Low Benefit 
Yes - Accepted 
extension of 
Conventions to internal 
conflicts, supported and 
lobbied for French 
proposal 
        
Yes but with Conditions       
France Democracy High (Colonial power) - Low benefit 
Yes - Accommodated, 
drafted proposal and 
lobbied others for 
support 
United States Democracy 




Yes - Accomodated to 
fewer conditions 
Greece ? High Risk (Active civil war)/High Benefit -  
Yes - Accomodated to 
fewer conditions 
China ? High Risk (Active civil war)/High Benefit -  
Yes - Accomodated to 
fewer conditions 
Canada Democracy ? Likely to side with US Yes - Accomodated to fewer conditions 
Australia Democracy ? Likely to side with UK Yes - Accomodated to fewer conditions 
Burma New Democracy High Risk (Fear of internal rebellion)//Low Benefit 
Yes but changed to 
REJECT extension 
        
Yes - Few or no conditions       
Norway Democracy Principled Approach Always Pro-Extension 
Denmark Democracy Principled Approach Always Pro-Extension 
Mexico Democracy (Authoritarian?) 
Low Risk, Principled 
Approach Always Pro-Extension 
Uruguay Democracy None Always Pro-Extension 
Monaco Constitutional Monarchy Principled Approach Always Pro-Extension 
USSR Totalitarian Low Risk/High Benefit? Always Pro-Extension 
Rumania Totalitarian? Likely to side with USSR Always Pro-Extension 
Hungary Totalitarian? Likely to side with USSR Always Pro-Extension 
Czechoslovakia Totalitarian? Likely to side with USSR Always Pro-Extension 
Switzerland Democracy None Always Pro-Extension 
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Appendix 4. Draft Article 42, First Protocol886 
 
Combatants and prisoners of war 
 
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party 
shall be a prisoner of war. 
 
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his 
right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be 
a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. 
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the 
nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain 
his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he 
carries his arms openly: 
 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate. 
 
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as 
perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c). 
 
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the 
requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a 
prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects 
to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This 
protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the 
Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences 
he has committed. 
 
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not engaged in an 
attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a 
combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities. 
 
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of war 
pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention. 
 
                                                
886 This is the final version of the text, reorganized as Article 44 in the negotiated treaty 
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7. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States with 
respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed 
armed units of a Party to the conflict. 
 
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13 of the First and Second 
Conventions, all members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as defined in 
Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to protection under those Conventions if they 
are wounded or sick or, in the case of the Second Convention, shipwrecked at sea or in 
other waters. 
 
 
 
